Too deep for me.

If it is true that much of what we think of as knowledge isn’t actually knowledge
then we must accept that as it is. — PL Olcott

"Knowledge" is just a word, not some platonic essence. Your role is to elucidate how the word functions, not to prescribe how it should function, according to some fictitious ontology the word does not possess.

What we cannot know with absolute certainty is that a kitten that we are looking at
right now physically exists, or is not a mere figment of the solipsist's imagination. — PL Olcott

And yet, if you see the kitten, and it is really there, then you know it is there. That is just how the word works. If it is not actually there, you only think you know it. It only becomes a gettier problem if the cat appears to be there, but isn't, and yet a real cat is behind you. And you claim something like "there is a cat nearby".

A more reasonable solution IMO is falsifiability: if the cat was not there, would you still believe it is? If the answer is yes, that is, if your belief is not sensitive to the truth of the matter, then I think it is not true knowledge (as we use the word). I think this solves all the Gettier problems: in all of them, belief is justified, but it is not sensitive to the truth. In this case, if the real cat behind you disappeared, you would still believe "there is a cat nearby", because of the illusory cat in front of you. Your belief, while justified and true, is nonetheless insensitive to the truth, and is therefore not knowledge.

Too deep for me. — jgill

If you "know" something that turns out to be false, then
you never knew it and only incorrectly presumed it.

And yet, if you see the kitten, and it is really there, then you know it is there. — hypericin

Another respondent provided a simpler example. You see what you
believe is a cat yet it is actually a space alien perfectly disguised
as a cat, it even has cat DNA.

In this case your justification is as complete as it possibly can be
within the synthetic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction and
yet the belief that it is a cat is still false.

You believe it is a cat you have DNA evidence that it is a cat and
yet it is not a cat. This shows that the T aspect of JTB is required.

This shows that the T aspect of JTB is required. — PL Olcott

This is not in dispute

This shows that the T aspect of JTB is required.
— PL Olcott
This is not in dispute — hypericin

It was the key thing that was in dispute with

— Philosophim

My apologies, but I have places to go this evening. I'll carry on our conversation tomorrow. — Philosophim

That is great

Realizing that synthetic knowledge is impossible yet also understanding
that a close approximation of synthetic knowledge has proven to be very
reliable how do these things fit within the Gettier cases?

Gettier cases prove that a reasonable approximation of knowledge
sometimes diverges from actual knowledge. — PL Olcott

I never said synthetic knowledge was impossible. I simply noted that truth cannot be a necessary requirement for synthetic knowledge. Gettier cases are happy accidents that technically happen due to the JTB as written down. Most of them can be fixed by spelling out one's justification.

"A bear is nearby" How did you get that? "Well I saw a bear up ahead just a minute ago." What bear is nearby? "A different bear behind me. I had justification for my belief, and my belief was true therefore I knew there was a bear nearby."

This is of course, stupid. Gettier was pointing out that JTB as written neglected one very important part of justification. That it should lead to why the conclusion is true, not that the conclusion is true and you had some justification for your belief. Something like this is an acceptable solution.

The problem is when you say, "It has to actually be true" you have to answer the question of, "How do you know it is true?" You cannot. If you can, feel free to do so. But if you cannot, then you cannot state that knowledge has truth as a necessary pre-requisite. Otherwise you say we know nothing, which is again, the abandonment of epistemology.

I simply noted that truth cannot be a necessary requirement for synthetic knowledge. — Philosophim

This shows that the T aspect of JTB is required.
— PL Olcott
This is not in dispute — hypericin

You are disputing this.
Most everyone knows that ALL knowledge must be true or instead of
knowledge we have false presumptions.

You are disputing this.
Most everyone knows that ALL knowledge must be true or instead of
knowledge we have false presumptions. — PL Olcott

Lets say, even though you have no proof, that most people think that truth is a requirement for knowledge. Philosophy is not a contest of opinions. Can you prove that truth is a necessary requirement for knowledge?

It is like the statement that people that are very much overweight
are never way too thin.

The meaning of the word "knowledge" requires that it be true.

Try and find any false statement that counts as knowledge that is
not merely knowledge of its falsity.

The meaning of the word "knowledge" requires that it be true. — PL Olcott

It does not. Prove that it requires it. To prove that it requires it, you must demonstrate that one can have synthetic knowledge of it, and also prove that it is true. And to clarify, the thing that we are proving is true, must not be known to be true prior to that proof.

Try and find any false statement that counts as knowledge that is
not merely knowledge of its falsity. — PL Olcott

I mentioned an example earlier. Over 2000 years ago people used to know that the Sun circled in the sky around the Earth. Later, we found out its actually the Earth that circles around the Sun. My point is that though people did not have the truth of the relative movement of the Earth and the Sun, this was all they could know. All logic lead to the conclusion that the Sun rotated around the in the sky, not that the Earth rotated around the Sun.

Lets go one further. At one time swans were known to be white. Later, someone discovered that swans were black on another continent. Prior to this discovery, didn't people know swans as white? If someone said, "Actually, swans are black" without any justification, they would be ridiculed. Are we to say then that they didn't know what a swan was? What if we later find out swans can be orange? Did we not know what a swan was?

Finally, imagine a man who lives in a forest goes about identifying different plants for his own amusement. He points at a short tree and says, "That's a bush". He's always able to identify it as a bush with complete accuracy. One day a botanist visits him and says, "Actually, that's a tree." The man looks at him and says, "Well that's a bush to me, I don't do botany." So what does the man know the bush as? Does he know? Has he ever known what the plant was?

Knowledge is personal, societal, and cultural. It does not depend on truth as a necessary precondition.

I mentioned an example earlier. Over 2000 years ago people used to know that the Sun circled in the sky around the Earth. — Philosophim

From their frame-of-reference they could see the Sun cross the sky
thus saying they they see the Sun cross the sky is accurate.

This seems to preclude falsehoods:
facts, information, and skills acquired by a person through experience
or education; the theoretical or practical understanding.
https://docs.elevio.help/en/articles/81626-knowledge

At one time swans were known to be white. Later, someone discovered that swans were black on another continent. — Philosophim

The correct thing to do at the time is to say all the swans that they know about are white.
To say that all swans are white is incorrect reasoning.

This is a good post. You make your case clearly and your argument is a good one. Purely coincidently, I agree with you.

A more reasonable solution IMO is falsifiability: — hypericin

A theory or hypothesis is falsifiable (or refutable) if
it can be logically contradicted by an empirical test.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability

This does not work with the analytic side of the analytic synthetic
distinction. How do we know that ducks are animals empirically?
This seems to be mostly a paraphrase of verifiability.

I do agree that the notion of Falsifiability is very excellent. I
don't see how it diverges from my own notion of verifiability.

If when looking at a duck we are actually looking at a space
alien perfectly disguised as a duck (including duck DNA)
then the distinction between duck and space alien could only
be made if it does something that ducks cannot do.

Falsifiability seems to be saying that while looking at a duck
we cannot be sure that it is a duck because it not being a duck
cannot be empirically validated.

My old saying is if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck lays
eggs and everything else just like a duck it could be a space
alien perfectly disguised as a duck.

My old saying is if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck lays
eggs and everything else just like a duck it could be a space
alien perfectly disguised as a duck. — PL Olcott

Here inductive logic works wonders.

My old saying is if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck lays
eggs and everything else just like a duck it could be a space
alien perfectly disguised as a duck.
— PL Olcott

Here inductive logic works wonders. — jgill

Inductive logic would simply (possibly incorrectly) guess that it is a duck.

Inductive logic would simply (possibly incorrectly) guess that it is a duck. — PL Olcott

:up: :cool:

From their frame-of-reference they could see the Sun cross the sky
thus saying they they see the Sun cross the sky is accurate. — PL Olcott

Then you agree with me. The truth is that the sun does not revolve around the Earth, it is that the Earth revolves around the sun. You allow frame of reference to be more important than truth for knowledge, which I agree with. Thus knowledge does not have truth as a necessary pre-requisite.

The correct thing to do at the time is to say all the swans that I know about are white.
To say that all swans are white is incorrect reasoning. — PL Olcott

No. At the time it was just understood that swans were white. You would ask a person, "What color are swans?" and they would say, "White." Do we say, "All the gravity we have encountered so far causes bodies to accelerate towards each other, or do we say gravity causes all bodies to accelerate towards one another?

Finally, I did not see a proof in your reply. I will assume that you don't have a proof that lets us know that what we know is true. So the point stands. Truth is not a pre-requisite for knowledge.

No. At the time it was just understood that swans were white. — Philosophim

Fair Witness
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Fair%20Witness

That house on the hilltop--can you see what color they've painted it?"
Anne looked, then answered, "It's white on this side."
Jubal went on to Jill: "You see? It doesn't occur to Anne to infer that the other side is white, too. All the King's horses couldn't force her to commit herself...unless she went there and looked--and even then she wouldn't assume that it stayed white after she left."

I'm noting that swans by definition were known as white at the time. The house by definition is not white, it has the attribute of white. The swan by definition was white. It was part of its identity.

If the rest of the points are also not addressed, then the point stands. And its really not my point, its just a point that's been concluded by many people in epistemology. If you want to counter them, my arguments are things you'll need to have answers to. Keep at it!

I'm noting that swans by definition were known as white at the time. The house by definition is not white, it has the attribute of white. The swan by definition was white. It was part of its identity. — Philosophim

To conclude that all swans are white on the basis of some swans are
white is flat out incorrect and there cannot possibly be two ways about this.

To conclude that all swans are white on the basis of some swans are
white is flat out incorrect and there cannot possibly be two ways about this. — PL Olcott

Lets take another example. You live in a place where all apples are red. Everyone calls them apples, everyone knows that they are red. Ask a person what color an apple is, and they'll say, "Red". We know green apples exist. But for them, they've never encountered or heard of a green apple. An apple being red is part of the definition of being an apple. That is what is known. Green apples won't be introduced for 200 years. Are you saying in that time that no one ever knew what an apple was?

And again:

Do we say, "All the gravity we have encountered so far causes bodies to accelerate towards each other, or do we say gravity causes all bodies to accelerate towards one another? — Philosophim

We say gravity causes bodies to accelerate towards each other. Its in the definition. We don't adendum knowledge claims with all possible exceptions. We assert. Do you know that gravity is a force that pulls objects together regardless of distance, or not?

But for them, they've never encountered or heard of a green apple. An apple being red is part of the definition of being an apple. — Philosophim

If they assume that all apples are red without seeing all apples
then they are wrong even if their assumption is correct.

I will count on gravity as long as it continues to function. I will not
assume that it is an immutable law of nature.

If they assume that all apples are red without seeing all apples
then they are wrong even if their assumption is correct. — PL Olcott

This is just a repetition of a previous statement, and doesn't solve the issue. You're not explaining to me how we resolve the fact that properties as part of the definition, are later found to be wrong. That means you can never know anything. What if we discover 100 years ago after scientific DNA advances in DNA, that oranges are actually apples? Its not just the color, its any property of anything we know. Its a vivid example of, "How do we know that what we know is true?"

I will count on gravity as long as it continues to function. I will not
assume that it is an immutable law of nature. — PL Olcott

Its not the question of whether you count on gravity, its whether you know what gravity is. Do you know gravity as the force that pulls all matter together? If we did find something different about gravity in the future, wouldn't we say it was because of the context of what people had available at the time, just like the sun example?

Don't just respond that these are assumptions next time please. Really think about it. Address the broad idea, not the specific instance.

That means you can never know anything. — Philosophim

Within the model of the actual world we can know the stipulated relations between elements because the model of the actual world is an axiomatic system.

When we attempt to map things in the world based on what appear to be sense data from the sense organs we cannot possibly tell the difference between a duck and a space alien perfectly disguised as a duck.

This seems to indicate that we cannot possibly know that any mapping from what appears to be physical sensations to their element in the model of the actual world is a correct mapping.

Within the model of the actual world we can know the stipulated relations between elements because the model of the actual world is an axiomatic system. — PL Olcott

Is it really an unquestionable system? Not at all. What is the model of a "tree". I envision a tree, and you envision a tree. Are they likely the same? No. If it were self-evident, then could I say all swans are white as an identity, then know that all swans are white?

When we attempt to map things in the world based on what appear to be sense data from the sense organs we cannot possibly tell the difference between a duck and a space alien perfectly disguised as a duck. — PL Olcott

Only if the underlying requirement is that the mapping is true. And yes, we both agree on that. This not only applies to this example, but all examples. This means again, that we can't know whether something is a duck and a space alien. So every time you go out into the world and see a duck, you'll have to say, "I don't know if that's a space alien in disguise."

That's a rather odd viewpoint of the world. When we step out of our armchair, we find this viewpoint to have major problems. We are left with a system that lets an insane person have just as much validity in saying, "I believe that duck could be a space alien in disguise," as someone who is more rational than someone who says, "I know that's a duck," even if that person has all the evidence in the world that shows that its a duck. Are we to then tell the mentally ill person, "Yes, you have the right of it. It definitely could be an alien in disguise instead of a duck."

The problem is you're so focused on fixing one problem, that you're not thinking about the numerous problems your fix results in. If you have truth as the necessary pre-requisite of knowledge, you are going to run into many, many more problems. Its like there is a crack in the wall, and instead of fixing the crack, you're breaking down the wall so the crack isn't there anymore. That's not a solution. That's just another problem.

This seems to indicate that we cannot possibly know that any mapping from what appears to be physical sensations to their element in the model of the actual world is a correct mapping. — PL Olcott

True, if we require that our mapping must be true. Why not instead of mapping based on reason, we say mapping is based on rational application with the limited information a person or group has at the time? Thus I can know that duck is a duck. I have no information that implies its a space alien, so I can't know it as a space alien, I can only know it as a duck. Then if later it reveals itself to be a space alien I can say, "I once knew that as a duck. I no longer know that as a duck. Now I know it as a space alien." And to be silly, the space alien could actually be a human disguised as a duck disguised as a space alien, ad infinitum, and we would still have stages in which we knew what it was based on a rational application of the limited information we had at the time.

Without the qualified mapping that I propose Buddhist enlightenment is impossible
because societal conditioning is construed as actual truth rather than possible truth.
This closes the mind so that when evidence is presented of the actual truth it is never noticed.

Without the qualified mapping that I propose Buddhist enlightenment is impossible — PL Olcott

Buddhism is just another philosophy. If its invalidated by the points I make, then it is. Buddhism affords no special treatment, and must answer the problems and solutions presented here on its own. But lets keep Buddhism out of the discussion. The question is whether knowledge needs, or does not need truth as a necessary requirement. Lets stick to that.

because societal conditioning is construed as actual truth rather than possible truth. — PL Olcott

I've given several examples in which societal conditioning is based on the context of possible truth, not actual truth. You haven't adequately shown that these examples do not happen.

This closes the mind so that when evidence is presented of the actual truth it is never noticed. — PL Olcott

Once again, you're jumping past the question, "How do we know we have actual truth?"

Once again, you're jumping past the question, "How do we know we have actual truth?" — Philosophim

We cannot possibly know that we have actual truth on the synthetic side of the analytic synthetic distinction. If we assume that we can we are deceiving ourselves.

When we see a cat in our living room we can act as if it is a cat until it proves to not be a cat. The same applies to the rest of what appears to be empirical knowledge.

When every lymph node of my body was jam packed with cancer last Summer I acted as if this was true and got chemo therapy that brought me back to no detectable cancer anywhere in my body.

The Apple Computer guy Steve Job's figured that orange juice would do the same thing and this killed him.