what is good? — Shawn

Well, the good stuff, obviously...

OP is referring to Moore's "open question" argument. More background:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-question_argument
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/

His main argument against their view was what has come to be known as the “open-question argument,” though he actually stated in two slightly different ways. Consider a particular naturalist claim, such as that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasant” or “x is pleasure.”If this claim were true, he argued, the judgement “Pleasure is good” would be equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure,” yet surely someone who asserts the former means to express more than that uninformative tautology. Alternatively, if this naturalist claim were true, “x is pleasant but x is not good” would be self-contradictory. Once it was established that x is pleasant, the question whether it is good would then be closed, or not worth considering, whereas, he argued, it remains open. The same argument can be mounted against any other naturalist proposal: even if we have determined that something is what we desire to desire or is more evolved, the question whether it is good remains open, in the sense of not being settled by the meaning of the word “good".

- "Moore's Moral Philosophy", SEP

But, how is stuff related to what is good?

What about this:

"Good" is an adjective denoting that a thing that is good is a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating OR at least three at the same time and in the same respect of the aforementioned qualifiers.

I invite examples that debunk this definition.

Please don't juxtapose something that is good now but will be not good later, or something that is good for Mr. X but not good for Ms. Y. Those violate the rule in the definition, "at the same time and in the same respect."

So, what is good? — Shawn

Answering this question depends on a specific evaluative context.

G.E. Moore, in his Principia Ethica has claimed that good is a simple and indefinable.

This might not be true of bad. For instance: I think we know what is bad for our species (i.e. harmful, deprivative, abject, traumatic) to intentionally do to ourselves or one another either by action or inaction (e.g. Confucius, Hillel the Elder, Epicurus ... Philippa Foot).

But, how is stuff related to what is good? — Shawn

Well, the stuff that is related to what is good, is the good stuff.

How will you respond to 's specification? Think Socrates. Use the open question.

Seems all the more complex since good as a simple is defined by circular definitions. Again we have this relational stuff arising out of a simple.

Is that how it works?

Answering this question depends on a specific evaluative context. — 180 Proof

So, good is context dependent?

I set up the stage, so I give the floor to you. :cool:

What meaning isn't?

When a speaker declares x is good, they are marking their approval of x. Moreover, they are asserting that this approval springs from something intrinsic to x itself. If I say "Sally is good", I don't merely like Sally, according to me Sally is so constituted as to be intrinsically liked.

Answering this question depends on a specific evaluative context. — 180 Proof

Good has no fixed referent, but the meaning itself holds constant.

Is it that "Sally is good" because you prefer her or do you "prefer Sally" because she is good? :chin:

So, what is good? — Shawn

That which is willed

The latter. Otherwise, "prefer" or "like" would be used, not "good".

That which is willed — bert1

This is "good" as a noun, "the good", the thing desired, or the objective. Taking "good" from being an adjective, or even adverb, and making it a noun, as you've done here, is what makes "good" intelligible.

"Good" is an adjective denoting that a thing that is good is a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating OR at least three at the same time and in the same respect of the aforementioned qualifiers.

I invite examples that debunk this definition. — god must be atheist

It seems to me and Banno, that what the open ended argument entails is that there are things that can be all those three and yet not be good. So, it seems there's room to provide more context here.

What meaning isn't? — 180 Proof

But, according to Moore, "good" is a simple. A simple is a thing that has no parts. Yet, we often use the term "good" in ways that make it seem as if it were something more than a simple.

Why is that, @Banno, if you care to mention...

Good has no fixed referent, but the meaning itself holds constant — hypericin

@Banno, this is surely something in your ballpark.

The good is...

That which is willed — bert1

Moore supposes that one might wonder if that which is willed is that which is good; and moreover, that this question makes sense. Yet if being willed were nothing more than being good, how could one question that equivalence?

That is, the notion of what is willed is distinct from the notion of what is good.

That is, one can consistently conceive of someone willing what is not good.

When a speaker declares x is good, they are marking their approval of x. — hypericin

Moore supposes that one might wonder if that which is approved of is that which is good; and moreover, that this question makes sense. Yet if being approved of were nothing more than being good, how could one question that equivalence?

That is, the notion of what is approved off is distinct from the notion of what is good.

That is, one can consistently conceive of someone approved off what is not good.

That is, the notion of what is willed is distinct from the notion of what is good. — Banno

Assuming @bert1 is a Kantian, does it follow that which is willed, is the good?

Reread my first post on this thread where I respond to Moore specifically (i.e. the open-question argument). As I point out, in ethics I think "defining good" is besides the point.

As I point out, in ethics I think "defining good" is besides the point. — 180 Proof

I think I can see what your saying. In that, treating good in the excluded of what is bad?

???

Oh sorry, I misunderstood you.

So, you say that it's dependent of the evaluative context. Do you have any criteria to propose? Mostly epistemic?

Whatever evaluative context you choose to specify e.g. ethics, aesthetics, economics, religion, engineering / building trades, etc the answer to "what is good?" will vary accordingly.

So, what's the consensus of the good in ethics? Moore proposed a form of consequentialism in terms of the good. Do you agree with him?

there are things that can be all those three and yet not be good. — Shawn

Never mind Kant and consensus and ethics and circularity of definition and stuff. Just give me one instance when three or four of my qualifyers are true but the quality is not good.

You guys just talk and talk and talk and nobody thinks around here. I need just one frekkin' instance of a thing that debunks my definition.

I am not saying that my definition is perfect. It may be, or it may not be. I don't know. But it must be accepted and all the other crap you people are talking about must be neglected until the definition gets debunked.

That's the only thing I don't like about this site. If I say something and it's inconvenient, but valid, people simply ignore it and talk around it.

↪Shawn Whatever evaluative context you choose to specify e.g. ethics, aesthetics, economics, religion, engineering / building trades, etc the answer to "what is good?" will vary accordingly. — 180 Proof

I am not saying that what you stated there debunks my definition, but what you say may be a simple case of equivocation as defined by Aristotle.

Seems all the more complex since good as a simple is defined by circular definitions. Again we have this relational stuff arising out of a simple. — Shawn

But I think that's Moore's contention: good can't be defined by or analyzed in terms of any other properties, good is a simple, sort of an atomic unit or fundamental building block of moral language and reasoning. Whether Moore is right about this is, of course, a different story.