If you like. There's distinctions between anaytic, linguistic and ordinary language philosophy that remain unconsidered. But your approach would also fit 's love-hate relationship with analytic approaches. It remains that the Sartwell article erroneously suggests that analytic philosophy is somehow antirealist.

But your approach would also fit ↪Wayfarer's love-hate relationship with analytic approaches. — Banno

'Analytic' is a method, not a philosophical stance per se. As you know, I frequently cite Thomas Nagel, as he's regarded an exemplary analytic philosopher and is one who expresses what I consider an important philosophical critique of scientific materialism. I believe there are many others who follow an analytic method in defense of the kinds of philosophical views that I'm supportive of (Richard Swinburne and Jerrod Katz come to mind, although I haven't read either of them yet.) Whereas the 'ordinary language' philosophers tend to have some characteristic meta-philosophical attitudes.

So analytic method is different to linguistic method?

'Ordinary language' philosophy is not, so far as I understand, a form of linguistics. Ordinary language philosophy wants to illuminate philosophical problems and concepts by examining how language is used in everyday situations, in order to promote clarity and dissolve misunderstandings that may arise from philosophical speculation and abstraction - hence its rejection of for instance idealism and metaphysics. But you can have analytic philosophers that explore metaphysical questions - such as those I mentioned.

//although when I read that essay again, it tends to merge them. In re-reading that essay, I'm less impressed, in light of the criticisms offered above, although still learned a few things from it.

I'm glad you understand that. Sartwell, in presenting such a sweeping history in a few hundred words, does not make such distinctions.

Contrary to the thrust of Sartwell's essay, Antirealism is not typical of recent philosophy.

I am proudly dissident from the mainstream (although I think 'anti-realism' is an unsatisfactory description.)

Ontological anti-realism is basically skepticism about any sort of resolution to metaphysical questions. It's pretty common.

My critique is of Sartwell, not of you.

It's pretty common. — frank

Can you offer any support for this?

https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5082

My critique is of Sartwell, not of you. — Banno

Yes, point taken. As I said, on second reading, it wasn't a terribly impressive essay, but what I got from it was a better sense of where the ordinary language philosophers fit in the scheme of things - something which I hadn't really appreciated up until now.

I often reflect on the 180 degree difference between what realism meant in traditional philosophy - realism concerning universals - and what it means now - realism concerning objects of experience.

Can you offer any support for this? — Banno

Skepticism about metaphysics has been popular since Wittgenstein.

Ontological anti-realism

The author explains the spectrum of anti-realist positions.

I've settled on the use of realism for views that hold there to be things that are true and yet unknown. This is both an ontological view and a choice of language use. Making a clear distinction between belief and truth strikes me as the better way to talk. Antirealism does not make this distinction clear.

It's come up in several places just recently. In Statements are true? a few folk are advocating a pragmatic antirealism; in Do people value truth? the issue is making the distinction between truth and belief clear.

Sure, there are various positions. The issue here is that Sartwell would have us think that antirealism is a consensus in analytic philosophy. It isn't; quite the opposite.

Sure, there are various positions. The issue here is that Sartwell would have us think that antirealism is a consensus in analytic philosophy. It isn't; quite the opposite. — Banno

Ontological anti-realism is common. The kind of anti-realism you're talking about probably isn't.

Common for whom?

I don't know the domain you mean.

Can you explain to me how "ontological antirealism" differs from what you think I am talking about. I'm not seeing it.

Can you explain to me how ontological antirealism differs from what you think I am talking about. I'm not seeing it. — Banno

Glance over the essay.

Common for whom?

I don't know the domain you mean. — Moliere

Analytical philosophers

:roll:

Not seeing it. My conclusion is that you have misunderstood something in the notion of antirealism.

Is this a misunderstanding between "common" and "consensus"?

It's been more than a minute since I read Chalmers, but even on the 2nd page:

An intermediate sort of lightweight realism has also developed, holding that while there are
objective answers to ontological questions, these answers are somehow shallow or trivial, perhaps reflecting conceptual truths rather than the furniture of the world. Deflationary views of this sort have been developed by Hirsch (1993; this volume), Thomasson (this volume), Wright and Hale (2001; this volume), and others. These views contrast with what we might call the heavyweight realism of Fine, Sider, van Inwagen, and others, according to which answers to ontological questions are highly nontrivial, and reflect the ultimate furniture of the world

Which would support the notion that there's no consensus.

But "common", as in held by some prominent persons, sure.

That survey is an interesting demonstration of the limits of classification. All those "anti-realisms" have the barest of connections to each other.
But I like the way it splits the bias toward how it is presented as a "consensus' depending upon how the thesis is put forward.

They are interesting results.

All I am using them for here is to show that, in contrast to the contention of the article mentioned in the OP, there is not a consensus in philosophy that favours antirealism. It takes Goodman and Rorty as exemplars of analytic philosophy, which is misleading.

I was interested to notice that 38% of the respondents accepted the reality of abstract objects (platonic realism). If that is included in the results for 'realism', then.....

Is this a misunderstanding between "common" and "consensus"? — Moliere

Has there ever been any kind of consensus among any sort of philosophers for the last 2400 years. :razz:

I am not versed in Goodman but we share enough admiration for Nussbaum to see she works with Rorty's questions while challenging his premises in other discussions.

I would like to frame the discussion in terms of histories of philosophy and how much a point of view is dependent upon that framework but it is a tortured draft for the time being. One cannot say analytic philosophers attempted to avoid that ground completely while the other team did not.

For that reason, I object to the 'movement' criteria because it elides the difference between what the thinkers are saying.
.

That's addressed in the correlations section further down.