I’m only arguing that if consciousness does not apply to the physiology, there is no other object to which it can apply. The circularity begins when you promise that “ when we describe ourselves as being conscious we're describing that non-physiological aspect of ourselves”, and when asked which non-physical aspect of ourselves we’re describing, you answer “consciousness”.

The reason I would say no such aspects exist is because there is no indication such aspects exist.

The circularity begins when you promise that “ when we describe ourselves as being conscious we're describing that non-physiological aspect of ourselves”, and when asked which non-physical aspect of ourselves we’re describing, you answer “consciousness”. — NOS4A2

I don't think it's circular. If you asked me what "physiology" describes, the answer is physiology.

I’m only arguing that if consciousness does not apply to the physiology, there is no other object to which it can apply. — NOS4A2

What does physiology apply to? The question doesn't make sense. Physiology is just its own thing. Similarly, if dualism is correct then consciousness is just its own thing.

The reason I would say no such aspects exist is because there is no indication such aspects exist. — NOS4A2

There's certainly something peculiar about consciousness given that a "hard" problem of consciousness is even considered. We don't consider a "hard" problem of electricity or water after all. Of course, that might just be because consciousness is significantly more complicated than every other natural phenomenon in the universe. Or it might be because consciousness really is non-natural and that there really is a "hard" problem.

Incidentally, what would constitute evidence of this claim? What would you be looking for?
— Wayfarer

Outstanding question. I did a summary of three points for someone else who asked the same question earlier in this thread. Of course, its not limited to that. Let me find and repaste them here.

1. Consciousness is able to exist despite a lack of physical capability to do so.

For example, move your consciousness apart from your head where it sits into the next room that you cannot currently see.

2. Demonstrate a conscious entity that has no physical or energetic correlation.

For example, prove that a completely brain dead body is conscious. Or Inebriate someone to a high blood alcohol level and demonstrate that their consciousness is completely unaffected.

3. If consciousness is not matter and/or energy, please demonstrate evidence of its existence without using a God of the Gaps approach. — Philosophim

But the existence of 'an immaterial entity' was not the point at issue. The claim being considered was this:

It (the act of typing) is physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process.

What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides?
— Philosophim

The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

This does not posit the existence of an immaterial entity separate from or outside of the physical. It is a philosophical argument: that the act of rational judgement is not reducible to the physical or explainable in physical terms.

Consider what is involved in judgement - every time you make an argument, you're inferring causal relations and equivalences, saying that 'this means that....' or 'because of this, then....'. These processes inhere entirely in the relations of ideas. And evidence for that claim has already been given, which is that the same ideas can be expressed in an endless variety of physical forms whilst still retaining their meaning.

Whereas you will always take the argument as requiring to establish the existence of an immaterial entity or thing. That is what I claim is the deleterious consequence of Cartesian philosophy with its fallacious conception of 'res cogitans', a thinking thing. It is called reification', literally 'making into a thing'. The 'matter-form' dualism associated with Aristotelian philosophy does not fall into that trap.

Humans are metaphysical beings because they can see meaning above and beyond the sensory. They seek to understand principles and causes. That is the origin of the idea of the 'rational soul' which is quite different to 'the ghost in the machine' allegory of Cartesian philosophy. (Although it is also true that much of modern and post-modern philosophy is irrational in its denial of there being an underlying universal logos, although that is a very different issue.)

As far as the effects of drugs and inebriants on the brain, it is obvious that this is so. But it does not establish that consciousness is a product of the brain. It is still quite feasible that the brain as a central organ behaves in the sense of a receiver. You wouldn't say that the television produces the characters of a television drama. It's still an open question, so the influence of drugs is immaterial in that sense.

All we're worried about is the details in how the brain generates it. — Philosophim

That is the Hard Problem. "Through our physical brain" is a where, not a how. "In the sky" does not tell us how flight is accomplished. "In our legs" does not tell us how walking is accomplished. "In our brain" does not tell us how consciousness is accomplished. The details are not insignificant. They are remarkably important. And they are unknown.

I don't think it's circular. If you asked me what "physiology" describes, the answer is physiology.

"Physiology" isn't an adjective. "Physical" is an adjective, and physical physicalness is circular.

What does physiology apply to? The question doesn't make sense. Physiology is just its own thing. Similarly, if dualism is correct then consciousness is just its own thing.

Physiology applies to an organism and the way it functions. Consciousness applies to what?

There's certainly something peculiar about consciousness given that a "hard" problem of consciousness is even considered. We don't consider a "hard" problem of electricity or water after all. Of course, that might just be because consciousness is significantly more complicated than every other natural phenomenon in the universe. Or it might be because consciousness really is non-natural and that there really is a "hard" problem.

There is no hard problem if the term "conscious" describes the concrete. It brings us back to the easy problems. But lifting the term from the concrete and applying it to the abstract leads the dualist directly into hard problems, probably because there is nothing to examine under under its own premise.

Physiology applies to an organism and the way it functions. Consciousness applies to what? — NOS4A2

I have no idea what you're asking here.

Dualists claim that humans are a collection of physical and non-physical (mental) stuff. The term "biology" is used to refer to the physical stuff and the term "consciousness" is used to refer to the non-physical (mental) stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this non-physical (mental) stuff.

Whereas materialists claim that humans are a collection of physical stuff alone and that the term "consciousness" refers to some subsection of that physical stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this subsection of that physical stuff.

There is no hard problem if the term "conscious" describes the concrete. — NOS4A2

Yes, if. But either way, there undoubtedly seems to me a hard problem, hence the existence of substantial contemporary philosophical literature on the nature of consciousness and of substance and property dualism. So either it is the case that consciousness is a physical thing, but significantly more complex than every other physical thing in the universe, or it isn't a physical thing.

:100: :clap:

I don't consider consciousness to be a thing but rather a process. — wonderer1

I agree.

Still, in light of the scientific evidence on the side of physicalists it seemed worth bringing up the question of why it is physicalists that are supposed to have the burden of proof. — wonderer1

The burden of proof is on anyone who claims to have the answer. Nobody has the answer at the moment. It’s all guesswork on everybody’s part. Somebody thinks it’s physical? Prove it. Somebody thinks it’s proto-consciousness? Prove it. Someone thinks it’s fields? Prove it.

I have no idea what you're asking here.

Dualists claim that humans are a collection of physical and non-physical (mental) stuff. The term "biology" is used to refer to the physical stuff and the term "consciousness" is used to refer to the non-physical (mental) stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this non-physical (mental) stuff.

Whereas materialists claim that humans are a collection of physical stuff alone and that the term "consciousness" refers to some subsection of that physical stuff. To say that a human is conscious is to say that it has this subsection of that physical stuff.

I’m just asking what the word “consciousness” refers to. I have to Imagine a string going from the word to what it is in the world the word refers to. The dualist would have nowhere to put it because it would either attach to some biology, or nothing. Non-physical stuff is just a roundabout way of saying “nothing”, in my view, because nothing indicates such stuff exists.

Yes, if. But either way, there undoubtedly seems to me a hard problem, hence the existence of substantial contemporary philosophical literature on the nature of consciousness and of substance and property dualism. So either it is the case that consciousness is a physical thing, but significantly more complex than every other physical thing in the universe, or it isn't a physical thing.

Or it isn’t a thing at all. Maybe it’s an abstract term denoting abstract qualities of physical things, particularity conscious organisms.

The burden of proof is on anyone who claims to have the answer. Nobody has the answer at the moment. It’s all guesswork on everybody’s part. Somebody thinks it’s physical? Prove it. Somebody thinks it’s proto-consciousness? Prove it. Someone thinks it’s fields? Prove it. — Patterner

Holds a cloth soaked in chloroform over your mouth and nose...

When I describe myself as English the word "English" is an adjective, being used to describe me, but "Englishness" isn't some physiological thing. — Michael

Would not "Englishness", if it exists, be some manifest quality or qualities?

I don't know of anyone who doesn't think the brain is necessary for human consciousness. But that doesn't tell us how the material brain produces consciousness. If my refrigerator started showing signs of consciousness, and I said, "How the hell is my refrigerator conscious?", would you say "Unplugs refrigerator"?

Would not "Englishness", if it exists, be some manifest quality or qualities? — Janus

If it is you're not going to find it by putting my body under a microscope. At best you can check my birth certificate or passport. Even though it's me that's English, not those pieces of paper.

So it's really strange that NOS thinks that dualism can be refuted by looking at the grammatical use of the adjective "conscious".

If it is you're not going to find it by putting my body under a microscope. — Michael

No, that's right, it would be observed in behavior, also a physical phenomenon.

No, that's right, it would be observed in behavior, also a physical phenomenon. — Janus

Because no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge?

But that aside, I'm questioning NOS's assertion that because the adjective "conscious" is used to describe biological organisms then consciousness must be biological. I don't think that at all follows. "English", "wet", and "stylish" are adjectives that are used to describe biological organisms, but it doesn't follow that Englishness, wetness, and style must be biological.

Consciousness may very well be physical, but this cannot be proved simply by looking at how adjectives are used.

And, of course, the assertion that humans are just biological organism begs the question.

I’m just asking what the word “consciousness” refers to. I have to Imagine a string going from the word to what it is in the world the word refers to. The dualist would have nowhere to put it because it would either attach to some biology, or nothing. Non-physical stuff is just a roundabout way of saying “nothing”, in my view, because nothing indicates such stuff exists. — NOS4A2

So this is just begging the question.

Maybe it’s an abstract term denoting abstract qualities of physical things, particularity conscious organisms. — NOS4A2

Are abstract qualities physical? If not, are they real?

Because no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge? — Michael

I did say "if Englishness exists".

And, of course, the assertion that humans are just biological organism begs the question. — Michael

We know humans are biological organisms; do we have any evidence that they are more than that?

I did say "if Englishness exists". — Janus

Well, there is such a thing as being English, but it's not a biological or behavioural feature of people; it's a legal status.

We know humans are biological organisms; do we have any evidence that they are more than that? — Janus

If humans are conscious and if consciousness is non-biological then consciousness is evidence that humans are more than biological organisms.

Of course whether or not consciousness is biological is the very thing being questioned, which is why it begs the question to argue that humans are just biological organisms.

We don't know whether or not consciousness is biological and so we don't know whether or not humans are just biological organisms.

As Patterner pointed out, consciousness is not empirically observable. — NotAristotle

Subjective consciousness is not empirically observable. Behavioral consciousness is. That is the only objective way any of us will, or likely ever, know consciousness within another being.

Or perhaps to put the question more precisely: How is the brain different from non-conscious physical stuff? My answer is that it's not different and that's the mystery. — NotAristotle

The brain and neurons are very different. That, so far is where we've encountered all kinds of natural bug, animal, and human consciousness. Its not like we've ever gone up to a rock and had it behave consciously. The only reason its a mystery is you think that its impossible for consciousness to come out of physical matter and energy. Why? It clearly does. Is it some necessary desire that we want ourselves to be above physical reality? Because if you eliminate that desire, its clear as day that consciousness is physical by even a cursory glance into medicine and brain research. I just don't get the mystery or the resistance.

I think [Gnomon's] fundamentally wrong because he has m = matter instead of m = mass, the correct equivalence. — ucarr

Obviously you are correct.

I've been criticizing him from the standpoint of execution of his argumentation. I've characterized it as being slapdash and error-laden.

You're being generous, ucarr. @Gnomon spouts his own warlock's brew of woo-woo nonsense which he rationalizes with pseudo-scientific sophistry. Have you read any of his personal blog on "EnFormationism"? A good laugh that quickly becomes a tedious slog ... yet insightful as to what he's really up to: substituting a deistic prime mover (i.e. universal programmer aka "The EnFormer") for "the creator god of Abraham". If you search my posts using "Gnomon" as a keyword you'll find that since 2020 I've challenged him hundreds of times to be more rigorously clear and accurate with the science and the philosophy he espouses, but to no avail. Maybe you will have better luck than I've had, ucarr ...

If firstly we picture Einstein sitting at his desk writing out the equations for special relativity, and then secondly we read his paper published in 1905, can we next conjoin these two events via memory to the effect that we can claim them public and therefore physical?

If I understand you correctly, "memory" in the brain is physical but without corroborating evidence its content is not public.

You're saying physicalism is rooted in the scientific method's demand that scientifically measurable things be public?

No. I'm saying that, IMO, physicalism excludes non-physical concepts (e.g. X-of-the-gaps supernaturalia) from explanations of aspects of (i.e. transformations in) the physical world ... such that, reversing your terms, "the scientific method is rooted in" (a) physicalist paradigm.

Is metacognitive, within your context, higher-order cognition, i.e., cognition of cognition?

More or less. Read the article I linked in the post you're referring to for an elaboration on the context within which I use the adjective "metacognitive".

Well, there is such a thing as being English, but it's not a biological or behavioural feature of people; it's a legal status. — Michael

Yes, but being English in the sense you've described is a matter of fact, not a quality of "Englishness" manifested in behavior.

If humans are conscious and if consciousness is non-biological then consciousness is evidence that humans are more than biological organisms. — Michael

Right, but there is no evidence that consciousness is non-biological—all the evidence points to it being a biological phenomenon.

We don't know whether or not consciousness is biological and so we don't know whether or not humans are just biological organisms. — Michael

If by "we don't know" you mean that it hasn't been proven, then I agree; nothing in science has been proven.

.

But the existence of 'an immaterial entity' was not the point at issue. The claim being considered was this:

It (the act of typing) is physical in some respects, but the salient point, our understanding of what is being said, the expression of intentional meaning - that is not a physical process.

What is the non-physical part? A sub-space where my consciousness resides?
— Philosophim

The interpretation of meaning. The constant, underlying, subliminal processes of 'this means that', 'this is that', 'this word has that meaning' - otherwise known as judgement. That is not a physical process. — Wayfarer

Yes, judgement is a physical process by your brain. Rocks don't do that right? Brains do. Just a cursory examination of chemistry and physics demonstrates impossibilities right before our eyes. To an ignorant mind, none of these wonders should happen. Fire is a thing of magic. Water is two gases at room temperature, yet becomes liquid when they join. Why then is it suddenly odd that brains have consciousness? There is nothing in matter and energy that notes that this cannot be. Further, there is nothing outside of matter and energy that shows this to be. The only logical conclusion is that matter and energy in the right form can create consciousness. This shouldn't be shocking or a revelation either. Its just one more magical piece of physics and chemistry.

It is a philosophical argument: that the act of rational judgement is not reducible to the physical or explainable in physical terms. — Wayfarer

That is not a philosophical argument. That is a claim of fact or science. If you state, "I believe that one day we will find that consciousness exists outside of the physical", that's philosophy. Philosophy is 'maybe', science and facts assert. And science and facts clearly assert that consciousness, as measured by behavior, is physical. If you want to claim that's false, it must be a scientific assertion, not a philosophical supposition. We can suppose the facts are wrong or incomplete, but we cannot philosophically assert that it is proven that this incompleteness indicates consciousness is not physical.

Consider what is involved in judgement - every time you make an argument, you're inferring causal relations and equivalences, saying that 'this means that....' or 'because of this, then....'. These processes inhere entirely in the relations of ideas. And evidence for that claim has already been given, which is that the same ideas can be expressed in an endless variety of physical forms whilst still retaining their meaning. — Wayfarer

I can play a song on a piano, and then play it on a harp. Does that make the song immaterial? No. The song, as played, is physical. The song as notes, are a physical record. The song as thought of, is retained through the physical brain. The expression of that song is unique in each way. It is NOT the same thing to play a song through a harp as it is through a piano. It is a different and unique physical expression which evokes similarities within one another. We construct a notation that represents sound wave frequencies, which are then played through different physical mediums for a different color of that sound wave.

Remove the physical air, and the sound does not exist. Remove the physical page and it ceases to be a record. Remove the brain that remembers it, and the music is gone forever. It does not go to a special place or is remembered in the either. Its simply gone. Can you show me where judgements go without brains? Or where judgements are made apart from brains? No. Thus the idea that our judgements and ideas are somehow not physical is merely an idea, not a confirmed reality.

Humans are metaphysical beings because they can see meaning above and beyond the sensory. They seek to understand principles and causes. — Wayfarer

That's not metaphysical, that's just another aspect of the physical. Your senses are not the same physical part of your body that processes those senses. You can have brain blindness for example. Your eyes see fine, but your brain cannot process the information. This is all physical. Many animals can take meaning above and beyond the sensory to plan. Crows for example can solve basic puzzles. Do we look at them and find anything more than neurons? No. We're simply a more advanced neuronal system that's built upon the other basic brain systems that we need to function. Do you think the lower brain which regulates your breathing and digestion is something other than physical? Your autonomous nervous system? The veins which help regulate and coax blood throughout your body? Life is full of amazing physical reactions and adaptations to different stimuli. Again, why balk at consciousness as a building upon that?

As far as the effects of drugs and inebriants on the brain, it is obvious that this is so. But it does not establish that consciousness is a product of the brain. It is still quite feasible that the brain as a central organ behaves in the sense of a receiver — Wayfarer

Taken alone, no drugs and inebrient alone determine consciousness is a product of the brain. But taken together withe years of neuroscience and study, there comes a point where its the only thing that makes sense at this time. Its not 'feasible' that the brain is simply a receiver, its 'pluasible'. Just like its plausible that all of our actions are controlled by some evil demon entity out there. 'plausiblity' is just an imaginative idea that seems like it could work in reality, yet has never been demonstrated to be true in reality. We have no evidence of the brain being a receiver to something outside of matter and energy. So its a fun idea, but fun ideas are beyond counting. An idea without anything to demonstrate it has legs in reality, is a unicorn. The idea that consciousness does not come from brains is a unicorn. It is nothing but a hope and a wish based on there being some gaps in our complete understanding of how the brain functions.

That is the Hard Problem. "Through our physical brain" is a where, not a how. "In the sky" does not tell us how flight is accomplished. "In our legs" does not tell us how walking is accomplished. "In our brain" does not tell us how consciousness is accomplished. The details are not insignificant. They are remarkably important. And they are unknown. — Patterner

Sure, but its not the hard problem. Its just a problem. We learn more every day how the brain works in both medicine and science. All of this was done going with the knowledge that consciousness comes from the brain, and waiting to be proven wrong. So far, its not wrong. Its a problem to map our behaviors of consciousness to the brain for sure. But that's easy and we set out with confidence that it will be solved one day. The hard problem, the problem that in all likelihood will never be solved, is an objective science that can determine the subjective experience of a consciousness.

But I think we're repeating at this point. I've noted my stance, and you've noted yours. If we disagree still at this point, I think we can both agree that's just going to be the way it is.

People may argue that we don't know how the brain produces consciousness, but this applies to other emergent phenomena as well. We don't know how agitated molecules in substances produce heat or how applying heat produces agitated molecules in substances which in turn causes the substance to rise in temperature. We can say it's due to friction, or due to photons, but we can then ask, " how does friction produce heat or how do photons agitate molecules"? And so on....

What we do know is that there is no evidence of consciousness existing anywhere apart from biological organisms, so we really have zero reason to think that consciousness can exist apart from biological organisms, and every reason to think it cannot.

Of course, this does not prove consciousness cannot exist apart from biological organisms, but as I already said, nothing in science is ever proven; proof is only possible in rule-based formal systems such as logic or mathematics.

What we do know is that there is no evidence of consciousness existing anywhere apart from biological organisms, so we really have zero reason to think that consciousness can exist apart from biological organisms, and every reason to think it cannot. — Janus

:100:

If by "we don't know" you mean that it hasn't been proven, then I agree; nothing in science has been proven. — Janus

:up: :up:

Yes, judgement is a physical process by your brain. — Philosophim

No, it’s an intellectual process. 2+2=4 is an intellectual operation. There is no such thing as ‘=‘ in the physical world, it is an abstraction. The mind relies on such abstractions to reason, and they’re not physical in nature. (Hence the interminable arguments about platonic realism.)

Because we do not have an adequate understanding of matter.

The puzzle is based on a concept of matter that makes the problem the equivalent of explain how a rock could be conscious.

No, it’s an intellectual process. 2+2=4 is an intellectual operation. There is no such thing as ‘=‘ in the physical world, it is an abstraction. — Wayfarer

It does exist in the physical world. It exists in our physical brains. Right? If it doesn't exist there, where does it exist?

‘In our brains’ is another reification. It has no location, it isn’t in any place. If an intelligent creature were to evolve by a completely separate biological pathway, they would discover the concept of equals, But it’s a concept, an idea, it is not a physical thing.

@Fooloso4 will recognise the provenance of this argument, although he may not agree with it ;-)

Subjective consciousness is not empirically observable. Behavioral consciousness is. — Philosophim

Behavior is not consciousness. That's stimulus and response. How do you behave when something sharp pokes into your back? How do you behave when your energy levels are depleted? These are not questions of consciousness.

The only reason its a mystery is you think that its impossible for consciousness to come out of physical matter and energy. Why? It clearly does. — Philosophim

It's a mystery because nobody can explain it. Christof Koch can't, try though he does. You are not even offering speculations. You only say it happens in the brain. That's obviously where my consciousness is. But what is the mechanism?

Is it some necessary desire that we want ourselves to be above physical reality? — Philosophim

Not for me. I don't care what the answer is. I just want to know what it is.

Because if you eliminate that desire, its clear as day that consciousness is physical by even a cursory glance into medicine and brain research. I just don't get the mystery or the resistance. — Philosophim

If it was not a mystery, we would have the answer. We don't. The resistance, in my case, is that the answer of "It just does" to the question of "How does the physical brain produce consciousness?" is no answer at all. Just as we wouldn't accept that answer to "How does eating food give us energy?", we shouldn't accept it here.

That is the Hard Problem. "Through our physical brain" is a where, not a how. "In the sky" does not tell us how flight is accomplished. "In our legs" does not tell us how walking is accomplished. "In our brain" does not tell us how consciousness is accomplished. The details are not insignificant. They are remarkably important. And they are unknown.
— Patterner

Sure, but its not the hard problem. — Philosophim

Yes it is. That's what is meant when people refer to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

From Chalmers' The Conscious Mind:

Many books and articles on consciousness have appeared in the past few years, and one might think that we are making progress. But on a closer look, most of this work leaves the hardest problems about consciousness untouched. Often, such work addresses what might be called the “easy” problems of consciousness: How does the brain process environmental stimulation? How does it integrate information? How do we produce reports on internal states? These are important questions, but to answer them is not to solve the hard problem: Why is all this processing accompanied by an experienced inner life?

From wiki:

In philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiences. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give a (healthy) human being the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioral functions such as watching, listening, speaking (including generating an utterance that appears to refer to personal behaviour or belief), and so forth. The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation: that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioral, as each physical system can be explained (at least in principle) purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon.

From Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it is like” for a subject in conscious experience, why conscious mental states “light up” and directly appear to the subject.

From Scholarpedia:

The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i.e., phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience? And why does a given physical process generate the specific experience it does—why an experience of red rather than green, for example?