Intelligibility has existence independent of the perception and comprehension of agent intellect? — ucarr

It has actual existence as what it is, say an apple, but is potential with respect to our perception (sensibility) and comprehension (intelligibility).

Asking this another way, when a tree falls in the forest sans observer, is this event nonetheless an intelligible phenomenon? — ucarr

Yes, the event is intrinsically comprehensible, but the extrinsic conditions required to actualize that potential are missing.

Asking it obversely, does intelligibility propagate only in direct connection to the comprehension of the agent intellect (of the sentient being)? — ucarr

What propagates is a physical action that can inform sense organs (the Scholastics called this the sensible species). This is because the object is acting on its environment, say by scattering light, emitting sound or pushing back when touched. Without this sort of action, there would be no sensation. After that, it is up to the subject to attend to the sensation or not. Attending is the act of the agent intellect, and deciding to attend is an act of will.

Does intelligibility persist in the absence of sentience? — ucarr

The simple answer would have been: "As long as the intelligible object does. Not as a stand-alone entity." We now aware that objects are surrounded by a radiance of action (or sensible species) that may persist long after the core object has ceased to be. For example, a star may be long gone before we perceive and comprehend it.

Aristotle held that action is an accident inhering in the substance, even though its effect is spatially outside the substance. (The house being built is outside the builder building it.) In this view, which I think we should adopt, substances are not confined by the spatio-temporal boundaries we perceive, but also include their radiance of action. There is no text saying this, but it follows from what the texts say, and helps clarify issues of delayed perception. It makes sense of us saying "I see that star," when the core object may be long gone.

Consider: Intelligibility ≡ Order
The above statement is true? — ucarr

Well, order is intelligible.

I see two problems which make me hesitate to agree. The first is conceptual. Assuming that order and intelligibility are coextensive, they still differ in definition. "Order" names an intrinsic property, while "intelligibility" points to a possible relation -- the possibility of being an object in the subject-object relation of knowledge.

The second problem is that order is one of those things which we may know when we see it, but does not have an agreed upon definition. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary online is: "the way in which people or things are arranged, either in relation to one another or according to a particular characteristic." This does not seem to capture the philosophical idea of order, for the arrangement may be quite disorderly. If you want to add that the arrangement has to be according to some intelligible principle, then we come close to what you are saying -- but I think metaphysical naturalists might object to such a definition as it implicates a source of intelligibility. Another problem with this definition is that we might want to say that unity is a form of order, and maybe even the highest form of order, and unity is not an arrangement of parts.

So, I cannot agree, not because I disagree with the insight, but because I do not see the connection clearly enough to commit to it.

Obversely, does non-teleological evolution preclude all linkage between intelligibility and order? — ucarr

I think "non-teleological evolution" is an oxymoron. Natural selection is selection by the laws of nature, which act to determinate ends.

Can there be unintelligible order? — ucarr

To judge that a system has order, it has to be capable of eliciting the concept <order>, which means that order is, by definition, intelligible. How can something unintelligible elicit any concept?

If not, must we conclude there can be no non-teleological evolution? — ucarr

That has long been my position for many theoretical and empirical reasons. See my "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 22 (1-2):32-66 (2010) (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution).

If so, must we conclude mind takes the sensory input of the proto-order of the objective world and converts it into the following block chain: intelligibility_perception_memory-processing-comprehension_self — ucarr

I would start with sensibility, but I agree that we come to know our self, not a priori, but by reflecting on what we do -- both physically and intentionally.

Using the above statements, can I deduce agent intellect is ontologically present and active within the mind of humans? — ucarr

Yes. The historical question was whether it was a human or a divine power. I think that idenitifying it with awareness allows us to settle the question in favor of a human power. If it were a divine power, we would be aware of everything.

Moreover, can I conclude agent intellect lies somewhere between hard dualism at one end and hard reduction at the other end? — ucarr

The agent intellect is an essential part of a theory that stands between them.

To judge that a system has order, it has to be capable of eliciting the concept <order>, which means that order is, by definition, intelligible. How can something unintelligible elicit any concept? — Dfpolis

It seems to me, the reason we can sometimes perceive order is because the laws of nature result in patterns and order. Conceivably, there are laws of nature that we we may never become aware of, and thus a sort of "order" we can never perceive. More importantly, I think "order" is too fuzzy (and subjective) to treat as an intrinsic property of a state of affairs, whereas the perception of order is explainable with laws of nature- which do seem to reflect something intrinsic.

It seems to me, the reason we can sometimes perceive order is because the laws of nature result in patterns and order. Conceivably, there are laws of nature that we we may never become aware of, and thus a sort of "order" we can never perceive. More importantly, I think "order" is too fuzzy (and subjective) to treat as an intrinsic property of a state of affairs, whereas the perception of order is explainable with laws of nature- which do seem to reflect something intrinsic. — Relativist

I agree with you for the most part. Order is a result of the laws of nature, which are not the same as our descriptions of them, because they act to determine the outcome of physical (vs. intentional) processes. I also said, "order is one of those things which we may know when we see it, but does not have an agreed upon definition." So, whether it is an intrinsic property cannot be determined until a definition is agreed upon.

whether it[order] is an intrinsic property cannot be determined until a definition is agreed upon. — Dfpolis

It seems superfluous to try and construe order as an intrinsic property, because laws of nature fully account for the perceived order.

It seems superfluous to try and construe order as an intrinsic property, because laws of nature fully account for the perceived order. — Relativist

An effect (order) is distinct from its cause (the operation of the laws). Looked at differently, order is evidence for a source of order.

An effect (order) is distinct from its cause (the operation of the laws). Looked at differently, order is evidence for a source of order. — Dfpolis

We perceive order, and infer laws of nature that account for it. So I agree our perception of order is a critical step in our understanding of nature, but the law exists with or without our perception and inferences.

Separate issue: have you read Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos"? Like you, he makes a case for teleology, and it's based on philosophy of mind issues.

the law exists with or without our perception and inferences. — Relativist

Of course.

have you read Thomas Nagel's "Mind and Cosmos"? — Relativist

No, I have not read it. You might take a look at this review: https://www.academia.edu/31170852/Mind_and_Cosmos_Why_the_Materialist_Neo_Darwinian_Conception_of_Nature_Is_Almost_Certainly_False_by_Thomas_Nagel

Assuming that order and intelligibility are coextensive, they still differ in definition. "Order" names an intrinsic property, while "intelligibility" points to a possible relation -- the possibility of being an object in the subject-object relation of knowledge. — Dfpolis

Regarding intelligibility and order, do we have a knarly Venn Diagram as with the form/ substance puzzle? In other words, do we have distinct properties that are inseparable?

Please assess the following conjecture: An apple is an ordered state of being of an existing thing. By definition, its order is active, not potential*.

*With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes.

In contrast, we can say an apple seed has the potential ordering of an apple.

n other words, do we have distinct properties that are inseparable? — ucarr

I suspect so, but we need a good definition of order to do the analysis.

Please assess the following conjecture: An apple is an ordered state of being of an existing thing. By definition, its order is active, not potential*. — ucarr

Again, I think this is putting the cart before the horse. We need to go through the Socratic exercise of finding a good definition. I think we can agree that where order occurs, it is actual, not potential.

About the seed: I wonder if it does not already have all the order that the mature tree will have, but packed tighter. If not, where would the tree's order originate? I am reminded of St. Augustine's idea of rationes seminales, which were supposed to contain all the information needed for future creatures.

About the seed: I wonder if it does not already have all the order that the mature tree will have, but packed tighter. — Dfpolis

This raises an interesting question. With your no-cart-before-the-horse proviso in mind, I don't seek an immediate answer: What degree of variation or change in an ordered sequence crosses the threshold dividing integral change from entropic breakdown? Entropy, a thermodynamic measurement essential to systems theory feels to me like a suitable context in which to pursue a contemporary and useful definition of order.

With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes. — ucarr

The problem with this is that we could not even call this "attributes", because "attribute" refers to an apprehended order. That's the reason for separating matter from form. In principle, matter is the absence of form. But Aristotle demonstrates that in reality the absence of form is logically impossible. So this is kind of like the concept of "infinite", a very useful concept which has no corresponding physical reality.

About the seed: I wonder if it does not already have all the order that the mature tree will have, but packed tighter. — Dfpolis

I do not think that this could be the case, because the growing seed is subjected to external forces, these are accidents, and the way that the growing form responds produces a unique order. So within the seed itself there is an allowance for the development of an order which is not already there. This is why evolution is possible, and consequently a reality.

This capacity to create order is what makes life so difficult to understand. That the order (form) is created as a response, rather than casually determined from the accidents, is what I've been telling you is very important to the understanding of sensation and intellection. This provides for the reality of a being with free will, the form in the mind must be created from within, rather than determined by the external accidents.

I do not think that this could be the case, because the growing seed is subjected to external forces, these are accidents, and the way that the growing form responds produces a unique order. — Metaphysician Undercover

That was the reason for my hesitation.

This is why evolution is possible, and consequently a reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

That was Lamarck's theory. It is not the current view.

This provides for the reality of a being with free will, the form in the mind must be created from within, rather than determined by the external accidents. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I argued in my article, there is no reason to think that physics has no intentional effects. So, how could physcal interactions produce free will?

What degree of variation or change in an ordered sequence crosses the threshold dividing integral change from entropic breakdown? Entropy, a thermodynamic measurement essential to systems theory feels to me like a suitable context in which to pursue a contemporary and useful definition of order. — ucarr

In statistical mechanics, entropy measures how many microscopic states could underlie a macroscopic state. It is only defined for closed systems. For example, in a box filled with a gas, many microscopic states could underlie a uniform temperature. Vastly fewer microscopic states have high temperature at one end and low temperature at the other. We can conclude that random motion is far more likely to produce one of the many uniform temperature macroscopic states than one of the few large temperature difference macroscopic states. Still, there is a theorem that says, if you wait long enough, the system will get as close as you like to any distribution you choose. Sadly, the wait times are large compared to the age of the universe.

The question is, how do we connect this relation between the macroscopic and the microscopic to order as a philosophical concept? Do we really want to define philosophic order in terms of the number of its possible microscopic realizations? I think such a definition would miss the point entirely. It seems to me that the idea of order is related to unity and intelligibility, rather than microscopic realizations, which were never thought of by classic authors. We see things as ordered, for example, when they are directed to a single end -- e.g., the parts of an organism being ordered to sustaining its life or propagating its species.

With active order absent, we have a chaotic jumble of disconnected attributes. — ucarr

The problem with this is that we could not even call this "attributes", because "attribute" refers to an apprehended order. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you say above -- re: attributes -- sounds correct to me. I know, therefore, I've omitted something essential from my statement.

Consider a PC for which you try to upgrade the monitor. Turning on the PC, momentarily you get coherent images onscreen and then the picture scrambles into a messy melange of incoherent shapes and colors. The problem is the new monitor requires a higher resolution video card than the one installed in your computer.

I use this example to posit the phenomenal universe as a field of proto-order. Its order gets "decided" -- resolved into order_intelligibility -- by the agent-intellect operations of a sentient observer.

For clarification by simplified example consider: At the level of automation, a video card with resolution sufficient to resolve data-unformatted does so via sufficient resolution.

In parallel, at the higher level of sentience, agent-intellect “decides” what is the order_intelligibility of phenomenal world present to its senses.

The Missing Essential

The missing essential is the interface, viz., the entanglement of data-neutral-wrt-order of the phenomenal universe and operational intentionality of agent-intellect.

The physicality of space becomes apparent when we conceptualize object/observer as entangled duet. Also, objectivity/subjectivity as integral whole perplexes simplistic and discrete conceptualizations of their difference.

These are claims made familiar by QM, right?

It seems to me that the idea of order is related to unity and intelligibility, rather than microscopic realizations, which were never thought of by classic authors. We see things as ordered, for example, when they are directed to a single end -- e.g., the parts of an organism being ordered to sustaining its life or propagating its species. — Dfpolis

Does agent-intellect have three essential functions? Are they: entanglement, causation, over-arching cognition?

Does agent-intellect have three essential functions? Are they: entanglement, causation, over-arching cognition? — ucarr

As Aristotle defined it, the agent intellect has one function: to make intelligibility actually known. I am identifying this with the act of awareness, by which neurally encoded contents are recognized.

As I argued in my article, there is no reason to think that physics has no intentional effects. — Dfpolis

I believe that intentional effects are fundamentally incompatible with Newton's first law. A force acting from within a body, to alter the motion of that body, cannot be described a force acting on the body.

The missing essential is the interface, viz., the entanglement of data-neutral-wrt-order of the phenomenal universe and operational intentionality of agent-intellect. — ucarr

Wouldn't the "missing essential" be knowledge itself? This would be the mode of interaction.

As I argued in my article, there is no reason to think that physics has no intentional effects. — Dfpolis

I mistyped. I meant. "As I argued in my article, there is no reason to think physics has intentional effects."

Oh thanks, that makes more sense. I couldn't figure out what you were asking, now I can answer the question.

So, how could physcal interactions produce free will? — Dfpolis

Physical interactions do not produce free will, it comes from something else. If Lamarckian evolutionary theory is closer to reality on this point, then so be it. Darwin's theory was accepted for its scientific merits, not for the philosophical aspects. Lamack's treatise on habits is more consistent with Aristotle, (as implying final cause), than Darwin's vague allusion to chance.