“we can know we act unconditionally” (i assume since there are other ways we can act too). — KantDane21

There. The 'we can know' in the second statement refers back to 'it is known' in the first statement; to balance the knowing, not to modify the acting: the conclusion is valid through knowing.*
*merely a lay opinion

There. The 'we can know' in the second statement refers back to 'it is known' in the first statement; to balance the knowing, not to modify the acting: the conclusion is valid through knowing. — Vera Mont

understood.
But, on second thoughts, the original argument... it is not a modus tollens. If it truly was, we would not need to modify the second premise (as fas as I knew, arguments having the form of modus tollens are all valid),

can maybe express it this way:

if any x is appearance, it is not knowable unconditionally;
y is knowable unconditionally;
therefore, y is not appearance.

thus
If P, then -Q
Y is Q
Y is -P

denying the antecedent fallacy?

"to satisfy the formal validity of the argument, the 2nd premise should be expressed in modal terms: “we can know we act unconditionally” (i assume since there are other ways we can act too) — KantDane21

i do not get that. did he offer any other reason why it has to be stated in modal terms?
And if stated in modal terms, it is then an inductive argument right??

did he offer any other reason why it has to be stated in modal terms? — jancanc

not that I saw, but will look again!

If anything is an appearance it is known conditionally;
We know we act direct and unconditionally;
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance. — KantDane21

Precisely. What something "does" (action) isn't strictly what something "is"(appearance), it is conditional (based on the perspective of the observer).

For example: Just as a mother scorning her child doesn't mean "she is scornful" (permanent definition). It just means in that single moment she scorned" (action). The appearance (being scornful) is conditional on a). The mothers justification, b) The interpretation of the child being scorned, or other observers for that matter and C) the passage of time;
As surely there were cases in the past and will be cases in the future where the mother is not scornful but approving or unsure. She has changed from moment to moment based on her interaction with her children.

Truly defined things, things that don't change themselves (there appearance is not conditional but absolute) are long lasting throughout time. Theyre stable and constant. For example "change" is a truly defined constant in that change exists and always has and always will (1st law of thermodynamics).

But its "action" what change does to the system around it (in other words how we perceive change as observers within the system) - that isn't so easily defined because those things (ourselves and other physical things) are only temporary states - constantly in a phase change, shifting one form to another, living, dying, etc. They are conditional in appearance (who they are and for what moment in time) and conditional in their actions (what they believe/their perceptions).

In essence we change, our perceptions change and our actions change. "Change"s existence itself doesn't change, and it's ability to act on the system it governs doesn't change (in potency). It stays constant so that we don't have to.

The argument (taken from Fred Bieser — KantDane21

It would be easier if you gave a link to the source, as premise one doesn't make any sense
and premise two is ungrammatical.

The assertion "We know we act directly and unconditionally" is, of course, fallacious; there is no reason to suppose that our action is not just another appearance, and thus known only conditionally.

But there is a deeper problem. "Conditionally" entails that there exist some criterion which is "unconditional", otherwise "conditionally" would have no meaning. Comments?