Human moral motivations; e.g. guilt, responsibility, conscience, empathy, blame, shame, altruism; are psychological, sociological, and cultural phenomena. Is it suggested that all psychological, sociological, and cultural motivations and behaviors can be explained and are controlled by physics? So, my wife's scampi recipe; the Constitution of the United States, Benny Hill, psychosis, Adolph Hitler, marshmallows, love, Hello Kitty... can all be explained by physics. Of course not.

We've had a lot of discussions here on the forum about the hierarchical nature of science and the perils of reductionism. It's a controversial subject among scientists and philosophers. In my understanding it comes down to this - Each level of phenomena on the hierarchy of science must be consistent with the laws of the next lower level, e.g. biological processes must not violate any rules of chemistry. By that standard, ultimately everything must be consistent with physics. That's reductionism. That does not mean that you can predict the behavior at higher levels from the processes at lower levels. Laws of chemistry cannot be used to predict the principles of biology. That would be called constructivism and it doesn't work. This is the point in the discussion when I include a link to a famous paper on this subject - "More is Different" by Anderson.

https://www.tkm.kit.edu/downloads/TKM1_2011_more_is_different_PWA.pdf

Now, if you want to discuss whether psychological and sociological process control our behavior and free us from responsibility, that's a different, more nuanced, discussion.

Is your OP not dependant on whether or nor the universe is in fact deterministic?
I asked you once before if you thought quantum fluctuations were a true example of random happenstance. Your answer was that under classical physics you thought they were, but you offered no reasons for thinking that under quantum physics, they were not.
Is "Avoiding blame with 'Physics made me do it' is indefensible" an issue at all, if we have no irrefutable evidence, that the universe is deterministic or not. Perhaps the truth is that the universe contains both 'instantiations,' deterministic and random.

Is it suggested that all psychological, sociological, and cultural motivations and behaviors can be explained and are controlled by physics? So, my wife's scampi recipe; the Constitution of the United States, Benny Hill, psychosis, Adolph Hitler, marshmallows, love, Hello Kitty... can all be explained by physics. Of course not. — T Clark

Why 'of course not'? I mean, it seems to be a product of physics, even if all those things are far more complicated than a more human-explainable interaction between two particles. So if your argument is about our ability to directly express love in terms of particle interactions, I will agree, but that doesn't mean that love isn't a function of particle interactions. If one assumes a form of dualism, that just means that our current knowledge of physics is incomplete. If it really works that way, then there's more physics going on unnoticed despite being right in front of behind your face. It would still be a causal relationship.

In my understanding it comes down to this - Each level of phenomena on the hierarchy of science must be consistent with the laws of the next lower level, e.g. biological processes must not violate any rules of chemistry.

Funny, because the dualists assert just such a violation, which, as I said just above, would mean that our knowledge of the 'rules of chemistry' are incomplete.

By that standard, ultimately everything must be consistent with physics. That's reductionism. That does not mean that you can predict the behavior at higher levels from the processes at lower levels.

Never said anything about predicting, especially constructively. I said it doesn't mean that one cannot be held responsible for choices made. The assignment of responsibility is equally a function (however unpredictable or possibly completely determined) of physics, and it would thus be a contradiction to not be responsible for choices, by definition.

My OP is attempting to bypass all the constructive and reductive arguments and just point out the contradiction resulting from the 'physics made me do it' defense.

Is your OP not dependant on whether or nor the universe is in fact deterministic? — universeness

No, not at all, nor is it dependent on a particular view (dualism or not) of mind. People reach for randomness as a door opening to allow free will in, but all evidence suggests that will works best with mechanisms that produce consistent choices given similar inputs.

I asked you once before if you thought quantum fluctuations were a true example of random happenstance. Your answer was that under classical physics you thought they were, but you offered no reasons for thinking that under quantum physics, they were not.

It's irrelevant here, but at the quantum level, there are hard deterministic interpretations, single world with zero randomness. Bohmian mechanics comes to mind. There are soft deterministic interpretations like MWI with no randomness, but also 'every possibility happens', and one cannot choose your world, so subjectively there is randomness. Then there are interpretations with true randomness like Copenhagen, with 'God rolling dice' as Einstein put it. Given today's list, I don't think Einstein would have favored Copenhagen, but there were not so many choices back when that quip was made.

Is "Avoiding blame with 'Physics made me do it' is indefensible" an issue at all, if we have no irrefutable evidence, that the universe is deterministic or not. — universeness

My argument is independent of whether the universe actually is deterministic or not, let alone being independent of our ability to know if it is deterministic or not.

My argument is independent of whether the universe actually is deterministic or not, let alone being independent of our ability to know if it is deterministic or not. — noAxioms

Ok. I broadly support your thread title;Avoiding blame with 'Physics made me do it' is indefensible.
I think it's important that the human race take full responsibility for their own battles with fear and their own sense of awe and wonder, but there are many other claims that I think are akin to this one that I would find very problematic, such as 'god made me do it.'
Other claims such as he/she/they made me do it or my mental illness made me do it or the trauma of my life experiences made me do it, etc, are different in my opinion.
Is there a stealth reason for your OP? Are you trying to carve a path from "Avoiding blame with 'Physics made me do it' is indefensible" to not accepting 'extenuating circumstances' as a legal/personal defence.
What main message are you trying to establish, based on someone accepting your OP 100%?

I said it doesn't mean that one cannot be held responsible for choices made. — noAxioms

What does it mean to be held responsible for choices made?

What does it mean to be held responsible for choices made? — Michael

The OP mentions the 'Strawsonian definition", on which the Stanford article is based:
"To be morally responsible is to be the proper object of the “reactive attitudes,” such as respect, praise, forgiveness, blame, indignation, and the like"
The definition sort of implies the attitudes of peers, but does not explicitly call it out.

I admit that my argument hinges on this definition and the argument may not hold with differing definitions, but I like the definition since it makes no reference to controversial subjects like 'right and wrong', be those objective, relative, or nonexistent.

Other claims such as he/she/they made me do it or my mental illness made me do it or the trauma of my life experiences made me do it, etc, are different in my opinion. — universeness

Such claims sort of imply that a kleptomaniac should be permitted to steal since his mental condition leaves him blameless. By my argument, the reactive attitude is still there, hence the responsibility. The course of action as to how to deal with such a person might be mitigated by said mental condition, but it doesn't absolve him of 'blame'.

Are you trying to carve a path from "Avoiding blame with 'Physics made me do it' is indefensible" to not accepting 'extenuating circumstances' as a legal/personal defence.

So many double-triple negatives, it is hard to read that, but ditto to my title. But as I said, mitigating circumstances might influence a reactive course of action, but it cannot erase responsibility.

What main message are you trying to establish, based on someone accepting your OP 100%?

I'm just sick of hearing all the arguments along the lines of "determinism, hence I'm not responsible for anything" which seems to seek an excuse to do anything you please.
I see such arguments in the actual world, but I don't want to bring up specifics for fear of sending the topic down a political sidetrack.

The OP mentions the 'Strawsonian definition", on which the Stanford article is based:
"To be morally responsible is to be the proper object of the “reactive attitudes,” such as respect, praise, forgiveness, blame, indignation, and the like"
The definition sort of implies the attitudes of peers, but does not explicitly call it out.

I admit that my argument hinges on this definition and the argument may not hold with differing definitions, but I like the definition since it makes no reference to controversial subjects like 'right and wrong', be those objective, relative, or nonexistent. — noAxioms

Then I'm not sure what you're trying to argue.

If determinism is true then either I do this or I do that, and then either you punish or reward me for it or you don't.

It certainly wouldn't make sense to argue that even if determinism is true we still should punish or reward people for their behaviour, as if our response to someone else's behaviour is a free choice.

Why 'of course not'? I mean, it seems to be a product of physics, even if all those things are far more complicated than a more human-explainable interaction between two particles. So if your argument is about our ability to directly express love in terms of particle interactions, I will agree, but that doesn't mean that love isn't a function of particle interactions. If one assumes a form of dualism, that just means that our current knowledge of physics is incomplete. If it really works that way, then there's more physics going on unnoticed despite being right in front of behind your face. It would still be a causal relationship. — noAxioms

Given your underlying assumptions, I would say you are correct. I don't agree with your underlying assumptions, but that's me. We can leave it at that.

Thank you all for your continued replies.

Then I'm not sure what you're trying to argue. — Michael

I had to step back and figure that out myself, and it turns out that I'm directly denying PAP, which apparently suggests that: "a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise".
This conflicts with the definition of moral responsibility used by the same Stanford article, that defines it as reactive attitudes. Simple substitution yields "a person can be the subject of reactive attitudes for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise", which seems clearly false. Those attitudes will be there regardless of the usual list of cop-outs, them being determinism, lack of free will, or sometimes asserted omniscience. The statement can be made more reasonable by talking of 'justified reactive attitudes" which leaves the door open for the attitudes not being justified in the cases of what I call the usual cop-outs.

Notice I am avoiding declaring a stance on determinism, free will, the objectivity/relativity/absence of right and wrong actions, etc. I have opinions on these, but they seem irrelevant to the point being made.


While I'm on it, I protest the usage of past tense in the phrase "could have done". Free will should be about being able to do otherwise. Putting it in past tense makes it sound like the free choice depends on your ability to alter something already done. So it should say "Free will is the ability to do otherwise" which is still a poor definition (not something I'd find desirable to have), but at least it is better than the past tense version.

Given your underlying assumptions, I would say you are correct. — T Clark

Trying to guess which assumptions you're talking about. That behavior is a product of physics is a sort of assumption, but even the dualists suggest only that there's more to physics than what is in the physics books, yet to be discovered so to speak.
That love can be described in terms of particle interactions is not something I'd ever suggest.
My point seems to be summarized in the reply to Michael above: A self-contradiction in the PAP article on the Stanford site.

Trying to guess which assumptions you're talking about. — noAxioms

You and I agree that the fact that human behavioral processes must be consistent with the principles of physics does not mean humans are not responsible for their actions. I think our reasons are different.

To say that A causes B when B is not even theoretically predictable from A is meaningless. For me, free will is a metaphysical issue, not a physical one. Holding people responsible for their actions is a social process. It does not happen in any manner derivable from physical principles.

Interesting that stuffy archaic Christianity defends freedom of the will as a matter of principle while scientific materialism views humans as automata.

The Christian god doesn't defend or respect human free will. Not according to the OT, where god does stuff like "harden Pharaoh's heart" and through it's so called 'prophets,' it celestially dictates what it's 'chosen' MUST do, regardless of any 'free will' they might think they have.
I responded to your post, just via annoyance, but I wont continue to do so, as this distracts from the purpose of the thread.

If someone reads about "physics made me do it" and then goes on to behave in all sorts of desperately selfish or immoral ways after reading such, shrugging and citing that it's not their fault, it's physics.

What then is to be said about the time line of their life where before reading about the idea they were more cooperative and good natured citizens and afterward, were reckless and selfish? What changed?

It's not like the entire physics of their bodies and minds have suddenly changed at that point of reading about an idea.

Thus, it stands more to reason that they made a conscious choice to believe it. And remove themselves from culpability by putting it on the rest of the world/realities set up.

If physics was deterministic, why would any given individual sway from varying degrees of socially acceptable/moral behaviour to socially unacceptable/immoral and vice versa. One would imagine that such a mechanistic and determined existence would be polar and dichotomous from the get go without any freedom to traverse from one side to the other.

Choice (freewill) and social conformity, morality, ethics or simply behaviour Intended to help others verses help oneself to their detriment, are inextricably linked.

If the system was deterministic, it devolves into a chaos of extreme egos, arrogance, intolerance, paranoia and inability to forgive or forget, a total lack of empathy (because choice is not a possible option. You're either good or bad. And that's that. No choice, no option to change behaviour).

I'm inclined then to believe the system involves free will. Or is at most semi-deterministic, with consciousness being the emergent ability to have free choice, because awareness is agency, control over ones own behaviour, Choice.

If someone reads about "physics made me do it" and then goes on to behave in all sorts of desperately selfish or immoral ways after reading such, shrugging and citing that it's not their fault, it's physics. — Benj96

Sorry, but your sentence fragment does not parse. You have an "if (...)" without a "then (...)".
If you read my argument above, I show how if somebody uses such reasoning to rationalize their behavior, they will still be held responsible, and thus the actions will be their fault, even if their actions actually are the result of physics, which I don't see how they can't be.

If you disagree with that, then one of the assumptions/definitions (all taken from the Stanford article) must be wrong.

What then is to be said about the time line of their life where before reading about the idea they were more cooperative and good natured citizens and afterward, were reckless and selfish? What changed?

Clearly their reasoning changed. That's how decision making works. Recently acquired data is part of the input to the decision making process.

Thus, it stands more to reason that they made a conscious choice to believe it. And remove themselves from culpability by putting it on the rest of the world/realities set up.

Made a choice, yes. Remove themselves from culpability, no, since culpability isn't something one chooses, but rather a social reaction to one's actions.

If physics was deterministic, why would any given individual sway from varying degrees socially acceptable/moral behaviour to socially unacceptable/immoral and vice versa.

I'm sorry, but how would determinism (or lack of it) be relevant to the reasons why such a sway would occur? I just don't see the connection. Perhaps you're not talking about physics being deterministic, but rather about this guy's beliefs about such changing after reading about it. But you didn't say that.

One would imagine that such a mechanistic and determined existence would be polar and dichotomous from the get go without any freedom to traverse from one side to the other.

I think you're confusing determinism with fatalism, the latter positing that things happen regardless of anything's ability to choose. If that were true, nothing would have evolved brains to make decisions, or better brains to make better decisions.

If the system was deterministic, it devolves into a chaos of extreme egos, arrogance, intolerance, paranoia and inability to forgive or forget, a total lack of empathy (because choice is not anl possible option).

I don't see how any that follows. Lack of free choice is not the same as lack of choice. In fact, free choice (choices made in absence of causal physics) seems to lead to the chaos you describe. That kind of free will is a bad thing in my book, but there are lots of other ways to define it.

Interesting that stuffy archaic Christianity defends freedom of the will as a matter of principle while scientific materialism views humans as automata. — Wayfarer

Depends on what you consider Christianity. The Church certainly defends freedom of will else it would lose its hold on the imparting of judgement, but the Bible seems to make no mention of it that I know of.

Science definitely uses a different definition and presumes we have it. It is important in a few cases like a loophole to Bell's theorem where superdeterminism controls our will to make this measurement or that such that we reach incorrect conclusions, sort of like there being pink elephants everywhere but determinism never lets you choose to look in the direction of one, so they're never witnessed. Physics must make the assumption that that sort of lack of free will isn't going on in order to concludes by induction that there aren't pink elephants on Earth.

Not according to the OT, where god does stuff like "harden Pharaoh's heart" — universeness

I think an omnipotent being could choose to reach in at need and alter the will of somebody when it suits the being's purpose. Of course this blows away determinism if the omnipotent thing can make 2+2=5 now and then because such interference suits its purpose. Momentum is conserved except when God does magic... Every law would have to have that exception listed.

Holding people responsible for their actions is a social process. — T Clark

I agree that it is a social process. I think my argument rests on that.

I think an omnipotent being could choose to reach in at need and alter the will of somebody when it suits the being's purpose. Of course this blows away determinism if the omnipotent thing can make 2+2=5 now and then because such interference suits its purpose. Momentum is conserved except when God does magic... Every law would have to have that exception listed. — noAxioms

By definition, yes, I agree. This is one of the reasons I find theism to be such tosh! The claim 'god made me do it,' would have to be a legally valid one and admissible in court because there is the biblical prima facie case, of what god did to pharaoh's 'free' will. If we accept that happening IS fact, then god may well have made you do it, perhaps even via it's control over Physics.

I agree that it is a social process. I think my argument rests on that. — noAxioms

"All of Christianity is my interpretation of Scripture," is, while common in Christianity itself, not particularly well justified. Saint Augustine's "On The Free Choice of the Will," C.S. Lewis, Chrysostom speaking about the "hardening of Pharaoh's heart," specifically in Homiles on Romans, Origen on this same passage, the current Catechism of the (Roman) Catholic Church, etc. all embrace free will. You also have fatalist Christian thinkers. There isn't a consensus, but it's a historical reality that early writers in Church tended to be libertarians. Right before Saint Paul discusses the hardening of Pharaoh's heart and "vessels of wrath destined for destruction," in Romans 9, he spends Romans 6-8 exploring a concept of reflexive freedom and extolling the freedom God grants to humanity. It's a nuanced vision that can be taken many ways.

I agree with you that Strawson's theory is unsatisfying. I don't generally agree with theories of justice and punishment that are wholly pragmatic either. I agree with Hegel that this reduces to treating humans like animals to be trained.

My favorite theory of freedom and justice is the one Hegel outlines in the Philosophy of Right, but it's a bit difficult to do justice to in a quick summary. I will try later if I have time because I think it answers this question in many ways.

I don't see anything like the argument suggested in the OP, in the SEP article.

All of Christianity is my interpretation of Scripture," is, while common in Christianity itself, not particularly well justified. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:halo: You wont be surprised that as an atheist, I consider almost every declaration, based on a theistic foundation, are not particularly well justified.

........ etc. all embrace free will.......there isn't a consensus — Count Timothy von Icarus

I know.

My favorite theory of freedom and justice is the one Hegel outlines in the Philosophy of Right, but it's a bit difficult to do justice to in a quick summary. I will try later if I have time because I think it answers this question in many ways. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My favourite theory of freedom and justice is that there is no system/notion of freedom and justice that is not flawed and there never will be, imo. BUT, I personally believe that a socialist/secular humanist approach to freedom and justice is best. I don't think that stance is augmented or diminished by any declaration that socialism and secular humanism, are sourced as 'states of physics.'