Well as far as I can remember I never such a contract, but in your view I did so implicitly when I joined the rational community? — goremand

Did you the sign the 'member of the English speaking community' contract ? Or did you absorb its semantic norms mostly without trying ?

Could you be more specific about how denying my autonomy results in self-contradiction? — goremand

Autonomy means [ approximately ] self-rule. Rejecting the unjustified claims of others is part of that. Rejecting the justified claims of others is irrationality. Note that such a framework can remain fairly blurry. The details can be debated endlessly.

I would not have thought that I have been giving the impression that that’s what I believe. I was stating a position that some people believe that makes no sense to me. — Patterner

You're right, sorry. Basically I just wanted to make clear I distance myself from epiphenomenalism (qualia as real, but causally impotent), so there is no need for you to argue against it.

Did you the sign the 'member of the English speaking community' contract ? Or did you absorb its semantic norms mostly without trying ? — plaque flag

The latter mostly, why does it matter?

Autonomy means [ approximately ] self-rule. Rejecting the unjustified claims of other is part of that. — plaque flag

Why? Why can't a non-autonomous being reject unjustified claims?

The latter mostly, why does it matter? — goremand

My point is that norms of autonomous rationality are also just mostly absorbed by members of freeish societies. We learn to take responsibility for our promises. We learn to justify claims and not expect others to simply take our word for it. We learn to think for ourselves and not just believe whatever we're told.

Why? Why can't a non-autonomous being reject unjustified claims? — goremand

I'd say they couldn't do so rationally. Recall what I actually claim.

Autonomy means [ approximately ] self-rule. Rejecting the unjustified claims of others is part of that. Rejecting the justified claims of others is irrationality. — plaque flag

The bolded part is where things get interesting. Despite our attachment to our current beliefs, our attachment to our conceptions of ourselves as rational dictates that we change those beliefs when they are shown inferior to or less justified than others.

Note that you are asking me to justify my claims (which also involves their clarification) as an expression of your autonomy. You are not bound to agree with me unless I make a sufficiently strong case. And you are only committed to agreeing with me, if I do make a strong enough case, to the degree that you identify with the project of determining your beliefs rationally.

I take myself to be explicating the concept of rationality here.

I'd say they couldn't do so rationally. Recall what I actually claim. — plaque flag

Ok well, I think we just have different conceptions of rationality. Maybe I believe no-one is rational in your sense of the term. So what?

Note that you are asking me to justify my claims (which also involves their clarification) as an expression of your autonomy. — plaque flag

I don't understand how this is so at all. Yes I am asking you to justify your claims, yes I do believe I am being rational, I just don't see how autonomy figures into it.

I don't understand how this is so at all. Yes I am asking you to justify your claims, yes I do believe I am being rational, I just don't see how autonomy figures into it. — goremand

Why don't you just take my word for my claims ? Why don't you just believe what I tell you to believe ?


Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a disadvantageous suspicion. For there is nothing so important because of its utility, nothing so holy, that it may be exempted from this searching review and inspection, which knows no respect for persons [i.e. no person bears more authority than any other—GW]. On this freedom rests the very existence of reason, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back. (A738f/B766f, translation modified)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/

Why don't you just take my word for my claims ? Why don't you just believe what I tell you to believe ? — plaque flag

So if I lacked autonomy I would just believe whatever you said? Are you implying that anything that lacks autonomy instead becomes perfectly obedient or amenable?

So if I lacked autonomy I would just believe whatever you said? Are you implying that anything that lacks autonomy instead becomes perfectly obedient or amenable? — goremand

No. I'm surprised you would think that. The issue is whether you ought to believe whatever I tell you. In short, I'm trying to get you to account for the normative dimension of the project of establishing beliefs rationally.

Another way to put it: why would a person be proud of being a scientist ? of trusting science ? Why would a person be proud of living an examined life ?

The issue is whether you ought to believe whatever I tell you. In short, I'm trying to get you to account for the normative dimension of the project of establishing beliefs rationally. — plaque flag

If I am rational, it is not because I "ought" to be or some such, but because it is in my nature, just like it is in my nature to walk, breathe, eat etc. There are "oughts" to being rational in the sense that rationality is a set of norms, but there are no norms that compel me to be rational in the first place.

Another way to put it: why would a person be proud of being a scientist ? of trusting science ? Why would a person be proud of living an examined life ? — plaque flag

I don't think they should or should not be proud of whatever they do with their life, that's really just a psychological question. I don't think there is such a thing as a "correct" emotion to feel about anything.

Overall you seem to be saying that you are an unfree-irresponsible meatbot or the algorithm inside it. You basically claim that pain don't hurt. You also reject the founding claim-constraining normativity of rational conversation.

Try to see this pose you are offering from the outside. Why should one trust an amoral robot programmed by its environment when 'it' claims to be such an amoral robot ? 'I am a liar.' ' I don't care about truth.'

I don't mean to be rude. I'm just pointing out the strangeness of you offering your opinions with a certain confidence while eroding any possible authority or interest they are likely to have. Like a drunk at a bar, satisfying with something that sounds edgy, 'unsentimentally' numb to the lack of coherence.

To be clear, I think you do care about truth, which is to your credit. And you are just trying to see around your culture to that transcendent truth by avoiding sentimental attachment to norms that might get in the way of that truth-seeing project. Nietzchean stuff.

Overall you seem to be saying that you are an unfree-irresponsible meatbot or the algorithm inside it. You basically claim that pain don't hurt. You also reject the founding claim-constraining normativity of rational conversation.

Try to see this pose you are offering from the outside. Why should one trust an amoral robot programmed by its environment when 'it' claims to be such an amoral robot ? 'I am a liar.' ' I don't care about truth.' — plaque flag

First off, you make it sound like I'm claiming I'm a "robot" and you're a real boy. I don't think you and me are any different really, I've made the decision to trust you despite not believing you really are compelled by the "normativity of rational conversation", based on prior experience and on my observations of your behavior, and I don't see why you can't do the same.

Second I think we are different in how we conceptualize motivation. I do not care about truth because I am rational, I am rational because I care about truth. Like most people I have curiosity, an irrational appetite or desire to know the truth and to figure things out. But if you do think that me being an erratic liar better explains my behavior, then by all means believe that.

I don't mean to be rude. I'm just pointing out the strangeness of you offering your opinions with a certain confidence while eroding any possible authority or interest they are likely to have. Like a drunk at a bar, satisfying with something that sounds edgy, 'unsentimentally' numb to the lack of coherence. — plaque flag

Well I don't mind your appraisal, I just don't see the point to it. It is not enough to just claim that what I say is incoherent, you also have to show it.

To be clear, I think you do care about truth, which is to your credit. And you are just trying to see around your culture to that transcendent truth by avoiding sentimental attachment to norms that might get in the way of that truth-seeing project. Nietzchean stuff. — plaque flag

All right, I'll just take that as a slightly patronizing compliment.

I hope I haven't been rude. I'm trying to get you to admit that you too are a real boy. I'm challenging what I see as your psychologism (rationality is just rationalization) and your functionalism (your version seems to deny the qualitative aspect of experience). You mention your curiosity. Is that something you feel ? And do you not see color or feel pain ?

I hope I haven't been rude. — plaque flag

No problem, don't worry.

I'm challenging what I see as your psychologism (rationality is just rationalization) — plaque flag

I think only in your case is it rationalization, the way I see it you are pulling yourself up by the bootstraps. You are rational because the norms of rationality compel you, that's like saying you play chess because the rules of chess say that you must play. It's just a cover-up for an arbitrary decision.

and your functionalism (your version seems to deny the qualitative aspect of experience) — plaque flag

This though is right on the money. I want to solve the problems of philosophy of mind, the hard problems and so on, and I do believe skepticism of phenomenal properties is the way to go.

You mention your curiosity. Is that something you feel ? And do you not see color or feel pain ? — plaque flag

Feeling and sight can be accounted for functionally, so yes I have feelings and yes I see colors. But the way I understand these terms is a bit different from yours, as I think I have already made pretty clear.

To be honest I think this is a pretty shallow approach you're taking, you're basically just restating a question I've already answered. Rhetorical incredulity is not enough, if you want to show me the error of my ways I need explicit criticism.

Just so you understand, this is how this line of questioning looks like from my perspective:

"I heard you deny phenomenal properties, is that true?"
"Yes."
"But do you really?"
"Yes."
"But do you reeeally?
"Yes."
"But do you reeeeeeally?"
etc.

I do believe skepticism of phenomenal properties is the way to go. — goremand

Feeling and sight can be accounted for functionally, so yes I have feelings and yes I see colors. — goremand

I understand that you want to be careful conceptually. But what I was trying to clarify here is whether you grant (basically) that life/experience involves a 'nonconceptual surplus.'

I think that people born blind can have knowledge of color because they can reason about color in a public language. So I wouldn't say that typically sighted people know about color, but I would say that there is an extra 'dimension' or 'aspect' in the way the world is given to them.

Coming from another angle, I think red functions structurally and inferentially in a way that makes knowledge of red possible for those born blind, but I don't think the referent of red is exhausted by or as its role in this structure.

I think Wittgenstein's beetle in the box analogy is brilliant, but it doesn't address what exceeds a structuralist semantics. The reason most people can't understand Wittgenstein's point is because they've used the structural place of red tacitly to locate a 'subjective' (qualitative) referent. They 'know' that pain --- the pain they care about --- is not primarily a concept. It's like the difference between the idea of bread and bread itself. Only one keeps you from starving.

But what I was trying to clarify here is whether you grant (basically) that life/experience involves a 'nonconceptual surplus.' — plaque flag

To me "experience" is just a functional concept or abstraction. So no, there is no "surplus". And me saying this is just restating what I have already said, are you struggling to just take what I say at face value?

I think red functions structurally and inferentially in a way that makes knowledge of red possible for those born blind, but I don't think the referent of red is exhausted by or as its role in this structure. — plaque flag

Well, I think that it is.

Ok, it seems you are really denying there is color and sound and pain beyond the inferential role of the tokens color, sound, and pain.

How are such tokens (historically contingent black glyphs on a white background) even invented or exchanged by the non-inferentially blind (by us, I mean, as opposed to the traditionally blind ) ?

Can you live your life as normal with your eyes closed ?

Are you committed to a p-zombie approach to human existence? So that the meaning of your own claims doesn't exist for you first-person ?

As far as we can say from experience, the world is only given perspectively to different sentient creatures. Denying subjectivity is just denying the being of the world.

I say this as a direct realist who doesn't think consciousness is more than awareness of this world. I see the world and not the inside of a private bubble.

Sorry, are you being literal here? You think that the water is deceiving you intentionally?

I maintain the water is innocent, it is simply behaving in accordance physics just as everything else. If you are "fooled" by this, the problem is with yourself. — goremand

Doesn't mean that it's not deception. like I said it can fool without intent. It makes the stick appear to bend when it doesn't.

But like I said before this topic is a waste of time.

The light traveling from the stick to our retina is behaving as we know it should according to physics, when a stick in the water appears bent. It is not behaving wrongly. It is only our intuitive interpretation of this light that causes confusion. — PhilosophyRunner

No it is behaving wrongly because it appears bent when it isn't. It has nothing to do with the intuitive interpretation of the light, hence why it's an optical illusion.

How are such tokens (historically contingent black glyphs on a white background) even invented or exchanged by the non-inferentially blind (by us, I mean, as opposed to the traditionally blind ) ? — plaque flag

You mean, how did we invent writing and other means of information exchange? Do you believe that without qualia, the invention and use of writing becomes inexplicable?

Can you live your life as normal with your eyes closed ? — plaque flag

I'm not sure what you mean. As far as I know skepticism of qualitative properties does not entail a loss of ability.

Are you committed to a p-zombie approach to human existence? So that the meaning of your own claims doesn't exist for you first-person ?

As far as we can say from experience, the world is only given perspectively to different sentient creatures. Denying subjectivity is just denying the being of the world.

I say this as a direct realist who doesn't think consciousness is more than awareness of this world. I see the world and not the inside of a private bubble. — plaque flag

It seems you are "bundling" concepts together in a (to me) arbitrary way, such that denial of one becomes denial of all. I don't remember ever denying subjectivity, consciousness or meaning as useful concepts, if these can only make sense in relation to qualitative properties you will have to explain why.

But like I said before this topic is a waste of time. — Darkneos

Ok.

You mean, how did we invent writing and other means of information exchange? Do you believe that without qualia, the invention and use of writing becomes inexplicable? — goremand

I don't go out of my way to hate on qualia, 'cuz there's an inferentialist defense of them probably, but I'm not a qualia-slinger myself. I'm a [ phenomenological ] direct realists. Roses are red. I see roses. I don't see some internal image of the rose. I just see the rose. I don't 'believe' in consciousness ---except as the being of the world for a sentient creature. In the human case, the world exists for (is seen by) dramaturgical-discursive subjects responsible for their claims about this world, who experience this one shared world not as a chaos of swirling sound and color but as meaningful totality of equipment and institutions.

Qualia aren't needed here. That concept tempts us toward a mystified understanding of the forest as somehow hidden behind the trees. The world itself appears in (as) the colors of the rainbow and the tweeting of birds, as colorful rainbows and tweeting birds (as a system of already meaningfully related entities).

So we need working eyes that see color (at least shades of gray, to pick out shapes) to invent writing systems. Yes. And we need ears that work to develop a rich musical tradition.

No it is behaving wrongly because it appears bent when it isn't. It has nothing to do with the intuitive interpretation of the light, hence why it's an optical illusion. — Darkneos

Then I suggest you read up on refraction. Light is behaving correctly as we understand it when it redirects at the boundary between water and air. The light is not misbehaving.

It is our consciousness (or brain depending on your stance) interpreting the redirected light as a bent stick that is causing the confusion.

Ok. — goremand

I mean it's been 5 pages and you haven't really gone anywhere with this.

It seems you are "bundling" concepts together in a (to me) arbitrary way, such that denial of one becomes denial of all. I don't remember ever denying subjectivity, consciousness or meaning as useful concepts, if these can only make sense in relation to qualitative properties you will have to explain why. — goremand

You kinda have to accept other minds otherwise there isn't a reason to take anything you say seriously.

It is our consciousness (or brain depending on your stance) interpreting the redirected light as a bent stick that is causing the confusion. — PhilosophyRunner

There is no stance, it's really just the brain. That fact is more or less solved at the moment and I am well aware of refraction hence it's not the brain's fault but the light playing tricks, like it sometimes does. It's the same for a mirage.

You mean, how did we invent writing and other means of information exchange? Do you believe that without qualia, the invention and use of writing becomes inexplicable? — goremand

There really isn't a reason to believe qualia exist. It's just another last gasp of dualism.

There is no stance, it's really just the brain. That fact is more or less solved at the moment and I am well aware of refraction hence it's not the brain's fault but the light playing tricks, like it sometimes does. It's the same for a mirage. — Darkneos

Refraction is not a trick of light. It is light behaving correctly as we understand it does.

In a sense it can be a trick of the light depending on the where

In a sense it can be a trick of the light depending on the where — Darkneos

Refraction is never a trick. It is simply the way light behaves when moving from one medium to another where there is a change in wave speed. This is well understood in physics, there is no trick, just the normal behavior of light.

Refraction is never a trick. It is simply the way light behaves when moving from one medium to another where there is a change in wave speed. This is well understood in physics, there is no trick, just the normal behavior of light. — PhilosophyRunner

That’s just not true. Refraction can sometimes be a trick like with water. That is also well understood in physics. I’m thinking you don’t get this as well as you’re making it out

That’s just not true. Refraction can sometimes be a trick like with water. That is also well understood in physics. I’m thinking you don’t get this as well as you’re making it out — Darkneos

There are no tricks in physics, I have no idea what you are talking about. Light changes direction at the boundary of two medium, given by Snell's law. It always behaves correctly according to Snell's law. Always.

There is no trick that happens sometimes.

There are no tricks in physics, I have no idea what you are talking about. Light changes direction at the boundary of two medium, given by Snell's law. It always behaves correctly according to Snell's law. Always.

There is no trick that happens sometimes. — PhilosophyRunner

Again, it depends on the context, science is more gray than most think. Especially in biology. Like I said you don't understand it as well as you think.