Tell me if I am getting anywhere with: — universeness
Why would it be wrong in modal logic to state knowledge subsumes belief?1. Knowledge entails belief. In other words, if I know p then I believe p. — Michael
2. For everything that is the case, this hypothetical person knows that it is the case. In other words, our hypothetical person is omniscient. — Michael
yes?I am not saying that there is anything that satisfies the second premise — Michael
3. At least one thing that is the case is not necessarily the case. In other words, it is possibly not the case — Michael
4. For at least one thing that is the case, this hypothetical person believes that it is the case and it is possibly not the case. In other words, he could be wrong — Michael
But "all things" cannot be defined. They indicate a quantity and this quantity is undefinable. They also indicate a quality, which is also undefinable. What are these things? What do these things consist of? — Alkis Piskas
What they all have in common is that they are not actual paradoxes because they are based on arbitrary and inexistent elements and/or facts. — Alkis Piskas
1. Knowledge entails belief. In other words, if I know p then I believe p. — Michael
What they all have in common is that they are not actual paradoxes because they are based on arbitrary and inexistent elements and/or facts.
— Alkis Piskas
Yes — jgill
The counterintuitive conclusion is that I could be wrong that p is true (even though I know that p is true). — Michael
So what does your analysis tell you about whether omniscience or/and absolute truths has/have existed, can exist or will exist? — universeness
. ∀p: Kp — Michael
10. ∃p: Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 6, 8, and 9)
Which means you believe some propositions that are true, but are metaphysically contingent. Not really a problem. — Relativist
1. I believe p but I am wrong
2. I believe p but I could be wrong — Michael
This is of course Moore's paradox, since the speaker has contradicted themselves.1. In the actual world, (Bp ^ ~p)
3. ∃p: Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 1 and 2) — Michael
2. I believe p but I could be wrong
But suppose also that in the actual world, p, but in other possible worlds, ~p; then we have
2. (In the actual world, p and Bp) ^ (in other possible worlds, ~p) — Banno
Prima facie, this seems ridiculous. I know Crowley's religion , Thelema, but I do not believe it. I must be missing the subtlety. I haven't read the entire thread; the symbolism seems alien which demonstrates the fact that mathematicians don't have to be logicians. We operate at a much more humble level. — jgill
I don’t think that’s right because when I say “I believe she’s 30 years old but I might be wrong” I’m not saying that in some alternate world she might not be 30 years old l, I’m saying that she might not be 30 years old in the actual world. — Michael
Makes no difference. There is no paradox here.If it helps, think of it in the third person instead. John believes that p is true and it is possible that p is not true. — Michael
No. That's because Premise 8 states: ∀p: Kp10. ∃p: Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 6, 8, and 9)
Which means you believe some propositions that are true, but are metaphysically contingent. Not really a problem. — Relativist
Do you not think this means “I believe p but it’s possible that I’m wrong”? — Michael
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