Uncertainty in consequentialist philosophy

CallMeDirac

I devised a sort of trolley problem about a year ago and haven't been able to come to a solid conclusion.

The problem goes:

In one area, you have a genocidal dictator, they have the means and motive to commit a massive genocide, with them is some number, we'll say ten thousand, random people.

In the other area, nobody

One of these areas must be destroyed, which means you now have the opportunity to stop a possible genocide by sacrificing a few thousand. The problem, if not obvious, is that killing the 10,001 people cannot be moral or immoral in a consequentialist world; by not killing anyone, one can watch what the dictator does and whether or not they end up killing more people than would have needed to have been sacrificed, but this cannot be said about killing the dictator given that there is no way, in that reality, to know whether or not the sacrifice was a net benefit

I'm curious how another consequentialist would personally resolve this issue, and whatever similar points have been handled by more competent philosophers.

javi2541997

↪CallMeDirac

In the other area, nobody — CallMeDirac

by not killing anyone, one can watch what the dictator does and whether or not they end up killing more people than would have needed to have been sacrificed, — CallMeDirac

This is the clue I do not understand. Why there is nobody in the other area? I always thought that in ethical dilemmas you have to choose one life/lives of one rail or the other. I mean I feel lost because one of the areas is empty so doesn't matter my choice because it would not have a real impact (?).

I'm curious how another consequentialist would personally resolve this issue — CallMeDirac

It is a complex issue, indeed. Because the consequences do not depend in choosing one area or the other but what the dictator would do afterwards. I mean, those 10.001 citizens are not in the rail previously. So we do not have the real choice of "save" them with our actions.
As you explained we would have to see what the dictator would do and then see if killing him was a real "net" benefit.

Tom Storm

I'm curious how another consequentialist would personally resolve this issue, and whatever similar points have been handled by more competent philosophers. — CallMeDirac

The problem with scenarios is that we can always invent some absurd notions that are impossible conundrums. The real world almost never throws up such situations. So for me, who cares, right?

On a more engaged note - I don't think I fully understand the actual scenario set up. Can you re-phrase it?

CallMeDirac

↪Tom Storm

Either kill 10,000 random people and 1 genocidal dictator or don't
(The dictator has the means and motive to commit a genocide of unknown proportion)

CallMeDirac

↪javi2541997

You choose to either kill 10,000 random people to prevent a possibly worse genocide or leave them safe and risk the genocide occurring, thus the dilemma. Can you sacrifice some number of people to avoid running the risk of genocide without knowing how bad the genocide would be or if the genocide would be able to happen at all?

javi2541997

↪CallMeDirac

Well, the nature of a genocide is the mass death of citizens caused by some belic or political circumstances. So, in my opinion, the genocide will always be evil. and it will surely happen because otherwise, we wouldn't be debating about the dilemma itself.
So, in my view, I would let them survive with the risk of a possibly genocide. Probably only a few would survive afterward but on the other hand, they would die all of them.

Tom Storm

Either kill 10,000 random people and 1 genocidal dictator or don't
(The dictator has the means and motive to commit a genocide of unknown proportion) — CallMeDirac

Ok, so let me see if I can follow this. I'll simplify it.

- A man who might kill millions is amongst a group of 10,000 others.
- You have the option to kill him along with 10,000 other innocents and prevent a potential mass murder.

That it?

Tom Storm

As I said, this is one of those absurd and therefore pointless scenarios, and some philosophers, like Peter Singer, would on this basis say that the question is not realistic and can be ignored. I would always say you don't act unless you are certain you are going to prevent many more deaths.

Strong consequentialism would argue you can kill the 10,001 people, if many more are saved.

Would we kill Pol Pot along with 10,000 innocent people? You would save 2 to 3 million people.

CallMeDirac

↪Tom Storm

That's the problem, "if many ARE saved", if the dictator is killed, there is no way to know if more were saved

Tom Storm

if the dictator is killed, there is no way to know if more were saved — CallMeDirac

If you don't know, the answer is clearly 'no', right? And you can't ever know.

Unless you are George W Bush or Tony Blair....

sime

After 911 Tony Blair and George Bush decided to divert the trolley in a similar scenario.

Tom Storm

↪sime

:up:

CallMeDirac

↪Tom Storm

And does that choice remain correct if after the dictator kills more
If that choice does become immoral, does the correct choice remain leaving them be, can an immoral choice be preferable to uncertainty?

T Clark

I'm curious how another consequentialist would personally resolve this issue, and whatever similar points have been handled by more competent philosophers. — CallMeDirac

As I said, this is one of those absurd and therefore pointless scenarios, and some philosophers, like Peter Singer, would on this basis say that the question is not realistic and can be ignored. — Tom Storm

I agree with Tom. For me, simplistic and unrealistic scenarios like the trolley problem and this one undermine the credibility of moral philosophy. When would a situation like the one you describe ever happen in real life. There are much more realistic events that really happened - the firestorming of Tokyo and Dresden; Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Churchill once decided not to warn people about the planned bombing of a British city because he didn't want the Germans to know they had broken the enigma code.

CallMeDirac

↪T Clark

Okay, instead of relaying the question with an easier-to-grasp scenario I'll just ask:
Through a consequentialist lense, is it moral to make a decision without the ability to prove whether or not it had a net benefit, or should one make a decision that, while possibly having a net loss, could be proven to have had a net benefit or loss; does the result of the provably beneficial or detrimental decision change whether or not the decision was the correct one to make based on the available information in the scenario?

Tom Storm

is it moral to make a decision without the ability to prove whether or not it had a net benefit, — CallMeDirac

This was answered earlier. If we don't know then "no". Not having the ability to prove what might happen means you don't have evidence to justify taking action. No offence but do you realise how silly the scenario is and how useless it is to gauge how people should behave in the world? It's so easy to generate irresolvable scenarios out of impossible putative events.

or should one make a decision that, while possibly having a net loss, could be proven to have had a net benefit or loss; does the result of the provably beneficial or detrimental decision change whether or not the decision was the correct one to make based on the available information in the scenario? — CallMeDirac

Knowing later the person mass murdered millions does not change the original decision because the evidence did not exist justifying the act. And if we killed the guy, we'll never know.

T Clark

Through a consequentialist lense, is it moral to make a decision without the ability to prove whether or not it had a net benefit — CallMeDirac

Look at the examples of real life situations I listed. Were they "moral" from a consequentialist point of view? They said that Hiroshima and Nagasaki shortened the war and saved thousands, tens of thousands, of allied lives. I don't know the answer to that. There was certainly more to it than that - revenge, retribution, were also involved. Still, I don't feel the need to second-guess Truman and his crew.

Philosophim

↪CallMeDirac

Lets simplify this further.

You can murder 10,001 people to prevent one man from murdering 10,000 people, or not murder anyone at all.

The correct answer is not to murder 10,001 people.

Since you've also included that the dictator may not actually murder anyone, this becomes even clearer. You do not murder anyone.

Alkis Piskas

↪CallMeDirac

Isn't sacrificing a few thousands a kind of genocide itself? Certainly, from a consequential viewpoint. But not from an intentional viewpoint. Because you and the dictator have different intentions. Besides, isn't this what hapens in wars? A war and the deaths that occur as a consequence, is unethical only from the part of the side that starts it with the motive of satisfying own interests and destroying the other side. It is not unethical from the part of the country that defends itself. (See Putin and the war in Ukraine.)

Consequentialist ethics are wrong. You cannot judge an action based on its effects or consequences. If you threaten my life with a gun and I kill you first to save my life is not an unethical action. It is considered self-defense. If I tell you something that hurts you, because of some person reason that I wouldn't know about, it is not unethical from my part. It would be only if I intended to hurt you by saying that thing.

It's the intention that counts.

Agent Smith

Human Rights in Islam

Whosoever kills a human being without (any reason like) man slaughter, or corruption on earth, it is as though he had killed all mankind ... — 5:32

What if someone had killed Adam or Eve?

Babbeus

↪CallMeDirac

You cannot predict if after the death of the dictator some other worse dictatorship could arise.

Babbeus

↪CallMeDirac

Here I have seen that there are different opinions about whether you should consider

actual consequences
predictable consequences
intended consequences
likely consequences

javi2541997

You cannot predict if after the death of the dictator some other worse dictatorship could arise. — Babbeus

Well, this conjecture didn't even exist in the beginning. If we constantly wonder what would happen with the dictator we would end up in an infinite loop. I guess the debate goes further: is it worthy to kill a "dictator" because our negative thoughts on him would prevent a mass genocide?

Here I have seen that there are different opinions about whether you should consider
actual consequences
predictable consequences
intended consequences
likely consequences — Babbeus

Interesting, indeed. Thanks for sharing. :100:

Uncertainty in consequentialist philosophy

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