It is clear to me that language works. — Andrew4Handel

I think once we accept that language transmits facts we have a basis for knowledge, a foundation for theorising etc and for some self confidence. — Andrew4Handel

I agree.

I do think this relies on empirical evidence so we don't need to believe everything a person says. — Andrew4Handel

I do not agree.

It is not possible to establish a communication with objective facts. From your OP, I highlight the importance of understanding the rules of a language: syntaxes, grammar, lexicon, etc...
If I read a sign that says: "I live in the house with red door, a cherry tree in the garden and worn sign with a 12 on the door," I am receiving a pure objective information.

But, If I am receiving that data from someone, there can be a lot of subjectivity and connotation bias. I mean, the words do exist themselves, yes. Yet, we can make a twisted use of them and lie to others. So, I see the opposite of your point: we have to believe others to make decisions and keep up the communication.

What I mean is that we can test what someone claims with empirical evidence to test the truth value of a sentence. Lies do not undermine the system because they can be detected.

And then what I mean is that language maps onto facts about the world somehow. When someone tells the truth and gives us information they prove that language transmits facts somehow.

To me it is not important is how language works but just that there are clear instances where facts are received through lanaguage. Making language a reliable vehicle and foundation for knowledge.

I think the problem with skepticism is that it undermines even itself. How can you be skeptical if your means of communicating your skepticism is also something to be skeptical about?

If you admit you might be a brain in vat you are committing yourself to an unresolvable uncertainty that has no use as far as I can see.

In this sense I think quite a lot of philosophy might be based on false doubt. We might be able to clarify more things we can't doubt if we except language transmits facts and not that all language is up for interpretation.

In this sense we know words successfully transmit accurate, veridical meaning that we successfully use to negotiate the world. We tend to understand most of what people tell us unless it contains technical jargon. — Andrew4Handel

There's nothing wrong with what you say, so far as it goes. But language has other important uses, admittedly always in communication, but still...

There is quite a list, but consider the importance of communicating and negotiating values - which, after all, are the basis of action, and co-operative action is at the heart of being a social creature. Speaking of which, establishing friendship - even love - and trust is just as important, though that may be done indirectly rather than in the way we communicate facts. And so on.

But, If I am receiving that data from someone, there can be a lot of subjectivity and connotation bias. I mean, the words do exist themselves, yes. Yet, we can make a twisted use of them and lie to others. So, I see the opposite of your point: we have to believe others to make decisions and keep up the communication. — javi2541997

I agree that it is almost impossible (and the "almost" is probably wrong) to communicate facts and nothing else. Neutral data is very rare. I do agree that trust is a very important factor in living a social life - that's why we tend to believe others unless there is a reason not to. Which is why it is so easy to deceive people.

I think I'm trying to say that language is not just for communicating data, but is critical to nearly everything about the way we live, because we are social animals. That brings a weakness, that it is possible to deceive us. But, in my book at least, that doesn't justify radical scepticism.

In this sense I think quite a lot of philosophy might be based on false doubt. — Andrew4Handel

I agree, except that I pretty sure that the "might" is definitely over-cautious. But that thesis needs more detail, which I can't at the moment provide.

language transmits facts and not that all language is up for interpretation. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not sure what you mean by "not up for interpretation". Do you mean something like "has a clear and definite meaning"? My qualification would be that that applies in specific contexts and usually between people who have a relationship within that context. I don't think it is possible to construct a meaningful sentence that cannot be interpreted in different ways in different contexts.

Lies do not undermine the system because they can be detected. — Andrew4Handel

How? Lies tend to be detected when the receiver already received the message, so an empirical analysis cannot be applied ex ante.

When someone tells the truth and gives us information they prove that language transmits facts somehow. — Andrew4Handel

I see the opposite. Words transmit facts, it is a given. But these facts are separated from "truth" or "false" because this is a subjective bias as I said previously. Our language has intrinsic information, but we manipulate it, to convince others with "truths" or "lies".

I think I'm trying to say that language is not just for communicating data, but is critical to nearly everything about the way we live, because we are social animals. That brings a weakness, that it is possible to deceive us. But, in my book at least, that doesn't justify radical scepticism. — Ludwig V

I agree. :up:

Neutral data is very rare. — Ludwig V

Maybe we can consider "neutral data" the International System of Units, for example. I guess using the metric system in communication cannot be affected by subjective thoughts or connotations. They are objective. For example, if I say: 1 metre equals 1000 mm. This is pure neutral data, because it is proven by maths.

I'm not sure what you mean by "not up for interpretation". Do you mean something like "has a clear and definite meaning"?. — Ludwig V

I am referring to lanaguage like directions, describing things, or information like "the house is on fire" that only succeed if the language is unambiguous.

Either the house is on fire or it isn't. The statement is either true or false and can be true where as something like the definition of the word "Politics" could be up for dispute.

But I just find it interesting that we can rely on language to some extent as opposed to having to start from a basis of complete doubt and skepticism.

The OP appears to be assuming the exterior world is real and the house is in the real external world. But information might just as well lead me to a house if I’m playing a video game and the house is in the game. If brain in a vat or solipsism is the case, then following information might also lead me to a house in the simulation or an imagined house in my mind. In other words, consistency within a world does not demonstrate the world is an actual objective fact.

do think this relies on empirical evidence so we don't need to believe everything a person says. But our experiences keep us alive and have allowed us to rigorously manipulate the world so I do not believe our sense have a huge scope for misleading us. So I don't think occasional illusions or false beliefs are grounds to undermine some notion of truth. — Andrew4Handel

There is a sort of intellectual laziness that is pervasive in philosophy. It goes something like this, I can imagine I am being deceive by my senses that there is a real world out there but what it could be is [insert what you can imagine] like a dream, brain-in-vat, simulation, etc. Then the philosopher goes on to say because this is possible will have no reason to believe we know anything. Radical skepticism is born.

I believe one mistake that occurs in the debate is the radical skeptic not distinguishing between what can be imagine and what is possible.

Are you familiar with On Certainty by Wittgenstein? Or Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry?

I think that any language you don't speak fails to convey meaning. For example urdu conveys no meaning to me.
But to communicate here we have to have at least minimal understanding of word reference.

After that with complex or controversial discussions we can dispute whether meaning is successfully conveyed.

People might claim that a lot of philosophy does not convey meaning.

Disputes seem to centre around the coherence or validity of a claim. At this juncture we might be stuck with a resort to purely subjective appraisal of meaning.

Then I think lack of understanding could be described more as ideological or an incompatibility of subjective landscapes.

My point is that just by successfully using any language you have disproven fundamental skepticism and proven a form of certainty.

Any skepticism following from this initial certainty of meaning conveyance has to have robust grounds and not just be word games.

Any worldview has to explain the fundamental fact that words convey meaning even solipsism, multiverses or brain in vat.

The only scenarios that might lead to profound skepticism here is the brain in the vat theory or solipsism. In which case all of these interactions could be created like an elaborate fiction for our consumption but there seems to be currently no grounds for believing this.

I agree with this if we're thinking in terms of epistemic contextualism,, e.g. Keith DeRose. In our everyday context it doesn't make sense, or have much practical importance, to question my own existence. But in the context of a philosophy class/discussion where knowledge and how we know is up for discussion, skepticism might be justified or warranted. I might assume skepticism for the sake of argument, and such an assumption would be warranted given the context. Perhaps, that warrant would last just long enough to show it is only warranted in that context and for that purpose.

Hence the ineptitude of pragmatism. In making use of the certainty of language it undermines its own scepticism towards language.

I think once we accept that language transmits facts we have a basis for knowledge….. — Andrew4Handel

So I can’t know anything unless some facts are transmitted to me by language?

No.

I think personal experience is a rich source of knowledge. But it can be subject to other peoples skepticism.

There is an issue it seems however concerning how we describe our experiences without language.

It seems we need language to catalogue our experiences. It depends on what kind of knowledge we want and what we want to do with it.

So I can’t know anything unless some facts are transmitted to me by language? — Mww

No. — Andrew4Handel

No, I can’t know anything unless….?

I think personal experience is a rich source of knowledge. — Andrew4Handel

So I can know, even without facts transmitted to me by language. All clear to me now. (grin)

It goes something like this, I can imagine I am being deceived by my senses that there is a real world out there but what it could be is [insert what you can imagine] like a dream, brain-in-vat, simulation, etc. Then the philosopher goes on to say because this is possible will have no reason to believe we know anything. Radical skepticism is born. — Richard B

I agree with this. You are right that we are far too casual about what it means to imagine something. These situations are never articulated fully and I'm not at all sure that they can be. I don't think either of them is remotely possible unless the real world is pretty much like the one we know and love.

Those cases might persuade me that the "world out there" might be very different from what I experience. But then, I know that already - the physicists remind me of it every time I hear about their work. No brain in a vat or simulation hypothesis could be more unimaginable that the world as seen by relativity or quantum physics. Developing a philosophical understanding of that situation would be more useful than speculating about brains.

Then there is the second move from imagine to possible, neglecting the possibility the we might be capable of imagining impossibilities. (The logic of that is a bit complicated, but still.) The third move is to confuse possibilities with actualities, neglecting the fact that many possibilities are not actual.

There's an issue of human psychology here. Once one focuses on the real possibility that a meteorite might fall on my head or my house at any moment, a feeling of insecurity can develop. Most people, I suppose, reflect that there is nothing I can do about that, and if it happens, I may be dead; if I am not, I'll have to cope with it. Then, after a while, they get bored with that thought and forget it. After all, it hasn't happened yet; I am certain of that.

There is an issue it seems however concerning how we describe our experiences without language. It seems we need language to catalogue our experiences. It depends on what kind of knowledge we want and what we want to do with it. — Andrew4Handel

It is too easy to imagine possibilities that aren't possible and the possibility that language is not meaningful, in my book, is among them. Which is not to deny that misunderstandings are not uncommon. What matters is that we have many ways of dealing with them - when they make a significant difference.

We need language to describe what we experience and there are many things that we can't know without language. But we don't need language to know some things. Animals that don't have language show what they know by their behaviour. The difficulty is to express accurately what they know.

I think some skepticism is just incredulity which is more of an attitude or emotion than reason.

To justify a skeptical statement it seems one has to offer a grounds for disbelieving something such as a logical fallacy or inconsistency or a defence of implausibility.

I think language allows us to talk about things that may not exist but are based on things that already exist. It seems impossible to talk about things that have no basis in preexisting structures.

I think some skepticism is just incredulity which is more of an attitude or emotion than reason. — Andrew4Handel

Yes, and I find myself in the grip of incredulity when confronting some sceptical writing. The complication is that incredulity and, indeed, attitudes and emotions may well be irrational, but can have a rational basis. My idea (starting from Cavell) is that we would benefit from a deeper, less dismissive examination of scepticism on the basis that it is more like an attitude or emotion than a hypothesis that is true or false.

I think language allows us to talk about things that may not exist but are based on things that already exist. It seems impossible to talk about things that have no basis in preexisting structures. — Andrew4Handel

The peculiar magic of language is that it allows us to talk (and think) about things that do not exist and even things that exist but are absent or things that cannot be perceived at all. But to talk about them, we need to start where we are. That's not a limitation because there's no alternative.

I think language also contains thoughts which may be visual and conceptual in nature. So that words don't just mean something explicit but work in close association with experiences and abstract concepts.

Skepticism seems trivial when you acknowledge the complex interrelationships I have just described. So I would say the idea that statements have to be either true or false is somewhat trivial.

Some skeptics appear to think they know are mind better than us and and know what we mean better than ourselves.

Language is very complicated indeed. But if philosophers don't pay close attention to complexities, they will develop distorted and partial views. But paying attention to complexities usually makes it more difficult to get a debate that can be decided for or against on each side. There's a very fine line between clarity and misrepresentation.

There are two approaches to language. One treats it as a definite structure; the other treats it as a complex activity. I prefer the latter.

I'm not tempted by scepticism. But I am puzzled and fascinated by the enduring appeal of sceptical views, and the confidence of sceptics in their approach. The odd thing about it is that philosophers who try to respond to scepticism and dismiss it are often remembered as sceptics. Descartes, Berkeley and Hume are all examples. Cavell was right to think that refuting it is not enough and that we need to try to understand it as a phenomenon.