Interesting OP, thanks. :up:
A topic that seems on the edge of the fringe of the outlands (so to speak).
But one that has some references (if not possible clues and answers) to some vital questions at the beating heart of philosophical inquiry.
Questions like the nature of being (and the real vs the unreal), knowing / skepticism (gnosis vs agnosis), naturalism / supernaturalism (including that bane of philosophy: religion (lol).

The concept of the ‘transrational’ makes one wonder (according to the etymology of transrational) what actually is beyond the rational?
Which begs the question of what is exactly rational? (Rational defined as ‘based on reason or logic’).
Or more controversially, is there a line dividing rational and irrational?
And where exactly or approximately is it?
Are emotional or instinctive behaviors included or excluded?
(And many such other juicy questions!)

And all this before even attempting to deal with the OP question of whether that which is beyond rational is also beyond proof, and possibly beyond words and description.

(As a welcome escape from this seeming impasse, the Zen master offers meditation. The cosmonaut offers psychedelics and deep music of your choice. The Epicurean offers chocolate cheesecake).

To me, this is somehow related to the transpersonal (as a whole including psychology, studies, and practices). I’ve been chewing on that general topic for awhile. Here’s an essay on the critiques of the movement (if it indeed is still even moving lol).

Ah… it seems like more questions than answers are found in heading in this heady but hazy direction.
(Times of doubt and exhaustion from the Apollonian-Dionysian dual may be soothed by the jovial and husky voice and insights of Joseph Campbell, along with some fine brandy).

Does the discovery of many questions mean one is at least heading in an interesting philosophical direction? :zip:

Thanks again! :smile:

This faith does not formulate itself—it simply lives, and so guards itself against formulae. ...It is only on the theory that no word is to be taken literally that this anti-realist is able to speak at all. Set down among Hindus he would have made use of the concepts of Sankhya, and among Chinese he would have employed those of Lao-tse—and in neither case would it have made any difference to him.—With a little freedom in the use of words, one might actually call Jesus a “free spirit”—he cares nothing for what is established: the word killeth, whatever is established killeth. The idea of “life” as an experience, as he alone conceives it, stands opposed to his mind to every sort of word, formula, law, belief and dogma.

Hmmm, such fanciful ideas! :nerd:

The concept of the ‘transrational’ makes one wonder (according to the etymology of transrational) what actually is beyond the rational? — 0 thru 9

To me, transrationalism is sophisticated, educated irrationalism. I mean that in a value-neutral way. Nietzsche's Christ takes 'the inner' to be first. I think we find some of Nietzsche's own 'mysticism' in that description: his sense of being behind words. Or 'under logic.' Schopenhauer celebrates the expressions on characters as present by certain painters. This mute expression also hints at a 'gnosis' that is nonconceptual. I'm strongly incline to interpret all of this in terms of Feeling. In completely nonspooky terms we can say that, obviously, the world is not only given conceptually but sensually and feelingly. Value is largely in the feeling 'dimension' or 'channel' or 'aspect' of this reality --- which makes it no less real.

since feeling is first
who pays any attention
to the syntax of things
will never wholly kiss you;
wholly to be a fool
while Spring is in the world
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/830640

To me, this is somehow related to the transpersonal (as a whole including psychology, studies, and practices). — 0 thru 9

The common denominator of this otherwise rich and ramified group of phenomena is the feeling of the individual that his consciousness expanded beyond the usual ego boundaries and the limitations of time and space.

To me even rationalist ( especially rationalist ? ) philosophy aspires beyond the current limited view of the ego in both senses: the ego is a view of the world, and this ego is also an entity in that view, understood more or less appropriately in its boundaries and function.

Which begs the question of what is exactly rational? (Rational defined as ‘based on reason or logic’).
Or more controversially, is there a line dividing rational and irrational?
And where exactly or approximately is it?
Are emotionals or instinctive behaviors included or excluded? — 0 thru 9

In this context, rationality is more normative than instrumental.

Apel's strong thesis is that his transcendental semiotics yields a set of normative conditions and validity claims presupposed in any critical discussion or rational argumentation. Central among these is the presupposition that a participant in a genuine argument is at the same time a member of a counterfactual, ideal communication community that is in principle equally open to all speakers and that excludes all force except the force of the better argument. Any claim to intersubjectively valid knowledge (scientific or moral-practical) implicitly acknowledges this ideal communication community as a metainstitution of rational argumentation, to be its ultimate source of justification (1980).
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/apel-karl-otto-1922

In my opinion, the ICC is the founding concept of science and philosophy, the essence of both, and the most general science just is philosophy (I prefer 'ontology' myself).

Unlike a perfect circle, which is also ideal and never perfectly present, this ideality of rationality is necessarily blurry and horizonal. This is because the ICC has no 'god' above it to tell it what it is. The rational community must itself further determine the nature of rationality, further explicate its own essence. Brandom understands Hegel to have grasped this as the giant shift in human culture.

How could we be bound by the norms that we impose in the first place ? This is where the thrown projection of Heidegger comes in, but I'll stop there for now.

I removed you from my ignore list out of curiosity, a mistake easily rectified.You only mystify yourself. But have fun with that. No hard feelings.

(Times of doubt and exhaustion from the Apollonian-Dionysian dual may be soothed by the jovial and husky voice and insights of Joseph Campbell, along with some fine brandy). — 0 thru 9

:up:
I love Joseph Campbell.

To me, transrationalism is sophisticated, educated irrationalism. I mean that in a value-neutral way. Nietzsche's Christ takes 'the inner' to be first. I think we find some of Nietzsche's own 'mysticism' in that description: his sense of being behind words. Or 'under logic.' Schopenhauer celebrates the expressions on characters as present by certain painters. This mute expression also hints at a 'gnosis' that is nonconceptual. I'm strongly incline to interpret all of this in terms of Feeling. In completely nonspooky terms we can say that, obviously, the world is not only given conceptually but sensually and feelingly. Value is largely in the feeling 'dimension' or 'channel' or 'aspect' of this reality --- which makes it no less real. — plaque flag

:up: Yes. Well put.
We as philosophy students rightfully disdain fallacies and faulty logic. They can be actually dangerous in certain circumstances. (Those in the USA get buried with fallacious reasoning every presidential election).

But as you imply, much of life’s experience would be diminished if everything ‘outside of logic and reason’ were ignored or devalued.

But as you imply, much of life’s experience would be diminished if everything ‘outside of logic and reason’ were ignored or devalued. — 0 thru 9

:up:

Given this kind of esoteric insight, are esoteric positions betraying themselves when they argue their validity ? Is exclusivity crucial here ? How does our need for recognition complicate the picture ? — plaque flag

The Schopenhauer book I have mentioned, Schopenhauer’s Compass, has some interesting things to say on this. Schop is drawn to mystical insight - calls it ‘illuminism’ - but is sternly insistent that it not be confused with or taken for philosophy proper. He harshly criticises the other German idealists (Schelling, Fichte, etc) on just these grounds - that they take ecstatic insights as the basis for philosophical precepts, and so arrive at ‘theology disguised as philosophy’.

Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system.

Both philosophers and theologians claim the authority to evaluate metaphysical principles, but the standards by which they conduct those evaluations are very different. Schopenhauer concludes that philosophers are ultimately in the position to critique principles that are advanced by theologians, not vice versa. He nonetheless recognizes that the metaphysical need of most people is satisfied by their religion. This is unsurprising because, he contends, the vast majority of people find existence “less puzzling and mysterious” than philosophers do, so they merely require a plausible explanation of their role in the universe that can be adopted “as a matter of course” (WWR II 162). In other words, most people require a metaphysical framework around which to orient their lives that is merely apparently true. Therefore, the theologian has no functional reason to determine what is actually true. By contrast, the philosopher is someone whose metaphysical need is not satisfied by merely apparent truths – he is intrinsically driven to seek out actual truths about the nature of the world. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism by Nicholas Linares

Although in all this, I think Schopenhauer’s overall perspective and orientation is far more mystically-oriented than almost any of the subsequent generations of philosophers.

Schopenhauer argues that philosophy and religion have the same fundamental aim: to satisfy “man’s need for metaphysics,” which is a “strong and ineradicable” instinct to seek explanations for existence that arises from “the knowledge of death, and therewith the consideration of the suffering and misery of life” (WWR I 161). Every system of metaphysics is a response to this realization of one’s finitude, and the function of those systems is to respond to that realization by letting individuals know their place in the universe, the purpose of their existence, and how they ought to act. All other philosophical principles (most importantly, ethics) follow from one’s metaphysical system. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism by Nicholas Linares

:up:
Yes, and this is what I also try to get at with dramaturgical ontology. It's not some footnote where our ontology puts us and our role in the world. This basic 'heroic' narrative, which is always also a metaphor for the world entire, might even be necessary for sanity.

Both philosophers and theologians claim the authority to evaluate metaphysical principles, but the standards by which they conduct those evaluations are very different. Schopenhauer concludes that philosophers are ultimately in the position to critique principles that are advanced by theologians, not vice versa. — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism by Nicholas Linares

This suggests to me a loyalty to Enlightenment rationality as he understands it, though he rejects its optimism, choosing instead an ancient unworldliness, which also appeals to me, even though I moderately decently run enough of the rat race to not be a problem for others.

He nonetheless recognizes that the metaphysical need of most people is satisfied by their religion. This is unsurprising because, he contends, the vast majority of people find existence “less puzzling and mysterious” than philosophers do, so they merely require a plausible explanation of their role in the universe that can be adopted “as a matter of course” (WWR II 162). — Schopenhauer's Philosophy of Religion and his Critique of German Idealism by Nicholas Linares

I'd say that philosophy proper is the dynamic 'religion' of an infinite 'self-eating' project. Philosophers (I think of phenomenologists especially) are masters of learning to find the mundane mysterious. I 'joke' that we are cyborgs, but I'm not joking. Language is weird, if one 'wakes up' not only to it as softwhere but, more crucially, as softwhen. You and I are both thousands of years old, in a genuine if atypical sense of age. Another example: I find in Husserl recently and just today in James' Principles of Psychology a potent illumination of the 'stretched moment' at the 'heart' of the world in its given-ness, but still we tend to babble unthinkingly about a punctiform realnumber now, simply because there's so much f(t) in our mathematical models. Shamelessly counterempirically and in the name of empiricism, we fall into hand-me-down fictions. But it's true that we don't want a painful identity crisis all the time. To me nonphilosophers are primarily just more practical (nurses who love their puppies and Taylor Swift) or less conceptual (I've known profound/intense musicians who were just passably literate.)

The OP opens many cans of worms but as I have an interest in the subject, I better add some more.

I'm strongly incline to interpret all of this in terms of Feeling — plaque flag

I think a better interpretation is in terms of metacognition - the understanding of understanding. There are innummerable maps and means developed in various cultures that address this. Feeling comes into it, but perhaps more as a consequence than cause.

I think it's important to recognise that what we're assessing are different perspectives on the nature of being. (The word 'reality' is often used here, but I think 'being' is more appropriate.)

In respect of the interpretation of 'the kingdom of Heaven', perennialists will say that 'the Kingdom of Heaven' corresponds with, or means the same as, the Buddhist Nirvāṇa or the Hindu Mokṣa, although such comparisons are often difficult to maintain in the face of critical scrutiny. I suppose to adopt philosophical terminology, the term 'apotheosis' might come to mind, that being 'the highest point in development; a culmination or climax.' Another term that might be added is 'theosis', although that would not be appropriate to Buddhism. In any case, according to the various traditions, these represent a state of supreme insight into the nature of being, associated with the end of all forms of distress and suffering. In the popular mind they are represented as 'Heaven' or 'life eternal', although quite what that means is obviously elusive.

Speaking of Buddhism, in the Pali texts of Theravada Buddhism, there is a complete map or topography of the 'stages of jhana' (jhana being meditative trance per this wikipedia article.) In the Mahāyāna (East Asian and Tibetan traditions) this is expanded to the Ten Bhumis, where bhumis are like stations or stages on the Bodhisattva path that may occupy several or many lifetimes.

Some of this lore has percolated into Western culture through the engagement with Eastern traditions and various esoteric movements and sects (including the Theosophical Society in the late 19th-early 20th C). A major milestone in all that was the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago, held in conjunction with the World Fair in 1893, and featuring many who would become very influential in subsequent culture - Swami Vivekananda, who toured the US by railway giving addresses; Soyen Shaku, the first Zen master to speak and reside in the US; and various others including a very young D T Suzuki who travelled as a translator and assistant to Soyen Shaku and was later to become the most influential Zen emissary to American culture. Then since the 1960's there's been a veritable explosion of interest, there are Zen and Tibetan centres all over the US and the world. (I've stayed, and sat zazen, in the Zen Centre of San Francisco, back in 2009).

Much could be said about all of this, but I think one point that needs to be made is that 'higher states' are not conceptual in nature - there can be no concept of a higher stage of jhana/dhyana, which is a barrier to our normal discursive/analytical mode of analysis. Learning this is arduous and painful, in my very limited experience. Much of this material occupies a kind of intersection of depth psychology, religious practice, and philosophical analysis (Tibetan Buddhism being a sterling example).

Hey I'll tell you one guy I think would be right up your street (although I'm not really a fan) - Brook Ziporyn.

I think a better interpretation is in terms of metacognition - the understanding of understanding. — Quixodian

Ah but that's already Kojeve/Hegel. I mean I agree, but that's our familiar autonomous creative rationality determining its own essence.

the core of Hegel’s philosophy is the idea that human history is the history of thought as it attempts to understand itself and its relation to its world.
https://iep.utm.edu/kojeve/#H2

There are innummerable maps and means developed in various cultures that address this. Feeling comes into it, but perhaps more as a consequence than cause. — Quixodian

Sure. Note that more than most I recognize that metaphysics is mythological and metaphorical. Rationality is not post-oracular. It's just a second-order synthetic-critical oracular tradition. Even in Popper there's a huge appreciation for the mysterious source of hypotheses (myths).

I don't deny that freemasons or monks can have esoteric traditions that are even partially rational in that some special set human beings are allowed to debate their modification.

Feeling seems to be a large part of how value is experienced in the world. The expression 'just' feelings is, for me, absurd, just to be clear. Because torture is just feelings, along with falling in love for the first time. As Schop noted, the great painters often painted a face of the liberated subject of knowledge. What more convincing proof can there be of wisdom than a loving serene demeanor ? As proof of almost constant sober joy and love ?

Much could be said about all of this, but I think one point that needs to be made is that 'higher states' are not conceptual in nature - there can be no concept of a higher stage of jhana/dhyana, which is a barrier to our normal discursive/analytical mode of analysis. — Quixodian

'Nonconceptual' suggests other aspects of experience, most plausibly a high and liberated feeling. We've discussed this issue before. If you say not feeling but not concept either, it starts to sound like round squares, or like a completely indefinite hope.

Recently I read What The Buddha Taught by Walpola Rahula. It's a beautiful book. I'm a fan of The Fire Sermon, and really I find so much to like. But what's not much discussed is the economic situation that supported the monks. I'm a married in 2023, so those bhikkus are almost escapist fantasies for me. I respect a lost beauty which is mostly no longer possible (which is not to deny living traditions where they are still feasible). I find enough comfort in what I see as a related affirming-forgiving transcendent 'pessimism.' Omnia vanitas. This vanitas is not simply emptiness. The original Hebrew is more suggestive/elusive.

All is hebel .

If you say not feeling but not concept either, it starts to sound like round squares, or like a completely indefinite hope. — plaque flag

One analogy that has occured to me, is that it would be more like being liberated from some deep psychological trauma that you had been holding and which had been affecting you without your being aware of it. So, something like catharsis, that results in a deep shift of your self-understanding and your view of life. I'm sure that would give rise to many feelings, but it's more than simply a feeling, as it is also something that you've come to understand about yourself and the world.

So, something like catharsis, that results in a deep shift of your self-understanding and your view of life. I'm sure that would give rise to many feelings, but it's more than simply a feeling, as it is also something that you've come to understand about yourself and the world. — Quixodian

Yes, I'd personally think it'd involve the whole self. But this to me happens with 'normal' philosophy and 'literature.' This 'normal' stuff is as radical as one could ask for. Emerson sits on the shelf, a piece of dynamite. I'm not the first to reach for the metaphor of deafness. 'A wakefulness for Dasein.' I'm anti-alienation. I dig into the dirt of the so-called mundane. To me, and maybe I'm just wired this way, the idea of a forest behind all the trees just ends hiding the beauty or at least the ugly fascination of the trees. I suffered greatly at times, but I can't understand certain pessimists who speak of boredom. We can conjure the ghosts of the mighty dead with a paperback and the courage to paraphrase (I think writing is ideally part of reading). Speaking of these ghosts:

... if the only form of tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its successes, “tradition” should positively be discouraged. ...Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour.

Some one said: “The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they did.” Precisely, and they are that which we know.

Shakespeare acquired more essential history from Plutarch than most men could from the whole British Museum. What is to be insisted upon is that the poet must develop or procure the consciousness of the past and that he should continue to develop this consciousness throughout his career.

What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.

There remains to define this process of depersonalization and its relation to the sense of tradition. It is in this depersonalization that art may be said to approach the condition of science.

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/articles/69400/tradition-and-the-individual-talent

This last part is about something like the ideal perspective I mention in another thread. Ontology is poetry approaching the condition of science.