a. Jane believes with justification that John is a bachelor
b. Jane's belief might be wrong
c. Therefore, if John is a bachelor then a) is true and b) is true and John is a bachelor — Michael
The part in bold makes no sense. (a) is the premise "Jane believes with justification that John is a bachelor". A premise is treated as true, so why make it the consequent of a conditional?
Then the other part of the conclusion is vacuous - it just repeats the antecedent of the conditional (If John is a bachelor, then John is a bachelor). — Relativist
It's just that the argument is vacuous, so I see no sense in posting it on a philosophy forum. — Relativist
The issue is what to make of arguments that go like this:
1. P.
2. (1) might be wrong.
... — Srap Tasmaner
The issue is what to make of arguments that go like this:
1. P.
2. (1) might be wrong. — Srap Tasmaner
Such as
(p ∧ ¬□p) → ◇¬p — bongo fury
Not quite, as it's not asserting p and then asserting that p might be wrong. It's asserting that there is this belief and then asserting that this belief might be wrong — Michael
I think our conflict is in regards to the prima facie difference between saying:
a. There is a possible world where my belief is false
b. It is possible that my belief is actually false
Given Kp ∧ ◇¬p I trust that you accept (a) is true even if my belief is true? — Michael
But I suspect that you claim that (b) is false if my belief is true?
(b) is a misuse of "possible" in this context, because of the "actually" there.
There are no leftover possibilities in the actual world. It is defined by which possibilities it actualizes and which it doesn't. A statement that has a different truth value from the one it has in the actual world, is a statement that belongs to and partly defines a different possible world.
I tried to work around this issue by suggesting that the epistemic dilemma can be cast as trying to figure out which sort of world the actual world is. That might work, for all I know, but I suspect it's reinventing the wheel. @Kuro seems to be much more knowledgeable about this stuff than me. — Srap Tasmaner
Jane's belief might actually be wrong
Therefore, Jane's belief is false — Michael
Then there's an issue with the claim "I believe p but it's possible that I'm wrong".
It shouldn't be interpreted simply as "I believe p and I'm not wrong but there is some other possible world where I am wrong".
And I don't think it should be interpreted simply as "I believe p but I'm not certain" as the claim prima facie says something about the subject matter of the belief rather than one's reasons for holding it.
So how do we make sense of such a claim? — Michael
But see this is not an argument. — Srap Tasmaner
It is. It’s like saying “I’m a bachelor, therefore I’m not married”. — Michael
I haven't read every post, but the posts I read seem due to a lack of understanding of modal logic. I explained the problem in my first post.And yet the conclusion has been met with such resistance. Why is that? — Michael
And no, it isn't, and it isn't. — Srap Tasmaner
In a context like this, "might be" is deliberately misleading. — Srap Tasmaner
That first argument was a reference to your claim here. When I asked you if that meant that "I might be wrong" entails "I am wrong" you responded with "I think that's the converse of what I was at least trying to say." — Michael
In a context like this, "might be" is deliberately misleading. — Srap Tasmaner
I was still (am still!) trying to figure out what's going on here. — Srap Tasmaner
Argument 1
Jane's belief might be wrong
Therefore, if Jane's belief is true then Jane's belief might be wrong
The argument is valid but the conclusion is counterintuitive despite its consequent simply being a restatement of the premise — Michael
Argument 2
There is a possible world where Jane's belief is false
Therefore, if Jane's belief is true then there is a possible world where Jane's belief is false
The conclusion is acceptable, but I think that the premise is an inaccurate interpretation of the original. — Michael
Argument 3
It is possible that Jane's belief is actually false
Therefore, if Jane's belief is true then it is possible that Jane's belief is actually false
I understand that this is adding a second layer of possible world semantics, but I don't know how else to phrase it. — Michael
Argument 4
Jane's belief is not certain
Therefore, if Jane's belief is true then Jane's belief is not certain
This, at least, appears to have an acceptable premise and conclusion, although I'm not sure if it's an accurate translation of Argument 3. — Michael
The paradox, though, is that whereas we may be willing to accept Arguments 2 and 4, we appear unwilling to accept Argument 1 (as shown by the resistance I am getting). Why is that? — Michael
I get what you're going for, I do. But if Jane's belief is true, Jane's belief can only be false counterfactually. We already know how to say that, and it's "Jane's belief might have been false," or "could have been false." — Srap Tasmaner
Your reasoning here seems to be that "Jane's belief might be wrong" and "Jane's belief is true" cannot both be true — Michael
We are suggesting that the actual world might be other than how we believe it to be. — Michael
No, it doesn't "mean the same thing," but it might or might not be different from how I think it is implies that I do not know whether it is how I think it is. — Srap Tasmaner
Your reasoning here seems to be that "Jane's belief might be wrong" and "Jane's belief is true" cannot both be true — Michael
They can both be true, yes — Srap Tasmaner
And this gets us no closer to your goal of fallibilist knowledge, so far as I can tell. — Srap Tasmaner
If Jane's belief might be wrong and if Jane's belief is true then Jane's belief is true and might be wrong. Why do you disagree so much with this contraction? — Michael
Do you at least understand the difference between "the actual world might be other than I believe it to be" and "there is a possible world that is other than how I believe the actual world to be"? — Michael
Because you have been very clear that you mean Jane's belief, which is true in the actual world, might be false in the actual world, and that's not an option. If it's true in ℋ, it cannot be false in ℋ; if it's possibly false, in addition to being true in ℋ, it's false counterfactually in some ℳ where ℳ ≠ ℋ. — Srap Tasmaner
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.