Awareness is a combination of two main factors: Observation and identification. — Philosophim

This is incorrect. Awareness does not depend or involve necessarily observation. You can be aware of millions of things that have nothing to do with observation. At the basis of all of them, is being aware of yourself. It doesn't involve any observation at all. Neither does being aware of your emotions, thinkng, etc. Awareness is a condition, a state. Observation is a process, an act. Awareness actually means knowing that something exists or is happening.

Just try it for yourself. Leaving concepts, descriptions, etc. aside, just sit back and experience that you are aware of your thoughts, your body, your movements. Do not observe anything. Just be aware of your thoughts, your body, your movements. This experience does not require any observation.

I have intervened at this point of your discussion because I think it has taken a wrong path, i.e. it is constructed around the the wrong assumption that awareness is based, depends --in part, together with identification as you say-- on observation. And by that occasion, I invite you to review and examine closely and from all its aspects the concept of awareness, because it is of most importance.

At the basis of all of them, is being aware of yourself. — Alkis Piskas

And how are you aware of yourself? Don't you need to observe something, then say, "I identify this as myself?"

Neither does being aware of your emotions, thinkng, etc. — Alkis Piskas

If you have no observation of emotions, thinking, etc, do you have a self? What are you if you have no emotions, thoughts, etc?

Awareness actually means knowing that something exists or is happening. — Alkis Piskas

Knowing that "something". What is this something? Isn't that something I observe? Notice that I pointed out that thoughts are part of observation. I'm not using perception or senses, I'm just noticing we need some type of "thing" to "assess".

Leaving concepts, descriptions, etc. aside, just sit back and experience that you are aware of your thoughts, your body, your movements. Do not observe anything. — Alkis Piskas

That's a contradiction to what I've defined. I need to observe something and then identify that as a "thought". I need to observe something and identify it as a "body". The combination of the two is awareness.

I have intervened at this point of your discussion because I think it has taken a wrong path — Alkis Piskas

Not a worry! Intervene wherever you think its incorrect.

It seems your main problem is with my definition of "observation". What I'm trying to get at is you need a "thing" that "you" experience. So perhaps it would be better if I used the words "experience and identity"?

I can’t imagine consciousness, would develop without perception. An infant born with no senses of any kind would not develop consciousness.

And how are you aware of yourself? Don't you need to observe something, then say, "I identify this as myself?" — Philosophim

Do you have to observe anything to know that you exist, that you are awake?

If you have no observation of emotions, thinking, etc, do you have a self? What are you if you have no emotions, thoughts, etc? — Philosophim

Do you have to feel or think anything to know that you exist? That you are a person? That you are reading this message?

Knowing that "something". What is this something? — Philosophim

Anything. Whatever. No some thing in particular. It could be e.g. just sitting on a chair. You don't have to obseve anything to be aware of that. The feeling of the chair on your bottom does not determine the fact that you are sitting. There must only exist a chair and your body be on it. No observation is needed for that.

You do not watch your legs and whole body move fast to be aware that you are running. You just know that you are running.

Notice that I pointed out that thoughts are part of observation. — Philosophim

Right. You can perceive, be aware of your thoughts. But you can also be aware of the absence of thoughts! (Being able to not think needs some training though. :smile:) As you can be aware of silence and space. These do not involve any perceiving/observation.

Leaving concepts, descriptions, etc. aside, just sit back and experience that you are aware of your thoughts, your body, your movements. Do not observe anything.
— Alkis Piskas
That's a contradiction to what I've defined. I need to observe something and then identify that as a "thought". I need to observe something and identify it as a "body". The combination of the two is awareness. — Philosophim

Yes I know that. Repeating it does not prove that I'm wrong! :smile:
Really, why are you refusing to do what I proposed, i.e. the little experiment? Don't you trust your experience?
Also, I wonder why do you chose to ignore all that I have said and shown in multiple ways about observation not being necessary for awareness to exist ...

So, since I'm being ignored, I have no other choice than to thank you for letting me express my views in your discussion and leave.

And how are you aware of yourself? Don't you need to observe something, then say, "I identify this as myself?"
— Philosophim
Do you have to observe anything to know that you exist, that you are awake? — Alkis Piskas

Yes. The state of wakefulness feels different from the state of sleeping. I'm pretty sure we're having a miscommunication on what "observation" is. The word is not important. My point is there are things that we encounter, and then we identify them. Simple as that.

Do you have to feel or think anything to know that you exist? That you are a person? That you are reading this message? — Alkis Piskas

Yes! I can't read a message without observing the message and identifying that they are words.

Knowing that "something". What is this something?
— Philosophim
Anything. Whatever. No some thing in particular. It could be e.g. just sitting on a chair. — Alkis Piskas

That's an observation combined with identification. Anything is observation. Identification is noting that anything is me sitting in a chair.

The feeling of the chair on your bottom does not determine the fact that you are sitting. — Alkis Piskas

The feeling is an observation. The identification is what determines whether I'm sitting.

You do not watch your legs and whole body move fast to be aware that you are running. You just know that you are running. — Alkis Piskas

Observe does not mean watch. Observation is feelings, thoughts, etc. Identification is noting that the combination of what you're observing can be identified as running.

But you can also be aware of the absence of thoughts! — Alkis Piskas

Yes, an observation that you're not thinking a particular thought can be identified as not having thoughts. You're taking observation to mean that we are ascertaining the existence of something. Observation is just your subjective experience without identity. Identity creates differences within that subjective experience.

That's a contradiction to what I've defined. I need to observe something and then identify that as a "thought". I need to observe something and identify it as a "body". The combination of the two is awareness.
— Philosophim
Yes I know that. Repeating it does not prove that I'm wrong! — Alkis Piskas

Pointing out its a contradiction does. Show that it is not a contradiction and you may have something.

Also, I wonder why do you chose to ignore all that I have said and shown in multiple ways about observation not being necessary for awareness to exist ... — Alkis Piskas

I'm not ignoring. I'm the OP who provided the definition and I'm trying to point out that you didn't understand what observation meant. Which is fine, no problem. But when responding you should attempt to understand the OP first right? We don't want straw man arguments.

But you can also be aware of the absence of thoughts!
— Alkis Piskas

Yes, an observation that you're not thinking a particular thought can be identified as not having thoughts. You're taking observation to mean that we are ascertaining the existence of something. Observation is just your subjective experience without identity. Identity creates differences within that subjective experience. — Philosophim

I may new misunderstanding both of you.

You cannot be aware of the absence of all thought. If you are aware, you are thinking. If you are thinking, you are aware.

And you cannot be aware that you are not thinking a particular thought. That would be thinking, "I'm not thinking about crayons right now."

And you cannot be aware that you are not thinking a particular thought. That would be thinking, "I'm not thinking about crayons right now." — Patterner

And yet you just did. Honestly, this is an incredibly unimportant part of the OP. What about the subjective vs objective consciousness?

And yet you just did. — Philosophim

You can't observe that you're not thinking a particular thought.

Not sure I understand the op either. It doesn't seem like you're discussing two kinds of consciousness. It seems like you're looking for a way to objectively identify another consciousness.

Hello Philosophim,

I know we terminated our conversation about consciousness on my thread because you felt there wasn’t much more that could be said, but I figured I would still put in my two cents into your thread to see if we can come to some agreement. Of course, it is your thread, so if you still feel as though there is nothing more to be productively said, then please feel free to terminate our discussion wherever you would like. I have a feeling that we are on polar opposites of the discussion when it comes to this topic, but that’s exactly what makes conversations the most interesting (;

To start, let me try to understand fully what you are saying. To me, it seems as though you are claiming there are two types of consciousness (i.e., subjective and objective) which are completely separable from each other; but, to me, when I read your post, it seemed like ‘objective’ consciousness is merely a more restricted scope of ‘subjective’ consciousness: the former seemed to be the latter with just the redaction of “what it is to be like a subjective experiencing” or, as you put it, “the viewpoint of consciousness itself”.

If that is correct, then I don’t see how “They are entirely separate realms of discussion and analysis”: when one analyzes how an organism has conscious experience of something, that is still “tied” to the same “consciousness” as that organism that is subjectively experiencing. I fear that this distinction implies that there could possibly be a being which has consciousness but doesn’t subjectively experience, but the consciousness we are studying objectively (from the side of behavior) is the same thing as the qualitative experience that the subject itself is having: we just don’t have direct, private access to it like that subject does.

This leads me to your definition of “consciousness” (i.e., “Awareness [consciousness] is a combination of two main factors: Observation and identification”): to me, being “conscious” and being “aware” (in the sense of observing and identifying) are not the same thing—perhaps this is a semantic dispute though. A being can be “aware” in the sense of being capable (to some degree) of observing its environment and identifying different aspects of its observation without having qualitative experience: for example, even basic AIs today can observe their environment and identify things (such as cups, tables, chairs, etc.) and they do not have conscious, qualitative experience: there is nothing to be like that AI (as of yet at least): it simply gathers input, interprets it, and produces output. When it touches something, it doesn’t feel it qualitatively; when it sees something, it has no qualitative sense of seeing happening there; when it hears, it doesn’t experience the sound itself but, rather, is just input/output like a computer. For these reasons, I think “awareness” should be distinguished from “consciousness”; otherwise, there becomes an ambiguity of what one is saying (e.g., are you talking about qualitative experience or just the ability to take in input and interpret the environment?--these are two very different things). Perhaps, is that what you are trying to get at with “objective” vs. “subjective” consciousness? Is “subjective” consciousness the qualitative experience and “objective” consciousness the mere awareness of the environment (plus the interpretation of it)?

For now, I think this is a good start.

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

And yet you just did.
— Philosophim
You can't observe that you're not thinking a particular thought.

Not sure I understand the op either. It doesn't seem like you're discussing two kinds of consciousness. It seems like you're looking for a way to objectively identify another consciousness. — Patterner

You can't observe that you're not thinking a particular thought. — Patterner

Look, I don't care. Its irrelevant so believe what you want. The point is not that I'm trying to identify another consciousness, its that consciousness can be divided into subjective and objective parts. If there's something you don't understand about that, feel free to ask.

Very glad to see you Bob! The reason I bowed out from your thread is I felt my points would deviate too much from your original intent. I felt that your thread was addressing those who were somewhat familiar with your topic, and agreed and understood basic points. My questions and critiques seemed too far out of place for your OP, and I did not want to derail your thread from others.

the former seemed to be the latter with just the redaction of “what it is to be like a subjective experiencing” or, as you put it, “the viewpoint of consciousness itself”. — Bob Ross

I think you have the right of it. Its really a separate evaluation. Objective and subjective consciousness are two aspects of "consciousness". My point was to take the original concept and divide it into clearer and more distinct notions to avoid potential problems when they are blended together.

If that is correct, then I don’t see how “They are entirely separate realms of discussion and analysis”: when one analyzes how an organism has conscious experience of something, that is still “tied” to the same “consciousness” as that organism that is subjectively experiencing. I fear that this distinction implies that there could possibly be a being which has consciousness but doesn’t subjectively experience, but the consciousness we are studying objectively (from the side of behavior) is the same thing as the qualitative experience that the subject itself is having: we just don’t have direct, private access to it like that subject does. — Bob Ross

My point is that it is irrelevant when studying objective consciousness that we have an objective evaluation of the subjective consciousness. This is mostly because subjective consciousness of other beings is outside of knowledge. It is something we simply cannot know. No human knows what its like to be subjectively conscious as a dog. But objectively, does a dog have consciousness? Yes, by its ability to observe, identify, and act.

A being can be “aware” in the sense of being capable (to some degree) of observing its environment and identifying different aspects of its observation without having qualitative experience: for example, even basic AIs today can observe their environment and identify things (such as cups, tables, chairs, etc.) and they do not have conscious, qualitative experience: — Bob Ross

My argument is that they do. Do they have human qualitative consciousness? No. They can have robotic consciousness. What is it like to experience from within the system the ability to observe, identify, then make an action? Its impossible to know. As such, its irrelevant in objective evaluation.

The problem is we're constantly trying to attribute subjective consciousness to situations that are impossible to do so. Objectively, consciousness does not require you to be human, can we both agree on that? Is a dog conscious? A bat? A crab? They all have brains, though much more primitive than human brains. Therefore their consciousness, in what they are able to observe, identify, and act on, is much more limited. Will we ever know what its like to have the qualitative experience of a dog? No. That still doesn't mean we can't work with what we have.

An allegory is quantum physics or even odds. Both of these evaluative fields work within the limitations they know. Qauntum physics has a limit where you cannot both know a particles velocity and location at the same time. So we construct a system around which one we decide to measure. A deck of 52 playing cards has an unknown order, but we know what all the cards are. Therefore we can construct odds. Objective consciousness is simply removing that which cannot be possibly known, the actual subjective experience.

are you talking about qualitative experience or just the ability to take in input and interpret the environment?--these are two very different things — Bob Ross

Are they? When a simple camera takes a picture, it simply processes the light. It cannot identify anything within that light. Only a consciousness can take in light, then form some identity out of it like a cloud, a sun, and grass. To observe, then identify, doesn't some "thing" have to observe, then match it to an identity? Is that not the qualitative experience? Some "thing" must maintain both the observation, and actively match an identity. We don't have to know what that's like for different observers and identifiers, but we can say the state of observing and identifying is consciousness at the most basic level.

If we attach a program to a camera that can identify things like clouds, a sun, and grass in the picture, then that is what it is conscious of. But that is ALL it is conscious of. It does not have feelings, or the ability to have the four other senses human's do. But there is something that retains an observation long enough to process through several identities, then match them.

Is “subjective” consciousness the qualitative experience and “objective” consciousness the mere awareness of the environment (plus the interpretation of it)? — Bob Ross

No, subjective consciousness is merely what it is like to be the thing which is conscious. Objective consciousness is the observation and confirmation that there is consciousness apart from the subjective experience itself. Thus if we can observe an entity that can observe, identify, and act, we can conclude it is conscious at least within what it can observe, identify, and act upon.

I can’t imagine consciousness, would develop without perception. An infant born with no senses of any kind would not develop consciousness. — Patterner

Was Helen Keller less conscious than most people?

I can’t imagine consciousness, would develop without perception. An infant born with no senses of any kind would not develop consciousness.
— Patterner

Was Helen Keller less conscious than most people? — RogueAI

She was born with all her senses. She lost them when she was 19 months old, and perception begins in the womb. Also, she did not lose all of her senses. She lost her sight and hearing.

She was born with all her senses. She lost them when she was 19 months old, and perception begins in the womb. Also, she did not lose all of her senses. She lost her sight and hearing. — Patterner

Let's assume we have a being born with only one sense, touch. Is it going to be less conscious than someone with all five senses? Or is consciousness like a switch? You either have it or you don't?

Look, I don't care. Its irrelevant so believe what you want. — Philosophim

Thank you. I believe that I cannot claim I am not thinking about crayons if I think, "I am not thinking about crayons."

The point is not that I'm trying to identify another consciousness, its that consciousness can be divided into subjective and objective parts. If there's something you don't understand about that, feel free to ask. — Philosophim

I did say I wasn't sure if I understood the op.

Hello Philosophim,

Very glad to see you Bob! The reason I bowed out from your thread is I felt my points would deviate too much from your original intent. I felt that your thread was addressing those who were somewhat familiar with your topic, and agreed and understood basic points. My questions and critiques seemed too far out of place for your OP, and I did not want to derail your thread from others.

Oh I see: fair enough!

Although I understand it better, I still don’t think I have completely pinned down your terminology; so let me ask for further clarification (and then I will revisit your post to respond adequately).

Is “qualitative experience” (i.e., qualia) different to you than observing, identifying, and acting (or are they the same)?

Is “awareness” different than “qualitative experience”? Is it the same as observing, identifying, and acting?

Do those terms, to you, refer to the exact same thing?

Am I correct in saying that, under your view, “objective” and “subjective” consciousness are both referring to qualitative experience? Awareness? Both?

This is mostly because subjective consciousness of other beings is outside of knowledge. It is something we simply cannot know.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are saying that we can objectively know that other beings have qualitative experience and that there is something to be like that subject but we cannot know what it is like to be that subject: is that correct?

They can have robotic consciousness.

Are you saying that there is something to be like a robot as a subject (but we just can’t know what that is like) and it has qualitative experience?

Objectively, consciousness does not require you to be human, can we both agree on that? Is a dog conscious? A bat? A crab?

I agree, but I think this is equally true within your “subjective” consciousness as well. I am not sure what the distinction is doing here (in terms of specifying only “objective” consciousness does not require you to be human).

To observe, then identify, doesn't some "thing" have to observe, then match it to an identity?

So this is where I need to re-evaluate depending on what you mean by the terms “awareness”, “qualitative experience”, “consciousness”, and “observation”. I don’t hold that a camera + a computerized interpreter (of the images) equates to a conscious being but I do agree that the camera is aware (as an observer) to some limited degree (in order to take in a photo of the environment). I just don’t hold consciousness and observation as the same thing, so can you elaborate on what you mean? Are they the same to you?

Is that not the qualitative experience?

No, I do not hold that there is something to be like a camera + computerized interpreter (of those images or what have you). I do not hold that the camera has qualitative experience: all that is occurring is quantitative measurements through-and-through. It quantifies its environment and then quantitatively analyzes the image (or what have you). qualitative experience, on the other hand, can’t be completely quantified—e.g., the subjectively experienced redness of the truck can’t be accurately quantified, whereas the camera is capturing quantitatively what it thinks is there and displaying it quantitatively via pixels (in hex encoded colors or what have you), of which you qualitatively experience when you look at the image via the camera screen (after taking a picture). There’s nothing qualitative happening in terms of the internal processes of the camera nor is the camera subjectively experiencing anything (I would say).

Objective consciousness is the observation and confirmation that there is consciousness apart from the subjective experience itself.

I don’t see how you can come to understand a thing as conscious but yet say you haven’t thereby posited it as subjectively experiencing: could you elaborate?

By my lights, the whole point of saying something is conscious is to grant that it has subjective experience, and the outer, objective analysis of that looks like the an aware, organic entity. It sounds like, under your view, there could be a being which is conscious but doesn’t have any subjective experience but, to me, that’s like saying that we can determine something thinks while holding it may not have a thinker.

Bob

Was Helen Keller less conscious than most people?

I would say so.

I would say that if you lose a finger, you are exactly that much less conscious than someone who has the same finger. You no longer have the conscious biology where your finger once was, like having the tactile and other sensations that you would have otherwise.

It scares me when you say things that I agree with...

:wink:

Let's assume we have a being born with only one sense, touch. Is it going to be less conscious than someone with all five senses? Or is consciousness like a switch? You either have it or you don't? — RogueAI

If you mean a human, my guess (based on no education in these matters :D) is that such a person could become conscious. There is a lot of wiring that takes place in the brain for many years after birth. It happens as the person interacts with the world. The brain evolved with our typical perceptions, so maybe it easily wires when the interactions are through the full compliment of senses? That's just a guess off the top of my head. But that doesn’t mean many things aren’t taking place even without the full complement. And the human brain still has its DNA telling it to grow in particular ways, so it’s trying, even if only getting interactions through touch.

Maybe it has more to do with communicating than simply perceiving and noticing what you're perceiving? It’s probably easier to communicate more ideas with more senses. Maybe a person's degree of consciousness depends on how well you can teach them to communicate.

Is “qualitative experience” (i.e., qualia) different to you than observing, identifying, and acting (or are they the same)? — Bob Ross

They are slightly different. Qualitative experience is the subjective act of observing and identifying. You can act as well, its just not required to subjectively be conscious. Think about someone in a coma that was unresponsive, but later comes out of it and is able to repeat conversations they heard while unresponsive. They were conscious, just unable to act.

Observing identifying and acting are objective measures of consciousness that can be known from monitoring a thing. Put a puzzle in front of a person, and they'll observe, attempt to identify, and make an action based on that identity.

Is “awareness” different than “qualitative experience”? Is it the same as observing, identifying, and acting? — Bob Ross

Awareness is a combination of two main factors: Observation and identification. — Philosophim

Qualitative experience would be the experience of observing and identifying from the subject observing and identifying.

Am I correct in saying that, under your view, “objective” and “subjective” consciousness are both referring to qualitative experience? Awareness? Both? — Bob Ross

No, only subjective consciousness refers to qualitative experience. Its not that objective experience denies that subjective consciousness exist, it just knows that it cannot be known and as such cannot be determined by an objective evaluation.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like you are saying that we can objectively know that other beings have qualitative experience and that there is something to be like that subject but we cannot know what it is like to be that subject: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, we cannot actually know whether other beings qualitatively experience, we can only assume or make an induction that they do. As there is no way to objectively measure or comprehend what another's qualitative experience would be like, its outside of our ability to know. Its like this: Both of our eyes see the wavelength for the color green, but I can never know if what you subjectively experience as green is the same as what I subjectively experience as green.

They can have robotic consciousness.

Are you saying that there is something to be like a robot as a subject (but we just can’t know what that is like) and it has qualitative experience? — Bob Ross

We can assume that there is, but we cannot know that there is. Whether a robot has qualitative experience and what its like is outside of the realm of knowledge.

I don’t hold that a camera + a computerized interpreter (of the images) equates to a conscious being but I do agree that the camera is aware (as an observer) to some limited degree (in order to take in a photo of the environment). I just don’t hold consciousness and observation as the same thing, so can you elaborate on what you mean? — Bob Ross

Something aware can both observe and identify. A camera that receives light through the lens and then prints it onto a photo is a simple observer. It does not identify anything in the picture itself, it just observes and records. An identifier is something which can look at that picture and think, "That part of the picture is a cloud". Consciousness requires both observation and the ability to identify. Observation or the ability to identify alone do not make consciousness.

Is that not the qualitative experience?

No, I do not hold that there is something to be like a camera + computerized interpreter (of those images or what have you). I do not hold that the camera has qualitative experience: all that is occurring is quantitative measurements through-and-through. — Bob Ross

And you can't know that it has qualitative experience, anymore than you can know any other objectively conscious being has qualitative experience. Bob, can you prove that I have qualitative experience? Can you know it for certain? It is just as difficult to prove I have qualitative experience as it is to prove a dog has qualitative experience. Since we cannot, when talking about what we can know objectively, qualitative experience of beings or things other than ourselves is unnecessary.

e.g., the subjectively experienced redness of the truck can’t be accurately quantified, whereas the camera is capturing quantitatively what it thinks is there and displaying it quantitatively via pixels (in hex encoded colors or what have you), of which you qualitatively experience when you look at the image via the camera screen (after taking a picture). There’s nothing qualitative happening in terms of the internal processes of the camera nor is the camera subjectively experiencing anything (I would say). — Bob Ross

I'll refer back to seeing the wavelength green vs experiencing the qualitative color of what green is to you. Its not that there isn't anything qualitatively happening to other people. Its that its outside of our knowledge. Because we cannot prove it, it is unimportant for us what exact color we see when we see the wavelength green. Same with the qualitative experience of an ai observing and identifying objects in a picture. We can note it sees the wavelength of green, but we cannot know what that experience is for it. Since we cannot know if it does or does not have qualitative experience, its subjective consciousness is not considered in objective consciousness evaluation.

Objective consciousness is the observation and confirmation that there is consciousness apart from the subjective experience itself.

I don’t see how you can come to understand a thing as conscious but yet say you haven’t thereby posited it as subjectively experiencing: could you elaborate? — Bob Ross

Certainly. Consciousness is described as anything which can observe and identify. The only way we can objectively know if something is consciousness is by observing its actions. There are only certain actions one can take which determine consciousness. If I put iodine in a person's blood, it will show signs of hormones for your thyroid. What is the qualitative experience of having iodine in your blood? If someone put it into our blood stream, we would not observe it by feeling in our blood, nor be able to identify it. Therefore we are not conscious of it.

However, stick a needle in someone's skin to insert the iodine, and a person can identify the feel and sight of the needle, and identify that it is a needle, or at least something that causes pain. Thus the person is conscious of the needle. Do we know what they feel? No. That is the subjective consciousness of the person. Does it matter subjectively what they feel when evaluating objectively whether they are conscious or not? No.

By my lights, the whole point of saying something is conscious is to grant that it has subjective experience, and the outer, objective analysis of that looks like the an aware, organic entity. It sounds like, under your view, there could be a being which is conscious but doesn’t have any subjective experience but, to me, that’s like saying that we can determine something thinks while holding it may not have a thinker. — Bob Ross

I am going a step further. I'm saying its impossible to know if something else besides yourself has qualitative experience because its purely subjective. Can you prove it otherwise? Can you demonstrate with full knowledge that I have subjective qualitative experience?

Great points Bob, glad to see you thinking about it!

Hello Philosophim,

Thank you for the elaboration, as I think I am beginning to penetrate into your terminology. However, I want to keep explaining it back to you to ensure I am getting it right. We simply do not use the terms the same, which is totally fine.

As I am now understanding you, “consciousness”, in general, is any being which “observes” and “identifies” its environment (and, as an optional addition, acts upon it); and “objective consciousness” is simply to be “conscious” (in the sense I defined above) whereas “subjective” consciousness is to be “conscious” plus qualia. In other words, every “subjectively conscious” being is “objectively conscious”, but not necessarily every “objectively conscious” being is “subjectively conscious”: is that fair?

However, there’s another aspect to this that I am sensing: the terms “objective” and “subjective” are meant to distinguish between the epistemic access we have to consciousness, and that is perhaps why you didn’t just use the term “consciousness” to refer to “an observing and identifying being” and “qualitative experience” (or what have you) as “an subjectively observing and identifying being”. Is that correct?

In terms of the distinction in epistemic access, I am understanding you to be claiming that we can only “know” of “objective aspects of consciousness”, where “knowledge” is perhaps restricted to what is empirically verifiable? Is that correct?

You can act as well, its just not required to subjectively be conscious. Think about someone in a coma that was unresponsive, but later comes out of it and is able to repeat conversations they heard while unresponsive. They were conscious, just unable to act.

I think perhaps “acting”, in the sense that you are using it (i.e., a visible bodily motion), is insufficient (which I think you are alluding to here). I think of being conscious as having receptivity (i.e., ability to receive input), sensibility (i.e., ability to acquire sensations from the receptors), knowledge of one’s environment (i.e., whether that be perception, self-knowledge, or basic stimulus responses), and having mental activity (e.g., qualia, thoughts, concepts, etc.). For you, I would imagine the last element there is not required (for one to be conscious), but the first three I think fit well into what I think you are trying to convey: I don’t think it matters if a being is actively displaying high-level bodily motions (i.e., actions). Maybe we can agree on that.

Observing identifying and acting are objective measures of consciousness that can be known from monitoring a thing

I take you to mean that observing, identifying, and acting are pragmatically useful for determining if one has receptivity, sensibility, and some knowledge of its environment: is that correct?

Qualitative experience would be the experience of observing and identifying from the subject observing and identifying.

This is where I get a bit confused: are you saying that the exact same “observing” and “identifying” is occurring objectively and the only subjective aspect is the viewpoint of the subject which is objectively “observing” and “identifying”? Because then it sounds like you might be saying qualia are not subjective, but merely the viewpoint of a subject that is having them is.

No, we cannot actually know whether other beings qualitatively experience, we can only assume or make an induction that they do.
…
Its like this: Both of our eyes see the wavelength for the color green, but I can never know if what you subjectively experience as green is the same as what I subjectively experience as green.

To me, your example argues a different point than your original claim (in that paragraph): the example is already conceding that “there is something to be like me” but that you can’t know what that is like, whereas your original claim was that we can’t even know that “there is something to be like me” (from you viewpoint). Are you claiming both of these claims (i.e., that you cannot know that there is something to be like me from your perspective and that you cannot know, even if there was something to be like me, what it would be like to be me)?

We can assume that there is, but we cannot know that there is. Whether a robot has qualitative experience and what its like is outside of the realm of knowledge.
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Bob, can you prove that I have qualitative experience?

Firstly, I just want to note that I do not think I need certainty to “know” things. Yes, I think that I can “know” you have qualitative experience insofar as it would be special pleading of me to think of myself as the only human being who has it. No I am not certain of it.

Secondly, I am be confident enough to say that a camera and an AI do not have qualitative experience because I can know what they are made of and there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all mechanical, quantitative operations. I am not certain that a pool of water cannot, all else being equal, turn into a car; but I am very confident that it won’t.

If you give me something which only has quantitative measuring capabilities, then I expect it to not have qualitative experience (but I do expect it to have awareness in the sense of the ability to quantify its environment).

It is just as difficult to prove I have qualitative experience as it is to prove a dog has qualitative experience. Since we cannot, when talking about what we can know objectively, qualitative experience of beings or things other than ourselves is unnecessary.

I would like to note that it is very necessary to prove it if one is a reductive physicalist: the entire metaphysical theory is riding on it.

Also, it seems like ‘proof’ to you implies certainty: is that correct? If so, then I agree that I cannot prove that a dog has qualitative experience, but then again I can’t prove that boiling eggs in water will cook them either. If I remember correctly, then the vast majority of your “knowledge” is cogency (i.e., inductions and abductions), right? If so, then you can run a very confident and cogent argument (‘proof’) that dogs have qualitative experience, but it doesn’t provide certainty for sure.

I'll refer back to seeing the wavelength green vs experiencing the qualitative color of what green is to you. Its not that there isn't anything qualitatively happening to other people. Its that its outside of our knowledge

To me, it seems as though you are claiming sometimes that we can’t know that other people have qualitative experience (viz., that there is something to be like them: they have qualia) and other times you are conceding that point, like the above paragraph, and saying just can’t know what it would be like to be like them.

Can you prove it otherwise? Can you demonstrate with full knowledge that I have subjective qualitative experience?

Why would I need to prove it with full knowledge (and am assuming full certainty) for it to be worth believing (or claiming to know)?

Bob

In terms of the distinction in epistemic access, I am understanding you to be claiming that we can only “know” of “objective aspects of consciousness”, where “knowledge” is perhaps restricted to what is empirically verifiable? Is that correct? — Bob Ross

Yes, with an addition just to be sure. A subjective consciousness can know its own qualia, no one else can.

I don’t think it matters if a being is actively displaying high-level bodily motions (i.e., actions). Maybe we can agree on that. — Bob Ross

Activity is not needed for subjective consciousness. It is just that activity is needed to objectively conclude that another being is conscious. Now, it may be the case that we can scan a brain and ascertain that the person is conscious, but unable to act. For an intro, this side exception seemed unneeded to ensure the initial idea was not overly complex.

Observing identifying and acting are objective measures of consciousness that can be known from monitoring a thing

I take you to mean that observing, identifying, and acting are pragmatically useful for determining if one has receptivity, sensibility, and some knowledge of its environment: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, I very purposefully excluded anything that had to do with perception as a requirement for consciousness. Perception is often associated with the five senses. Observation does not preclude perception, but it does not necessitate it. If you are thinking about an image in your mind, you are observing something. When you identify that image, feeling, thought, etc, you are identifying. You can also observe perceptions, have sensibility, and know your environment while being conscious, but those can all be bundled under variations of observation and identity.

Qualitative experience would be the experience of observing and identifying from the subject observing and identifying.

This is where I get a bit confused: are you saying that the exact same “observing” and “identifying” is occurring objectively and the only subjective aspect is the viewpoint of the subject which is objectively “observing” and “identifying”? Because then it sounds like you might be saying qualia are not subjective, but merely the viewpoint of a subject that is having them is. — Bob Ross

The viewpoint of the subject is what I mean by "subjective". It is formed by the viewer, and can only be experienced by the viewer. That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable. Subjective does not mean unreasonable, illogical, or unprovable. Subjective merely means that it is an experience that can only be known to the entity having it.

For example, I like the color blue. Its my favorite color. No one else can say objectively that its my favorite color, because there's no way of proving it. I could be lying. Only I know if blue is my favorite color. The fact that blue is my favorite color also does not objectively make blue the best color for everyone. The subjective conscious is simply the personal experience of being conscious, or qualia.

To me, your example argues a different point than your original claim (in that paragraph): the example is already conceding that “there is something to be like me” but that you can’t know what that is like, — Bob Ross

To clarify, the "something like me" would be the objectively observable nature of being a conscious being. I cannot say "subjectively like me". But I can observe a being and determine it is conscious by the actions in commits, because only a conscious being can observe, identify, and act on that combination.

Think about a fly. A fly can observe the smell of trash, then decide to land on it. Do we know if it thinks about it morally? If the fly wonders at its own existence? No. But what we can know is it scans the environment, identifies, and acts upon it. Do we need to know the flies experience of being a fly to objectively conclude it has a basic consciousness? No. Its beyond our knowledge, so we simply exclude it when evaluating what we can know.

Firstly, I just want to note that I do not think I need certainty to “know” things. Yes, I think that I can “know” you have qualitative experience insofar as it would be special pleading of me to think of myself as the only human being who has it. No I am not certain of it. — Bob Ross

You believe I have qualitative experience. Certainty does not give knowledge, logically correct identification from our observations do. You know that I'm conscious because of the actions I've done here. The words that I've written cannot be done without observation and identification. Do you know the feelings I had when I wrote them? No. Do you know all of the other thoughts whirling in my head that are not necessarily conveyed by the words that I wrote? No. Is it important that we know that I have a subjective qualia, or what that subjective qualia is for you to conclude I'm objectively conscious? Not at all.

Objectivity assumes a logic that stands despite subjective challenges to it. We cannot objectively note that everyone sees green as everyone else, but we can objectively note that if someone is observing the wavelength of green, they are at least perceiving a color we can all agree is green. So if you cannot objectively prove that I experience qualia, its not a matter of belief, its a matter of something you cannot know.

Secondly, I am be confident enough to say that a camera and an AI do not have qualitative experience because I can know what they are made of and there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all mechanical, quantitative operations. — Bob Ross

And yet that's not logical. I can look at a brain, know what it is made of and see that there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all chemical, quantitative operations. So according to your argument, you could confidently say that you know no human being has qualitative experience, including yourself. This is a contradiction, so we know it to be wrong.

I would like to note that it is very necessary to prove it if one is a reductive physicalist: the entire metaphysical theory is riding on it. — Bob Ross

Bob, I don't care about philosophical identities. They're useful as a digest to get into particular thoughts, but the identity itself is unimportant. What's important to me is whether arguments have consistent, logical applications that allow us to function in the world optimally. If my points blow through some type of philosophical ideology but meet the criteria I value, so be it.

Also, it seems like ‘proof’ to you implies certainty: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, proof would be a logically consistent belief that is concurrent with reality, (or "what is") and not denied by it. We can have incredible certainty in beliefs that are wrong. Its been a while, but just think back along the lines of my knowledge paper if you need details.

If I remember correctly, then the vast majority of your “knowledge” is cogency (i.e., inductions and abductions), right? — Bob Ross

No, the vast majority of what we hold are beliefs, and if we're logical, we attempt to hold onto the most cogent beliefs we can when we are unable to know whether that belief is right. It seems a cogent belief that other beings can experience qualia, but it cannot be known what that qualia is like for them. We can objectively know whether something has consciousness or not, regardless of what we personally believe.

To me, it seems as though you are claiming sometimes that we can’t know that other people have qualitative experience (viz., that there is something to be like them: they have qualia) and other times you are conceding that point, like the above paragraph, and saying just can’t know what it would be like to be like them. — Bob Ross

We cannot know, but we believe that others have qualia. But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion. It is not that we cannot speak or have further beliefs about subjective consciousness, it is simply a recognition that such discussions can at most only be beliefs, and not objective certainties.

Can you prove it otherwise? Can you demonstrate with full knowledge that I have subjective qualitative experience?

Why would I need to prove it with full knowledge (and am assuming full certainty) for it to be worth believing (or claiming to know)? — Bob Ross

You can find worth in believing that I have qualia. But you cannot know it. Once again, this inability to know does not mean we cannot reasonably use cogency to think about the possibilities of qualia. Its just that we have to understand that such discussions can never be objective discussions. There will always be an uncertain belief. There is nothing wrong with this, as there are many many things that we cannot truly know yet we reasonably plan and work with. I don't know what tomorrow will bring or if I will even be alive, but I still plan with a general prediction of what will happen. Same with subjective consciousness.

Hello Philosophim,

Thank you for the clarifications: now that I have a better grasp (hopefully) of what you are saying, let me offer some worries/critiques I have. To simplify it down, here are the three main ones:

1. The fact that a being observes, identifies, and acts does not entail, in itself, that it has qualia.

2. The fact that a being has qualia does not entail, in itself, that there is something to be like it.

3. Qualia is irreducible to brain states.

I will let you navigate the discussion where you deem fit. Apart from the parts of your post (that I think) fall under one of the above categories, here’s my responses:

But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion

Beliefs are behavioral attitudes towards things which are objective and, as such, absolutely pertain to objective inquiry. I don’t think you can name a single field of study which isn’t predicated on beliefs—not even science.

We use beliefs to try and figure out what reality is, and most of our “knowledge” is made up of beliefs about the world (based off of evidence): this includes science and any empirical inquiry anyone can do.

For example, I believe that “every change has a cause”, and this is one of the axioms of science—one of the axioms of studying objectively brains.

I don’t think you can neatly separate beliefs from some sort of objective inquiry like you are implying.

And yet that's not logical. I can look at a brain, know what it is made of and see that there is no room for qualitative anything: it is all chemical, quantitative operations. So according to your argument, you could confidently say that you know no human being has qualitative experience, including yourself. This is a contradiction, so we know it to be wrong.

This isn’t true: you can’t account for qualia, which you do know exists because you have it, by looking at the quantitative processes of the brain. We can account for a camera simply by its quantitative processes and parts that produce those quantified measurements. I don’t see any contradiction here.

Bob, I don't care about philosophical identities. They're useful as a digest to get into particular thoughts, but the identity itself is unimportant. What's important to me is whether arguments have consistent, logical applications that allow us to function in the world optimally. If my points blow through some type of philosophical ideology but meet the criteria I value, so be it.

Fair enough! Let me re-phrase it: it is important if you are claiming that there is a mind-independent world which has mind-independent brains that produce qualia.

proof would be a logically consistent belief that is concurrent with reality

The idea that a dog has qualia is logically consistent and concurs with reality; but yet you said we cannot ‘prove’ it: why? The belief that a dog has qualia is a reasonable, cogent, and evidence based claim which meets your definition of proof.

I take you to mean that observing, identifying, and acting are pragmatically useful for determining if one has receptivity, sensibility, and some knowledge of its environment: is that correct? — Bob Ross

No, I very purposefully excluded anything that had to do with perception as a requirement for consciousness. Perception is often associated with the five senses.

By “knowledge of its environment”, I am not referring to “perception” necessarily, so I agree with you here; and “sensibility” is not referring to only human (or higher animal like) senses but, rather, sensing at all (which includes mechanical sensing).

That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable.

Under your view, how is this undeniable? I thought you are claiming that we can’t know.

For example, I like the color blue. Its my favorite color. No one else can say objectively that its my favorite color, because there's no way of proving it

Although you are correct that “I like the color blue” is subjective, it doesn’t follow that no one can invalidate that claim. If it turns out, unbeknownst to you, that you don’t like the color blue, then your proclamation of “I like the color blue” is in fact false. A proposition being subjective just means that the truthity is indexical (i.e., relative to the subject at hand), not that the subject is 100% correct pertaining thereto. You can absolutely get your preferences wrong (e.g., be delusional or simply really bad at psycho analysis). If the proposition “I like the color blue” is factually (i.e., objectively evaluated) as false and you claim it to be true, then you are wrong: it doesn’t matter that we are talking about your preferences.

I will stop here for now and let you respond,

Bob

The viewpoint of the subject is what I mean by "subjective". It is formed by the viewer, and can only be experienced by the viewer. That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable. — Philosophim

What if I said that the viewpoint of the subject is thought, not experienced? The subject perceives (experiences) things from some perspective (viewpoint) but does not experience the viewpoint itself. Further to that would be to say that the subject does not experience subjectivity or being a subject.

I think subjective experience is often conflated with and counted as the experience of subjectivity.

But beliefs about something are not objective, therefore they do not belong in objective analysis or discussion

Beliefs are behavioral attitudes towards things which are objective and, as such, absolutely pertain to objective inquiry. I don’t think you can name a single field of study which isn’t predicated on beliefs—not even science. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. Its not that we cannot start with beliefs. But beliefs must become hypotheses and be tested. Everything has a cause is known, because anytime we've tried to prove something doesn't have a cause, we fail. Its plausible that one day we will encounter something that doesn't have a prior cause, but it is currently something that we have never encountered before, so its not in the realm of possibility.

This isn’t true: you can’t account for qualia, which you do know exists because you have it, by looking at the quantitative processes of the brain. We can account for a camera simply by its quantitative processes and parts that produce those quantified measurements. I don’t see any contradiction here. — Bob Ross

I can account for that. But only me. In brain surgery they keep you conscious. They'll stimulate certain portions of your brain and ask you to respond. In this case, they'll ask you what you're feeling, or your qualia. Now can the surgeon know what its like when you say, "I'm thinking of a tree"? Of course not. There's no way to objectively measure that you are seeing a tree, or what that tree looks like exactly. They have to believe that you're giving them a close enough picture to what you're experiencing. But if they stimulate that brain state, they can cause you to think and feel things that you had no intent of thinking or feeling.

But lets go even simpler, alcohol or anesthesia. We know that when these chemicals enter your blood stream and hit your brain, your consciousness diminishes and can be blacked out entirely. Do I know the exact qualia of someone else getting blacked out? No. But I know my own.

If it is the case that we can use quantitative processes to change our own qualia, then the argument I made stands and you're still holding a contradiction.

Fair enough! Let me re-phrase it: it is important if you are claiming that there is a mind-independent world which has mind-independent brains that produce qualia. — Bob Ross

From my point of view there is a mind independent world, but I do not believe brains are fully independent from our minds. Our minds are a portion of our brain, and the part of the brain that is conscious.

The idea that a dog has qualia is logically consistent and concurs with reality; but yet you said we cannot ‘prove’ it: why? The belief that a dog has qualia is a reasonable, cogent, and evidence based claim which meets your definition of proof. — Bob Ross

Where is the evidence of qualia? If I operate on a dog and open up the brain, do I see the image and smell the smells the dog is experiencing? No. Thus we run into the philosophical zombie example.

"A philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience.[1]

For example, if a philosophical zombie were poked with a sharp object, it would not feel any pain, but it would behave exactly the way any conscious human would."
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

Some debate has been done over the meaning of this, but I am keen to observe one fact we can all agree on: No one can prove that a philosophical zombie can't exist. In fact, there's evidence for it in a well diagnosed issue with some animals: Blindsight.

I'm citing Luke's post here which then sights a post on Blindsight. I think its a fascinating read. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14286/a-potential-solution-to-the-hard-problem/p1

Here's an excerpt:
"In the blind area, DB himself maintained that he had no visual awareness. Nonetheless, Weiskrantz asked him to guess the location and shape of an object that lay in this area. To everyone’s surprise, he consistently guessed correctly. To DB himself, his success in guessing seemed quite unreasonable. So far as he was concerned, he wasn’t the source of his perceptual judgments, his sight had nothing to do with him. Weiskrantz named this capacity ‘blindsight’: visual perception in the absence of any felt visual sensations."
https://aeon.co/essays/how-blindsight-answers-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness

So here we have a being that is objectively conscious, but does not have subjective qualia to experience the location and shape he's obviously observing and identifying. We could say, "Well maybe he's lying." That's true, perhaps he's a very convincing liar. We can't know, because we can't experience consciousness from that person's subjective viewpoint. We can't prove that they have it, and we can't prove that they don't have it.

Now I do want to throw a caveat out there. It is not that we cannot come to a cogent set of beliefs that work consistently well enough for communication or evaluation in tandem with objective assessment. But it is only that, cogent beliefs. I can objectively state that when anesthesia is applied to a person, they black out. But I cannot objectively state what is it like for that person to black out.

That subjective experience is what they have, which is undeniable.

Under your view, how is this undeniable? I thought you are claiming that we can’t know. — Bob Ross

My apologies, that was me being unclear. My own subjective experience is what I have, and is undeniable. Whether a something beyond myself does, or does not have a subjective experience is undeniable from its own viewpoint. What is a belief and not knowledge, is that I can claim what that subjective experience from the view point of that being is like, or even that it has, or does not have any all.

Although you are correct that “I like the color blue” is subjective, it doesn’t follow that no one can invalidate that claim. If it turns out, unbeknownst to you, that you don’t like the color blue, then your proclamation of “I like the color blue” is in fact false. A proposition being subjective just means that the truthity is indexical (i.e., relative to the subject at hand), not that the subject is 100% correct pertaining thereto. — Bob Ross

Agreed! What we can claim though is that when you claimed that you liked the color blue, you saw the color blue and you identified it as a color you liked at that moment. Its not whether something is a fact which is qualia, it is the experience of observing and identifying. Whether that is correct, or incorrect does not deny the subjective experience of that action itself.

Fantastic viewpoints as always Bob!

Further to that would be to say that the subject does not experience subjectivity or being a subject. — Janus

What if I said that the viewpoint of the subject is thought, not experienced? The subject perceives (experiences) things from some perspective (viewpoint) but does not experience the viewpoint itself. Further to that would be to say that the subject does not experience subjectivity or being a subject.

I think subjective experience is often conflated with and counted as the experience of subjectivity. — Janus

I think we might be talking semantics here. How do you subjectively view the world? I can't know. You do. Go with that. That is your subjective consciousness.

I think we might be talking semantics here. — Philosophim

I don't think it's merely a matter of semantics. I'm not claiming that you can see the world from my perspective. I'm saying that we don't experience our subjectivity; rather 'subjectivity' is how seeing the world from a perspective is defined, so subjectivity is thought post hoc, not experienced. Thinking that subjectivity is experienced is a kind of reification, and I think the same goes for qualia. This reification of the self as substantive entity is the source of much confusion, Descartes being a notable example.

Does the electric eye that distinguishes frequencies of the spectrum that we perceive with our eyes have the same subjective experience of colors that we have? Does it have a different subjective experience of colors than we have? Is light hitting its sensor, and its circuits distinguishing one frequency from another, a subjective experience?

I don't think it's merely a matter of semantics. I'm not claiming that you can see the world from my perspective. I'm saying that we don't experience our subjectivity; rather 'subjectivity' is how seeing the world from a perspective is defined, so subjectivity is thought post hoc, not experienced. Thinking that subjectivity is experienced is a kind of reification, and I think the same goes for qualia. This reification of the self as substantive entity is the source of much confusion, Descartes being a notable example. — Janus

I think this is ok. How would you apply this in relation to the OP's point?

Does the electric eye that distinguishes frequencies of the spectrum that we perceive with our eyes have the same subjective experience of colors that we have? Does it have a different subjective experience of colors than we have? Is light hitting its sensor, and its circuits distinguishing one frequency from another, a subjective experience? — Patterner

The point is we cannot know what it experiences. However, I should make something implicit explicit now. When I speak of the ability to identify this includes the capability to create identity. An electric eye that records and shunts light off to pre-programmed areas isn't conscious. An eye which can observe, then create identify within what it observes (this combination of beams of light represents something new , like a cloud) would be conscious. Of course, conscious of only that.

I think this is ok. How would you apply this in relation to the OP's point? — Philosophim

I would say that subjective consciousness may not be what we naively or intuitively think it is, and that. maybe (I'd have to think further on this) there is no substantive distinction between objective and subjective consciousness, but that the distinction is an artefact of our dualistic mode of thinking.

Thanks. I was wondering what Janus meant when saying we don't experience subjectivity. I'm wondering if our experience of perception of the spectrum is different from the electric eye's.