Another inept Trumpian apologetic. Michels supported Mussolini, you support Trump. Same difference. One fascist autocrat or another. Rather than the rule of a few, the rule of one. — Fooloso4
The danger of oligarchy is always there – but, luckily, it does not always materialise. I therefore think that it is more appropriate to call Michels’ theory not the iron law but the iron threat of oligarchy.
:up: :up:The logistical 'problems' mentioned in the OP are features of a representative form of government not flaws [ ... ] the US government has been erring on the side of the few for around 50 or 60 years. That's the result of the corruption, not the form of government. — creativesoul
When you have a centralized state, oligarchy in some form will evidently happen. Perhaps we should define oligarchy and oligarchs better as let's say the Russian oligarch of the 1990's is different from a Soviet Politbyro member, who obviously would be an oligarch in the broader sense.I didn’t mean they favor oligarchy, but that their organization necessarily tends in that direction, no matter what type of organization they prefer. — NOS4A2
Prefixing "iron" helps hide that it is not a law. Oligarchy is not inevitable.But, again, the question is not whether or not this can happen (surely it can) but whether it is unavoidable. — p.12
Oligarchy is not inevitable. — Banno
I suppose that's why I push against these narratives. We need one another. That's a good thing to recognize. It's also good to recognize that some people use that need for their own ends -- but the solution isn't individualization, because that gives people who are able, who have more power even more power. Masters like being able to spell out the rules to subordinates, and it's much easier to do so when they subordinates are alone. — Moliere
Let's take just this part of the paper into debate.the critique of step five highlights the pessimism inherent in Michels’ view. — Banno
But, again, the question is not whether or not this can happen (surely it can) but whether it is unavoidable. There is quite some empirical evidence supporting the theoretical argument that it can be avoided. For example, Lipset (1952/2010, p. 17), presenting the first findings and analysis of his famous case on ‘The internal politics of the International Typographical Union’ (Lipset, Trow, & Coleman, 1956), showed that ‘the rank and file’ can indeed ‘keep very much on the alert’; they stayed suspicious of their officials and rejected outright some of their proposals to change policies.
Jaumier (2017) found that members of a French co-operative sheet-metal factory regularly criticised members of the executive board, mainly as one of several means to limit the board’s power and to show its members that they should not go beyond their mandate.
Thus, there is a good chance in democratic organisations that discipline and strict observance of hierarchical rules might not become the prevailing behaviour of, or even a necessity for, subordinates. Most members can, and probably will, show a non-obedient mindset (free and sovereign personality; critical mind; distrust of leaders but loyalty to institutions; open challenges of policies and disagreement with others;
The danger of oligarchy is always there – but, luckily, it does not always materialise. I therefore think that it is more appropriate to call Michels’ theory not the iron law but the iron threat of oligarchy.
I don’t get why people push back against it because everyone we organize with is an individual. If you only see them as a means to some collective end, then it is their subordination rather than their cooperation you require. — NOS4A2
Diefenbach does give credit Michels and understands that his conclusions have importance. He also makes quite astute observations. So what is the problem here? The answer is: ideology overriding rationality and logic. This ideology is shown well in Diefenbach's conclusion:
The danger of oligarchy is always there – but, luckily, it does not always materialise. I therefore think that it is more appropriate to call Michels’ theory not the iron law but the iron threat of oligarchy.
By talking about the 'danger' and 'threat' of oligarchy that "luckily will not materialize", Diefenbach clearly shows what he thinks about oligarchy. And this is the trap many fall into: they see the structures of organizations as ideological or ideologically constructed and morally good or bad, and spend little if any thought on the logical and rational grounds on just why organizations have evolved to what they are now.
Perhaps "The Iron Law of oligarchy" is the wrong way to look at this phenomenon. Perhaps it would be better to call it "The fundamental limitations of collective decision making". Collective decision making takes time, people think inherently differently, will disagree and will make different choices. The only answer to this is to try to seek some sort of consensus. Also, specialization of roles in an organization is natural in creating efficiency. Hence the outcome and the effect will be that some people will have pivotal roles in the function of an organization. And hence, you will have "the oligarchy" in some way or another. That "oligarch" might then be the secretary of the council, an employee of the firm like a CEO or an wealthy financier of various enterprises. At this general level, there isn't so much use for this law. That few people will have power over others in any organization should be obvious and insisting that you can eradicate "oligarchy" at this general level is just a thought that hasn't much to do with reality.
Hence the mistake is think about the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" from an ideological viewpoint. Or to give too much ideological value to what basically is a logical or rational outcome of a complex issue. — ssu
It's true that human beings and other primates are gregarious. But you are a single object. The last dyad you or I have ever experienced ended when the umbilical cord was severed. Any and all attachments are strictly metaphorical. To me it's patently false to treat aggregates of any number of human beings as single objects, so I'm a strict nominalist in that regard. I can't get around it and I can't help but fashion my politics around what I see as brute facts.
For these reasons I believe any effort to give a group priority over the individuals in it—collectivism—is to prioritize ideas over actuality, and worse, one's own ideas and nothing more. It is never about the collective qua collective, nor could it be. — NOS4A2
I don't see social interactions, conversations, and natural groupings as organizations because they are not arranged systematically and artificially. They are not organized.
But I guess its an interesting question if any aggregate of human beings can be considered an organization. if you want to get into it, it's clear that the relationship of mother and child, or the bourgeois family, are not democracies by any stretch of the imagination. — NOS4A2
Indeed, but I read this as a result of ambiguities in the formulation of the supposed "iron rule". The objection is methodological; it is that the notion of oligarchy is insufficiently clear to enable an empirical investigation. The supposed law is an example of Popper's poor historicism, and falls subject to tht criticism - as is pointed out very clearly in the introduction.Thomas Diefenbach here uses frequently conditinionals — ssu
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