the self is a thing just like any other thing. It comes into existence just like every other thing, by being thought of, conceptualized, by a person. — T Clark
I don't think consciousness handles intention and judgement, it just attaches meaning, labels to them using language. — T Clark
If one the many 'consciousness mysterians' were to say that the question of "how/why the brain produces consciousness" is unanswered and then go on to give what would count as an answer from their own definition of function - say "I'm expecting to see how consciousness carries out some function and by 'function' I mean..." - then we'd at least have something to discuss. But as it stands, the discussion still seems little more than "Ohhh, isn't it weird, man". — Isaac
There are many papers that explains how personal experiences arise from brain function, how pathology, physical injury and intoxication/physical condition can affect their quality and how we are able to diagnose and repair problematic states of consciousness. — Nickolasgaspar
I would say that consciousness causes (some) behaviour, not that (some) behaviour is consciousness. As I mentioned before, I can think many things that I never "manifest" in behaviour. — Michael
You're missing my point, it's not that we must look at this from a functional point of view, that was just an example, it's that we must look at this from some point of view. It's not sufficient to be dissatisfied with answers given from one perspective (functional ones serving as the example here) without saying why or how those accounts are unsatisfactory, what are they missing? — Isaac
If neuroscience doesn't explain consciousness by reference to functions, why not? What is it that such an account is missing? — Isaac
If 'orange' is understood to refer to a quale, then to whose quale is it supposed to refer ? — plaque flag
A person might then say that 'orange' refers to my quale. And then you get it and link it to yours. So it has two references that might be the same, one can never tell. — plaque flag
One can interpret things that way. I don't think it's obvious. — plaque flag
Yes. And we can just watch interactions. On this forum, I can tell (I am convinced) that other people grasp Wittgenstein's later work the way I do. And we read one philosopher about another too, which possibly changes, all at the same time, what we think about the author, the philosopher being commented upon, and ourselves. — plaque flag
I don't even want THC these days. It'd probably be fine, maybe fun, but I don't bother to seek it out. — plaque flag
then we have more reason to think our perceptions of the orange are similar. — Janus
So the sentence " I saw an orange afterimage", just taken as a bare sentence, isn't abstractly referring to a certain kind of experience? What do you take the sentence to mean? — Janus
If you can tell something as complex as how others grasp Wittgenstein's later work the "way you do", should it not be much easier to tell if someone's perception of a colour is the way you perceive it? — Janus
All drugs including caffeine, alcohol THC and psychedelics, etc., alter how we see things. — Janus
Can you expand on that? Is this something specific to consciousness, or do you think it equally unjustified to assign an evolutionary purpose to osmosis, or active sodium ion transportation? — Isaac
I don't think so, however admittedly tempting this sounds. If 'true orangeness' is hidden, we have no data whatsoever for supporting such a hypothesis. I don't see logic but only a comfortable and familiar prejudice. — plaque flag
But 'pure' qualia are problematic — plaque flag
People want to say what they also say can't be said. — plaque flag
We might ask what 'experience' is supposed to mean. — plaque flag
We need not introduce internal images, though this is tempting in ordinary contexts, given popular metaphors like the mind is a container. — plaque flag
It's 'obvious' once one grasps it (switches metaphors?). — plaque flag
This may be a parody, but how wide of the mark is it ? — plaque flag
To me this also points toward that lack in our lifeworld of 'pure' mentality and its shadow 'pure' materiality. — plaque flag
but also on the well-observed structural commonalities of the human visual system. — Janus
it is sensations, feelings, thoughts and images. — Janus
haven't anywhere claimed, or even suggested that, there is any such thing as "pure mentality" or "pure materiality". — Janus
Again all I've said is that our perceptions are not accessible to others other than by means of what we tell them.
So, most of us feel pain, see colour, taste food, visualize, and so on. These are all experiences, and the only way others can know about them is if we tell them.
— Janus
Perception is private, but it is talked about in a public language; a fact which would only be possible if there were a good degree of commonality. — Janus
I also happen to think that the fact that there is that which cannot be said is perhaps the most important fact about being human. — Janus
There's a long history in evolutionary biology of people off-handedly assigning evolutionary reasons why certain traits were selected with no evidence — T Clark
So maybe consciousness isn't produced only from the brain but from the whole body.And brain just plays the central role to all that function. — dimosthenis9
I am not convinced that such evidence, proves that information can be passed between 'conscious' creatures via morphic resonance and morphic fields. But even if it does, that does not mean consciousness is not 'what the brain does,' it would mean that perhaps information can be passed/correlated via some quantum phenomena such as entanglement (as Sheldrake himself has suggested). — universeness
If we talk to/observe, a human with no legs, would we find some difference in their 'level of consciousness' compared to people with legs? — universeness
We can consider the affects on human consciousness, if we removed parts of the brain. — universeness
it would mean that perhaps information can be passed/correlated via some quantum phenomena such as entanglement (as Sheldrake himself has suggested). — universeness
Yes, and/or that information is a naturalistic feature. If there is an 'information manifold,' however, it would seem to prima facie vastly expand, not contract, the scope of the science of consciousness. — Pantagruel
Well they would simply have different consciousness as in every person in general.If by difference you mean lower level of consciousness for those with no legs.Then of course not. — dimosthenis9
Yeah, but consider also the brain without a heart to support it. — dimosthenis9
Your last two sentence's above are true for all of us posting on this thread, so that's a given imo.My only guess is that this interaction, that makes the phenomenon of consciousness to emerge, is among all body functions.And yes brain plays a huge role as coordinate them.
But as i mentioned before nothing can stand on its own in human body.Not even brain.
It is the interaction of everything that makes it happen.
But its only my hypothesis.Does not make it true. — dimosthenis9
So I suppose the extent to which one is content with an evolutionary frame is the extent to which one is willing to allow for other influence. — Isaac
Yeah, but even if all that Sheldrake claims, eventually turns out to be true, how much would that increase the personal credence level YOU assign to such as panpsychism?
For me, my answer would be, not much! I still have a credence level of around 1%. — universeness
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