Would you consider "other minds exist" and/or "there is more than one mind" to be a metaphysical proposition? (I should have asked you this first)

You obviously have a gift for non sequitur.

Your etymological shift says nothing as regards my OP or any point made. More, you falsify my definition of "knowledge" by presenting argument or examples counter to that definition, not by saying that "knowledge" throughout history has had different meaning. If "knowledge" is anything other or more than "awareness of what is", you need only say so and why.

Of course. And again for reasons given.

But "other minds exist" has a truth value. It's either true or false that there are other minds than my own. The truth value is currently unknowable, but that's an epistemological issue, no?

No, it doesn't. Or rather "can't", and this precisely because it is imponderable (not conveniently "currently unknowable"). The epistemological issue is not whether the statement "other minds exist" is true or false; the epistemological issue is that the statement "other minds exist" cannot be adjudicated or otherwise rationally assessed to be one or the other, and is therefore epistemically meaningless.

Metaphysics is to philosophy what mathematics is to theoretical physics. — Agent Smith

What do you make of the following interpretation of your above statement: math is the infrastructure of theoretical physics(?)

Here's the definition of infrastructure I'm using:

infrastructure -- noun -- the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or [the] enterprise:

The epistemological issue is not whether the statement "other minds exist" is true or false; the epistemological issue is that the statement "other minds exist" cannot be adjudicated or otherwise rationally assessed to be one or the other, and is therefore epistemically meaningless. — Zettel

I can see that, but isn't that going to lead to radical skepticism? For example, let's take a non-metaphysical claim: "The cat is on the mat". Isn't that going to turn into metaphysics if we unpack it? Isn't "the cat is on the mat" really saying "there is this mind-independent material stuff, and it combines into things like 'cats' and 'mats' and there's a particular arrangement of matter called 'the cat' and another arrangement called 'the mat'" and so on...

Your etymological shift says nothing as regards my OP or any point made. — Zettel

The etymological shift was yours:

Etymologically, "love" at time and context of ancient Greek philosophy meant "regard" or "appreciation". — Zettel

If "knowledge" is anything other or more than "awareness of what is", you need only say so and why. — Zettel

To determine the meaning of a term we should attend to its use. Put differently , in order to gain knowledge of what knowledge is, we must have an awareness of the use of the term. But you have ignored what knowledge is except in so far as it supports your claims. Contrary to the concerns and interests of philosophers for over two thousand years, you claim that:

philosophy deals only with knowledge of the world, not with self-knowledge, — Zettel

Perhaps some traction might be gained by you telling us who you do recognize as philosophers.

Not at all. The utterance "The cat is on the mat" is ponderable, empirically verifiable; "other minds exist" is not. Not sure what necessity "unpacking" serves in this instance.

Don't you think this is a metaphysical claim?

"mind-independent stuff exists"

[M]etaphysical questions have no truth value. They are not true or false, they are useful or not useful. Metaphysics sets out the rules, what Collingwood calls "absolute presuppositions," of human understanding. — T Clark

It's clear from this thread that @Zettel disagrees with this because s/he's incorrigibly dogmatic. Another Dunning-Kruger troll; thus, s/he cannot respond to you or anyone here without fatuous trivialities and snark.

If s/he walks like Bartricks, talks like Bartricks, then s/he'll be banned (again) like ...

Do you or anyone else here ever post anything other than unsupported sentiment?  — Zettel (Bartricks)

Pathetic projection – no post on this thread yet has been gassing "unsupported sentiments" more than the OP.

First off, you need to learn the difference between language meaning and language use. Second, if you disagree with my given definition of "knowledge", you need only take issue and offer opposing reasoned argument or evidence. But claiming what you say is my purpose with such definition is not to falsify or otherwise invalidate that definition in the slightest.

Again, you have not engaged a single point presented in the OP. Instead, you dance, making tangential remarks, voicing unsupported disagreement, invoking extraneous historical/etymological considerations.

I have already stated who I recognize as a philosopher. Popper is another. Hume another.

This is not to say you are not entitled to your feelings; it is to say that your feelings do not describe "what is", only "what is to you". Big difference. — Zettel

by knowledge I mean awareness of "what is". "What is" is that which is empirically verified. — Zettel

An argument: the proposition that axiology (i.e. the philosophical study of value)—which can thereby include the study of ethical and aesthetic values—ought not be properly considered a subset of philosophy on grounds that axiology does not address “what is” (which is empirically verifiable) but “what is to you” (which is not empirically verifiable) is, in short, self-refuting; this because the very affirmation’s truth value (if any) is contingent on standards of value (such as in relation to what is good, right, correct, or proper and their converse in respect to philosophy) that cannot be empirically verifiable via observations and, thereby, which hold no truth value in relation to “what is”.

Intending to simplify the just expressed: you’re using your own empirically unverifiable system of values to make the philosophical assertion that the study of values and has no philosophically worth on grounds of not being empirically verifiable—thereby entailing your own assertion to have no philosophical worth.

As others have mentioned, metaphysics tends to concern itself with first principles, which I’ll contend include first principles in relation to value. These, then, address issues such as why it is that you yourself value empirically verifiable philosophy and disvalue empirically unverifiable philosophy in the first place.

Wincing refutation.

Brutal polemic,

Devastating rejoinder.

Compelling counter.

Always amusing when trolls like you, who lack the intellect and intellectual integrity to address specific points and offer intelligent rejoinder, instead turn to non sequitur, ad hominem and pout.

:rofl:

Are you having a bad day? And can you stop having a bad day now, please?

Bartricks was an idealist. I'm not getting idealist vibes from Zettel.

You misread (I can't even say "misinterpreted") my OP and comments subsequent. Perhaps in lieu of putting words in my mouth and inserting your foot in yours, you can ask for clarification and/or additional support for claims made.

As for "first principles", nothing like begging the question.

You obviously are no stranger to psychological projection.

And non sequitur.

You do give good pout, however.

Bartricks was, in practice, a 'solipsist' and I'm getting 'solipsist' vibes from Zettel.

↪RogueAI Bartricks was, in practice, a 'solipsist' and I'm getting 'solipsist' vibes from Zettel. — 180 Proof

I'm wondering if solipsism is a choice or an inevitability for some people....

First off, you need to learn the difference between language meaning and language use. — Zettel

Where do you imagine the meaning of words comes from if not the use of words?

if you disagree with my given definition of "knowledge", you need only take issue and offer opposing reasoned argument or evidence. — Zettel

Are you really unaware that this is what I have been doing?

I have already stated who I recognize as a philosopher. — Zettel

You recognize Wittgenstein as a philosopher and yet you seem unaware of what he says about meaning and use. In addition you seem unaware that both the early and later Wittgenstein rejected the idea that philosophy is about:

... that which is empirically verified. — Zettel

Contrary to what is empirically verified he says:

Man has to awaken to wonder - and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.(Culture and Value)

Working in philosophy -- like work in architecture in many respects -- is really more work on oneself. On one's own conception. On how one sees things. (And what one expects of them.) (CV, 24)

His concern is not with knowledge of the world but with oneself, on seeing, most importantly with seeing aspects and aspect blindness. It is not about an awareness of what is but rather on how one sees what is. Aesthetics remains a central concern. It is not theoretical but experiential.

As he says:

… our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena. (PI 90)

RIP Z :roll:

Perhaps in lieu of putting words in my mouth and inserting your foot in yours, you can ask for clarification and/or additional support for claims made. — Zettel

OK then, maybe I've read too much into what you're saying. I'll give it another go. From the OP:

Are metaphysical doctrines such as aesthetics and ethics really "branches" of philosophy, or are they just thinly disguised poetry? The propositions issuing from metaphysics and philosophy seem logically and epistemologically distinct.

Philosophy means "love of wisdom". Wisdom requires knowledge, not belief, opinion, sentiment or personal view, else how does (read: "can") one 'know' who or what is wise? — Zettel

So, "philosophy means 'love of wisdom'" and "wisdom requires knowledge". OK, though this does not then imply that philosophy is "love of knowledge" per se.

If I understand the OP well enough, it contends that "love of wisdom" which aspires to gain knowledge of what values are (such as ethical and aesthetic values) and why they are as they are should not be properly considered philosophy.

So far you've specified that this is so because ethics and aesthetics (both of which consist of values, or worths) are not empirically verifiable and so cannot consist of knowledge (regarding "what is" rather than "what is to you")

But this again seems self-refuting to me: "love", emotive though it is, holds a value, a worth, otherwise it becomes a meaningless term; so your very affirmation of what proper philosophy (i.e., "love of wisdom") is will be grounded on that which you claim to be the "thinly disguised poetry" of metaphysics, rather than on empirically verifiable knowns. Thereby (given the dichotomy you're presented) by your own standards making the enterprise of demarcating proper philosophy - i.e., proper love of wisdom - itself metaphysical, i.e. thinly disguised poetry.

On the other hand, if you can somehow demonstrate love to be an empirically verifiable known regarding "what is", then you'd likewise demonstrate a value/worth to be an empirically verifiable known - thereby making axiology (which again encompasses the study of ethical and aesthetic value) a worthwhile philosophical study by the OP's standards.

RIP Z :roll: — jgill

Darn. Saw the banning only after my last post. Seems like play time might be over for me. Oh well.

To vastly oversimplify; in my view... science is applied materialism, mathematics is applied idealism. — T Clark

Let me indulge in gross simplification by characterizing materialism as quantitative and idealism as qualitative.

Are you saying science is hands-on measurement in practice (quantitative) whereas math is cerebral language in practice (qualitative)?

It will forever be a mystery. Myself, I think I caught a whiff of a certain computationalist that posted up a storm and then went out in a bang. I used to like to go out in a bang.

Are you saying science is hands-on measurement in practice (quantitative) whereas math is cerebral language in practice (qualitative)? — ucarr

My party line is that a particular metaphysics describes the underlying assumptions, what RG Collingwood calls "absolute presuppositions," of a particular way of seeing the world. When I say science is applied materialism I mean that science will only work in a physicalist, materialist world. You have to believe or act as if you believe there is an objective reality that behaves in accordance with universal laws. When I say mathematics is applied idealism I mean that mathematics will only work in an idealist world. You have to believe or act as if you believe that mathematical entities have an independent existence.

I read somewhere, I can't remember where, that scientists tend to be materialists and mathematicians tend to be idealists. That makes sense to me.

Metaphysics is to philosophy what mathematics is to theoretical physics.
— Agent Smith

What do you make of the following interpretation of your above statement: math is the infrastructure of theoretical physics(?)

Here's the definition of infrastructure I'm using:

infrastructure -- noun -- the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or [the] enterprise: — ucarr

Good enough for me. Very Platonic in character though - as if numbers were people living in a city, maybe they are!

Yes, but 2023 Buick Enclave has third row video.

Your turn. — Zettel

We're off-topic. I agree metaphysics is speculative, but you aren't saying anything new if that's your point.