Normal science needs revolutionary science , and vice versa. Encouraging and accelerating the flow of becoming in all its modalities is the thing, not trying to catch and freeze in place a moment of the rational so as to stave off the inevitable moment of revolutionary change and the irrational which follow upon and are inspired by the moment of the rational and the normal. — Joshs

:up:
I agree. So I've been trying to sketch (influenced by Habermas and Apel) the widest concept of rationality that still actually means something. I cannot embrace 'anything goes' or 'science is whatever scientists do.' Or rather I can embrace 'anything goes' in a larger context of personal freedom limited by the personal freedom of others. But that's just my ICC. That's just something like what Habermas offers.

I recall/interpret that Feyerabend was afraid of what I myself find most intellectually horrible, which is a fanatical irrationalism that identifies itself with the rational. This is why some 'progressives' dismay me more than rednecks who never pretend to rationality in the first place. I'm guessing Feyerbend felt this same revulsion at times towards those with paradoxically dogmatic conceptions of rationality itself. 'Anything goes' should be recognized as a framework whose only unquestionable belief (its founding intention ) is that no other belief is unquestionable.

I'd say that scientific paradigm switching is rational in the larger ethical-dramaturgical sense, and I'd support that by noting that it happens within science. Neurath's boat seems appropriate here. Some modifications are more substantial than others (perhaps foundational physical theories are questioned), but the basic style of communication ( under the meta-authority of the critical-synthetic tradition as such, which transcends all of its theoretical products ) remains intact. — plaque flag

Does the basic style of communication transcend its theoretical products, or do its theoretical products redefine the very nature of the tradition? Does paradigm switching happen WITHIN science as it is understood under the terms of the old paradigm , or does the old guard, protecting its interpretation of the tradition. reject the heretical paradigm as non-science?

Does the basic style of communication transcend its theoretical products, or do its theoretical products redefine the very nature of the tradition? Does paradigm switching happen WITHIN science as it is understood under the terms of the old paradigm , or does the old guard, protecting its interpretation of the tradition. reject the heretical paradigm as non-science? — Joshs

To me it's a given (absolutely fundamental) that rationality (phenomenology, philosophy, ontology, science in the highest sense) determines its own essence. This is implicit in the firstness of First philosophy.

The 'most burning issue' for phenomenology first philosophy is...itself, in a recurring return to its radical founding intention, which is never finally clarified or fixed. Heidegger's early lecture courses are great on the 'methodology' of 'pre-science.'

Be we as thrown projection don't start with nothing. Habermas and Apel fallibly articulate our heritage within that very heritage.

We inherit tradition as possibility rather than [ only ] substance, or 'substance' as possibility.

agree that Mary can talk about the concept of colour, ie "colour is the visual perception based on the electromagnetic spectrum. Though colour is not an inherent property of matter, colour perception is related to an object's light absorption, reflection, emission spectra and interference"

But can Mary talk about what it feels like to perceive colour ? — RussellA

I think she can. To me the big insight from Brandom/Sellars is the space of reasons. Sapient use of concepts is normative. Mary can explain a belief or action in terms of perceiving a colored object.

But the traffic light was green !

Or maybe she doesn't buy a can of paint with her husband because she was 'thinking of something a little more vivid.'

This inferential role isn't everything, but to me it looks like a big part of the grip of concepts, and these concepts need some kind of grip on ' [obviously/vividly] interpersonal space.' The actual boundaries of personal space are not fixed, IMV, as technology gets better and can even lately begin to generate images of what we are thinking about. Your toothache exists in my world inasmuch as it lives in the space of reasons. You can explain your absence from a planned meeting in terms of it, etc. Physical/mental is not absolute, though the world's being given only to our through perspectives is what tempts us toward an unnecessary dualism.

I think she can — plaque flag

If Mary can talk about not only the concept of colour but also what it feels like to perceive colour, then, in your own words, how would you describe your perception of the colour violet to a person who cannot see colours.

If Mary can talk about not only the concept of colour but also what it feels like to perceive colour, then, in your own words, how would you describe your perception of the colour violet to a person who cannot see colours. — RussellA

Note that I'm not saying we have to accept Mary's talk. I'm saying that 'what red is like for me' has a genuine role in the human discussion. Mary may even say: I can never 'really' tell you what red is like for me.. She may justify this claim philosophically.

It's the same with 'God.' A theist may make claims about God, perhaps to justify other claims. An atheist may challenge the theist's use of this God concept, but the atheist can only do so because 'God' already has a kind of system of familiar uses.