:cool:

I like the relationship between poet and philosopher -- subversive to put the poet as the maker of what the philosopher needs to do his craft! — Moliere

Its only a simplified summary of Wittgenstein.

Meaning is use. Philosophy is 'engine idling' - Philosophers are not saying anything, as the engine is not doing any work, going anywhere, producing new knowledge. They are tuning the language to make it run more smoothly. Thus philosophers do nothing useful with the language in the sense of saying anything meaningful. They disentangle the threads so that poets can weave new meanings and identities for us to wear and use.

All of these evolutionary changes are possible without disrupting communication, only as long as they take place logically (there is a need for a new word, a comprehensible reason for an adjustment, and consensus among the primary users of the jargon) and gradually (so that the users of the language have time to learn the new application.) Otherwise, Babel ensues. — Vera Mont

In favor of this picture of linguistic change I'd say that languages do, in fact, take a long time to change. There's a stability there which is the reason we are tempted by the metaphor of the Public Shelf of Meaning, or in more sophisticated prose, metaphysical Propositions.

What I'd substitute for Propositions is repetition. By repeatedly using a locution in a similar fashion it comes to seem that the days resemble one another, or even that there are days at all rather than intermittent light-space dark-space. Then by finding ways to preserve our writing over time that allowed us the metaphor of nature as book that we can read. The fundamentals of writing are the same between speech and the script, the only difference is rate at which the sign fades, which in turn allows us to start interpreting the sign in the same way that we were interpreting the world, which gives rise to the picture of Propositions.

This is the better way to put the question given the nonsense of private languages:

Given that meaning is public -- for what reasons do we disagree over meaning?

There's a stability there which is the reason we are tempted by the metaphor of the Public Shelf of Meaning, or in more sophisticated prose, metaphysical Propositions. — Moliere

In truth, I have never heard 'the public shelf' reference before, and I have no idea what the 'metaphysical proposition' is. So, here we have a failure to communicate. For me, language use is not a philosophical issue; it's as simple and pragmatic as the several uses of a hammer.

Given that meaning is public -- for what reasons do we disagree over meaning? — Moliere

Meaning may be public - that is, a language used by many people consists of a vocabulary. But its distribution is not egalitarian. Different classes have access to more or less education, more or less sophisticated concepts and therefore different ways of using language, different applications for the same word. Specialized occupations also have specialized words and applications even for common words, while the general public has little access to those specialized forms of communication. Language is distorted by financial and covert interest groups who deliberately exclude members of the public from their communications. Some economic and political groups also deform the common language in order to manipulate and mislead the public. And some slight innovations, such as a play on words or metaphor, are introduced in popular entertainment and art.

In an era of fast-evolving technologies and mass communication, these intentional distortions, as well as unintended misunderstandings, from several sources at once, can spread far more rapidly than they could have even a century ago - over a far larger population that incorrectly believes it owns and speaks a single language.

over a far larger population that incorrectly believes it owns and speaks a single language. — Vera Mont

Now that's intriguing, and I think forms the most radical interpretation of @frank's "creative" side of the gradient of meaning.

At a certain point we don't speak the same language. It becomes Middle English or German or some such.

But are you and I speaking the same language in this series of posts?

But you are not "taking a minute of fame" you are contributing a minute (or seconds, really) of fame. For which I am grateful. Every second counts. — BC

One of the things I like about the Oxford English Dictionary is that it is empirical in its research -- it looks for actual uses to support the record of meaning. It is an empirical historical method of inquiry.

And with that comes new uses. The dictionary is never finished since, from our present record, we clearly see that meaning shifts over time.

Maybe the better question is -- how is it, given that meaning is public, that we understand novel uses?

You can see that the meaning of the sentence depends on the context of utterance. This is always true. — frank

I agree with the spirit of this (I think), but I also think it's analytically useful to keep the meaning of the utterance and the meaning of the sentence separate. In your example, I'd then say:

The utterance "The cat is on the mat," means "There's spinache between your teeth," but the sentence still retains the meaning "the cat is on the mat", too. That is, given that code divides audience between in-group and out-group, the in-group would still know what the sentence means to the out-group, and if a member of the out-group would use the sentence, that's what the utterance would mean.

I'd say any theory based on "meaning is use," would have to incoroporate that difference. More later. Maybe. I'm not at my best lately.

Maybe the better question is -- how is it, given that meaning is public, that we understand novel uses? — Moliere

Well, sometimes we don't understand.

"Dope", for instance. The word was derived from Dutch "doopen" meaning 'to dip" or 'sauce' and was imported into English about 200 years ago. It has been used to mean a) a drug b) inside information c) a stupid person d) a thick varnish or a lubricant. It also has a meaning in semiconductor manufacture, It is both a noun and verb.

Those uses were familiar to me. "Dope" meaning 'cool' or 'high quality' -- dope shoes -- was meaningless to me the first few times I encountered this usage.

Things used to be "hot"; then they became "cool".

I read pretty widely, and I thought I had a large vocabulary. However, I keep coming across English words that are as unfamiliar as Sanskrit. I've been collecting them, along with their meaning. The words are not common at all -- I check them out on Google Ngram, which is a measure of the frequency that words have appeared in print during the last several hundred years.

Who the hell uses these weird words?

A medievalist would be familiar with destrier, a medieval knight's warhorse. But who uses instauration, the action of restoring or renewing something? Here's one with very narrow usage: floccinaucinihilipilification The Latin elements were listed in a well-known rule of the Latin Grammar used at Eton College, an English public school. Right. Not my neighborhood. But here is a rare word that one could use at TPF fairly often:

monocausotaxophilia, "the love of single ideas that explain everything, one of humanity’s most common cognitive errors." The novelist Kim Stanley Robinson may have coined this word in a Financial Times article. The article is behind a paywall.

Paywall is a new word we all know the meaning of.

So: we encounter new words that are familiar to other speakers; we can guess at the meaning from context, ask what it means, or look it up. If we hear the word several times, we might add it to our own lexicon. Or not: I read somewhere that after middle age, people tend not to learn new words. My guess is that this is not a brain phenomenon, but a cultural one. Life no longer brings older people into contact with people regularly using new and different vocabularies. Plus, other middle aged or older people find somebody using too many new words very annoying.

I have added this new word to my vocabulary: deliquesce. It means to melt, or fade away, It's what happens to a snowman on a warm winter day. There are times when I wished I could just deliquesce -- quickly melt and fade away from the unpleasant situation I was in. 'Deliquesce' also labels the unpleasant experience of becoming obsolete and irrelevant--another experience I've had (sob, snivel).

I'm not at my best lately. — Dawnstorm

Checked your 'sell by' date?

Checked your 'sell by' date? — BC

I'm about half a century old, but this is mostly about... environmental hazard? I do start feeling the wear and tear.

At a certain point we don't speak the same language. It becomes Middle English or German or some such. — Moliere

No, it doesn't: neither of those peoples would understand a word of it. It becomes jargon, code, doubletalk, jingo, financial hocus-pocus, hieratic, moneyspeak, propaganda, newscaster parrot, hype, slang, dialect and nonsense.

But are you and I speaking the same language in this series of posts? — Moliere

There is a large enough overlap to call it the same language, yes. It's not usual for all speakers of a language to be familiar with its entire vocabulary, and it is quite common for each party in a conversation to apply a word as it is used in a different discipline.

Maybe the better question is -- how is it, given that meaning is public, that we understand novel uses? — Moliere

The agility of the human mind. We apply associations and imagination to accommodate variation. We can usually correct quite accurately for errors on spelling and regional difference in pronunciation, as well as discern the merits of creative linguistic construction - hence the appreciation of poetry and humour.

On the other end of the spectrum is the Hittite language. When they were first trying to translate it, they thought maybe it was Semitic, because there was a lot of that in the region They kept coming across a word that looked like it would be pronounced "wassah", and it was frequently near a word that was probably "bread." Then somebody had the crazy idea that "wassah" may have been the same as the English word "water." Turns out that was true. Hittite is an Indo-european language from a 3500 year old extinct culture, but they pronounced "water" pretty much the same way we do. That's an old shelf to take meanings down from.

The utterance "The cat is on the mat," means "There's spinache between your teeth," but the sentence still retains the meaning "the cat is on the mat", too. That is, given that code divides audience between in-group and out-group, the in-group would still know what the sentence means to the out-group, and if a member of the out-group would use the sentence, that's what the utterance would mean. — Dawnstorm

I agree.

the wear and tear — Dawnstorm

Tell me about it! I'm 76 and limping around (bad knees and hips).

Well, sometimes we don't understand. — BC

Good point.

And maybe that's the better question too: why don't we understand, sometimes? Or maybe I'm just barking up the wrong tree.

So: we encounter new words that are familiar to other speakers; we can guess at the meaning from context, ask what it means, or look it up. — BC

A handy list of techniques for determining meaning.


Really, I think that's basically exhaustive. At least these are the usual ways of determining meaning.

So, as @unenlightened hinted at, there was no question here at all, and all the theories of meaning are just so many words missing the point because you can't determine meaning ahead of time, you have to learn it.

Is it because of this experience that we believe others are wrong when they use a word in some way we perceive as novel? "Look, the locution has been this way for a long time, and I don't understand why you'd change it..."

Or is it always a matter of some other disagreement -- that the meaning is well understood, but the claim that one or the other person does not understand the meaning is usually an exaggeration, and is more like shorthand for "I wouldn't say it like that"?

There is a large enough overlap to call it the same language, yes. It's not usual for all speakers of a language to be familiar with its entire vocabulary, and it is quite common for each party in a conversation to apply a word as it is used in a different discipline. — Vera Mont

Heh, then I'd say we're in a conundrum: at what point is there not enough overlap? Is it just more like a feeling of frustration which we give into, and so the beginnings of a social divide starts, and eventually -- over time and practice -- the groups evolve differently?

Surely there is more than one language. And surely there is miscommunication. What enables us to learn another language, or to understand a miscommunication?

The agility of the human mind. We apply associations and imagination to accommodate variation. We can usually correct quite accurately for errors on spelling and regional difference in pronunciation, as well as discern the merits of creative linguistic construction - hence the appreciation of poetry and humour. — Vera Mont

I find that unsatisfying because it comes back to the idea that meaning is mental. While I'm happy to say we need a mind to speak, or at least a brain, I don't think meaning is mental. Or at least, if meaning is public, you get into some weird thoughts about the mental then -- like that the mental is also public, when we usually think of our individual minds as being not-quite-so-public.

Not entirely false, but definitely counter-intuitive.

Part of my background thoughts is that meaning is a part of the world, and overflows our attempt to grasp it -- and language is that very attempt to solidify, in thought, what can't be solidified in thought.

Heh, then I'd say we're in a conundrum: at what point is there not enough overlap? — Moliere

The American Republican and Democratic core have already arrived there.

Is it just more like a feeling of frustration which we give into, and so the beginnings of a social divide starts, and eventually -- over time and practice -- the groups evolve differently? — Moliere

They diverge, yes. Whether they evolve, I don't know. The Angles, Saxons, Jutes and Britons did meld to become British; the Normans overcame the communication gap and went on to become English. The Welsh learned English, but remained a separate identity. It all depends on how history devolves from the point of contact, or the point of divergence.

What enables us to learn another language, or to understand a miscommunication? — Moliere

The capacity and willingness to learn. An interest in the other group and its culture... or a benefit in interactions with that other group.

I don't think meaning is mental. — Moliere

Well, it's not physical or spiritual... Language is one of the processes the brain carries out, because the kidneys and thyroid can't think.

Or at least, if meaning is public, you get into some weird thoughts about the mental then -- like that the mental is also public, — Moliere

Yes, we're capable of weird thoughts, even bizarre ones. Why would you need to share a brain, or compromise your individual identity, in order to partake in a common pool of words and their conventional usage? What part of your identity do you sacrifice by drawing water from a communal well?

Part of my background thoughts is that meaning is a part of the world, and overflows our attempt to grasp it -- and language is that very attempt to solidify, in thought, what can't be solidified in thought. — Moliere

That's way-out metaphysical for a pedestrian mind like mine.

Against the shelf -- wasn't it our own continued repetition of using "water" (for obvious needs) that allowed the translation to take place?

And we understood this bit, in the translation, but did we get the whole meaning? I don't think so.

Puns and jokes are a good example here -- the meaning of a pun is so contextual that it's pretty hard to understand without context. And surely they had jokes about so common a word? We say "it's water under the bridge" to mean that the past no longer matters. Surely we didn't recover all the meaning of the language in understanding one of its uses that we still use?

Against the shelf -- wasn't it our own continued repetition of using "water" (for obvious needs) that allowed the translation to take place? — Moliere

In this case, yes. Our own usage was like the Rosetta stone for Egyptian, or Babylonian texts were for Sumerian. The latter two cases show that translation doesn't rely on a continuum of usage. We're able to engage with abstract patterns that people thousands of years ago used. We're outside those ancient communities, though, so it's possible that translation is lossy. Since our worldview is profoundly different from theirs in some ways, I would say that's likely, though there are those who would disagree.

And we understood this bit, in the translation, but did we get the whole meaning? I don't think so. — Moliere

There are probably nuances that we don't know about.

When we reach a complete mutual understanding, we are of one mind. Nobody wants that, do they?

The American Republican and Democratic core have already arrived there. — Vera Mont

When we reach a complete mutual understanding, we are of one mind. Nobody wants that, do they? — unenlightened

What enables us to learn another language, or to understand a miscommunication?
— Moliere
The capacity and willingness to learn. An interest in the other group and its culture... or a benefit in interactions with that other group. — Vera Mont

So this is a nice demarcation of scope, to me. Rather than reaching for Big L Language, as I was, this focuses the meaning of meaning, in our case, to meaning in terms of mutual understanding, or meaning in terms of two opposing sides who just seem to refuse to communicate, and asking the far more relevant question: why does disagreement seem to distort meaning to a point that we no longer mean the same things, and are talking past one another?

Some ideas provided here -- no interest in the other group or culture, or no benefit from interaction with the other group or culture, or good old fashioned fun (cooperation is boring! I want to win!)

why does disagreement seem to distort meaning to a point that we no longer mean the same things, and are talking past one another? — Moliere

There is an element of that when disagreement is over some fundamental concept, like the equality of citizens or what the cardinal sins and virtues are. In that kind of situation, words like "right" and "justice" and "value" have the same linguistic root yet represent different ideas.
In most cases, though, I don't think it's the disagreement itself that alters the meaning of language, but rather the leaders and would-be leaders of a faction, who deliberately distort and misrepresent ideas in order to manipulate their followers. So the two factions still agree on what a "table" is, they have very different motives for pounding on it.

So "in most cases" -- what's stopping people who are not the leaders and would-be leaders from seeing that ideas or meanings are distorted or misrepresented? Not in a specific way -- cuz then it's easy enough to see why this or that person didn't pick up on the manipulation -- but how does this deliberate distortion become a part of the common lexicon such that people cannot talk?

In order to understand others you have to put yourself in their shoes. See what they see out of their skull holes. Then you hook into their frame of reference and the meaning of their utterances will be obvious.

If a person has a very rigid sense of identity, they can't take up residence in other people's positions. Or maybe they've judged the other to be evil or what not. Then they don't want to be tainted.

This doesn't undermine the idea that meaning is first shared and after that potentially private. It just means sometimes we aren't communicating. We're just talking at each other.

-- the wisdom of Asperger's.

I think the "language as use," insight is simultaneously genius and a negative influence on the philosophy of language. While Wittgenstein is more equivocal in the Investigations over whether language is always use, his work has been used to build an all encompassing theory, one of the very sort he argues against in the Investigations. Language may sometimes be a game, but it isn't always a game, unless we stretch the definition of "game" to become so broad as to lose all explanatory power.

It is prima facie unreasonable to say that we don't mean things by our words outside of the structure of language. Language is, after all, a method of communication. Sometimes we very obviously are referring to objects with speech, e.g., "my car needs a new timing belt."

Now, animals also communicate, monkeys make different calls for different predators, different dances by honey bees refer to the location of food in relation to the hive, etc. When a dog shows anger, aggression, it is communicating it mental states. And, all sorts of animals communicate aggression in very similar ways, making themselves look larger, bearing their fangs and claws, making displays of strength by jumping or beating things around them, etc.

To be sure, we could perhaps describe this in terms of evolutionary game theory, but we don't think evolution is games all the way down. Also, to totally define language in terms of use seems to demand that we lapse into a hard behavioralism that denies that language sometimes is communicating our internal, subjective experiences. But even non-social animals raised in isolation communicate their internal states through body posture, facial expressions, etc. So it seems that the "use" isn't necessarily based on learned rules. IMO, language is not suis generis, but rather a type of communication, and much confusion comes from us focusing on the most complex form of communication in isolation from simpler forms.

I'll allow Umberto Eco to make the case for a broader view:

To realize that /stop/ and the red light convey the same order is as intuitive as to decide that, to convince people to refrain from drinking a certain liquid , one can either write /poison/ or draw a skull on the bottle .

Now, the basic problem of a semiotic inquiry on different kinds of signs is exactly this one: why does one understand something intuitively?

...To say that some truth is intuitive usually means that one does not want to challenge it for the sake of economy - that is, because its explanation belongs to some other science.

Now, the basic problem of a semiotic inquiry on different kinds of signs is exactly this one: why does one understand something intuitively?

[Consider charming/seducing someone versus threatening them into an action. The resulting behavior one gets, the use, is the same. Why do both work the same way? And why is one more likely to work than the others in some cases]

Perhaps it is by virtue of a 'shallow' similar­ity in their effect that one intuitively understands that both behaviors produce ideas and emotions in the mind of the potential victim . But, in order to explain how both behaviors produce the same effect, one should look for something 'deeper' .To look for such a deeper common struc­ture, for the cognitive and cultural laws that rule both phenomena ­ such is the endeavor of a general semiotics .


[Semiotics does not need one answer for the question above] it can also decide, for instance (as many semioticians did ) , that the way in which a cloud signifies rain is different from the way in which a French sentence signifies - or is equivalent to - an allegedly corresponding English sentence ...


[The principles of a more general semiotics can allow] allow one to look at the whole of human activity from a coherent point of view. To see human beings as signifying animals - even outside the practice of verbal language - and to see that their ability to produce and to interpret signs, as well as their ability to draw inferences , is rooted in the same cognitive structures , represent a way to give form to our experience.

I agree 100% with the last paragraph. Cognitive science tells us we use the same hardware for understanding language as for perceiving. When we visualize words we use the visual cortex in ways similar to processing sight, etc. This system is modular. Disorders like aphasia show that meaning can be completely separated from language production based on rules; we can lose the rules but retain our sense of meaning, or lose our ability to imbue speech with meaning but keep the ability to follow the rules. The attempt to draw general rules in philosophy of language is simultaneously to focused on just human language and too broad, attempting to reduce an emergent property used for many purposes to one sort of thing.

I agree 100% with the last paragraph. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Me too. And we use the word in that way "Footprints mean feet have passed by'; 'clouds sometimes mean rain'; 'Rainbows mean god promises to spare us from flood'; 'Umberto means... when he says...' This is why it becomes confusing when one asks what 'mean' means. And even more confusing when one writes a whole book about it but does not deign to stray outside the writings of academic philosophers, as if there is no meaning outside the ivory tower. (I'm looking at you, Ogden and Richards.)

There is an element of that when disagreement is over some fundamental concept, like the equality of citizens or what the cardinal sins and virtues are. In that kind of situation, words like "right" and "justice" and "value" have the same linguistic root yet represent different ideas. — Vera Mont

You are correct here, however I will add a caveat.

When people use these words in the context you describe, they are often being taciturn. When person A says "I want justice," they really mean "I want justice in line with my values and my worldview." When person B says "I want justice" they also mean the same. Of course, if persons A and B have different values or worldviews, then what "justice" looks to them is different. However I would put forward that the problem is not a misunderstanding of the word, rather that the word is being used as a short form for more than just itself. Simple elaboration clarifies the misunderstanding.

I am interested in figuring out a framework for people with different politics, values, etc to communicate effectively with each other, and I see this as one of the biggest stumbling blocks.

Another example in politics that I see all sides throw at one another - divisive. People will say "X is being divisive." However the way this is often used actually means "X is being divisive and I want them to come in line with my values and worldview, and I refuse to move towards them or meet halfway even if that will solve the divisiveness because I find their values and worldview deplorable."

A lot of misunderstanding can simply be solved by elaboration. One thing I like about this forum is the elaboration, it certainly helps healthy discussions.

what's stopping people who are not the leaders and would-be leaders from seeing that ideas or meanings are distorted or misrepresented? — Moliere

The desire to believe their faction's version of reality. The minions are less interested in accurate information than in reassurance and the promise of being made great again - whether they ever had been anything but puny or not.

but how does this deliberate distortion become a part of the common lexicon such that people cannot talk? — Moliere

On the contrary! Jingo gives them a much louder, more persuasive collective voice than their individual intellect ever could have. Yelling slogans makes people feel strong.

I am interested in figuring out a framework for people with different politics, values, etc to communicate effectively with each other, and I see this as one of the biggest stumbling blocks. — PhilosophyRunner

Try peace and prosperity. The easiest way to keep the polity at one another's throats, so they don't notice you're picking their pockets, is to keep shouting "Boo!" The terrists are coming! The migrants want you wimmin and your jabs! The commies will take all your stuff! Bad weather is a Chinese plot! Vaccines will make you sterile! Democrats want to sell your kiddies! Anxious people lash out in whatever direction somebody points to a cause of all their troubles. (Especially in countries where education and news media are controlled by the same interest group as the economy and law enforcement.)

When people feel secure and have the leisure to inform themselves, they tend to become far more tolerant, more interested in maintaining equilibrium.

When people use these words in the context you describe, they are often being taciturn. When person A says "I want justice," they really mean "I want justice in line with my values and my worldview." When person B says "I want justice" they also mean the same. Of course, if persons A and B have different values or worldviews, then what "justice" looks to them is different. However I would put forward that the problem is not a misunderstanding of the word, rather that the word is being used as a short form for more than just itself. Simple elaboration clarifies the misunderstanding.

Is this assuming nominalism? That there is no "justice," or "good," that people can point to that extends outside the frame of "my desires and preferences?"

That everyone might understand justice in a different way doesn't preclude that "justice" exists. People understand what is meant by "species," "economic recession," "computation," or "fundemental particle" in different ways, but that doesn't mean the words lack a referent, right?


Values are perhaps different in that it is less possible to describe them truthfully while also describing them objectively. But objectivity ≠ truth. In some ways, moving to more objective descriptions of a phenomenon appear to lead to less accurate depictions of those phenomena.

Anyhow, values being somehow more subjective doesn't seem to preclude their having some sort of referent outside of personal experience. When we refer to "a lack of justice," in the world, it seems like we are referring not simply to our own mental states or to a collective set of mental states, but states of affairs in the world in a way not of a different kind form claims like "there is no hydrogen gas in the cannister." That is, there is a set of empirically discoverable conditions we think a certain state of affairs lacks.

Consider that many animals and young children appear to have a sense of fairness.

A sense of fairness has long been considered purely human -- but animals also react with frustration when they are treated unequally by a person. For instance, a well-known video shows monkeys throwing the offered cucumber at their trainer when a conspecific receives sweet grapes as a reward for the same task.

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2023/03/230302114205.htm#:~:text=FULL%20STORY-,A%20sense%20of%20fairness%20has%20long%20been%20considered%20purely%20human,reward%20for%20the%20same%20task.

We live in a world of cause and effect. We are highly attuned to recognize these patterns, and their nuances. We become frustrated when events do not correspond to our predictions. There is a desire for regularity and this transfers over to social conditions as well, although social conditions can shift greatly over time, for humans and animals.

A desire for fairness has a certain sort of logic, even from an evolutionary standpoint. To my mind, this recalls the idea Hegel develops in the Philosophy of Right and which Honneth picks up in Freedom's Right. We can objectify values to the degree that we can understand their underlying logic in nature. And they do seem to have an underlying logic, to be something necessary rather than contingent— a solution to the game of survival. The human mind comes from nature and it would be suprising if broad similarities across species and cultured did not stem from something necessary in our development as opposed to contingent. Hence, I think a form of justice, etc. can be found implicit in the development of species and further in the development of cultures and history. But this doesn't mean that an objective Platonic form of justice exists as such, but rather that the concept is developing, unfolding, itself a complex and dynamical process.

Which is all to say, I think we have good grounds for thinking justice can refer to both our individual sense of justice, social norms, OR a higher form of justice that lies implicit within the logic of being.