• jospehus
    4
    Here is what I think is true.

    The objects of knowledge exists logically prior to the knowledge of those objects.

    I think that this has implications for theology.

    It seems if the objects of knowledge are logically prior to the existence of knowledge then it would seem that God would have to be a contingent being.

    For if God knows the x is true God can only have this property because x exists and is true.

    It seems like God needs the existence of a non-god thing (x) in order to have his essential property of knowledge.

    Thus he depends upon ex to be what he is.

    Does anyone find the thesis that the objects of knowledge exists logically prior to the existence of knowledge objectionable?
  • punos
    561
    Not at all, unless you define X as God itself instead. Is God the first thing or is God the "thing" before the first thing? It may depend on one's definition of what a God is supposed to be. Does God have to have some sort of consciousness or can it be unconscious or sub-conscious?
  • 180 Proof
    15.4k
    You assume "God" learns; however, 'omniscience' precludes having to learn as there cannot be any unknowns for an 'omniscient being'. Your theological conclusion does not logically follow, jospehus, because "God" so conceived cannot be subject to 'epistemological' conditions or entailments.
  • T Clark
    14k
    Does anyone find the thesis that the objects of knowledge exists logically prior to the existence of knowledge objectionable?jospehus

    I guess this is a kind of Platonic idealism. I've always thought that application of such a metaphysical view requires an assumption of the existence of God. I don't think it adds any explanatory value beyond just assuming that objects of knowledge do not exist prior to knowledge. Applying Occam's Razor, I choose the later assumption.
  • Hallucinogen
    322
    There's a dual relationship between knowing and being. For something to be, it has to be compatible with the laws of perception and attribution. Otherwise, that which perceives and knows wouldn't share a reality with what we're proposing to "be". They must share the same reality, and therefore share the same rules. So it actually isn't the object that is logically prior, it is the rules of interaction between objects and knowledge thereof that is prior.
  • unenlightened
    9.2k
    Do not try to constrain being with words. Constrain your words rather to what is.
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