Srap Tasmaner...
Suppose I claim there is a smallest positive real number, call it k.
It's easily proven that k < 1, right?
Does that prove that there is a smallest positive real number?

No.
The name k is a non-referring description, like the present King of France.
There are no provable qualities of k.

If k exists then 1/k (the largest real number) must also exist, which is false.
There are no positive qualities of k that are true!

Naming or describing do not require reference.

Then did you mean the DNA as an abstract thing? In that case, it is a single abstract thing, identical (in every way) to itself. — litewave

OK, that makes sense. I have five apples here, and an identical number of oranges over there. The oranges does not represent a new five, even if it is a different instantiation of five things.

OK, how about the candle?
— noAxioms

In the usual usage the candle is meant as a thing extended in spacetime (enduring in time). Then the statement "candle is lit at time T" means that the candle is in the lit state at time T.[/quote]This also makes sense. Interestingly, the naming of it creates it. To physics, it is all just particles and events and relations, but the grouping of them, extended in spacetime, is encapsulated by the name 'candle', which has meaning to the user of the language.

Not sure why we're nailing down the usage of identical in this topic.
— noAxioms
Existence in the most general sense means being identical to oneself and different from others.

This is worth a reply on its own. Thank you for this different definition, which admittedly seems not to reference a context, but is one implied? More later.

If k exists then 1/k (the largest real number) must also exist, which is false.
There are no positive qualities of k that are true! — Owen

And yet mathematicians talk about and use the concept of infinity in productive ways all the time.

You're missing the point.

You have claimed that "one truth about x proves x exists," and given a reconstruction of the cogito along these lines.

Presumably if you are trying to prove x exists, you don't know yet. In particular, you don't know yet whether the expression "x" refers. Your method was supposed to show that "x" refers. (Because it is true that Descartes is thinking, Descartes exists.)

If you must already know that the expression "x" has a reference (the object x) in order to know that "Fx" is true for some F or other, then you are not proving x exists, you are presupposing it.

Of course you can infer from the truth of "Ga" that G is a real predicate and a is an existing individual. But that's not proving anything. You already knew all of that.

It's as if you derived Fx and derived Gx, then used &-introduction to get (Fx & Gx), and then told us that you could prove Fx from (Fx & Gx). You can infer Fx from (Fx & Gx), sure. That's just &-elimination. But you could only truly assert (Fx & Gx) in the first place because you could already truly assert Fx and you could already truly assert Gx. Do you see the difference?

You’ll have to explain this better. The main crux that I don’t yet understand: how is a horse—which is one particular existent—in any way compare with the sum of all existent things? The argument I provided was for the latter; and I can’t yet make sense of how it could be meaningfully applied to the former (or to any particular existent for that matter).

Less pivotally, you’ve lost me with how a horse can be distinguished as such without it holding a background of not-horse; I’m thinking background in terms of shrubs, the sky, a tree or two, etc. But even an imagined or dreamed horse will have some background that is itself distinguishable as such … no? Then again, say you try your hardest to visually imagine a horse with no background; let me know if you can visually imagine this such that there is no color or shade of grey, white, or black to this not-horse realm. I know I can’t. Which isn’t to say that I can’t focus my attention on the imagined horse such that the non-horse background is not payed attention to; but this non-horse area will still be relatively dark, or light, or something. This not-horse realm is then a background to the visually imagined horse. — javra

It seems things exist against a background of other existents, not against nonexistent things. So a horse is a horse because it is not a shrub, not because it isn't a unicorn. If everything was a horse, there would be no horse. There would indeed be no background, and I cannot visualize that. Part of the description of a horse is where it stops.

There’s being in and of itself and then there’s things that stand out in one way or another—or, to be more up to date with the thread, things that have a context. Both givens with being and things that have a context are existents, but while being encapsulates all things with a context—such that all things with a context are—not all forms of being are things with a context.

To hopefully better phrase a previously given example: A gravitational singularity from which the Big Bang resulted (this as is modeled by todays mainstream physics) is one such instance of a given with being that is not a thing with context.

This was commented on by others. The singularity is but one event in a much larger collection of events in the context. It is a special boundary event to be sure, and none of the other ones qualify as the edge of it, but it still seems to be but one event in that context. The entire context is what perhaps lack a context of its own. I see this as the same wording you are reaching for here, but I don't envision the singularity as a context free existent of its own.

One way of putting it: if the Big Bang resulted from absolute nonbeing, then it was an ex nihilo effect. Allowing for such can result in metaphysical mayhem if one is to be consistent about what one upholds—which is one strong justification for the very old philosophical proposition that “nothing can come from nothing” (maybe a different issue though, this were there to be disagreements with this outlook on ex nihilo effects).

Why effect? The word implies a cause, contradicting ex nihilo. 'Resulted' is a verb tense implying time is not part of the collection, but something (time, perhaps space as well, but not ex nihilo) into which the Big Bang happened, again a contradiction. All these references seem to imply a deeper context, and the metaphysical mayhem resulting in the conflict between that context and the ex hihilo.
If spacetime (not just the singularity, but the whole QM collection) exists sans context, then it just is. It is not an effect, and is not something that 'resulted'. If so, what does it mean when I say it 'just is'? That's the conflict I run into: lack of meaning to that wording.

On the other hand, as our models of spacetime break down the further we conceptually move back through the Big Bang, we are left with the alternative that there initially existed a state of being devoid of both space and time.

Existed? That wording contradicts there not being time. How can time not yet exist? Maybe it will exist in an hour. Sorry, my eternalist leanings are really showing through here. If the universe defines time, then it doesn't have the property of an object within that temporal context, of needing to come into existence from nonexistence. Being one of those things myself, such thinking is hard to set aside. The intuitions are what make us fit.

But, getting back to the reasoning first offered for the sum of all existents, let “the sum of all that exists” be here termed the cosmos. If one wants to uphold multiple universes, then the cosmos would encapsulate all these multiple universes. Thus defined, I still find it justifiable to uphold that the cosmos can only exists in terms of being per se but does not exist in terms of a thing with context. The existence of things with context is a product of pertaining to the cosmos as one of its many parts, imo.

Agree with this. The way you define cosmos is an objective description, not confined to things existing in <X>.

In retrospect, though, I’m arguing from a point of view not very sympathetic to there actually being multiple physical universes. If you’re leading enquiry is into how our universe’s existence compares to those of other universes, this is something that I’m not qualified to comment on.

One of the simplest ones is that of places beyond the Hubble sphere. Physics says the universe is infinite. There's not a place you can be at the edge where you see stars only on one side. Given that, are there stars 50 billion light years distant? If so, that star defines another universe, completely beyond empirical reach from here. Light from anywhere in that universe will never reach us. If it doesn't exist, then there must be a furthest existing star, from which no other stars in that direction are visible.
Strange answer is that both might be true, depending on your coordinate system of choice. The question plays on several unstated assumption, one of which equates existence to 'existence now'. In that latter form, the big bang doesn't exist because it is in the past. But a reference to time doesn't work for anything outside the context of that time. I can't ask if pi exists now, but I can ask if the concept of pi exists now, but not before somebody thought of it.

Hey, this is metaphysics. It's not true or false. It's enlightening or misleading. It's useful or not. — T Clark

Hits (nonexistent!) 'like' button. I'm apparently looking for something useful.

I'm a little confused by your formulation, but let's try this - Yes, this dfjsl-ajfl exists as much as Santa, love, math, or the moon. — T Clark

Just for my $0.02: I think love is a physical thing in the same category as the moon. Not an object, but a complex physical relation of matter, not just an an abstraction like Santa and Math. I can give coordinates to an instantiation of love. A simpler relation is velocity, not a property of any physical thing, but a relation that a physical thing can have with some reference. Of course I can give coordinates to Santa as much as I can to my invisible friend at my side, both being references to mentally constructed objects.

I think the idea of objective reality is hard to support in this context. I think its existence is worthy of examination. That is not a new idea. You have assumed the existence of the physical reality of objective reality independent of human conceptualization. I think you have begged the question.

Yes, that's what started this topic. I felt myself to be begging when I pushed this problem.

A collection of things (such as a cosmos) is also different from its parts, so the parts provide a context for the collection/whole. — litewave

I find this true, but circular. A thing exists if it is part of the context of all existents. That's just a tautology. But delimited by some objective criteria such as logical possibility, the distinction seems to be drawn. The universe (our spacetime, or perhaps our quantum-mechanical wad of inflation stuff in which our spactime is defined, exists due to its logical consistency. There is no larger theater in which the universe is instantiated and built/played out.

Existence in the most general sense means being identical to oneself and different from others. — litewave

More on this. Wouldn't something nonexistent be identical to itself? Take the smallest postive real number, or javra's dfjsl-ajf'l, something not logically possible (mostly due to that four-sided triangle bit). How about the 'like' button on this forum. It seems not to exist, but it is logically consistent, and identical to itself. Perhaps it exists, but is not present in the context of the features of this forum. Were it not to exist at all, I could not complain of the nonexistence of it in this context.

And yet mathematicians talk about and use the concept of infinity in productive ways all the time. — T Clark

Mathematicians are not making a reference to the largest number.

Second - no. It doesn't bring something into existence "in the context of ideas." It brings it into existence in the only way things are brought into existence. — T Clark

Only way? There is nothing possible yet unnamed, totally not known by any entity capable of knowing about things? Is that what you're saying?

"Existence in the most general sense means being identical to oneself and different from others."

I agree that: x exists <-> x=x
x exists <-> Ey(x=y)

Names and descriptions refer or not.

1. (x=x, for all x) is an axiom in FOPL=.

Leibnitz/Russell: x=y =def AF(Fx <-> Fy).
In which case x=x <-> AF(Fx <-> Fx),
ie. x=x is tautologous for any x.

AF(F(Vulcan) <-> F(Vulcan)) is tautologous.
Therefore, Vulcan exists ???

Note that: AF(F(The present King of France) = F(The present King of France)), is also tautologous.
Therefore (The present King of France exists) ???

A better definition of Identity...
x=y =def (EF(Fx) & EF(Fy) & AF(Fx <-> Fy)).
x=x <-> (EF(Fx) & EF(Fx) & AF(Fx <-> Fx)).
x=x <-> EF(Fx).
x=x <-> x exists.

If x or y do not exist then x=y is false.

Interestingly, the naming of it creates it. To physics, it is all just particles and events and relations, but the grouping of them, extended in spacetime, is encapsulated by the name 'candle', which has meaning to the user of the language. — noAxioms

I wouldn't say that naming something creates it. The candle is objectively there, as a collection of atoms. Just because we find this collection interesting enough to give it a name doesn't mean we created this collection by naming it.

Thank you for this different definition, which admittedly seems not to reference a context, but is one implied? — noAxioms

Every thing must be differentiated from other things, so those other things provide a context. But I mean the word "context" in the sense of "all other things". Those other things need not be just outside a whole but also inside the whole - the parts of the whole. Because the whole is also different from its parts.

Wouldn't something nonexistent be identical to itself? Take the smallest postive real number, or javra's dfjsl-ajf'l, something not logically possible (mostly due to that four-sided triangle bit). — noAxioms

A nonexistent has no identity, so I don't think it makes sense to regard it as identical to itself. The definition of a four-sided triangle, for example, denies that the triangle is a triangle; it denies its identity. It refers to nothing. All contradictory definitions refer to nothing.

How about the 'like' button on this forum. It seems not to exist, but it is logically consistent, and identical to itself. Perhaps it exists, but is not present in the context of the features of this forum. Were it not to exist at all, I could not complain of the nonexistence of it in this context. — noAxioms

Maybe the existence of the 'like' button on this forum is logically consistent, but obviously its nonexistence is logically consistent too. If both scenarios are consistent then they both exist - but in different worlds (contexts), because it would be contradictory if the button existed and simultaneously didn't exist in the same world. We happen to live in a world where the button doesn't exist, but perhaps our copies in a different world (which is a copy of our world) can enjoy the button.

AF(F(Vulcan) <-> F(Vulcan)) is tautologous.
Therefore, Vulcan exists ??? — Owen

It depends on whether Vulcan is consistently defined. Does it have a consistent identity? If not, then it has no identity and it makes no sense to say that it is identical to itself. So we have to examine what properties the presumed Vulcan has, what parts, if any, it has, and whether these properties and parts do not contradict each other or whether they do not contradict the environment in which they presumably exist.

I wouldn't say that naming something creates it. The candle is objectively there, as a collection of atoms. Just because we find this collection interesting enough to give it a name doesn't mean we created this collection by naming it. — litewave

The naming creates the abstract grouping at best. Sure, the name makes no physical changes to the atoms, events and whatnot that comprise the group itself.
But a candle is a fairly simple example of an object as member of a known context. There is perhaps an apple that isn't next to it with which I can perform an empirical test. I can't do that with the universe since there's no objective stance from which a distinction can be made. The candle seems to be an example of what a naming does to it. I wanted to explore the idea of that.

A nonexistent has no identity, so I don't think it makes sense to regard it as identical to itself. The definition of a four-sided triangle, for example, denies that the triangle is a triangle; it denies its identity. It refers to nothing. All contradictory definitions refer to nothing. — litewave

I have a hard time with this one. Perhaps I don't exist because I am a contradiction in some way not identified. The lowest positive real number seems to have the identity named, and has obvious properties like being the inverse of the largest number. A sufficiently complex nonexisting thing might have the property of self awareness, and yet is not identical to itself due to some contradiction deep in some unexplored corner.

I kind of like the identity <-> existent thing, but my nature is to see if it stands up to a little exploratory cross examination. If I (or my universe context) was self-contradictory, what test for that might there be?

Maybe the existence of the 'like' button on this forum is logically consistent, but obviously its nonexistence is logically consistent too. If both scenarios are consistent then they both exist - but in different worlds (contexts), because it would be contradictory if the button existed and simultaneously didn't exist in the same world. We happen to live in a world where the button doesn't exist, but perhaps our copies in a different world (which is a copy of our world) can enjoy the button. — litewave

We don't think entirely differently, do we? If no world has it, then it is logically impossible. If this is a uni-world sort of physics (non-MW interpretation), then hard-determinism is what makes the alternative with the button an impossible thing.

If I (or my universe context) was self-contradictory, what test for that might there be? — noAxioms

I think it would be absurd if there existed something that is not identical to itself, or something that is not different from other things. So your existence is a guarantee that you are consistent with all reality, even though it is in practice impossible for you to check the consistency of your relations to all your parts, properties, and everything else.

We don't think entirely differently, do we? If no world has it, then it is logically impossible. If this is a uni-world sort of physics (non-MW interpretation), then hard-determinism is what makes the alternative with the button an impossible thing. — noAxioms

Yes. Although it doesn't seem to be inconsistent for there to be parallel worlds.

If I (or my universe context) was self-contradictory, what test for that might there be?
— noAxioms

I think it would be absurd if there existed something that is not identical to itself, or something that is not different from other things. So your existence is a guarantee that you are consistent with all reality, even though it is in practice impossible for you to check the consistency of your relations to all your parts, properties, and everything else. — litewave

I didn't assert existence yet. Suppose I am self-contradictory and thus don't exist. I am not identical to myself then, but how would I know that?

Your statement above presumes the existence of the inconsistent thing. If a inconsistent thing can still think, then cogito ergo sum doesn't work. That's actually what I always suspected, so I'm not taking this as any sort of denial of your definition of existence. Just noticing the implications.

I'll also try to look at your paper you just put out.

Yes. Although it doesn't seem to be inconsistent for there to be parallel worlds.

No, I have always favored the interpretation since the other ones require the ability to alter the past. Not impossible, but a harder pill to swallow I think. The view really messes with one's intuitive sense of self identity, and for that reason, probably meets more resistance than it deserves.

Just for my $0.02: I think love is a physical thing in the same category as the moon. Not an object, but a complex physical relation of matter, not just an an abstraction like Santa and Math. — noAxioms

I don't want to go down this path now, it's off post, but I'll say this - Love is no more the pattern of neurons blinking in my brain than the basketball game I'm (rhetorically) watching on TV is the same as the pattern of electrons moving through it's circuits.

"And yet mathematicians talk about and use the concept of infinity in productive ways all the time. — T Clark
Mathematicians are not making a reference to the largest number. — noAxioms

Nitpicking. They compare sets with uncountably large numbers of members.

Second - no. It doesn't bring something into existence "in the context of ideas." It brings it into existence in the only way things are brought into existence. — T Clark

Only way? There is nothing possible yet unnamed, totally not known by any entity capable of knowing about things? Is that what you're saying? — noAxioms

It exists to the extent I understand that the universe, which does exist, may include things which are "possible yet unnamed, totally not known by any entity capable of knowing about things." Other than that, how do they exist any more than a unicorn does?

I didn't assert existence yet. Suppose I am self-contradictory and thus don't exist. I am not identical to myself then, but how would I know that? — noAxioms

I assert at the beginning that existing things must be consistent because it seems absurd to me that an inconsistent thing (such as a four-sided triangle) could exist. So to suppose that I am self-contradictory means to suppose that I don't exist, which is absurd.

Your statement above presumes the existence of the inconsistent thing. — noAxioms

On the contrary, I presume that inconsistent things don't exist.

So to suppose that I am self-contradictory means to suppose that I don't exist, which is absurd. — litewave

Well, people in history questioning their own existence (Descartes most famously) cannot start from a begging position of considering nonexistence absurd. Why ask the question if you know what the answer is going to be?
An inconsistent thing doesn't exist, but it still seems to have properties, so having properties is not proof of existence.

Well, people in history questioning their own existence (Descartes most famously) cannot start from a begging position of considering nonexistence absurd. Why ask the question if you know what the answer is going to be? — noAxioms

I never really asked myself the question if I exist - I take my existence for granted. The reason I take it for granted is that I am conscious (consciousness) and consciousness is something rather than nothing, so it exists. Regarding the existence of my body, I am not 100% sure because it might be an illusion in my consciousness and I am not totally certain that the body is necessary for my consciousness. But there seems to be a lot of sensory as well as rational converging evidence that my body exists too, and in that case the body must be logically consistent too.

An inconsistent thing doesn't exist, but it still seems to have properties, so having properties is not proof of existence. — noAxioms

How can something that doesn't exist have properties? There is nothing that would instantiate those properties.

I assert at the beginning that existing things must be consistent because it seems absurd to me that an inconsistent thing (such as a four-sided triangle) could exist. So to suppose that I am self-contradictory means to suppose that I don't exist, which is absurd. — litewave

I must admit, I've gotten lost in this back and forth between noAxioms and litewave, so I've been reading, but not participating. I do have a problem with this whole "four-sided triangle" thing. Here's the game we are playing. Let's call it the geometry game. Here are the arbitrary rules we come up with:

[1] You and I look around the geometry universe and pick out things to talk about - say polygons.
[2] We talk about the properties of polygons - they have at least 3 sides of finite length and vertices that meet at angles. They have the same number of angles as sides. They exist in two dimensions.
[3] Hey! Let's give different types of polygons different names. Ok! let's use Latin names as bases - triangles have three sides, quadrangles have four sides, pentangles have five sides, and so on.
[4] Now we think about the different types of polygons and their different properties and write them down.
[5] Now we show our ideas to Euclid. He steals them and becomes famous. We end up digging ditches.

A couple of weeks later you ask me "can a four-sided triangle exist?" I don't say "No, a four-sided triangle can't exist." I don't say "That's inconsistent." I say "You've broken the arbitrary rules of the geometry game."

I never really asked myself the question if I exist - I take my existence for granted. The reason I take it for granted is that I am conscious (consciousness) and consciousness is something rather than nothing, so it exists. — litewave

I thought you had equated existence to 'logically consistent', not to 'something, not nothing', which is a weaker, circular definition.
I've spent quite some time trying to identify all the things I take for granted. There are plenty I'm sure I've not yet identified. Some of them hold water when put to the test, but I like to put all of them to the test.
If existence is consistency, then the consciousness is not evidence unless it can be shown to be consistent. The fact that they've named 'the hard problem of consciousness' implies that the self-consistency of it is in question.

How can something that doesn't exist have properties? There is nothing that would instantiate those properties. — litewave

A far better question. I notice the word instatiation there, perhaps implying a thing possible but not instantiated. Let's presume a person is a physical thing, with a body and consciousness that is part of physical processes of that body. This person is one thing extended in time and space, from conception to death, head to toe. Now picture two of those persons, identical, except one instantiated, and the other not. What would be the difference between the thought processes (consciousness) of the instantiated one vs. the uninstantiated one?

That's sort of my method of working my way through these sort of questions. Doing it in 3rd person really helps. The problem above can be simplified to 2+2=4. Is 2+2 objectively equal to 4, or does the arithmetic require instantiation for the sum to be true/performed?

Sorry, I didn't completely answer your question about properties of an inconsistent thing, but I named some of the lowest positive real number. Those properties still seem valie, even if they lead eventually to inconsistencies. If the inconsistencies are subtle enough, the nonexistence of the thing might not be so clear.

I assert at the beginning that existing things must be consistent because it seems absurd to me that an inconsistent thing (such as a four-sided triangle) could exist. So to suppose that I am self-contradictory means to suppose that I don't exist, which is absurd. — litewave

Just because existing things must be self consistent doesn't imply all self-consistent things must exist. I've been exploring the implications of the two being synonymous, but just exploration.

A couple of weeks later you ask me "can a four-sided triangle exist?" I don't say "No, a four-sided triangle can't exist." I don't say "That's inconsistent." I say "You've broken the arbitrary rules of the geometry game." — T Clark

What rule was broken? Sure, the name arbitrarily assigned to the three sided thing, but what is fundamentally impossible is equating three to four. Is the abstract rule that makes that impossible some arbitrarily assigned rule, or is three really not equal to four, even in the absence of people doing geometry?

A couple of weeks later you ask me "can a four-sided triangle exist?" I don't say "No, a four-sided triangle can't exist." I don't say "That's inconsistent." I say "You've broken the arbitrary rules of the geometry game." — T Clark

Whatever rules you make, if they refer to reality they cannot say that something has and in the same sense doesn't have three sides.

I've spent quite some time trying to identify all the things I take for granted. There are plenty I'm sure I've not yet identified. Some of them hold water when put to the test, but I like to put all of them to the test. — noAxioms

That would be an interesting question for another thread.

I thought you had equated existence to 'logically consistent', not to 'something, not nothing', which is a weaker, circular definition. — noAxioms

That which is logically consistent has an identity and so is something. That which is logically inconsistent does not have an identity and so is nothing. We may speak of an inconsistent thing as of "something", but due to the absence of identity it is not really something or a thing.

If existence is consistency, then the consciousness is not evidence unless it can be shown to be consistent. The fact that they've named 'the hard problem of consciousness' implies that the self-consistency of it is in question. — noAxioms

Consciousness is difficult to explain but that doesn't have to mean it is inconsistent. I think qualia of consciousness could be intrinsic identities of things, as opposed to structural/relational identities of things, and that's why they are indescribable and yet related to other things (correlates of consciousness). I elaborate it in my paper An outline of reality.

Now picture two of those persons, identical, except one instantiated, and the other not. What would be the difference between the thought processes (consciousness) of the instantiated one vs. the uninstantiated one? — noAxioms

If it is consistent for a property to be instantiated in a thing then it is instantiated in that thing (because consistency = existence). If a property is not instantiated in a thing then it is inconsistent for that property to be instantiated in that thing.

Is 2+2 objectively equal to 4, or does the arithmetic require instantiation for the sum to be true/performed? — noAxioms

I think a property (abstract entity) would not be a property if it was not a property of something. In other words, uninstantiated properties are a contradiction, and so they don't exist.

Sorry, I didn't completely answer your question about properties of an inconsistent thing, but I named some of the lowest positive real number. Those properties still seem valie, even if they lead eventually to inconsistencies. If the inconsistencies are subtle enough, the nonexistence of the thing might not be so clear. — noAxioms

Yes, but whether the inconsistencies are clear to someone is ontologically irrelevant.

That which is logically consistent has an identity and so is something. — litewave

It seems to me that you eliminate the existence of nothing without explicit statement of contradiction. So four-leaf clovers with three leaves don't exist, but barring that sort of contradiction, everything else does. It seems to leave completely empty the question of if something exists. I can think of no thing that is not completely abstract that is logically inconsistent. I own a four wheeled car with five wheels. Does my car not exist?

I don't usually find myself on this side of the argument. Consistency, while perhaps necessary, doesn't seem sufficient. I've argued for the existence of unicorns, not just imaginary ones, which, as I stated in your thread, are imagined experience of unicorns, not unicorns themselves. Not even an idealist can create a physical object. He only creates the experience of that object since his entire universe is experience.

It seems to leave completely empty the question of if something exists. — noAxioms

A consistent something, whether it is abstract or concrete, exists. An inconsistent "something", whether it is defined as concrete or abstract, doesn't exist (is nothing).

I own a four wheeled car with five wheels. Does my car not exist? — noAxioms

Of course it doesn't. You just defined a concrete inconsistent "thing".

I replied a day early. Below is a better critique, but first:

I own a four wheeled car with five wheels. Does my car not exist?
— noAxioms

Of course it doesn't. You just defined a concrete inconsistent "thing". — litewave

This is a cheap shot on my part. My car is four wheeled, but it has a fifth as a spare. The statement is true, but the language ambiguity doesn't count as logical inconsistency.
Similarly, I can create a square circle. Grab chalk and draw a square in a parking lot (four equal sides and angles). If you draw it large enough (somewhat larger than 6000 miles on a side), it becomes a circle. Non-euclidean geometry to the rescue!
But it illustrates a point: Objectively, there seem to be no hard rules to be violated. I have a hard time justifying a four-sided triangle, but it presumes that three is not identical to four. Pretty obvious, but is that true given no rules at all?

A consistent something, whether it is abstract or concrete, exists. An inconsistent "something", whether it is defined as concrete or abstract, doesn't exist (is nothing).

This didn't really answer my question, but is simply a reiteration of your stance. I actually thought of a valid challenge to it, and it is an empirical one:

MW interpretation says there is no wavefunction collapse and all possible outcomes exist. Problem is that some outcomes are more probable than others. Some particle has a half-life of say a millisecond, but it is possible that the thing lasts a minute or more. So if all these outcomes exist, why do empirical measurements find more occurrences of the probable ones than the improbable ones? Wave functions would not be known at all if all outcomes exist equally.

One solution is that any event (the decay of said particle) has some finite number of discreet possible delay times to decay. This implies an upper limit to the length of time of decay (violating definition of half-life), and it means all the times between those discreet values are somehow impossible. I don't think any physicist would accept such a solution to the problem, but I suppose it cannot be disproved either unless it can be measured better than the resolution of the discreed possibilities.

The other solution is that some realities are more probable than others, and in the case of your proposed view, it means some things are more logically consistent than other things. This world exists more than the possible but more improbable ones.

If you deny the problem, how so? If you agree with the problem, what might resolve this seeming conflict?