"Implies" as in strongly suggest the truth of.What? If I have doubts that proves that having doubt implies a thinking being? How? What is the process of logical implication? — Isaac
Sorry, I don't do Russell's notation. Please try again.This, I think, is "I(I) have a doubt (D)" in Russell's notation.
∃x(Ix∧∀y(Iy→y=x)∧Dx)
I see the existence of 'I' being declared, not logically implied.
How do you render it such that it is logically implied? — Isaac
What? If I have doubts that proves that having doubt implies a thinking being? How? What is the process of logical implication? — Isaac
I like Zahavi’s critique of Chalmers’ position:
“Chalmers's discussion of the hard problem has identified and labeled an aspect of consciousness that cannot be ignored. However, his way of defining and distinguishing the hard problem from the easy problems seems in many ways indebted to the very reductionism that he is out to oppose. If one thinks that cognition and intentionality is basically a matter of information processing and causal co-variation that could in principle just as well go on in a mindless computer–or to use Chalmers' own favored example, in an experienceless zombie–then one is left with the impression that all that is really distinctive about consciousness is its qualitative or phenomenal aspect. But this seems to suggest that with the exception of some evanescent qualia everything about consciousness including intentionality can be explained in reductive (computational or neural) terms; and in this case, epiphenomenalism thre — Joshs
"Implies" as in strongly suggest the truth of.
This should not be hard to understand. — Caldwell
Where do you think doubt comes from? — Caldwell
Let's talk normal language. — Caldwell
Since thinking is only known to be practiced by (some) entities it is a plausible conclusion that wherever thinking is occuring there will be an entity doing it. — Janus
This radical separation of cognitive processes from consciousness created a peculiar "explanatory gap" in scientific theorizing about the mind. — Joshs
Its role is not as an internal agent or ho-munculus that issues commands, but as an order parameter that or-ganizes and regulates dynamic activity. Freeman and Varela thus agree that consciousness is neurally embodied as a global dynamic activity pattern that organizes activity throughout the brain.” — Joshs
It does not seem to be by definition that it makes no sense for me to doubt whether I am in pain. — Luke
I think this would be a good topic for a thread. Don't have time to start one. — bert1
The word 'doubt' is used in such a way as makes "I doubt I'm in pain" nonsensical, makes "I doubt I'm thinking" garbage... — Isaac
But these are facts about the use of the word 'doubt', they're not about logical necessity. — Isaac
If, for example, I declare that 'whatsits' have 5 arms and 'thingamabobs' have 2 it is logically implied that 'whatsits' have more arms. But this says nothing about the necessary existence of either. — Isaac
If I use a word 'doubt' and it's sensible use requires also an 'I' to do the doubting, this likewise says nothing about the necessary existence of either. — Isaac
Why is "I doubt I'm in pain" nonsensical? — Luke
If "the internal coherence of language" is about logic or logical necessity, then so is the use of the word "doubt". — Luke
Right, it's logically implied. — Luke
I agree that the use of a word does not necessarily imply the existence of something. But do you deny that people have pains, doubts, thoughts, etc? — Luke
That’s a great article. Thanks for sharing! :up: — Luke
For him the desire to reify the "psychological" is bound up with the view that all language is essentially referential in nature. It is linked with the idea that the primary function of words is to provide names for objects. It is also bound up with the notion that the essential aim of language is to effect a simple form of communication. The idea that when I tell you what is "going on inside me" I use words like "sharp pain" to pass on information to you. If you are acquainted with "sharp pains" yourself, if you know what kind of things those words designate, then by analogy you gain an insight into my situation. For Wittgenstein, this picture of how language operates generates (and supports) the idea of an "inner realm of mental events" which looks non-trivially like the "mental realm" conjured up by Descartes' philosophy of mind.
It is the name-object view of language and its attendant metaphysics that Wittgenstein challenges
Why does it matter? Is it mainly down to the role each perspective plays in supporting a contested ontology? Either 1) a physicalist monism (therefore keeping atheism safe from woo OR 2) an ontological dualism allowing for more traditional forms of Western theism OR 3) a non-physicalist monism (idealism), mysticism and the East? 4)?
Is this ever just about consciousness? — Tom Storm
This suggests that the origin of the explanatory gap is theoretical, if only the wrong theory wasn't chosen there wouldn't be one.. I can't see how this is so. One of these two propositions must be shown to be false to resolve the hard problem:
1. The existence of mental events is conditional on the right kinds of physical events taking place. (note that this does not imply epiphenomenalism).
2. We can't conceive how physical events can engender mental events, as an exhaustive inventory of physical events does not seem to imply mental events.
Does the choice of theory as described here impact either? — hypericin
Its role is not as an internal agent or ho-munculus that issues commands, but as an order parameter that or-ganizes and regulates dynamic activity. Freeman and Varela thus agree that consciousness is neurally embodied as a global dynamic activity pattern that organizes activity throughout the brain.”
— Joshs
Does this mean something? — hypericin
To be fair, there are important differences between say, Kant, Hoffman and Kastrup. Sure, they could be called "idealists", but that's a bit like saying that Strawson and Dennett are both materialists, which they are, but vastly different in what the word entails. — Manuel
As I gave the example of earlier, early scientists used to refer to 'ether' and each would know what the other meant. Their use of the word didn't create a necessity for science to explain what 'ether' was. It doesn't exist, there's no such thing. — Isaac
You seem to be confusing empirical and absolute truth. Since thinking is only known to be practiced by (some) entities it is a plausible conclusion that wherever thinking is occuring there will be an entity doing it.
But this is a truth of dualistic thinking. Since entities are formal collective representations of dualistic thinking and since we can say that reality is not beholden to suvh thinking, from the 'perspective ' of non-duality there is no thinking and there are no entities.
What's the difference between a physicalist monism and a non-physical one? Is consciousness not physical? Or alternatively, if consciousness is not physical, why isn't the rest of the universe non-physical? — Manuel
What consequences follow from proclaiming one term instead of another one? — Manuel
One problem with this whole way of setting up the issue, however, is that it presupposes we can make sense of the very notion of a single, canonical, physicalist description of the world, which is highly doubtful, and that in arriving (or at any rate approaching) such a description, we are attaining a viewpoint that does not in any way presuppose our own cognition and lived experience. In other words, the hard problem seems to depend for its very formulation on the philosophical position known as transcendental or metaphysical realism. From the phenomenological perspective explored here, however — but also from the perspective of pragmatism à la Charles Saunders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, as well as its contemporary inheritors such as Hilary Putnam (1999) — this transcendental or metaphysical realist position is the paradigm of a nonsensical or incoherent metaphysical viewpoint, for (among other problems) it fails to acknowledge its own reflexive dependence on the intersubjectivity and reciprocal empathy of the human life-world. — Joshs
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