Is ethics rational? Or is it just rational to be ethical?

What about reasonable? — Pantagruel

I thought about starting a thread to discuss the difference between rationality and reason. They seem different to me, but they are considered synonyms. They are generally defined in terms of each other, so it's hard to separate. How would you define them?

This is how I, tentatively, see it - The discussion of anything can be rational, logical; but premises are not necessarily rational. I'd go further and say premises are generally not rational, which isn't to say they are irrational. Most of our thinking is not rational. We grasp most things without tracing our knowledge back to a source. Rationality comes into play when we have to go back and justify what we've proposed.

One way I think of reason as different from rationality, although I'm not sure it is legitimate, is in terms of broader values. Rationality is a hammer. Reason takes into account issues beyond the bare facts, e.g. clarity, civility, contemplation, cooperation. Again, that's my idiosyncratic way of looking at it.

So, yes. Discussions of criminality and ethics can be rational and reasonable.

If thinking is strategic — Pantagruel

Also, I don't think thinking is strategic. I'm not even sure what that means. Certainly a lot of our thinking is not goal oriented.

This is how I, tentatively, see it - The discussion of anything can be rational, logical; but premises are not necessarily rational. I'd go further and say premises are generally not rational, which isn't to say they are irrational. Most of our thinking is not rational. We grasp most things without tracing our knowledge back to a source. Rationality comes into play when we have to go back and justify what we've proposed.

One way I think of reason as different from rationality, although I'm not sure it is legitimate, is in terms of broader values. Rationality is a hammer. Reason takes into account issues beyond the bare facts, e.g. clarity, civility, contemplation, cooperation. Again, that's my idiosyncratic way of looking at it. — T Clark

This tracks with me. I was continuing my inter-evaluation with ethics (which I think is another top-level descriptor). What if ethics is just the projection of one's relative degree of empathy in any given situation? Then ethics is just rationalization. To rationalize is to confine something to a mental schema (rationality is a hammer, as you put it). To reason is to solve a problem. Ethics is reasonable. And it is reasonable to be ethical. Butt may not be rational, if there is self-sacrifice is required.

I think that reason is probably the best umbrella term, if there is one.

Also, I don't think thinking is strategic. I'm not even sure what that means. Certainly a lot of our thinking is not goal oriented. — T Clark

I was thinking of a criminal. Who can have high situational-awareness and make complex plans. But is that sufficient to rationality?

I was continuing my inter-evaluation with ethics (which I think is another top-level descriptor). — Pantagruel

By "top level descriptor" do you mean a category at the same level as reason or rationality? Or what?

Also, I don't think thinking is strategic. I'm not even sure what that means. Certainly a lot of our thinking is not goal oriented.
— T Clark

I was thinking of a criminal. Who can have high situational-awareness and make complex plans. But is that sufficient to rationality? — Pantagruel

What I should have said is that thinking is not necessarily strategic.

I don't think complexity makes something rational. It's the connections between elements that are important. I'll stick with yes, criminal thinking can be rational. Didn't you see "Ocean's 11," "The Italian Job," and all those other heist movies.

By "top level descriptor" do you mean a category at the same level as reason or rationality? Or what? — T Clark

Yes, trying to capture some kind of paradigm descriptor of thought in its purest or ideal form. I believe there are elements of logic, ethics, awareness, rationality. Reason.

If thinking is strategic, is it therefore also rational? — Pantagruel

Not necessarily. One may think strategically within a framework of delusion, with internal rules that match no rational sequence in the world of 'normal' people.

Is it possible to be a criminal, and also rational, in the strictest sense of the word? — Pantagruel

Of course. Strict or lax, 'rational' refers to the thinking process, not the aim to which it is directed. Laws are arbitrary and changeable; the decision to break one or more of them can be motivated by any number of rational intentions.

What about reasonable? — Pantagruel

What about reasonable what? Ideation, belief, desire, intention, thought, behaviour? Reasonable from whose point of view? By what standard?

Is ethics rational? — Pantagruel

Yes.

Or is it just rational to be ethical? — Pantagruel

That depends on the individual, his convictions and his circumstances.

I thought about starting a thread to discuss the difference between rationality and reason. They seem different to me, but they are considered synonyms. — T Clark

They are, usually, but the derived word 'reasonable' is not synonymous with 'rational'. Reasonableness is a social judgment; rationality is a psychological one.

Yes, trying to capture some kind of paradigm descriptor of thought in its purest or ideal form. I believe there are elements of logic, ethics, awareness, rationality. Reason. — Pantagruel

I think I know why you've chosen those elements, but you can't have thought without Intuition, emotion, imagination, visualization, memory.

the derived word 'reasonable' is not synonymous with 'rational'. — Vera Mont

I think that ambiguity is the reason I never took on the task of clarifying the distinction. There's just too much room for pointless disagreement descending into "sez you." People have a lot invested in what is considered reasonable or rational and what is not.

you can't have thought without Intuition, emotion, imagination, visualization, memory. — T Clark

Just so! Reason is a component of the thinking process (normally) and the result is judged as rational or logical when the conclusion is coherent with the premises and information available. The premises or belief from which the thought begins may be entirely false (religious tenet, cultural assumption) and the information may be incorrect (optical illusion, misuse of language, inaccurate measurement, deliberate lie) and therefore the conclusion derived from them entirely wrong, disastrously wrong, as long as they are internally consistent, the thought is rational.

People have a lot invested in what is considered reasonable or rational and what is not. — T Clark

I suppose... But don't they in just about every kind of opinion and belief? Avoiding all of those subjects doesn't leave much to discuss. The weather, traffic, our children and our dreams...

I think that ambiguity is the reason I never took on the task of clarifying the distinction. There's just too much room for pointless disagreement descending into "sez you." People have a lot invested in what is considered reasonable or rational and what is not. — T Clark

I think the terrain can be mapped. I'm reading Understanding and Explanation; in exploring the contention between the scientistic and hermeutic approaches to understanding and intentionality Apel comments several times how the approaches mutually exclude to the extent that they complement. I think that the "key players" in this debate likewise all play their parts and can be profitably explored through example usages (if not reduced to simplistic definitions).

The premises or belief from which the thought begins may be entirely false (religious tenet, cultural assumption) and the information may be incorrect (optical illusion, misuse of language, inaccurate measurement, deliberate lie) and therefore the conclusion derived from them entirely wrong, disastrously wrong, as long as they are internally consistent, the thought is rational. — Vera Mont

Sure, the premises may be wrong, but they also may just be non-rational. In a recent thread I made the claim that all premises, if you trace them back to their source, are non-rational.

I suppose... But don't they in just about every kind of opinion and belief? Avoiding all of those subjects doesn't leave much to discuss. The weather, traffic, our children and our dreams... — Vera Mont

I'm mostly thinking about here on the forum. There are some topics I avoid because I don't think the discussion will go anywhere useful. This one seems to be proving me wrong in that regard. For many here, rational is a value judgement. They don't acknowledge the legitimacy of things they don't consider rational or the distinction between irrational and non-rational.

I think that ambiguity is the reason I never took on the task of clarifying the distinction. There's just too much room for pointless disagreement descending into "sez you." People have a lot invested in what is considered reasonable or rational and what is not.
— T Clark

I think the terrain can be mapped. — Pantagruel

As I noted in my response to @Vera Mont, this discussion seems to be proving me wrong.

scientistic and hermeutic approaches to understanding and intentionality — Pantagruel

Can you briefly summarize these. That may be an unreasonable, although not irrational, request.

Sure, the premises may be wrong, but they also may just be non-rational. — T Clark

That makes no difference to the kind of thinking that is applied to a problem. The whole chain of reasoning may be invalidated at the end by one irrational premise or one false datum along the way, but the process itself is either rational or irrational. Just as the process of smelting is the same whatever the metal. The raw ores going in affect the product, not the process.

There are some topics I avoid because I don't think the discussion will go anywhere useful. — T Clark

I try don't think of forum topics in terms of utility... No, on second look, that's a lie. I do gain something, even from some of the futile, circular ones. Maybe not something practical, but at the very least, brief glimpses into other people's minds. Sometimes it's dark in there - but mostly it's just different.

Can you briefly summarize these. That may be an unreasonable, although not irrational, request. — T Clark

For what it's worth, I find it quite reasonable and look forward to the response.

Can you briefly summarize these. That may be an unreasonable, although not irrational, request. — T Clark

It concerns the distinction between deductive nomological events which have "explanations" (are cases of laws taking place in specifiable contexts) versus the meaningfulness of human events, which can be interpreted in contexts, which are themselves meaningful (the hermeneutic circle). Mechanical causality versus freedom is another dimension of this inquiry. I wasn't citing it so much for content as an example of how disparate concepts can complement and exclude and participate in a mutual inter-definition.

Some nice points in this thread, which I'll reread.

I'm only surprised no one has yet used the phrase "instrumental rationality," which could be defined something like, the rational selection of a course of action to achieve a given goal -- the kicker being that this means any goal, however arbitrary. Sometimes "reasonableness" is contrasted specifically with instrumental rationality in submitting to judgment also the worthwhileness of the goal and the acceptability of the means of achieving it, so a broader decision-making process.

I'm only surprised no one has yet used the phrase "instrumental rationality," which could be defined something like, the rational selection of a course of action to achieve a given goal -- the kicker being that this means any goal, however arbitrary. Sometimes "reasonableness" is contrasted specifically with instrumental rationality in submitting to judgment also the worthwhileness of the goal and the acceptability of the means of achieving it, so a broader decision-making process. — Srap Tasmaner

I think instrumental rationality aligns closely with something I mentioned, which was situational awareness. Vera mentioned how one can think instrumentally, but within a misguided or delusive framework.

To be rational is to be highly reason-responsive. Reason-responsiveness has two components: a receptivity component and a reactivity component.

To be receptive to Reason is for one's faculty of reason to be reliably informing one about what one has reason to do and reason to believe. To be reactive to Reason is to be able reliably to respond to that information and act or believe accordingly.

Thus, a maximally rational person is someone whose reason reliably tells them about the reasons that there are, and who correspondingly acts and believes as reason bids them act and believe.

To be reasonable, by contrast, is to be suitably reason-responsive to moral reasons. A perfectly rational person would also be reasonable then. But a reasonable person will not necessarily be perfectly rational, for it is consistent with being reliably reason-responsive with respect to moral reasons that one might not be reliably responsive to instrumental or aesthetic or epistemic reasons.

This is also why a person who is highly reason-responsive to instrumental reasons - so, they've very self-interested and very good at doing what promotes their own ends - may not be reasonable if, that is, their pursuit of self-interest is not suitably regulated by moral considerations.

Similarly, someone might be highly reason-responsive to aesthetic reasons - and so be rational in that respect - yet not be reasonable (Gauguin, for instance, who abandoned his family to pursue his art - that was aesthetically rational, but not at all reasonable).

Thus, a maximally rational person is someone whose reason reliably tells them about the reasons that there are, and who correspondingly acts and believes as reason bids them act and believe. — Bartricks

Insofar as physical, legal, social and moral constraints allow them to. Sometimes both the rational and reasonable way to act is as unreasonably and irrationally as the people in one's community - else one may find onself in a bonfire without any toenails. Even leaving one's family may be both rational and reasonable - some families are eminently leave-worthy - but a morally bound man won't break his promises.
No human being is purely one type or another, can make all their decisions according the same mode of thought, and everything they do decide is situation-dependent. So, all decisions are likely to be some mixture of rational, ethical, instinctive, emotional and coerced.

And do you think, for example, that these reason-orientations would tend to produce different orientations toward various philosophical topics, so some people might naturally lean towards particular types of solutions, others others? Then many of our antinomies could be objectifications of these different rational-types.

No human being is purely one type or another, can make all their decisions according the same mode of thought, and everything they do decide is situation-dependent. So, all decisions are likely to be some mixture of rational, ethical, instinctive, emotional and coerced. — Vera Mont

I think so too. And tradition-authority influenced.

Philosophical puzzles are puzzles about the nature of reality. Each one has but one solution, not multiple solutions (until we figure out what the correct solution is, there may be several candidate solutions in play - but the fact remains that there is in reality only one correct solution to any philosophical problem).

To solve philosophical problems requires being highly responsive to epistemic reasons (also known as evidential reasons). So, the ideal philosopher is perfectly responsive to epistemic reasons.

Needless to say, there are very few people like that. Most people's picture of reality is based largely on what they would like to be the case, or what they already believe (and can't be bothered to revise), or what they believe ought to be the case, or what they find it most attractive to consider being the case.

So, most people will reject the conclusion of an argument if they dislike it, or if it conflicts with the body of beliefs they already hold, or if they think it would be immoral to believe such a conclusion, or if they find it an ugly belief to hold. And they will do that regardless of how good the argument is.

Note: the perfectly rational person is not necessarily going to be the perfect philosopher. For there may be truths about reality that we do not have overall reason to believe. The ideally rational person recognizes what they have overall reason to believe and believes it. That we have epistemic reason to believe x does not entail that we have overall reason to believe it.

So, the dedicated philosopher may not be perfectly rational.

That makes no difference to the kind of thinking that is applied to a problem. The whole chain of reasoning may be invalidated at the end by one irrational premise or one false datum along the way, but the process itself is either rational or irrational. — Vera Mont

I agree with this but, as I noted, I think premises are by their nature non-rational, which is not to say irrational.

I do gain something, even from some of the futile, circular ones. — Vera Mont

Yes, I too have gained from those types of discussions. I've learned to avoid them if possible. I also try to keep the opening posts on threads I start very specific so I have a better chance to really examine the subject I'm interested in.

Sometimes "reasonableness" is contrasted specifically with instrumental rationality in submitting to judgment also the worthwhileness of the goal and the acceptability of the means of achieving it, so a broader decision-making process. — Srap Tasmaner

This makes sense to me. As I wrote previously:

Reason takes into account issues beyond the bare facts, e.g. clarity, civility, contemplation, cooperation. — T Clark

It would have made sense to add the worthiness of the goals to my list.

If thinking is strategic, is it therefore also rational? Is it possible to be a criminal, and also rational, in the strictest sense of the word? What about reasonable? — Pantagruel

Something being rational does not make it ipso facto good. In essence, reason is using knowledge to achieve gaols (S. Pinker) and this can be in the service of almost any purpose imaginable, from serial killing to political dictatorship.

We tend to fetishise reason as a sort of transcendental virtue. And while I think reason is non-negotiable for civilised discourse, it may also be used to achieve lamentable outcomes. And how you determine the lamentable from the benign will likely depend upon your worldview.

agree with this but, as I noted, I think premises are by their nature non-rational, which is not to say irrational. — T Clark

Whatall premises? How so?