The categories of understanding are identifiable simply by reflecting on the ways we experience and judge things; nothing at all to do with the thing-in-itself.
The problem is, Bob, I don't think you are listening to anyone else.
My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant. I’m sufficiently persuaded by the affirmative argument to think he’s come up with a perfectly fascinating metaphysical theory. That’s it
On your “Of The Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception” quote, the very next line after what you posted, shoots your argument in the foot.
The “I think” must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think”, in the subject in which this diversity is found. But the representation, “I think” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or primitive aperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation “I think” must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations...the unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it
He is clearly explicating that there is a phenomenal appearance of a self and a transcendental self….. — Bob Ross
”My conviction regarding the fact of the categories is irrelevant….”
-Mww
It’s not irrelevant to me, and what is the ‘affirmative argument’? To me, Kant just asserts it flat out and super speculatively in CPR. — Bob Ross
The self that thinks transcendentally is not meant to indicate a transcendental self;
The notion of a phenomenal appearance of a self is an unwarranted intermingling of domains, leading to methodological incompatibilities, and from those arise contradictions;
I see no reason to agree he is clearly explicating as you say.
This is a very subtle exposition that the doing, the methodological operation, and the talking about the doing, the speculative articulation of such method, are very different.
When thinking, as such, in and of itself, “I think” is not included in that act, but just is the act;
That I am conscious that, is not the same as the consciousness of;
That I do this, presupposes the conditions of the ability for this.
The Part in CPR on understanding is a Division consisting of 2 Books, 5 Chapters, 8 Sections, 24 subsections, covering roughly a 185 A/B pagination range in 214 pages of text, AND…a freakin’ appendix to boot!!!!….so to say he asserts anything flat out is a gross mischaracterization on the one hand, and at the same time stands as a super speculatively affirmative argument on the other.
I must agree with
↪Janus
when he says you’re not listening.
I keep saying I’m persuaded yet you keep asking why I’m convinced, which is merely an insignificant microcosm but representative of a significant part of the present dialectic nonetheless.
Same with requests for proofs
By analytic idealism, I take it to be that reality is fundamentally (ontologically) one mind which has dissociated parts (like bernardo kastrup's view). — Bob Ross
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.