Me, I consider it perfectly normal to lack a precise definition for a philosophical concept. You probably could not define the word "definition" in a way that isn't vague and slippery.... and yet you keep asking for definitions. — Olivier5

I think it is possible to precisely define, but not using words that don't already contain the concept. The definition is ostensive. Ostensive definitions typically point to some public object. But with consciousness the 'pointing' is reflexive and 'internal'. It's turning awareness in on itself. Some people can do it, I think you can. Oddly some people seem to struggle with it, almost as if they are zombies. I hesitate to say that as it seems so insulting - people lacking a basic concept of what, in part, they are. Even people like 180 Proof and Banno, who are well educated and sophistacated thinkers in many ways, genuinely don't seem to have the concept. I don't really understand it though, I don't know how people can not have it. Some people seem to have it and then say it's a 'folk concept' like elan vital or something, which seems to show that they don't have it after all. I can list people on this forum who do and don't seem to have the concept.

EDIT: I'm acutely aware this sounds like the tailors in the emperor's new clothes. It's most dissatisfactory. I hate that there is, in philopsophy, a divide between those who have a concept and those who don't. We should all share the same concepts, and then proceed to argue about what they tell us about the world and consciousness, and have genuinely competing theories. But if we don't share concepts, it's hard to even get a conversation started in which people are not missing each others points.

There are several definitions of consciousness I'm happy with. — Isaac

You mind mentioning a few of them?

Why assume the those who don't 'have it' are flawed and those that 'have it' not?

Would you also assume those who hear voices to be possessed of an insight others lack?

Would you say of those who just feel strongly in their gut that they can see the future, they really can see the future?

I don't see why this 'feeling' that there's something there is treated any differently to any other folk-notion. People feel strongly about all sorts of things that have later turned out to be nothing.

You mind mentioning a few of them? — Olivier5

I don't think it will progress the discussion, but...

The Grady Coma Scale is instrumental.

The Glasgow Coma Scale contains more nuanced data.

Simple pupillary patterns if you want to go really super-defined.

Isaac, I'm very sympathetic to your response. It's exactly what I would say in your position.

Lets take the hearing voices example. The analogy is not apt, because with hearing voices, there is content to the experience, and the theory that the voices are spirits possessing the body admits of being false. What doesn't admit of being false is that the person is experiencing something-or-other, in other words, they are having an experience. And a fortiori, if they are having an experience of something, they are aware, or conscious.

The Grady Coma Scale is instrumental.

The Glasgow Coma Scale contains more nuanced data. — Isaac

These are perfectly good definitions of one sense of consciousness. but not the sense involved in the hard problem. They are two different concepts. Your clarity is helpful.

Even people like 180 Proof and Banno, who are well educated and sophistacated thinkers in many ways, genuinely don't seem to have the concept. — bert1

You mean "Even people like @180 Proof and @Banno, who are well educated and sophistacated thinkers in many ways, genuinely don't seem to have the concept."

Nothing about me without me (@Banno's done me this courtesy a few times, so I thought I'd return it)

You mean "Even people like 180 Proof and @Banno, who are well educated and sophistacated thinkers in many ways, genuinely don't seem to have the concept." — Isaac

Thank you for being more conscientious than I can be bothered to be. :)

I've had lengthy conversations with both of them on this.

What doesn't admit of being false is that the person is experiencing something-or-other, in other words, they are having an experience. — bert1

Why not? I don't see any prima facie reason why someone ought be 'having an experience' just because they say they are.

Oddly some people seem to struggle with it, almost as if they are zombies. I hesitate to say that as it seems so insulting - people lacking a basic concept of what, in part, they are. Even people like 180 Proof and Banno, who are well educated and sophistacated thinkers in many ways, genuinely don't seem to have the concept. I don't really understand it though, I don't know how people can not have it. — bert1

Some people say they don't use foundational concept X, for instance the concept of "truth", and they truly believe that they do not use the concept, while actually using it just like anybody else. They just use it while remaining unaware that they do. IOW, they simply lie to themselves.

if we don't share concepts, it's hard to even get a conversation started in which people are not missing each others points. — bert1

Yes, and in fact, isn't it exactly what we are seeing here, on this and all the other threads on the same subject?

These are perfectly good definitions of one sense of consciousness. but not the sense involved in the hard problem. They are two different concepts. — bert1

Understood.@Olivier5 asked so I gave them. I don't think it helps much, it is, as you say, this other sense I'm trying to pin down.

Why not? I don't see any prima facie reason why someone ought be 'having an experience' just because they say they are. — Isaac

OK, of course, they could theoretically be a zombie, reporting an experience that they're not having because they don't have experiences. We can only properly talk about this is the first person, because that is what the concept entails. So I will talk about me. If I hear voices in my head and I think they are spirits possessing me, I could be wrong. What I can't be wrong about is that I'm having an experience.

I was not asking for some name dropping, but for a definition of consciousness that is not vague or slippery.

What I can't be wrong about is that I'm having an experience. — bert1

Why not?

Some people say they don't use foundational concept X, for instance the concept of "truth", and they truly believe that they do not use the concept, while actually using it just like anybody else. They just use it while remaining unaware that they do. IOW, they simply lie to themselves. — Olivier5

Yes, I think you may well be right about that.

Yes, and in fact, isn't it exactly what we are seeing here, on this and all the other threads on the same subject? — Olivier5

Broadly, yes, I agree

I was not asking for some name dropping, but for a definition of consciousness that is not vague or slippery. — Olivier5

Neither of those scales are particularly vague or slippery, they're used to good effect clinically.

Why not? — Isaac

Because I'm not specifying any particular content. There nothing to be wrong about.

Because I'm not specifying any particular content. There nothing to be wrong about. — bert1

Your claim (as I understand it) is that something is going on in (or around) you, called 'an experience' which is not just neural activity. Something else. It's possible you're wrong. That no such thing is going on.

Your claim (as I understand it) is that something is going on in (or around) you, called 'an experience' which is not just neural activity. — Isaac

That's not what I intend to claim. My claim is (I allege) theory-neutral. It may be that experiences just are neuronal activity, or whatever. But for the person, the subject, (whatever that turns out to be physically or metaphysically), the fact of their subjectivity is a given, otherwise we don't even have an example to talk about. As soon as we speak about consciousness, in this phenomonlogical sense, we have a subject of an experience. We can argue about what they are experiencing is, but not about the presence of the subject.

Take you, right now. You are talking to bert1 on a philosophy forum. But are you though? I could be a bot pretending to be bert1. I might be Banno, who has killed me and is using my computer because he's insane. You might be dreaming. So all of that content you think you are experiencing might be wrong. But the fact that something is happening, you are aware of something happening, whatever it turns out to be, can't be wrong, can it? Is it possible, from your point of view, that you are not really having an experience of any sort at all at the moment? Even if you are experiencing an illusion, you are still experiencing that, no?

I am not really interested in a scale. A scale is merely a measurement tool. I am interested in a definition of consciousness that would be aggreable by most, including you.

It's been like pulling a teeth.

I conclude that such a definition simply does not exist. Which is perfectly normal for a foundational concept. You cannot define "time", "space", or even "life" in a way that everyone will agree. And yet we rely on these concepts every single day.

But the fact that something is happening, you are aware of something happening, whatever it turn out to be, can't be wrong, can it? — bert1

I think it can be. It could be that I receive data, respond to it, then later rationalise that whole event chain as 'an experience' which could be nothing more than a post hoc story about what happened, not an accurate account of what really happened.

I think it can be. It could be that I receive data, respond to it, then later rationalise that whole event chain as 'an experience' which could be nothing more than a post hoc story about what happened, not an accurate account of what really happened. — Isaac

This is really interesting. Could you flesh out what this 'post hoc' rationalisation is entailed by the word 'experience'? You clearly think that saying something has an experience is theory-laden. What am I committed to do you think? What would show that someone who thought they had an experience, didn't really?

I am interested in a definition of consciousness that would be aggreable by most, including you. — Olivier5

Consciousness - The property of scoring 4:5:6 on the Glasgow coma scale.

Consciousness - The property of scoring 4:5:6 on the Glasgow coma scale. — Isaac

That's consistent with not having an experience. Is that right?

Consciousness - The property of scoring 4:5:6 on the Glasgow coma scale. — Isaac

Alright. Would you happen to know if some computers are able to achieve a scoring of 4:5:6 on the Glasgow coma scale, as of today?

So, take the concept of a P-zombie. It's identified as being indistinguishable externally from a person with 'experiences', right?

Now, when you reflect on your own mental events, you're not doing so real time, you're doing so milliseconds (sometimes more) after they happened. So you, in reflection, are just like the third party looking at a P-zombie. You don't know for sure what just happened and could be wrong about it. You tell a story.

That's consistent with not having an experience. Is that right? — bert1

Other way round 4:5:6 is good (if memory serves - not a clinician!)

Would you happen to know if some computers are able to achieve a scoring of 4:5:6 on the Glasgow coma scale, as of today? — Olivier5

Possibly. They'd need to have eyes, but I don't see any reason they couldn't.

Sure, but it's the milliseconds after that is relevant. Maybe I didn't have an experience three milliseconds ago, but I am now. I may have been a zombie 3 milliseconds ago, but I know I'm not now.

Maybe I didn't have an experience three milliseconds ago, but I am now. — bert1

Ok, so if 'experience' is the word we're using to describe the post hoc storytelling, then neuroscience has a few quite good models for that. There doesn't seem to be a hard problem there.

Possibly. They'd need to have eyes, but I don't see any reason they couldn't. — Isaac

OK, so this clearly separates two concepts of consciousness. One in which experience is not part of the concept. One in which it is.

One way to solve the hard problem of consciousness is simply to say experiences are illusions, ad-hoc rationalisations, not real, don't exist. That's a genuine solution.