There is an idea that one can self-obligate, i.e. that one can by some act (or series of acts) create a moral imperative to perform (or not) some other act. A simple example in a generally neutral moral frame is that of contracts - two moral agents meet some formal requirements of behavior and consequently have an enforceable right against the other along with an enforceable obligation to the other. This sort of self-obligation should be relatively unobjectionable in-so-far as it is a feature of how our world works. Whether we think of self-obligation as derivative (some higher authority establishes the moral context in which obligations/rights can be created) or primary (all moral authority arises from the individual), the idea is largely the same - I do X at time Y, thereby morally committing myself to do P at time Q.

For many of us, morality springs forth (if at all) not from some external source (objective or otherwise), but from ourselves - that we each create morality. In this context, moral authority of others (if any) is granted by ourselves in each moment of becoming/unfolding/existence/etc. Our obligations fundamentally derive not from the outside, but from the inside; we are our own masters and can never abrogate that authority. On pain of cliche (or perhaps profound misunderstanding), we each are doomed to/blessed with radical freedom - the choice to do as we will without external moral constraint or compulsion.

Now it may seem obvious at first (radical freedom and all), but I am curious what power we have to compel/command ourselves to action (or inaction). In particular, I am curious what the moral relationship is between the self that commits a future self to action and the future self that finds itself so committed. What power, if any, do the notions of self-obligation, commitment, command, etc. have with respect to the duties of our future selves? And what does it mean if the self of the present has neither duty to the past nor ability to impose upon the future? Differently, what does it mean if present self has no duty to future self? Does all conservation turn into a whimsical act of self-denial?

Pathologically, when discussing our past selves or future selves with another ("But you promised!"), should we treat those selves as separate moral actors/agents? Do we disavow ourselves?