• Mark S
    264
    Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) begins with an empirical observation, “All past and present cultural moral norms are heuristics (usually reliable, but fallible rules of thumb) for parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems.” See “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”.

    This empirical observation suggests two universal moral principles that describe moral ‘means’. Those principles are:
    • “Act to solve cooperation problems” and
    • “Do not act to create cooperation problems”

    Note that domination moral norms and marker moral norms are not universal.

    MACS’ moral principles can be culturally useful the same way the Golden Rule is even though both are silent regarding moral ends. (The MACS perspective reveals versions of the Golden Rule are unusually effective heuristics for MACS’ principles.)

    And since MACS’ principles are silent about ultimate moral goals (ends), they, like the Golden Rule, are complementary with consequentialist moralities as described in “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism”.

    But are MACS’s moral principles normative, what people morally ought and ought not do? Or are they only morally irrelevant principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors?

    Bernard Gert’s definition of morality implies a way to determine normativity that is independent of any specific moral premise. He suggests that “…the term ‘morality’ can be used … normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.”

    I know of no better definition of normativity and will use it to argue MACS’s principles define right and wrong concerning the ‘means’ of interactions with other people.

    Gert’s inclusion of “given specified conditions” makes his criterion flexible enough to be adapted to separately judge the normativity of moral ‘means’ and moral ends (goals). I will adapt Gert’s proposal as:

    “What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.”

    For this specific case, “well-informed” includes understanding objective scientific claims that:

    1) “Past and present cultural moral norms are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems” and

    2) The ability to solve cooperation problems that are present everywhere in our universe is necessary for the existence of all highly cooperative societies regardless of biology or environment. Cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment) that are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems are necessary for all highly cooperative societies composed of intelligent, self-interested agents such as human beings.

    But even assuming the above scientific claims are accepted as true, would “all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people” agree to advocate for MACS’s two principles?

    In favor of advocating for the claims:

    1) Advocating for MACS will make it more likely we can maintain a highly cooperative society with all the social and individual benefits that cooperation brings.

    2) MACS defines moral principles that are more than just cross-culturally universal. Because the cooperation problems they solve are innate to our universe, they are cross-species, environment, and time universal.

    3) MACS’ principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because the reproductive fitness benefits that following them produced helped select for the biology underlying our moral sense. These principles specifically selected for our sense of fairness and our moral emotions: empathy, gratitude, loyalty, righteous indignation at the violation of moral norms, shame, and guilt. Their reproductive fitness benefits also selected for our emotional experience of ‘elevation’ (a pleasurable mix of satisfaction, pride, and optimism in the cooperative company of friends and family) as an incentive for living in cooperative groups. The emotional experience of elevation may be central to experiencing durable happiness.

    4) MACS’ silence on moral ‘ends’ (the goals of this cooperation) leaves rational people largely free to advocate for their preferences or needs for moral goals. Those preferences could include: a) “Maximize well-being”, “Minimize suffering”, or “Maximize virtue”, b) claims that the morality of goals is culture dependent (implying moral ‘ends’ are subjective while moral ‘means’ can be objective), or c) whatever they favor at any given time.

    5) MACS is attractive simply because it has the strongest argument for universality (independent of its normativity).

    Why might “well-informed, mentally normal, rational people who accept the above scientific claims as provisionally true”not advocate for MACS’s principles?

    1) Because one’s theology contradicts MACS’s principles. For example, a theology could claim that women must be submissive to men, which is immoral by MACS’s principles.

    2) Because one’s rational thought leads them to otherwise define moral means such as Kant’s categorical imperatives.

    3) Because one did not want to constrain their own behavior. They might expect to personally benefit if everyone else followed these principles but want to feel free to violate them based on their needs and preferences.

    These negative reasons are arguably not compelling since:

    1) Rather than rejecting MACS for theological reasons, it seems more likely that a rational, well-informed theologian will embrace it as an insight into how their god or gods created morality. Theologians are typically already well-informed about ongoing ‘reinterpretations” and ‘evolution’ of their theological moralities in the face of internal and external contradictions. Resolving those contradictions using principles innate to the universe their god created should be welcomed by rational, religious minds.

    2) I expect a rational person would favor the MACS definition of moral means that are innate to our universe and harmonious with our moral sense rather than, for example, Kantianism with its well-known inherent disharmony with our moral sense. For example, a murderer could ask where his next victim is. The Kantian might feel morally obligated to tell the truth. By MACS, you would be morally obligated to lie to avoid the cooperation problem (violating indirect reciprocity) caused by murder.

    3) Finally, a person could rationally advocate for moral principles for society without necessarily committing to always following them. A person could rationally decide to act immorally. In the case of MACS’ moral principles, this does not result in incoherence because while MACS’s principles are arguably normative (define right and wrong) they are not imperative (what everyone must do regardless of needs and preferences). It can be rational to violate them.

    Someone may think of other reasons that rational, well-informed people might advocate for some other moral ‘means’ than MACS’ principles.

    On the balance of the above pluses and minuses, it seems to me that all, or virtually all, “well-informed, mentally normal, rational people who accept the above scientific claims as provisionally true” will advocate for MACS’s principles rather than any other. MACS’ moral principles would then be classified by Gert’s criterion as normative.
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    Why are you starting multiple threads on the same topic? Does it mean a lot to you, this MACS? I don't think cultural norms track morality only. Sinister elements may too.
  • Mark S
    264


    Why are you starting multiple threads on the same topic?Agent Smith

    Good question!

    The three threads are about three different applications of MACS. One long thread on the subject would be hopelessly confusing about which application of MACS was being discussed in each comment.

    Also, describing each of the three applications one at a time as they build on each other allows me to refine my ideas and presentation for the successive OP’s based on the much appreciated comments and questions I get.

    In review, the separate applications are:

    1) “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”

    Introduced the empirical data that MACS is based on and described how this data is culturally useful for resolving many disputes about cultural moral norms. It is useful despite having no innate, or argued for, normativity. A simple 'is' observation about past and present cultural moral norms is sufficient to resolve, as described, many serious disputes about enforcing cultural moral norms (which MACS reveals to be heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies). For many, that may be an unusual idea. This thread discusses several controversial questions and is useful as a standalone.

    2) “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism”.

    Emphasizes that MACS only tells us about what moral means (moral interactions between people as described by cultural moral norms) ‘are’ and is silent about moral goals such as forms of consequentialism. By defining moral ‘means’ as solving cooperation problems, MACS complements consequentialism by eliminating consequentialism’s well-known ‘means’ flaws such as over-demandingness. Conversely, consequentialist goals complement MACS by providing a definition of what goals of cooperation are moral – a subject MACS is silent on. There are still no normativity claims involved regarding MACS itself.

    For people who do not accept the reality of imperative moral oughts, a MACS/consequentialist morality might be their preference for both their society and themselves.

    Again, there are several ideas that may be new here and worth discussing on their own.

    3) “Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies”

    Could MACS be normative – define what we ought and ought not to do?

    Describes the third application of MACS with a normative claim.

    I don't think cultural norms track morality only. Sinister elements may too.Agent Smith

    Sinister elements such as domination moral norms and some marker moral norms do of course exist as I described in “What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”

    Cultural norms track a lot of things. The subject here is cultural moral norms – norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment, though the violator may not actually be punished except by social disapproval.

    Does it mean a lot to you, this MACS?Agent Smith

    Yes, it has kept me entertained for about 15 years now. The science was easy. The presentation is devilishly difficult.
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    Not all cultural norms are congruent with morality though. That's of course a strawman of your position, but just thought it's a good feedback for your project.
  • Mark S
    264

    Cultural moral norms (cultural norms whose violation is commonly considered to deserve punishment) are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    Cultural moral norms (cultural norms whose violation is commonly considered to deserve punishment) are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.Mark S

    Well, we did discuss, in the old thread of yours, the mafia; may be we can find counterexamples thereabouts.
  • Banno
    24.7k
    Indeed, three threads by the same person, repeating the same error.
  • Agent Smith
    9.5k
    Indeed, three threads by the same person, repeating the same error.Banno

    :lol: I thought the OP was trying out different strategies/approaches to his thesis, exploring different aspects of it that is.

    Perhaps he means to show or investigate protomorality in the form of group cohesion effected through culturual norms. I dunno, just a wild guess.
  • Mark S
    264

    means to show or investigate protomoralityAgent Smith

    Understanding MACS as “protomorality” sounds like a helpful perspective. It could help bridge the intellectual framing gap between how understanding what moral behavior ‘is’ is culturally useful (my topic) and traditional moral philosophy’s focus on what ought to be moral, a different category of thing.
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