Oops - apologies, TC, if I've been clogging your OP with unrelated frivolities. — Tom Storm

Thanks, although I found the back and forth inoffensive.

I fairly regularly get to standby when a person's been given Ketamine for some painful procedure. That drug puts people under so they don't feel pain or move, but as they're coming out of it, they usually go into a dissociative state that's terrifying.

There was one person who screamed over and over that he wasn't real. Turned out, he'd been convinced that he was a character in a video game, which just the kind of bizarre shit Katamine produces.

So of course, the philosophical question that comes to one is: how do I know I'm not on Ketamine? What criteria would I use to determine that?

Reality and what is real are defined by the ability of elements and their structures to interact with each other and being registered by our observations.
There is nothing we can say, hypothesize or theorize beyond that "ability" of "real things". — Nickolasgaspar

I think this definition is a good one. It gets at some of the confusion about the reality of quantum events. What's real is what's "registered by our observations."

A brain state is real and can be observed... So the mental experience of an apple is real, but a physical apple doesn't exist in there. — Nickolasgaspar

This makes sense, although I'm not sure it answers all the questions. I think for some, it is not only the mental state that is real, the imagined apple is too.

Discussion of anything presupposes its being real or possibly real enough to discuss. — Mww

Except when that's clearly false? You and I, discussing whether the Bermuda Triangle is a thing, with a mysterious ship- and plane-eating property, cannot be assuming that it is real: that is the question we are addressing.

(1) Is it possible that the Bermuda Triangle is a real thing? Is the idea consistent with the laws of nature as we understand them, for instance? Is there some suitably naturalist explanation for the disappearance of ships and planes thereabouts?
(1a) Our understanding of nature may be correct to the extent of ruling out Bermuda Triangles.
(1b) Our understanding of nature may be incorrect at least in ruling out Bermuda Triangles.

(2) If the existence of a Bermuda Triangle is consistent with our understanding of nature, or if our understanding of nature incorrectly rules it out, then the question remains whether we live in a world that has a Bermuda Triangle. It may be possible and thus real somewhere, just not here.

But now consider the actual Bermuda Triangle, marked off as a region of the Atlantic ocean through which ships and planes pass, and within which ships and planes are lost at roughly the same rate as any similarly heavily trafficked coastal region anywhere in the world.

With that in mind, to say that the Bermuda Triangle is not real, is to say that there is not something to be explained, but nothing, there being no statistical anomaly in need of explanation. The set of things to be explained exists but is empty.

If reality only makes sense in relation to human sensations, then why wouldn't you be concerned with the sensations themselves, hearing, feeling, tasting, and smelling? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say that the sensations themselves aren't real.

If the sensations are what are real, then we have two conditions, that which is sensing, and that which is sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think the sensations are "what are real", i.e. all that is real. I think they are the measure, or at least one measure, of what is real.

If we start from human sensations, shouldn't that which is sensing be just as real as the thing sensed? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking if we, our selves, are real? It's a good question. I didn't address that in my OP, but I didn't intend to exclude it from the discussion.

The idea of “real” or “reality” comes up frequently on the forum, often in relation to quantum mechanics. It has struck me the concept is not usually defined explicitly or carefully. — T Clark

I used to think of reality as having a relationship to existence as having a relationship to being, where "the real" refers to lived experience, existence refers to judgments of statements, and being does not refer but is the most fundamental -- one might be tempted to say there's a Hegelian relationship between being and the other two. Something rougly along those lines.


Recently having been revisiting Levinas I came across a term he uses: the there is. The opening paragraph of chapter 2 in the Levinas reader, a pdf which I found through the graces of google:

Let us imagine all beings, things and persons , reverting to nothingness.
One cannot put this return to nothingness outside of all events. But what of
this nothingness itself? Something would happen, if only night and the
silence of nothingness. The indeterminateness of this 'something is happening'
is not the indeterminateness of a subject and does not refer to a
substantive . Like the third person pronoun in the impersonal form of a
verb , it designates not the uncertainly known author of the action, but the
characteristic of this action itself which somehow has no author . This
impersonal, anonymous, yet inextinguishable 'consummation' of being,
which murmurs in the depths of nothingness itself we shall designate by the
term there is. The there is, inasmuch as it resists a personal form, is 'being in
general' — Levinas

To stretch my mind a bit -- I might say reality is related to the self in the selfs projects or pictures, or more fundamentally, in the selfs enjoyment of grasping the world for itself -- and being able to do so without falling into the usual traps by use of the there is. But here, reality isn't playing the linguistic role that @Banno sets out (which I'm also drawn to -- honestly those were my first thoughts. OLP has had its way with me! :D ) -- and here's where I'd say I think we get along, because as he says reality plays many roles, and it depends upon the philosopher. It's just a matter of setting it out.

Reality is that which corresponds to a sensation in general; and that, consequently, the conception of which indicates a real being in time, that is to say, a representation of that sensation, and the sense it makes is proportional to the manifold of representations contained in the conception, and the relation of them to the sensation, and to each other. — Mww

I didn't say and I don't believe reality is what corresponds to sensation. I said reality only makes sense in comparison or relation to sensation. Yes, my way of saying it is vague and weaselly, intentionally so. I wanted to leave it open what exactly the relationship is.

Because I say so, yes, and it is knowledge a priori that I say so, but knowledge of reality, by means of sensation, is of empirical objects, so not a priori knowledge. — Mww

Sorry. This was intended as a joke.

I’ll define “reality” as the state of being real.
— T Clark

Agreed, in principle, the caveat being the state of being real does not necessarily imply reality. Non-reciprocity kinda thing, doncha know. — Mww

I don't understand.

"Real", as is used in English is an honorific word, adding little substance to what is being discussed. — Manuel

You may be right, but it comes up often in our discussions here on the forum. That's why I started the thread.

Are unicorns real? Well, they're not objects in the world, but people can surely speak about them without much problem, within an appropriate context (mythology, storytelling, etc.) — Manuel

Yes, this is the kind of question that usually comes up when we talk about what is real. I haven't taken a position one way or another.

So of course, the philosophical question that comes to one is: how do I know I'm not in Ketamine? — frank

An alternative philosophical question - to what extent is the delusion real?

If I understand correctly, the difference is that fiction is open for examination by everyone while delusions are purely personal. I'm not sure I buy that distinction. — T Clark

You are right to be sceptical. It is a distinction that I only became aware of as I wrote.
Not sure I can explain but here goes anyway:

The words on the page of the Tao Te Ching or the Bible are open to interpretation as literature.
We can read and share what the words or The Word mean to us if anything.

Hallucination: a sensory perception not accessible or real to those other than the sufferer.
Delusion: a fixed, false conviction in something that is not real or shared by other people.

Both hallucinations and delusions can and should be assessed and treated where possible:
https://www.verywellhealth.com/hallucinations-5222084
https://www.verywellhealth.com/delusions-5113070

It's important to recognise the distinction between different kinds of reality and their consequences.
For health reasons, if nothing else.

An alternative philosophical question - to what extent is the delusion real? — T Clark

Aren't delusions unreal by definition?

I used to think of reality as having a relationship to existence as having a relationship to being, where "the real" refers to lived experience, existence refers to judgments of statements, and being does not refer but is the most fundamental -- one might be tempted to say there's a Hegelian relationship between being and the other two. Something rougly along those lines. — Moliere

I don't think I understand the distinctions you're making. After some thought, I generally think of "being" and "existence" as the same thing. As I noted in the OP, I see "reality" as being related but not the same. I didn't define how they are the same and how they are different because I'm not sure I can. Maybe I think of "existence" and "being" as more abstract than "reality." "Reality" is somehow more normal.

To stretch my mind a bit -- I might say reality is related to the self in the selfs projects or pictures, or more fundamentally, in the selfs enjoyment of grasping the world for itself. — Moliere

I don't understand this.

Aren't delusions unreal by definition? — frank

That's one of the questions on the table.

The words on the page of the Tao Te Ching or the Bible are open to interpretation as literature. We can read and share what the words or The Word mean to us if anything.

Hallucination: a sensory perception not accessible or real to those other than the sufferer.
Delusion: a fixed, false conviction in something that is not real or shared by other people...

It's important to recognise the distinction between different kinds of reality and their consequences. — Amity

I recognize the distinction you're making, but I'm not sure I buy it, at least not from a philosophical point of view.

Aren't delusions unreal by definition?
— frank

That's one of the questions on the table. — T Clark

Delusion:

"An idiosyncratic belief or impression that is firmly maintained despite being contradicted by what is generally accepted as reality or rational argument."

What about the definition are you questioning?

I recognize the distinction you're making, but I'm not sure I buy it, at least not from a philosophical point of view. — T Clark

OK, call it a pragmatic point of view. Philosophy as a way of life...
You don't need to buy it.

I don't understand this — T Clark

Oh, I may not either -- but I think I got a gist at least. And I'm just stretching, really -- attempting to make use of concepts more widely than in their interpretive home (while mid-reading no less -- so there be danger here!)

I'll try to un-jargonize the above here --

Reality is that aspect of being we notice. I'm cool with just drawing a distinction between being and reality -- good enough for me.

Being is that which has no distinction. If it were distinct then it'd be individuated then it wouldn't apply to some existence. There are no predicates, but the very basis upon which predicates can be stated. Reality, then, is that which is cared about.

And, more generally, we are free to set out what we mean by reality. It changes depending upon the philosopher.

:smirk:

The idea of “real” or “reality” comes up frequently on the forum, often in relation to quantum mechanics. — T Clark

Since science is epistemic, not ontic, I don't see what "QM" has to do with "reality" as such (i.e. map (QM) =/= terrain (reality); therefore, interpreting one in terms of the other seems to me a category error), and puzzles me why (the Mods allow) so much pseudo-quantum graffiti to deface these fora.

what is generally accepted as reality or rational argument."

What about the definition are you questioning? — frank

"What is generally accepted as reality" is not necessarily the same as reality as viewed from a philosophical perspective.

OK, call it a pragmatic point of view. Philosophy as a way of life...
You don't need to buy it. — Amity

No, but I'm allowed to express an opinion.

Reality is that aspect of being we notice. — Moliere

Or maybe it is the aspect of being we can notice, even if we don't right now.

Being is that which has no distinction. If it were distinct then it'd be individuated then it wouldn't apply to some existence. — Moliere

Funny - "that which has no distinction" is what Lao Tzu would probably call "non-being."

And, more generally, we are free to set out what we mean by reality. It changes depending upon the philosopher. — Moliere

Agreed. I guess that's the point of this discussion - if you're going to use the words, make sure you let us all know what you mean.

Since science is epistemic, not ontic, I don't see what "QM" has to do with "reality" as such (i.e. map (QM) =/= territorry (reality); therefore, interpreting one in terms of the other seems to me a category error), and puzzles me why (the Mods allow) so much pseudo-quantum graffiti to deface these fora. — 180 Proof

I agree, which is one of the reasons I brought this whole thing up. How much of quantum "weirdness" is metaphysics and how much is physics?

Since science is epistemic, not ontic — 180 Proof

Interesting.

Sure, I would agree that physics is epistemic.

Would you say the same thing about the things studied by biologists?

One of the reasons I came up with the criteria for reality I did was that in several discussions posters claimed that quantum behavior at atomic and subatomic scale called into question the reality of phenomena at human scale. I reject that idea — T Clark

.

Husserlian phenomenology makes a distinction between the real, the sensate and the imaginary. For him , the real refers to something like a spatial object in empirical nature. The real object is actually a concatenation of memory, anticipation and sensate data. We never actually
experience the object as a fulfilled unity so the ‘real’ is an idealization, and is contingent and relative. The real is based in part on immediate data of sensation , but what we actually experience in sensation changes from
one moment to the next as a Heraclitean flux, unlike the real , which we assume to have extension, duration and persistence. Imagination is memory of actual
sense sat ( and the real, which is constituted at a higher level from this primordial experience of the world).

Funny - "that which has no distinction" is what Lao Tzu would probably call "non-being." — T Clark

well, they are sort of similar -- since being applies to everything that is, it's not like we can say it's like this or that thing. It's everything. And when I look at everything -- what on earth is in common? Nothing.

Or maybe it is the aspect of being we can notice, even if we don't right now. — T Clark

I'm fine with this way of talking too.

"Aspect" is probably the wrong word, now that I'm thinking on it. Sounds like "property", and it's probably better to say "mode": A kind of way which we encounter being. Ways? What is a way? (Dasein's comportant...)

Agreed. I guess that's the point of this discussion - if you're going to use the words, make sure you let us all know what you mean. — T Clark

Heh. It'd be nice, but I think that usually we just assume we know what we mean with "real" -- and that's not too weird, either. We don't go about proving reality, more often than not. Maybe whether a statement is true, but not reality. Reality doesn't admit of proof or disproof. And if that's so, is it even amenable to reason?

It's almost more weird to set out the term in the first place :D -- which is why such talk gets so confusing, I think. Too many possibilities at this level of abstraction, and without some kind of text or tradition or something -- it's just not definable. It requires some philosophic tools to define. But in so doing we are already sort of begging the question in defining it by defining it by such-and-such as being real.

To bring this back to quantum weirdness -- It's fascinating unto itself, but yeah, I take it that most QM-weird discussions are -- perhaps unknowingly -- begging the question, and pointing at this weird thing to say "Look, if this weird thing exists, then my weird thing exists"

What is generally accepted as reality" is not necessarily the same as reality as viewed from a philosophical perspective. — T Clark

What's the difference?

What's the difference? — frank

That's the subject of this discussion.

How much of quantum "weirdness" is metaphysics and how much is physics? — T Clark

Mostly 'metacognitive dissonance.'

Sure, I would agree that physics is epistemic.

Would you say the same thing about the things studied by biologists? — Manuel

Yes, even more so.

That's the subject of this discussion. — T Clark

You stated that what is usually considered to be reality may be distinct from reality as viewed from a philosophical perspective.

Can you not articulate what the potential difference is?

Discussion of anything presupposes its being real or possibly real enough to discuss.
— Mww

Except when that's clearly false?..... — Srap Tasmaner

I don’t understand. If there is a discussion, there must be something to discuss. The presupposition is the necessary conceivability of the object of the discussion. It is impossible to discuss that for which there is no conception. What is “clearly false” in any of that?
————-

You and I, discussing whether the Bermuda Triangle is a thing, with a mysterious ship- and plane-eating property, cannot be assuming that it is real: that is the question we are addressing. — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not addressing anything other than limitations for the state of being real. The B.T. may not be a thing that devours real objects, but it is necessarily a real conception, insofar as if it weren’t......how could we be discussing its properties? Can’t be a property that doesn’t belong to something, right?
————

The set of things to be explained exists but is empty. — Srap Tasmaner

Can a set of things to be explained be empty? The set of explanations of things that exist may be empty, but that thing to be explained must be a member of the set of all things.

But I’m not a set kinda guy, so....