It is a problem for science even if one does not aim to reduce consciousness into an epiphenomenon.

It seems to me that the looking at all reduction as a closure is also a closure. I read Aristotle as trying to open doors on his terms. The failing of the Scholastics was to read him as the answer to everything.

By leaving out an essential feature you are misrepresenting it.
— Fooloso4
Asked and answered. — Dfpolis

Asked and evaded.

what if anything are you actually explaining with regard to consciousness?
— Fooloso4
That it is not reducible to a physical process. — Dfpolis

At best you have pointed to Aristotle's idea of the active intellect, which he says is immaterial. It is not a process because it is unchanging. Your equating the active intellect with consciousness is just something you have claimed.

... for it is not affected or altered. Hence this is a different form from movement; for movement is the activity of the incomplete, while activity proper is different, the activity of the complete. — ibid.431a4

This lends support to the claim that the active intellect is an unmoved mover. It does not move but moves or causes the passive intellect to know.

As @Paine rightly points out, it is not just a problem for reductionists. How is it that there are conscious beings? After all, not all beings are conscious.

It does lend support for that claim.

It is interesting to me that the language in De Anima is more directed to recognizing different kinds of agency than coming to terms with a chain of causality. The distinctions being made about how the soul works are being measured by those who are ensouled: Change happens in this way in some situations but in other ways in others. A desire to be informed by our conditions, as well as they can be described at any time.

After all, not all beings are conscious. — Fooloso4

In my taxonomy, beings are differentiated from things precisely because they are animated (by soul, in Aristotle’s terms.) And you can see it in that even the simplest organisms embody intentional actions even if not conscious in any real sense, although that will sound too near vitalism for most.

Wasn't there a bit of a flame war here about this definition of being last year?

Whenever I mentioned my take on the meaning of 'ontology', SLX would go completely ballistic, but he's not around any more.

At best you have pointed to Aristotle's idea of the active intellect, which he says is immaterial. It is not a process because it is unchanging. — Fooloso4

I made no such claim.

Are you guys referring to a specific OP?

In my taxonomy, beings are differentiated from things precisely because they are animated (by soul, in Aristotle’s terms.) And you can see it in that even the simplest organisms embody intentional actions even if not conscious in any real sense, although that will sound too near vitalism for most. — Wayfarer

This seems reasonable. I think Aristotle's idea of form is more applicable to organisms than the inorganic world.

Are you guys referring to a specific OP? — Paine

I am of the view that the word 'ontology' refers to exploration the nature of being, as distinct from the study of phenomena or the analysis of what kinds of things there are, which I said is the domain of science proper. I was told this was highly eccentric and idiosyncratic (in no uncertain terms) whenever I mentioned it (this was by a former mod, streetlightx, who is no longer a contributor. He was highly educated but often vitriolic in the extreme). Anyway, carry on, this is a digression.

Leaving aside your detractors in the past, I have trouble matching your distinction between ontology and epistemology with Aristotelian and Platonic texts.

Is there some portion of that text that does that for you?

I made no such claim. — Dfpolis

Right, you did not say what I did not say you said.

See e.g. this post and subsequent criticism. SLX posted a link to an apparently classic article by Charles Kahn, which I read pretty carefully, and which I think supports my interrpretation.

I am of the view that the word 'ontology' refers to exploration the nature of being, as distinct from the study of phenomena or the analysis of what kinds of things there are, which I said is the domain of science proper. — Wayfarer

This is good. What was the problem?

What was the problem? — L'éléphant

Basically the problem was that this particular mod hated my guts and would initiate or join any pile-on concerning myself. All water under the bridge.

Hahaha! :up:

All water under the bridge — Wayfarer

And this could be a topic of discussion all by itself. It's interesting that a small incident that occurred years ago can pop up in our minds when we deliberately relegated it to "water under the bridge" - or so we thought. This happened to me last week when a casual remark made by a high school classmate seventy years ago popped into my thoughts. It's partly the evoked emotion caused by the incident that fixes it firmly in the subconscious, available for re-annoying. :sad:

Not commenting on your remark, Wayfarer. It just brought the topic to mind.

Basically the problem was that this particular mod hated my guts and would initiate or join any pile-on concerning myself. All water under the bridge — Wayfarer

If you miss him you can find him on Discord now. I had a little exchange with him there concerning Deleuze. The mod had to step in to keep him civil. Plus ca change…

:cool:

:lol:

Sorry to go off-topic on this thread.

This happened to me last week when a casual remark made by a high school classmate seventy years ago popped into my thoughts. It's partly the evoked emotion caused by the incident that fixes it firmly in the subconscious, available for re-annoying. :sad: — jgill

It's my job to deal with people with a wide range of net worth so basically I'm trained to deal with why people say what they say. (Not to say I've mastered it, so once in a while I fall prey to it, too -- but a "professional" one like me :cool: rebounds back)

Time should have blurred that emotion in you caused by the classmate's remark. But know this, I bet that memory came back to you at the moment when you're not feeling well or your mind was pre-occupied with some disturbance not related to the past memory. You were just vulnerable at that moment, like an infection that you acquired.

I bet that memory came back to you at the moment when you're not feeling well or your mind was pre-occupied — L'éléphant

Indeed it did. I'm 86 and things I haven't thought of in years come back to irritate. :meh:

But so do good things. :smile:

No, what allows me to avoid Cartesian dualism is Arsitotle's definition of the psyche as the actuality of a potentially living body instead of as res cogitans. — Dfpolis

OK, I did not see in the article, how you moved form that definition of soul to your rejection of dualism. All I saw supporting the rejection was the passage I quoted, where you moved from a rejection of the Fundamental Assumption (a rejection unsupported in principle), to a rejection of both property and substance dualism.

"Soul" is defined as the first grade of actuality of a natural, organized body, having life potentially in it. Within Aristotle's conceptual space, as explained in his "Metaphysics", this type of actuality is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of that body, as cause of its existence as an organized body. Therefore we can conclude that this "form" which is called "the soul" is prior in time to the material existence of the living body, therefore independent from it.

So I ask you, how do you proceed within this conceptual space, to reject dualism? You state in your article, that matter and form are logically separably, but not physically separable. But this claim is useless to this analysis because a physical body is necessarily a combination of both matter and form. To separate matter and form would give us something other than a physical body therefore this is "physically" impossible. To separate the two would require something other than a physical process. So, Aristotle uses logic, a logical process of analysis, to show that form is necessarily prior to matter. therefore separate. And since this separate form is necessarily prior in time to the living human body which performs physical observations, the separate form is not physically observable.

Aristotle is clear that hyle is a kind of physis (an intrinsic principle of change), a "source of power," and that it "desires" the new form in a substantial change. Thus, it is an active tendency, and not passively receptive, in the case of natural changes. In artificial changes, it is passively receptive. — Dfpolis

This is completely unsupported and wrong. Nowhere does Aristotle insist that matter is "active" in any sense. In fact, the whole separation between potential/actual, matter/form, is designed by Aristotle to remove the confusion created by this idea. Assigning "active" power to matter is a mixing of the categories, which renders any conclusions you draw from this procedure as invalid. If he refers to matter as being "inclined toward...", or as having "urges", he is referring to the habits of a material body, in the Platonic way, not to matter itself.

Its form must be determined by a prior potential, viz. its predecessor's hyle. Also, it must be actualized by something that is already operational/actual. That line of actualization can be traced to the Unmoved Mover. Still, the form cannot exist prior to the being, because the form is the being's actuality, and it is not actual before it exists. — Dfpolis

This shows a bit of misunderstanding. The prior potential does not determine any future forms. It is the prior form (formal cause), in conjunction with the active form, acting at the present (as final cause) which determines future forms. Material cause is simply indeterminate possibility. The prior form, as formal cause is deterministic, however, the final cause, acting at the present is teleological. In the sense that the form of the object which will come to be (through the act of the artist), exists already in the mind of the artist, prior to its material existence (Metaph, Bk 7, which we've discussed previously), the form of the thing does exist prior to the natural thing's material existence.

Ultimately, it is. Proximately, it cannot be, because change requires a prior potential to new form. That is why the Unmoved Mover cannot change. — Dfpolis

That analysis shows the necessity of prior potentials in natural processes. — Dfpolis

We need to distinguish between making what was potential actual, and making something with no prior potential (true creation). — Dfpolis

We need to distinguish secondary causality, which is the causality found in nature, from metaphysical actualization, which is what the cosmological argument relies upon. — Dfpolis

Consider the above four quotes. You recognize the necessity of "prior potentials" in natural processes. You also recognize that "ultimately" there must be a "metaphysical actualization", and this is derived from the cosmological argument.

The two types of actualization, are discussed by Aristotle in "On the Soul" when he proposes the definition of "soul" as "the first grade of actuality". Aristotle's dualism is based in the logical need for two distinct types of "form", or order, one created by the human mind as formulae, and the other being the type of actuality which is prior to the material existence of material objects as the cause of them being what they are.

I suggest that it is somewhat disingenuous of you to recognize that Aristotle's conceptual space necessitates this duality of actuality (form), yet you assert that this conceptual space provides the means for rejecting dualism.

It is interesting to me that the language in De Anima is more directed to recognizing different kinds of agency than coming to terms with a chain of causality. — Paine

This is precisely the reason why Aristotle's "conceptual space" cannot be used to reject dualism. What he exposes is distinct types of agency. The two principal types of agency, or "form", cannot be reduced, one to the other. In fact the further we analyze them, in an attempt to reconcile them, the further apart they get, and the more obvious it becomes, that dualism cannot be avoided. This is why Aristotle's philosophy is central to the development of the concept of free will, and this is decisively dualist.

Basically the problem was that this particular mod hated my guts and would initiate or join any pile-on concerning myself. — Wayfarer

SLX showed extraordinary will power by completely ignoring me no matter what I posted. Banno is similar, but doesn't demonstrate the same will power, and succumbs from time to time.

It appears to me, that what's coming out in this thread, is that there is a form of scientism within which the practitioners attempt to reduce all forms of causation to a single determinist form. This is the manifestation of an urge to reject dualism for monism, and dispel the spiritual woo-hoo. The common method of procedure is to conflate formal cause with final cause, and represent final cause as a type of formal cause, instead of as a distinct form of causation. Ultimately this renders the whole of material, or physical existence as somewhat unintelligible, because the two are fundamentally incompatible.

That appears to be the modern trend in metaphysics, it's well demonstrated by apokrisis. Ultimately, Aristotle's "prime matter" ends up as the first principle, as prior to any ordered or formed existence. And, instead of recognizing the need for a prior actuality ("final cause"), which is demonstrated by Aristotle's cosmological argument, the actuality of ordered material existence (displaying formal causation) is said to "emerge" from prime matter. Of course this is repugnant to the rational mind, to think that order could emerge from disorder, and that is why we need to maintain a separation between pre-material final cause, and post-material formal cause, in the way that Aristotle demonstrated, so that we can maintain the intelligibility of the physical world .

Of course this is repugnant to the rational mind, to think that order could emerge from disorder, — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe I'm just naive, but how is the well-documented physical phenomenon/fact of negentropy not in and of itself sufficient evidence of this?

It appears to me, that what's coming out in this thread, is that there is a form of scientism within which the practitioners attempt to reduce all forms of causation to a single determinist form. This is the manifestation of an urge to reject dualism for monism, and dispel the spiritual woo-hoo. The common method of procedure is to conflate formal cause with final cause, and represent final cause as a type of formal cause, instead of as a distinct form of causation. Ultimately this renders the whole of material, or physical existence as somewhat unintelligible, because the two are fundamentally incompatible — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m wondering how this relates to phenomenology, which it seems to me attempts to reduce all forms of causation to a single non-determinist form, thereby dispelling the spiritual woo-hoo without falling into materialist determinisms.

And then there’s Nietzsche’s take on causation:

If I have anything of a unity within me, it certainly doesn’t lie in the conscious ‘I’ and in feeling, willing, thinking, but somewhere else: in the sustaining, appropriating, expelling, watchful prudence of my whole
organism, of which my conscious self is only a tool. Feeling, willing, thinking everywhere show only outcomes, the causes of which are entirely unknown to me: the way these outcomes succeed one another as if one
succeeded out of its predecessor is probably just an illusion: in truth, the causes may be connected to one another in such a way that the final causes give me the impression of being associated, logically or psychologically. I deny that one intellectual or psychological phenomenon is the direct cause of another intellectual or psychological phenomenon – even if this seems to be so. The true world of causes is hidden from us: it is unutterably more complicated

I don't agree with the way you characterize the differences between agencies in Aristotle.

We argued about this extensively last year after you posted your thesis.

I still have to say what I said then:
"When I piece together what you ascribe to Aristotle, I don't understand it as a thought by itself."

Lacking extraordinary will power I am going to respond.

The fact that you find it repugnant to think that order could emerge from disorder, tells us nothing about what occurs in nature or the rational mind.

... pre-material final cause — Metaphysician Undercover

You can posit a pre-material final cause but in doing so you part ways with Aristotle. The final cause is always the end or telos of some being and does not exist apart from it.

... we need to maintain a separation between pre-material final cause, and post-material formal cause, in the way that Aristotle demonstrated — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Aristotle demonstrate this? We can distinguish between the final and formal cause but they are always at work together within a being.

I saw supporting the rejection was the passage I quoted, where you moved from a rejection of the Fundamental Assumption (a rejection unsupported in principle), to a rejection of both property and substance dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not reject the FA. It has led, inter alia, to the science of physics. I only reject its adequacy in studying mind.

Within Aristotle's conceptual space, as explained in his "Metaphysics", this type of actuality is necessarily prior in time to the material existence of that body, as cause of its existence as an organized body. — Metaphysician Undercover

You continue to be confused. First actuality is being operational. Second actuality is operating. While something actual must effect a change, the first actuality of organisms (their form) is being alive, and it is concurrent with them being able to act as they do.

So I ask you, how do you proceed within this conceptual space, to reject dualism? — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said in the article and in my earlier response to you: by not treating psyche as a thing, but as a kind of actuality, we avoid Cartesian dualism.

This is completely unsupported and wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

I referred you to my hyle article, where it is supported. I have no interest in repeating my explanations.

Material cause is simply indeterminate possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the common view. It is not what Aristotle said. See my hyle article.

Aristotle's dualism — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not arguing against having more than one principle in an organism (not against matter and form) as Aristotle recognized, but against having two things (res cogitans and res extensa) as Descartes thought. I've told you this a number of times before.

one created by the human mind as formulae — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle does not say that the human mind creates forms, but that it actualizes the intelligibility belonging to the form of the sensed object. He even says that in doing so, the nous becomes, in some way, the thing it knows. Thus, the known form is the form of the known.

you to recognize that Aristotle's conceptual space necessitates this duality of actuality (form) — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not proposed such a duality. Again, the known form is the form of the known.