My belief is that he was telling philosophers to remain silent about it. If only they would. He was too clever to think that the clergy or theologians would stop their hooting and honking. — Ciceronianus

Indeed, I've much sympathy with that. The further question might be what it is that they ought be quite about, and that, if anything, is the topic of this thread: delineating, so far as it is possible to do so, what it is that is ineffable.

Perhaps the answer has to be that there is not anything about which we cannot talk. If the world is what is the case, then the world is what can be said. As in my fumbling reply to Frank, above, after everything is said, there remains what is to be done - riding a bike, dancing, painting, planting flowers, praying or visiting the Art Gallery.

That is, at least some of what is called "ineffable" is mistaking what is to be said for what is to be done.

Can one put into words the way in which one knows something as believe, justified and true, that is, the tacit sense of its truth? — Joshs

Sure, at some point the talk stops and one is left to act.

So the public definition of whiteness as a continuation isn't in contradiction with the subjective 'private language' use-cases of whiteness by each speaker of the linguistic community, but accommodates them in the same way that it accommodates the objective physical definition of 'whiteness' in terms of the physical responses of optical estimators,. — sime

I'm impressed with this. It looks like a formalisation (or at least a more formal variation) of the private language argument, in that the "physical responses of optical estimators" drops out of the calculation, so that what does the work is the continuation. Is that roughly right?

Would that I had a better grasp of λ-calculus.

All of the above by way of avoiding the "woo".

But what about the stuff we can do before we reach for the Tao Te Ching?

We have three related words. The ineffable, about which we can say nothing, and which as a result can not enter into our explicit considerations; 's numinous, to which we can no more than nod, and perhaps the sacred, which remains undiscussed.

I wonder if we could also add ‘spiritual’? I’m more generous to it than some atheists, as I translate it to mean emotional well-being. Is spiritual a word we can reclaim in a secular context?

I'm thinking that language less creatures beliefs are ineffable, by them or by us. We can talk about them though, so language less belief may not count as being ineffable, or does it? I know that that's not the target of the notion of being ineffable. Rather, it's used more as a safety net by those who cannot put their own meaningful thought, belief, and/or experience into acceptable words.

have three related words. The ineffable, about which we can say nothing, and which as a result can not enter into our explicit considerations; ↪Tom Storm's numinous, to which we can no more than nod, and perhaps the sacred, which remains undiscussed. — Banno

I'd define the ineffable as that which we cannot say everything about, not nothing. We can call the ineffable sunset magical, which is to say something about it, but it hardly conveys the full experience.

That is why I disagree with your assessment that my view on universal ineffableness is solipistic. I didn't suggest we can say nothing at all about anything.

I think your definition of sacred is off. The sacred is that which is set apart from the mundane and venerated. While some things may be so venerated as to be forbidden to be discussed (the Orthodox Jewish prohibition of ever speaking the name of God (YHWH) comes to mind), that is the exception. Sacred prayers, for example, are recited daily. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sacredness

Seems you wish to create a typology of thought, from those most capable of being reduced to symbol to those least capable. I'd submit it's not a type distinction, but just of degree, and dependent upon the artistry of the speaker in painting a picture of his thoughts.

Our thoughts are extremely complex, intertwined with countless perceptions and interpretations, so much so we cannot expect they'd be specifically and inerrantly conveyed, nor is it reasonable to assume they'd be interpreted similarly by others. That is, my understandimg of your comments will differ from how others understand them.

My private mental world will always remain to some amount private, no matter how much I might be the sort that wishes to share my deepest thoughts.

I'd define the ineffable as that which we cannot say everything about... — Hanover

I can't see how that might work. What is there that cannot be said? "...it hardly conveys the full experience" - of course not! That has to be experienced! But as suggested to @Frank, that just means that it is not something to be said, but something to be done. It's not a something that remains unsaid!

I think your definition of sacred is off. — Hanover

I did not wish to make such a definition - I was just marking it for discussion later - it remains so far undiscussed. I did indeed have in mind "setting apart", an act of deciding that such-and-such is special, a volition that marks something as outside. But I remain unconvinced that this is a good thing - it is after all exactly how the Golden Calf of Exodus came about, declared sacred by the Israelites.

What something ‘is’ defines a use — Joshs

I don't see that there is a necessary link between what something "is" and any use that something may have, in that something may exist and yet have no use.

A stone is defined as a "hard solid non-metallic mineral matter". Stone may be used as a building material, but even if it isn't, it still remains a stone.

Coffee may be drunk, but even if never drunk, it would still be coffee.

A person is something, and if it is true that "what something "is" defines a use", then people would have no value outside of what use they had.

Continuations obviously aren't the whole story, nor even necessarily part of the story for there are problems, but they seem useful in conveying the open-ended, counterfactual and inferential semantics of terms as well as accommodating the differing perspectival semantics of individual speakers. — sime

I think we are saying the same thing.

Continuation
I know very little about the concept of "continuation" in computing, other than it gives a programming language the ability to save the execution state at any point and return to that point at a later point in the program, possibly multiple times.

I understand "continuation" as the ability to return to the same instruction or idea multiple times. Using an analogy, when hiking through a hot desert, I must continually refer to a note that says "drink water".

However, I don't understand its relevance to the situation of Bob experiencing the colour white when looking at his white socks.

Observer dependent and independent properties
Going back to the question as to whether the strong flavour of coffee is an observer dependent property or an observer independent property, I would suggest that the fact that coffee has a strong flavour is an observer independent property.

The light emitted by the socks has been labelled in the English-speaking world as "white". It could well have been that a different word had been chosen, for example "green", but in the event "white" was chosen.

However, when I see "white" light, I may in fact have the private subjective experience of the colour red, and you may have the private subjective experience of the colour green. We will never know, as it is impossible for me to put my private subjective experience into words, as it is impossible for anyone to put their private subjective experience into words.

Public communication
But our private subjective experiences are irrelevant as regards communication using language. Even if I experience the colour red, I can talk about the "white" socks. Even if you experience the colour green, you can also talk about the "white" socks.

We could have a sensible conversation about the "white" socks, even though our private experiences were different.

In this sense, the public label "white" is observer independent. As regards language, "the socks are white" is true regardless of anyone's private subjective experience.

The fact that private subjective experiences of public objects are ineffable doesn't prevent sensible conversations about these public objects.

However, when I see "white" light, I may in fact have the private subjective experience of the colour red, and you may have the private subjective experience of the colour green. We will never know, as it is impossible for me to put my private subjective experience into words, as it is impossible for anyone to put their private subjective experience into words. — RussellA

In the most literal sense I think your final statement is true -- experience is not the same as words. And words are not cabinets into which experience gets placed and launched over to a conversation partner or reader (nor, for that matter, would I put concepts or thoughts into words, since words aren't cabinets at all -- "semantic content" rides along the vehicle metaphor, but it is a metaphoric understanding of language, I believe)

Also, I think that this notion relies upon visual metaphors about experience -- sometimes, we do know the private, subjective experience of others, and sometimes we are able to express our "insides" perfectly well to someone. After all, I followed along with what you were saying pretty well. And while it's possible for our spectrums to be inverted, we're also able to distinguish between color-blinded persons and non-color-blinded persons, in spite of (in my case at least) not being color blind. So there are cases where the private/public distinction just doesn't hold up so cleanly.

This by way of complicating the notion of "experience" as counting as ineffable.

But as suggested to Frank, that just means that it is not something to be said, but something to be done. It's not a something that remains unsaid! — Banno

:up:

sometimes, we do know the private, subjective experience of others — Moliere

If I touch a radiator, sometimes I notice that I quickly pull my hand away, grimace, put my hand into cold water and experience a pain. If I see someone else touch the same radiator, quickly pull their hand away, grimace and put their hand into cold water, I can infer with great certainty that they have felt the same pain.

Although we cannot put our private subjective experiences into words, we can put them into actions. Accepting Thomist philosophical axiom 7.7 "The same causes in the same circumstances produce always the same effects", it follows that our identical actions had an identical cause. As the proverb says, “action speaks louder than words”.

Ineffable is defined as "too great or extreme to be expressed or described in words". It may be that a private subjective experience cannot be described in words, however, as it is said that "words are actions", it could also be said that "actions are words", in which case putting our private subjective experiences into actions is a form of language, and therefore not ineffable.

Perhaps the answer has to be that there is not anything about which we cannot talk. — Banno

Well, I think that's certain. That's not to say that's to our credit or benefit, though. I think Wittgenstein wasn't claiming there were subjects we couldn't talk about. Instead, I think he was saying that there are subjects we shouldn't talk about because by doing so we let "language go on holiday" or are bewitched by it, and do not gain by doing so.

Indeed, I've much sympathy with that. The further question might be what it is that they ought be quite about, and that, if anything, is the topic of this thread: delineating, so far as it is possible to do so, what it is that is ineffable. — Banno

Even for voluble verbose philosophers, the concept of Holism seems to be inherently ineffable, in the sense that a complex whole system cannot be understood when "delineated" in terms of its parts, without losing the integrated wholeness. An old high school biology example says that "if you dissect a frog, you lose the interrelating & binding effect of Life, which defines the essence of a frog. A dissected frog is no longer a functioning organism : it's "-ology" without the "bio-". So you learn about organs apart from the organism. Hence, you can't have your frog, and cut it too.

Naturalists typically define general essential frogginess in terms of how it differs from other aquatic animals. A specific specie can be described in terms of what it does, and how it fits a niche, instead of what it is. The "-ness" suffix is an indicator of essential qualities, that are difficult to describe or define, apart from enumerating its parts. Green is a physical property, but It isn't easy being green. :smile:

Ineffable :
Let's think the unthinkable, let's do the undoable. Let us prepare to grapple with the ineffable itself, and see if we may not eff it after all.” ― Douglas Adams, Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency

EFFING GREENESS

I don't see that there is a necessary link between what something "is" and any use that something may have, in that something may exist and yet have no use.

A stone is defined as a "hard solid non-metallic mineral matter". Stone may be used as a building material, but even if it isn't, it still remains a stone. — RussellA

No, a stone is picked up, it is thrown, it is inspected, it is ignored, or perhaps it is ‘defined’. Every use of the word stone provides us with a different sense of meaning of ‘stone’. Asking for the definition of the word ‘stone’ is an uncommon and narrow use of the word, rather than being some overarching grounding for the word ‘stone’, as if every conceivable sense of meaning of the word in actual, unique contexts is somehow subordinate to a context-independent , generic dictionary definition of ‘stone’

it could also be said that "actions are words", in which case putting our private subjective experiences into actions is a form of language, and therefore not ineffable — RussellA

Raging out and attacking someone or something? (just joking)

Actions constitute much of what is ineffable. Ice skaters, gymnasts, climbers, . . . An acquaintance of mine, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, from many years ago studied flow as a psychologist. Expressing this condition among participants of these sports is done as shared experiences, not words.

Love the way ineffable is being picked apart by forumites !

"Some things you have to learn on your own" looks like it is about an ineffable entity we might call "knowing how to ride a bike", but there is no difference between "knowing how to ride a bike" and "riding a bike"; we don't have two things here, one being bike riding and the other being knowing how to ride a bike. — Banno

Of course there is a difference between doing something and knowing how to do it. One doesn't need to be riding a bike in order to know how; one can know how to ride a bike even while they aren't doing so. Riding a bike and knowing how to ride are two different things.

Or, suppose we had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would we then know how to ride a bike? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list! — Banno

Assuming that the instructions are complete, with nothing omitted, then we should expect to know how to ride a bike after reading them. The instructions could include sections on pedalling and maintaining balance, for example. If there is something that cannot be captured in the instructions which can only be learned by doing, then why should this "something" not be called ineffable?

This is analogous to Mary's Room and the ability hypothesis. Mary supposedly learns everything there is to know about colour perception, except what colours look like or how to pick out colours by sight. This latter knowledge/ability is not included in the information that Mary reads while in her room which supposedly contains all there is to know about colour perception; it is only upon leaving her black-and-white room that she gains this ability. The fact that this knowledge/ability to identify colours could not be written down or verbalised, such that Mary could learn it within the confines of her black-and-white room, makes it ineffable. See also PI 78.

What is there that cannot be said? — Banno

The ineffable.

"...it hardly conveys the full experience" - of course not! That has to be experienced! — Banno

Then what "has to be experienced" is something that cannot be said.

But as suggested to Frank, that just means that it is not something to be said, but something to be done. — Banno

It is "something to be done" because it cannot be said. That's what makes it ineffable. Otherwise, we should be able to say it.

This by way of complicating the notion of "experience" as counting as ineffable. — Moliere

Yep.

A dead frog is not a frog? That is, not sure about your notion of essence. Nowadays a property is considered essential if and only if it belongs to the individual in question in every possible world.You seem to be using some other notion...

Every use of the word stone provides us with a different sense of meaning of ‘stone’. — Joshs

A stone has an uncountable number of potential uses. It can be used to hammer in a nail, be used in a game to skip over water when thrown, be used as a paperweight, keep open a door, to build the walls of a house, to construct a foundation, as ballast in a ship, etc.

If every different use of a stone gave us a different meaning of stone, then there would be an uncountable number of definitions of "stone"

I'm with @Banno who wrote "Nowadays a property is considered essential if and only if it belongs to the individual in question in every possible world."

Actions constitute much of what is ineffable. — jgill

It depends on how ineffable is defined

The Britannica Dictionary defines ineffable as "too great, powerful, beautiful, etc., to be described or expressed". The Merriam Webster Dictionary as "incapable of being expressed in words, indescribable". The Free Dictionary as " Incapable of being expressed; indescribable or unutterable".

Whilst the private subjective experience of pain cannot be described in words, it can be expressed in action, such as quickly pulling my hand away from a hot radiator.

That is, "Some things you have to learn on your own" looks like it is about an ineffable entity we might call "knowing how to ride a bike", but there is no difference between "knowing how to ride a bike" and "riding a bike"; we don't have two things here, one being bike riding and the other being knowing how to ride a bike. — Banno

Yes there is two distinct things here, as correctly points out. And, you ought not neglect this difference as it is a manifestation of the difference between potential and actual, which is the substance of Aristotle's biology. Knowing how to ride a bike does not require that one is actually riding a bike. The knowledge resides in a type of dormancy, as a feature of the memory; it is a potential which is only expressed as the action of actually riding, from time to time. Therefore knowing how to ride a bike is only the potential to actually ride, which is clearly distinct from the act of riding. All of the so-called "powers of the soul", self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, intellection, are all understood in this way, as not active all the time. They are understood as a continuous potential, which is ready, and able to be activated at any moment, in a punctuated, discontinuous way.

And if this is right, then there is nothing here that is ineffable. Or if you prefer, what appeared to be the ineffable bit is just the doing, the getting on the bike and riding it. — Banno

The ineffable bit, for us because we have yet to figure this out, is the actualization itself. Knowing how to ride, as the potential to ride, we can talk about, and know about. Actually riding, we can also talk about. But the difficulty lies in the bit in between, the impetus, which is the actualization of the potential. This is where we find free will. But it is only "ineffable" because it does not very well fit into our categorization, and so it is something not understood. And since it's not understood we can't talk about it. It's that instant in time when something changes from being at rest, to being in motion, where acceleration must be infinite, we haven't figured out what constitutes this so we cannot sensibly talk about it.

If every different use of a stone gave us a different meaning of stone, then there would be an uncountable number of definitions of "stone"

I'm with Banno who wrote "Nowadays a property is considered essential if and only if it belongs to the individual in question in every possible world." — RussellA

And I’m with the later Wittgenstein , who argues that there is no such thing as a word outside of some particular use; for a word to be is for a word to be used, and word use is always situational, contextual and personal. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world; there is nothing common to all language games or particular applications of a rule or definition of a word. Wittgenstein's metaphor of “spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre” shows the difference between language use as applications of pre-existing categorical , normative and rule-governed frames and language use as a subtle or not-so-subtle re-invention of the sense of norms, rules and categories. The family resemblance among senses of meaning of a word like stone is the continuous overlapping of fibers altering previous patterns of language use via fresh contexts of use, rather than the churning out of a new instance of a superordinate theme, rule, property or attribute.

I can use the term "stone" literally/materially
"I threw a stone into a river and it made a splash."

Or

I can use the term "stone" figuratively:
"his heart was made of stone. He was cold, callous and did not care for the struggles of others."

In truth I can use the word "stone" in a number of ways:
"he was stoned because he smoked too much weed"
"he was stoned to death because of his crimes".
"his physique was as though he was carved of stone."
"the corpse was stone cold by the time the coroner arrived on the scene".

The use of a word depends on its context. All of which denote some particular characteristic /physical attribute of a stone. Anything from the "sphere of meaning" pertaining to the word "stone."

Therefore, one word can have many meanings.

We should then be careful to clarify exactly how someone uses a word so as to not misinterpret/make assumptions about the meaning of their statement. Especially if the use is ambiguous and could make sense in more than one non-discrete way.

Quote: "It's not easy to talk about something that can't be expressed in words."

Bertrand Russell in the Introduction to the Tractatus wrote "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit. The whole subject of ethics, for example, is placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions."

When going to the library and seeing the number of books on religion, ethics, morality, art, etc, one can only conclude that it is in fact very easy to talk about things that cannot be expressed in words.

I cannot express my private subjective experience of the colour red in words, for example, yet have no difficulty in talking about it.

As Bertrand Russell asked, where is the loophole.

In language are three rule-governed domains, form, content and use. Form includes the rules that govern how sounds are combined, rules that govern how words are constructed and rules the govern how words are combined into sentences. Content is the meaning of words and sentences. Use is the pragmatic skill of combining form and content to create functional and socially appropriate communication.

It must be the case that identical form has identical content, such that the proposition A "the bird is blue" has the same content as proposition B "the bird is blue". Therefore, if I know the content of proposition A then I also know the content of proposition B.

Therefore, generalising, if I know forms A and B, if form A is identical to form B, if I know the content of form A then I also know the content of form B.

I am human form A and I know its contents, my private subjective experiences. I observe human form B. As human form B shares more than 99% of its DNA with me, has descended from the same woman who lived in Africa between 150,000 and 200,000 years ago, and has, to all intents and purposes, the same human form as me, I can infer with almost absolute certainty that I know their contents, their private subjective experiences.

Human form B does not need to express their private subjective experiences in words for me to have an almost absolute belief that their private subjective experiences are the same as mine.

Perhaps this is the loophole that Bertrand Russell was looking for.

We can talk about that which cannot be expressed in words, because having the same form, we have the same content.

I can't see how that might work. What is there that cannot be said? "...it hardly conveys the full experience" - of course not! That has to be experienced! But as suggested to Frank, that just means that it is not something to be said, but something to be done. It's not a something that remains unsaid! — Banno

I don't understand this concession, where you acknowledge that the experience cannot be accurately conveyed. That would equate to universal ineffability, and it seems to acknowledge a distinction between the object and the phenomenal state, a distinction you've always maintained.

If I tell you I saw a sunrise, but I can never actually fully describe it, then there is something within my experience that cannot be stated, and is thus ineffable. If what we say of sunrises can be said of all experience, then all experience is ineffable.

To borrow from Kant, the unity of apperception is the a priori ability to perceive an object as a single thing, as opposed to it being a disorganized mix of various perceptions. If that unity we perceive of a single experience if not conveyable by communication, then what is being conveyed other than particular qualia composing the unified perception?

We've debated before whether there were a need to speak of qualia, with your position being that perceptions were not subdividable entities and that perceptions and objects were mirror images, not distinguished by our perception faculties (i.e., seeing, hearing, mentally processing, etc.) . Such is direct realism.

If you say now that the perception is not to be dealt with as a unity, but as that with various qualities (i.e. qualia), with some qualia being describable and some ineffable, then you seem to be admitting that which I thought you previously vehemently denied. We're now talking about the qualia that composes the unity of the experience and discussing which may or may not be describable in language.

And that raises another question here: If there are parts of the experience that are conveyable through language, which ones are they? I can't follow why the sunrise would be ineffable but the rays of light, the warmth, the joy provided by the sun (or any other such portion of the unified experience) would not.

And I’m with the later Wittgenstein , who argues that there is no such thing as a word outside of some particular use; for a word to be is for a word to be used, and word use is always situational, contextual and personal — Joshs

I agree as well with the later Wittgenstein, in that language is a set of language games, where the purpose of language is to do something, change the world in some way. Meaning as use. It could be standing in front of a cave and saying the magical phrase "open sesame" or it could be walking into a Tanzanian builder's yard and saying "jiwe", where saying "jiwe" will achieve my goal of being given a stone. Saying "jiwe" in a Tanzanian builder's yard is one possible language game.

It is not the case that "jiwe" achieves my goal, it is the performative act of saying "jiwe" that will achieve my goal.

As you say, the context in which a word is used is crucial, but context is independent of whatever meaning a word may have. If I walked into a Parisian cafe and said "jiwe" I may get strange looks. If I said "jiwe" in a language class I might get top marks.

Wittgenstein talked about meaning as use, but this cannot mean that the meaning of a word changes dependant upon how it is being used in a particular context, but rather, the purpose a word is being used for changes with the context.

If the meaning of a word changed with context, language would have no foundation, and there would be the problem of circularity. I wouldn't know what a word meant if I didn't know the context, and I wouldn't know the context unless I knew the meaning of the word.

A stone may be used as a hammer. A stone may be used as a door stop. The meaning of "stone" is independent of any use it is put to. A stone being used as a hammer means that the nail will be driven into the wood. A stone being used as a door stop means that the door will remain open.

The way that the word is being used has a meaning and changes with context. The meaning of the word doesn't change with context.

While I agree that all humans necessarily share a set of commonly held experience in order for human language to be of any use to us, linguistics might not be the best way to justify this. More specifically:

It must be the case that identical form has identical content, such that the proposition A "the bird is blue" has the same content as proposition B "the bird is blue". — RussellA

Identical form does not always have identical content. The form of propositions sentences A and B can well be identical as forms go while nevertheless being endowed with the following, differing, propositional contents:

A: the bird is of a certain color termed "blue"
B: the bird is of a certain emotive state termed "blue"

-------

If the meaning of a word changed with context, language would have no foundation, and there would be the problem of circularity. I wouldn't know what a word meant if I didn't know the context, and I wouldn't know the context unless I knew the meaning of the word.

A stone may be used as a hammer. A stone may be used as a door stop. The meaning of "stone" is independent of any use it is put to. A stone being used as a hammer means that the nail will be driven into the wood. A stone being used as a door stop means that the door will remain open.

The way that the word is being used has a meaning and changes with context. The meaning of the word doesn't change with context. — RussellA

One way to make sense of this is to infer that use is purposeful and, in at least some sense, is synonymous to purpose ... and that all words have intersubjective meanings / purposes relative to some cohort as top-level context. When viewed as such, words can then be further fine-tuned in meaning / purpose via the subcontext-situated intents of some individual(s) within the cohort

For example: The intersubjective purpose of the either visual or auditory symbol "stone" among the cohort of all English speakers is to reference a hard earthen object whose parameters allow for some leeway in terms of what the material object might be: e.g. a rock, a pebble, a large formation of marble, etc. This is the meaning relative to all English speakers as generalized, top-level context. Whereas, as one example, the purpose of this same symbol can among a subset of English speakers, here jewelers, be that of referencing diamonds. This being a subcontext of the former.

↪Gnomon
A dead frog is not a frog? That is, not sure about your notion of essence. Nowadays a property is considered essential if and only if it belongs to the individual in question in every possible world.You seem to be using some other notion... — Banno

My notion of "essence" (e.g. of frogginess) is based on Aristotle's definition of "substance". Biologists may think of substance as material properties (the frog's physical body), but naturalists & philosophers tend to include such qualities as behavior, to define "frogginess" : definitive features that frogs have in common with each other. So the essence of Frog is more than physiology. It includes instincts & mental factors that differentiate a frog from a lizard. "Properties" are known via the physical senses. But "qualities" are known via rational inference. Pragmatic scientists necessarily focus on effable Properties, But theoretical Philosophers are more concerned with ineffable Qualities. :smile:

Essence or Substance :
In Aristotle essence was identified with substance (ousia) or sometimes substantial form. The essence is what makes the thing be what it is. The essence of a thing or substance is able to be known and so defined accordingly. It is through the definition that we come to know essences.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Essence

Qualia :
Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/

context is independent of whatever meaning a word may have. If I walked into a Parisian cafe and said "jiwe" I may get strange looks. If I said "jiwe" in a language class I might get top marks. — RussellA

I disagree that the later Wittgenstein believes context is independent of whatever meaning a word has. Words don’t have meanings as context-independent categories. Word meanings only exist as particular senses of meaning produced in particular contexts. What the word “jiwe” means in a language class is not simply an already established definition within that class, but the product of the particular language game occasioning its immediate use. If that word is used in the class on three consecutive days, it will be understood not according to a single
identical definition applicable to all three days , but based on three unique senses related by family resemblance.

If the meaning of a word changed with context, language would have no foundation, and there would be the problem of circularity. I wouldn't know what a word meant if I didn't know the context, and I wouldn't know the context unless I knew the meaning of the word. — RussellA

You’re thinking of words in the old way as referring to objects. For Wittgenstein words don’t refer to objects, they enact forms of life. The issue of circularity isn’t resolved by referring the meaning of words back
to dictionary definitions or pre-established
rules of use. There is still the problem of interpretation.

Human form B does not need to express their private subjective experiences in words for me to have an almost absolute belief that their private subjective experiences are the same as mine. — RussellA

Amazing how you can share the experience of a complicated gymnastic routine just by watching. Eons ago if I had only known that I needn't actually do the gymnastics to experience the flow and other sensations that gymnasts have; I could have saved myself a lot of muscle aches and bruises by just mind melding with an actual athlete.

And to think this thread took flight from what I wrote as a joke. :roll: