And finally, "...the truth [my emphasis] of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and eadefinitive — Sam26

True nonsense that is unassailable and definitive. Of course you can’t argue nonsense. (This is essentially Karl Popper’s argument against the Tractatus)

I sometimes read that Wittgenstein showed great intellectual honesty with his conclusions on how to view his work. But was there a more honest or better path to take than giving us this ladder metaphor.

Could he have simply said that what I describe here in this book is accurate and thus true? Or that I have demonstrated something as true and sensical that is not necessarily proposition of natural science?

Or maybe the honest conclusion is to recognize the failure of the attempt of the Tractatus which he eventually did.

True nonsense that is unassailable and definitive. Of course you can’t argue nonsense. (This is essentially Karl Popper’s argument against the Tractatus) — Richard B

That's not what Wittgenstein is saying, viz., that "True nonsense is unassailable and definitive." These are the kinds of misunderstandings that happen when people read the Tractatus. Again, he's saying that the logic behind his thinking about metaphysical propositions (as per the limits of language), and the conclusions that follow from his picture theory and truth-function theory, are unassailable and definitive.

So, by raising the questions about the essence of language, the essence of the world, and the limits of language, one comes to see through the journey of the Tractatus, that the questions and answers are nonsensical. This, he believes is unassailable and definitive.

I don't believe Popper ever really understood Wittgenstein, and neither did Russell.

I don't believe Popper ever really understood Wittgenstein, and neither did Russell. — Sam26

Popper thought the Wittgenstein did grasp propositions of natural science. Specifically, as you say, he was interested in demarcating sense from nonsense. However, for Popper the demarcating of science from pseudo science was the more fruitful direction. And this was achieved by his falsification idea rather than verification of states of affair. Although, I don’t believe he was very familiar with later Wittgenstein so he never directly critique it.

Another difference I believe was Popper thought there were real philosophical problems, while later Wittgenstein did not.