Discussions about moral realism (the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad) would benefit by recognizing that the objectivity (mind-independence) of the three main aspects of morality can, and do, differ. Those three aspects are moral bindingness, ultimate goals (ends), and moral ‘means’.

To illustrate, here is my Morality as Cooperation Strategies view on the objectivity of the three aspects:

Moral bindingness:

There is no objective source of moral bindingness beyond conditional (instrumental) oughts.

There is a subjective source of moral bindingness that can be more powerful than conditional oughts. That subjective source is the illusion foisted on us by our genes (Michael Ruse) that our moral judgments are what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences.

Imperative moral goals:

There are no imperative moral goals – ultimate goals for acting morally that everyone ought to pursue regardless of their needs and preferences.

The goals of moral behavior in a society are subjective in the sense of being whatever people in that society can agree on. However, the moral goals a society can agree on are constrained by two tethers:

• Our preferences encoded in our biology
• The benefits of getting everyone’s agreement (everyone who is choosing the goals).

These two tethers combine to produce what we most commonly see in philosophical proposals for moral goals 1) “well-being” as defined by our shared preferences encoded in our biology and 2) cosmopolitanism at least to the extent of all people in the ingroup choosing ultimate goals being worthy of moral regard.

Moral ‘means’:

Virtually all past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense are explained as advocating or motivating parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. That is, cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist because they advocate and motivate parts of cooperation strategies.

Some of these moral norms increase cooperation benefits by cooperating to exploit outgroups. For example, “slavery is moral” and “women must be submissive to men” advocate cooperatively exploiting outgroups with the goal of benefiting an ingroup.

The strategies that past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense advocate and motivate (even those that exploit outgroups) have a universal, mind-independent, necessary core function - solving cooperation problems.

The universal component is consistent with:
• Behaviors that solve cooperation problems are moral.
• Behaviors that create cooperation problems are immoral.

Game theory shows that the cooperation problems solved by cultural moral norms and our moral sense are as innate to our universe as the logic and mathematics that define them.

The above definition of “moral” is, therefore, cross-species universal, not just cross-culturally universal. All intelligent, independent agent species must solve the same cooperation problems to form highly cooperative societies and will therefore have a morality with the same universal core function.

Implications for how we talk about moral realism:

There are a variety of perspectives on the objectivity of moral bindingness, ultimate goals (ends), and moral ‘means’.

Taking my above perspective as an example, I am a moral realist about moral ‘means’ and a moral anti-realist about imperative moral bindingness and ultimate goals.

Overall, this implies moral realism, that there are some facts of the matter about right and wrong as defined by:
• Behaviors that solve cooperation problems are moral.
• Behaviors that create cooperation problems are immoral.

But there are no facts of the matter about imperative moral bindingness or ultimate goals for moral behavior.