I would translate to:

‘90’ is sufficient to tell us about the temperature, but the temperature is not sufficient (but can potentially) give us 90 (temperature)

‘rising’ is sufficient to tell us about the temperature, but the temperature is not sufficient (but can potentially) give us rising (temperature)

So that’s not the same as the 3+1 is 4 which is the word ‘4’ is sufficient to tell us about 3+1 and 3+1 ARE sufficient to give you 4.

They’re both two of the four permutations but they’re quite different.

Two extremely simple ideas - sufficiency & necessity - and look how powerful they are. They, if wIElded well can make the difference between dukkha (agony) and ananda (bliss)

The problem I have with this is that you are making a decision on what you think is the case. I think there are two beliefs here. We are fallible AND because of that it seems we should implicitly or explicitly communicate that everything merely seems to be the case. I agree that the first seems to be true (lol), but the second I think is very questionable. I think that we often misuse 'is' and implicit 'is' claims, but that in general it works really well and especially well for people who have good self-knowledge. Last, I think there are all sorts of implicit 'is' ideas, even in your communication.

But the point goes much deeper than that because everything fallible human beings believe about the exterior world is liable to be wrong. — Art48

Apart from liable being too strong an word, there is also the implicit assumption that if it is true that we are fallible, it does not necessarily follow that we should quasi-assert things in all cases.

But things seem much different in the material world. — Art48

Do they seem that way? Does seeming count for seeming? Maybe this is one of those fallible ideas?

We often think that seem makes less of a claim than an is statement. But it is and is statement. It claims that something appears to be the case, but we don't know. That's also an is claim, while a subjective one. It's a claim about a subjective experience - and we can be wrong about those. It also universalizes that claim about appearances. (I did notice that you qualified some of the 'seems' statements with 'to me' )

The fundamental problem with “is” seems to be the person using that word seemingly speaks with a god-like authority: — Art48

I don't think this is true. I don't think it seems that way. Though sometimes when I here 'is' statements it does.

Further 'the fundamental problem' part of the sentence has an implicit is. What the fundamental problem is seems to be...that there is a fundamental problem and certainly that there is a problem is presumed. Yes, one could further amend this statement....What seems to be a problem and further seems to be the fundamental one ....' But I think we end up with a kind of infinite regression, especially given my argument about 'seems' being a kind of is claim. This may be handled elegantly in Eprime, I don't know.

Also this seems to be viewing language as a container for truth period. My sentences will contain truth and convey this to others. I think that is a very limited view of language and it reminds me of Reddy's Conduit Metaphor essay.....
https://www.reddyworks.com/the-conduit-metaphor/original-conduit-metaphor-article

Further, what is the clearest sign we are dedicated to an 'is'?: how we live, I think. If one shifts one's use of language to Eprime and is critical of the use of English, one is living as if 'is' is a problem. And one is communicating to others and perhaps, if one gets what one wants, changing how they live. In the end, I can't really see how it matters. Is is getting affected by my choices.

Last, when we act in the world, it is often beneficial to act like something is. Not to act like it merely seems. It could be is but we act like it seems. It's not a good strategy for taking shots in golf. It might be ok leading up to the swing, but not for the swing itself. You don't want some qualifier in the air during that swing.

And I suppose as a side note, I am not sure amending language changes our basic is attitude. I imagine some arguments degenerating into 'well, you certainly seem to me to be being a real a______.' 'That seems typical of you.' Eprime merely lacking is may get around this somehow but my guess is that the implicit is will still be there.

Telling a kid he is behaving 'unharmoniously' may seem to avoid the kinds or moral judgment that he is naughty includes. But I suspect that the kid called the former feels pretty much the same. (this was not an example of replacing is with seems, but rather using a different kind of language shift that (in my opinion) fails because the humans means, in the end, the same thing at root, despite the surface change.

We often think that seem makes less of a claim than an is statement. But it is and is statement. It claims that something appears to be the case, but we don't know. That's also an is claim, while a subjective one. It's a claim about a subjective experience - and we can be wrong about those. — Bylaw

I'd say we cannot be wrong about subjective experience but we can be wrong about how we interpret it. For example, "I see water" may be an erroneous interpretation of a mirage. We can be certain of our experience (phenomena) but we cannot be certain as to its cause (noumena).

Telling a kid he is behaving 'unharmoniously' may seem to avoid the kinds or moral judgment that he is naughty includes. But I suspect that the kid called the former feels pretty much the same. (this was not an example of replacing is with seems, but rather using a different kind of language shift that (in my opinion) fails because the humans means, in the end, the same thing at root, despite the surface change. — Bylaw

I believe we habitually use "is" language. Changing language and the way we think about "is" may or may not have any practical benefit but I find more accurate language desirable in any case.

I'd say we cannot be wrong about subjective experience but we can be wrong about how we interpret it. For example, "I see water" may be an erroneous interpretation of a mirage. We can be certain of our experience (phenomena) but we cannot be certain as to its cause (noumena). — Art48

Apart from your stating this all with fairly strong certainty, I disagree. 1) I think it is very hard to separate perceiving - subjective experience - from interpretation. 2) we have reasons/motivations to not notice how things seem to us. So, I may say, when arguing with my spouse that she seems angry. When in fact she actually seems scared (really) but I'd rather not notice that she primarily seems scared to me. I, at least, notice that sometimes, at least, I try to deny, to myself, part or all of what seems to me to be happening. This can have an attendant feeling of anxiety or guilt, if I allow myself to notice that these emotional states are present...or not. So, I think we can be wrong about what seems.

And if that seems strange, I think it is important to remember that we are not monads. We are complicated and thinking of us as having parts, cognitive,subjective parts, can be a very useful model. That something seems like X to part of us but Y to another part or yet another now in control would rather not accept what it seems like to that first part of us.

3) there's the brute ontological issue deciding that seeming is always what we think it is. That may seem obvious, but seeming is a part of reality also. So, what we are claiming is that there are these perceptions about what are outside us, and these can be fallible but what is inside us, our subjective experiencing, that we can be sure of. And we can be sure that we are not fallible introspectors, that we are not interpreting incorrectly our perceptions of our internal reactions and so on.

I think that's an extremely strong claim. Think about all the motives for not noticed how we actually are experiencing ourselves our internal states our perceptions.

And from there you get an infinite regress. Where we must express ourselves that it seems like it seemed like......

I believe we habitually use "is" language. Changing language and the way we think about "is" may or may not have any practical benefit but I find more accurate language desirable in any case. — Art48

Desirable to whom? How do you find it this way? What was your process for determining it is more desirable and cannot this process also be fallible?

Bylaw: “I think it is very hard to separate perceiving - subjective experience - from interpretation.”

Agree. As optical illusions demonstrate, for instance, the Adelson's Checker-Shadow Illusion.

Bylaw: “So, what we are claiming is that there are these perceptions about what are outside us, and these can be fallible but what is inside us, our subjective experiencing, that we can be sure of. And we can be sure that we are not fallible introspectors, that we are not interpreting incorrectly our perceptions of our internal reactions and so on.”

I’d say we are fallible as to interpretation but infallible as to our input sensations: I may wrongly think I see water but if I am experiencing light then I am experiencing light. Even if I am hallucinating the light, I am still experiencing and can’t be wrong about the fact that I am experiencing. It’s like if I say my arm hurts (and I’m not lying) then I can’t be wrong about the fact that I am experiencing sensations of pain that seem to be originating in my arm. I’ve read that amputees sometimes have “phantom pain” in lost limbs. So I may be wrong that my ARM hurts (if, for example, I’ve lost that arm) but I can be wrong about the experience of pain I feel.

Bylaw: “Desirable to whom? How do you find it this way? What was your process for determining it is more desirable and cannot this process also be fallible?”

If it is agreed that changing our language more accurately represents the world (an idea you may reject), then changing language is desirable if we are concerned about accuracy. However, I don’t mean to claim that we become infallible if we change our language.

Bylaw: “Desirable to whom? How do you find it this way? What was your process for determining it is more desirable and cannot this process also be fallible?”[ — Art48

If it is agreed that changing our language more accurately represents the world (an idea you may reject), then changing language is desirable if we are concerned about accuracy. However, I don’t mean to claim that we become infallible if we change our language.[

I didn't take it that way. What I meant is that it can be beneficial to be blunt and certain in many situations, rather than more cautious formulations, EVEN IF we are fallible. So, how do know that even if it is more accurate it is better to have a language that no longer includes this kind of ontological certainty.

As far as the rest, I understood or assumed that you thought our assessments of our subjective experience must be accurate. But I address my skepticism about that in my previous post. Could you respond to those`objections`?

‘90’ is sufficient to tell us about the temperature, but the temperature is not sufficient (but can potentially) give us 90 (temperature) — invizzy

"90" is only sufficient to tell us about 90 of something, something yet unclarified.
90 degrees celcius or 90 degrees kelvin, now that tells us about temperature. Both very different temperatures at that.

rising’ is sufficient to tell us about the temperature, but the temperature is not sufficient (but can potentially) give us rising (temperature) — invizzy

"Rising" is sufficient to tell us that something is rising: an idea is rising in my awareness, a boy is rising from bed, a loaf of bread is rising in the oven, the cost of living is rising.

"Rising" alone like "90" - not qualified, means very little informationally.

3 and 4 on the other hand are discrete in meaning as numbers. They don't require further qualification when used exclusively for maths. When using concepts outside of maths on the otherhand we must qualify what those numbers pertain to.

So maths and semantic languages are not the same. One (maths) is objective, the other (spoken language) is open to interpretation unless qualified exactingly.

Thus should dissolve the contradiction you're inquiring about.

EVEN IF we are fallible — Bylaw

And that we are. If not in potential alone then act. Error must exist in some format/manner so that truth may exist by proxy.

Two extremely simple ideas - sufficiency & necessity — Agent Smith

I think that "sufficiency" and "neccesity" can be synonyms for one another.

They need not be two things but rather one thing.
What is "true" for example is sufficient for it to be true, and neccesary for it to be "true".

For example it is sufficent for one to pee after drinking water - to meet a requirement, that the body's fluid intake and fluid loss are equal, and it is neccesary - to meet that requirement, hence it is sufficient for the purpose.

E-Prime (short for English-Prime or English Prime, sometimes denoted É or E′) is.... — Art48

Is what? Wait for it...

....a version of the English language that excludes all forms of the verb to be — Art48

Nice punchline. N-Prime is what we call the version that excludes all proper names. Your turn.