I come from outside philosophy and am here mainly to understand what others believe and why and to have conversations which might enlarge my perspective. Initially I came to see what I may have missed by not privileging philosophy in my life.

I have not privileged philosophy because I find the works mostly unappealing to read (I have tasted a lot of it) and don't believe I have innate capacity to develop useful readings of the texts.

Since most of us are not Kant or Wittgenstein, we are likely limited in our capacity to do original thinking and are relegated to acquiring a kind of history of ideas, with some allegiances to what others have thought before us.

I've said before - Humans seem to be machines for making meaning - drawing connections and telling stories. Hence, culture, art, entertainment, religion, literature, philosophy, science, etc, etc. We can't help ourselves. It's our thing. Some of us like our stories to be metanarratives - foundational and transcendent. Some of us (me) are happy with tentative accounts, subject to constant revision.

Welcome to TPF Ø, good to have you on board :smile:

I never think of myself as having a philosophy. That way of putting it feels foreign to me. And in fact, I neither know how to describe my general philosophical position nor whether I even have one. But let’s see how it goes…

I started this site as a replacement for an older site that fell apart. I was a moderator there towards the end, and now I’m one of three administrators here at TPF. Like Tom, I have no formal training in philosophy. Depending on how you look at it, I’m a Renaissance man or a mere dilettante, but when I’m into philosophy—it comes and goes—I take it somewhat seriously. After having read some Marx and Hegel in my late teens, when I was a member of a weird Trotskyist cult, I dropped philosophy until about fifteen years ago, when I joined the predecessor of this site. I taught myself some logic, read Plato, Descartes, Wittgenstein, Austin and Ryle, studied the Critique of Pure Reason for many months, read Foucault and Husserl and Merleau-Ponty and a bunch of other things. Now, after five years without much interest in philosophy, I’m into early critical theory and may even come back around to tackling Hegel at some point.

On what there is, I’m a non-reductive materialist. I also think there’s always something left out of our perception and conceptualization, i.e., something that escapes the human world while also underlying it (though “underlying” seems like the wrong word), which could be described as the Real, the non-identical, or the unconditioned, depending on your theory. This is how I attempt to be a proper realist while giving Kant his due.

On perception, I sometimes describe myself as a direct realist, but sometimes I reject that label and advocate embodied cognition, enactivism, ecological perception and so on, in an effort to sidestep the interminable (on TPF at least) debate between direct and indirect realism.

On knowledge and the mind I’m with externalism, enactivism, and embodied cognition, and I’m a big fan of Wittgenstein’s contribution here too. I’m aware that I just reduced epistemology and the philosophy of mind to one sentence.

Politically I tend to think in quasi-neo-Marxian terms but I don’t like most Marxisms. Political and social philosophy is my main philosophical interest at the moment, where I feel most affinity with philosophers like Adorno. I think that capitalism is the most powerful and most flexible in a long line of social forms based on domination and exploitation and the curtailment of human freedom, creativity and flourishing. I also think that modernity has produced, and could still produce more, non-capitalist social forms that are similarly based on oppression. I believe this is a difficult problem.

Generally I believe that history is more important to philosophy than most philosophers have understood and I am impatient with philosophical theories that are clear outgrowths of their historical conditions—like Descartes and the centuries of representationalism that followed—even though I accept (sometimes) that in philosophy, theories cannot be rejected merely by pointing to their historico-ideological nature. I might start a discussion about this one day, i.e., about historicism.

On God and religion, again I think somewhat anti-philosophically about it: I take it for granted that it’s an anthropological and historical phenomenon, and I have no interest in debating or thinking about God’s existence. So by default I’m an atheist, but I respect and value aspects of religious and spiritual thinking and see no need to fight against religion per se.

On meta-ethics I go for something like a social naturalist moral realism, which plays out normatively as virtue ethics. And I go back to early Marx here for some sort of humanism and a focus not only on the social nature but also on the essential (there I said it) creativity of human beings.

In general for: the body, society, history, creativity, human flourishing and endless criticism.

In general against: Cartesian theories of perception and the mind, ahistorical and asocial philosophy, idealism, greedy reductionism, and stupidity.

I’ve avoided logic, truth, mathematics, science, and language, either because I haven’t decided where I stand or because I don’t know the issues well.

and if you want to create a behemoth of text, that is also fine — Ø implies everything

Et voila.

I also find most philosophical texts unappealing in their formulation. However, underneath all of the unnecessary complex verbiage and syntax, there are sometimes very important points. Also, sometimes I find the text unappealing upon first reading, simply due to not understanding the nuanced demands that called for the more advanced vocabulary. Sometimes, this can also justify a cluttered syntax. Other times, it's like the author wants to give you a migraine.

Philosophy is often a misused term. Particularly by folk who think speculative material science is in the discipline. Philosophy is a developmental science. You become more educated in it and maybe you get to use its tools in different settings and arenas.

Academic philosophy or literary philosophy is highly dialectical and should be understood as an acedemic discipline for its own ends.

Practical philosophy is when you're capable
to enter into the domain of the public and
social sphere as an agent of positive
change and a skilled worker at detection
of fundamental error or flawed reason.

A practice and evolving group of skill sets which
almost always needs retuning and continued
reinforcing from study and teaching.

However, underneath all of the unnecessary complex verbiage and syntax, there are sometimes very important points. — Ø implies everything

I make no argument against the texts themselves, the problem sits with me as an inadequate reader of such texts - for reasons of capacity and temperament.

What are your philosophies? — Ø implies everything

Keep it simple, "Live and let live"

I don't care what any of the great philosophers have said about anything, They were only guessing at things. Whilst many of them appear to logically be correct, it all comes down to one thing. If I stick my nose into someone else's life it gives them the right to stick their nose in mine. So, don't give a shit what others believe. Live your own life.

I too am an amateur and do not approach or discuss philosophy as merely an academic subject. I think my user profile may be a convenient place to read a summary of my philosophical concerns (as distinct from my many more philosophical interests graffiti'd across TPF).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/profile/47/180-proof

I've come to understand that a philosopher (foolosopher) is a fool who recognizes his or her own foolery (NB: repetitively self-harming foolery I call "stupidity") and therefore seeks – loves – the wisdom which masters (reduces) foolery. Thus, for me at least, philosophy is the discipline of methodologically unlearning self-immiserating (meta-cognitive & moral) habits through a daily praxis of reflective study, dialectical discursive reasoning & aesthetic-moral engagement.

FWIW, I seem to wear all of these buttons / labels simultaneously:
• epicurean-spinozist
• fallibilist-absurdist
• economic democrat



:death: :flower:
(memento mori, memento vivere)

update: a recent post ...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/791990

Thank you for the welcome :)

In response to your self-proclaimed behemoth of a text, I have a list of question of behemoth length. If you do not wish to answer some or all of the answers, due to the time it would take, I completely understand! Here they go:

1. Could you elaborate on your non-reductive materialism? Are you saying that there are propositions regarding the mental realm whose truth is undecidable from information about the physical realm, and vice versa? Yet at the same time, the mental and physical still exist as the same substance?

2. As an occasional direct realist, how do you respond to Cognitive Dynamics: From Attractors to Active Inference (Friston et al., 2014), and Objects of Consciousness (Hoffman & Prakash, 2014)? They argue that direct realism is impossible/implausible due to entropy and evolution, respectively.

3. As an externalist, where do you think your "justification" comes from? I use quotation marks because some externalists do not believe in justification; in that case, replaced justification with the most fitting analog.

4. As an enactivist, how do you account for metacognition? Is the contents of our mind also a part of our environment, thus relegating this sense of ourselves to be the consciousness itself, and not the mental structures around/attached to it?

5. What do you think of Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs?

6. How do you respond to the claim that some people make stating that communism and/or socialism has never been successful in practice?

7. As an historicist, do you counter The Death of the Author view, or do you try to reconcile it? If the latter, do you perhaps think it is largely irrelevant to historicism?

Sorry for taking a while to reply. I had time to reply to Tom Storm, but as I formulated my question to you, I was whisked away by mundanities.

If I’d known you were going to ask difficult questions I wouldn’t have posted :grin:

Some other time perhaps. Each one deserves a main page discussion of its own and I don’t currently have enough interest or knowledge to answer them all.

It’s been bothering me that I didn’t answer those questions. I am interested in questions 1, 5, and 7, so I’d like to come back to them some time. But as I say, they’re for the main philosophy sections, not the Lounge, so maybe I’ll start a new discussion there if I get the time. Or if you feel like it, start a new discussion on hinge certainties or historicism (probably in Metaphysics & Epistemology and General Philosophy, respectively).

Questions 2, 3, and 4: those I cannot answer. For instance, I have not read those works that argue against direct realism, and when I said I was for externalism it seems I was bullshitting or perhaps was once in favour of it but have now forgotten the debate.

But I’ll answer 6 directly: I agree.

I see :) If I get time, I will ask some questions outside of the Lounge and refer back to this conversation :)

If you are interested in those particular philosophical topics, then it would be great if you started discussions about them. But note that what is in this thread is just an informal Lounge chat.

What do you mean, "what are my philosophies"? I'm not going to outline the things I'm working on, dude. I have my own philosophies. I'm actively working on my own stuff in the fields of metaphilosophy, epistemology and the philosophy of mind. I'm also working on contributions to scepticism and daoism, but I don't classify myself as either (anymore). I recently finished the outline to my definition of consciousness, which only took me 20 years, so I'm making progress. And again, no, I'm not going to showcase that to you.

I'm not going to outline the things I'm working on, dude. — Ying

That is completely understandable. Luckily however, I am not pointing a gun at your head.

That is completely understandable. Luckily however, I am not pointing a gun at your head. — Ø implies everything

:up:

My mind changes a lot. But I think that's a good thing. And I frequently find myself in between positions.

I have certain loves: Epicurus, Kant, Marx, Feyerabend, Camus, Levinas

But thems are just loves. And we aren't our lovers, much less the people we hold in admiration.

I'm pretty creative so I mostly like to explore different notions on the boards -- usually others' because it's easier to comment than to make an OP, but sometimes I get the gumption to start a discussion.

Welcome to the boards. Do you have a "lay of the land" you'd share about yourself?

Welcome to the boards. Do you have a "lay of the land" you'd share about yourself? — Moliere

Thank you :)

Regarding your question, I think my bio has a nice summary of the center piece of my philosophy:

I am interested in epistemology and ontology, and am currently trying to create my own theory of everything (un)knowable, all derived from the empty set of propositions. As such, I employ absolute skepticism in my theory creation, and in-line with this, I am currently trying to bridge the justificatory chasm of time.

In philosophical conversation outside of my theory creation however, I do make various assumptions, lest I be bored as hell.

I do not wish to go into too much detail regarding this theory before having published it in a far more mature form. As for that philosophical conversation outside of my theory creation however, I can elaborate a little further:

I'm pretty much interested in everything that has to do with science, philosophy and mathematics. To scratch the surface, I can mention that I really like Camus' The Myth of Sisyphus. The essay has helped me a lot, and I feel like the core idea acts as my safety netting in case my theory never works out. I also like Jung's theory of archetypes; I think I have had a relationship with archetypes since I was a kid, which I have expressed through my life-long habit of writing fiction. The idea of archetypes have taken on a new depth of meaning after I began learning about and experimenting with psychedelics in my teens. I also find a lot of ideas in Buddhism, and eastern spirituality in general, very interesting.

As for politics, I am mostly uninterested, given that any concrete discussion relies on information of which I have no faith that we possess. Society is corrupt at every level, and I somewhat lean towards the possibility that any societal structuring would fail to deliver on its promises. However, if there is any level of political discussion I could be interested in, it would be the philosophical level that merely pertains to figuring out what societal structuring is likely best given assumptions about human nature, since this kind of discussion is not contingent on assuming some political source (not) being credible.

I hear many of the differences between philosophers as a problem of translation. The encyclopedic method of putting views into a common language where they can be readily compared to each other has a value but makes it all too easy at the same time.

I hear many of the differences between philosophers as a problem of translation. — Paine

I definitely agree with that.

The encyclopedic method of putting views into a common language where they can be readily compared to each other has a value but makes it all too easy at the same time. — Paine

I would disagree there. We would still have many fundamental differences left to have fun with, and at the same time, a lot of unnecessary (and sometimes deadly) conflict would have been removed through such a language.

I did say that the method has value. Maybe saying "too easy" sends the wrong message. I find a value in struggling and becoming familiar with a thinker that cannot be replaced by skillful summation.

Perhaps my perspective is a disability of sorts. I share many of the interests you mentioned but don't think of them as matters I have a clear relationship with. I feel most closely to what Kafka said:

"I am the problem, no scholar to be found, far and wide."

I find a value in struggling and becoming familiar with a thinker that cannot be replaced by skillful summation. — Paine

I find value in struggle too. A universal and precise language would not eliminate struggle; it would increase the fruits of it, however. And what is value in becoming familiar with a thinker if not the value of their ideas?

I hope I did not imply as much.

Could you elaborate?

I did not mean to imply struggle had an intrinsic value in this context. Trying to read important thinkers is not easy because they are the ones handing out the difficult homework. Readers have to interpret a meaning to even have an inkling of what is being said. The movement from first guesses to better ones is a commitment to learn the lessons as they are presented. I have not had yet the experience of getting to the end.

That is different from settling upon a mark of what was intended. A mark that can be freely traded in the marketplace of ideas. Those two dimensions are entangled with each other. I propose that they cannot be dissolved into one.

Readers have to interpret a meaning to even have an inkling of what is being said. The movement from first guesses to better ones is a commitment to learn the lessons as they are presented. — Paine

There is definitely much value inherent in this process. It exercises many things; one's discipline, one's ability to comprehend and reason, one's ability to fluidly shift between semiotic mappings, etc.

However, in the aftermath of a widespread adoption of a precise and static philosophical lingua de franca, there would still be many exercises of discipline, comprehension and reasoning left. There would be little to no exercising of one's ability to fluidly shift between semiotic mappings (except for during one's learning of the language), though there would not be much need for this ability anyways, given that discourse would now happen with precision and clarity. Multi-layered and interpretative discourse could be relegated to art.

There is definitely much value inherent in this process. It exercises many things; one's discipline, one's ability to comprehend and reason, one's ability to fluidly shift between semiotic mappings, etc. — Ø implies everything

There is always the question of what the author was/is trying to say. I am not sure what the 'fluidity' you mention refers to. Is it the way academics talk amongst each other or are you saying that those original intentions are simply not available?

"Art" is treated very differently by different people. Do you have someone who frames this particularly well in your mind or do you have your own theory?

I am not sure what the 'fluidity' you mention refers to. — Paine

If you are very fluid in your ability to shift between semiotic mappings, then you are good at pushing aside previous groundings of signifiers so as to receive the stated grounding of the speaker. This allows for a far less interrupted flow of ideas from them to you.

I find philosophers are typically at either end of this spectrum. Some philosophers get caught up in the history and baggage of words, thinking it relevant to the actual conceptualization communicated by those words despite the speaker clearly redefining them. Other philosophers understand that words are intrinsically empty* vessels of meaning and that the concepts they carry are the target; unless you're a semantician, you don't care about the map, you care about the land!

*They may have phonaesthetic properties that factor in on what meanings are more likely to be given them; see the Bouba/Kiki effect. Even then, certain definitions of intrinsic in this context may relegate even phonaesthetic properties to the set of extrinsic properties of words.

I get the map versus terrain distinction. Where we disagree is if the efforts of thinkers are properly understood as:

"previous groundings of signifiers so as to receive the stated grounding of the speaker."

That makes it sound like you have gained a height above the others where you have a better view. The presumption does not offend me.

But you are taking the 'previous groundings' as something that can be accepted as such.

So, where are you going to put all those who object to the map drawn under those conditions?

I'm not quite sure I get what you mean. I might seem to be overly literal in my confusion, but their efforts cannot literally be the previous groundings themselves. I expect that's not what you mean, but I think I need a reformulation of what you said to get it.

What do you take as examples of 'previous groundings'?