I don't think the syllogism is "just a hot mess." — Leontiskos
What do we wish, by means of proper reason, to extract from a syllogism? — Mww
If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated... — Mww
It follows that while the major is true in its use of “mediately”, the minor remains equivocal insofar as “non-mediately” has a different relation to knowledge than the relation in the major, hence is a fallacious sophisma figurae dictionis, especially if “non-mediately” doesn’t relate to knowledge at all. — Mww
Having said all that, what do you think “non-mediately” means, and do you think knowledge is possible by it? — Mww
I think the reason no one has challenged the minor is because we all believe that we possess a knowledge of our acts which is not mediated. This is different from our knowledge of the acts of others. — Leontiskos
We "feel" our own actions "from the inside" it seems, and we see, or hear the actions of others, but if feeling as well as seeing and hearing is mediated by prior neuronal activity, the immediacy may be merely phenomenological, which then just be to say that knowledge of our actions seems immediate, which is of course true. — Janus
It's valid because of the form of the argument.It's valid because "action is mediated" is not our argument. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Proof by contradiction works in math -- and it was built as a mathematical argument.Although, I am aware that mathematicians generally prefer direct proofs over the reductio, because a reductio lacks fecundity, it cannot be used to set up new proofs as easily. — Count Timothy von Icarus
...there's not a containment relationship that exists in the argument. "Setting a set of things" itself is part of theory of action, which is about critical judgment -- see Kant's theory of action. If you notice, the argument provided includes that critical judgment on judgment about appearances:It's a containment relationship that fails to obtain. Or we can define it through membership. Action is not in the set of "things known mediately," while "all appearances" are members of that set. Thus, on pain of contradiction, action cannot be a member of the set of appearances as this would entail that it is an element in the set of things that are know mediately (which is rejected in P2). — Count Timothy von Icarus
If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately
Thus, action cannot be an appearance.
If it is the case no knowledge is at all possible that is not mediated...
— Mww
If this were the case then the minor would simply be false. But it is not false, because we do have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner. — Leontiskos
(Ever listened to speeches on the floor of the U.S. House? Yikes, I tell ya; one instance of illegitimate reasoning right after another. The more serious the topic, potentially the more silly the logic) — Mww
Aristotle calls this an error in scientific reasoning, meaning it only shows up in demonstrations of the premises. — Mww
Here, the major premise, that appearances are known mediately, is true as demonstrated by means of some theory, but the minor, an individual knows his actions non-mediately, is demonstrated as false by that same theory. — Mww
Again I’ll ask….how do you think it is possible to have knowledge of our own actions in a non-mediated manner? — Mww
Bottom line….knowledge of any kind, is necessarily mediated by the system which makes knowledge possible. — Mww
My point in indicating that everyone in the tread accepts it is to say that this burden is on you. To everyone in the thread it is accepted that we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument. The commonsensical idea is that when I see someone else flip a coin my knowledge is mediated by sense data; but when I flip a coin my knowledge that I am acting is in no way limited to sense data. Because I am the one effecting the act, therefore I know that the act is being effected. The mediation of the former is not present in the latter. — Leontiskos
Anything that is an appearance is known mediately,
Action is known only non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.
This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound. — Janus
We know our actions in a direct way -- no input from the outside world. If I walked over to the kitchen, I knew it without waiting for an object to hit my eyes. My action is within me. My being is within me. A ball is outside of me, I can perceive it. I can perceive its qualities. If I lay down and imagine aliens, only I could know I am imagining. The act of imagining is not something that I perceive like I am perceiving a tree. In fact, compared to the perception of a tree, my imagination can take many forms; whereas a tree is a tree is a tree. Seven billion people could confirm that a pine tree is a pine tree.To everyone in the thread it is accepted that we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, — Leontiskos
….we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions, and if you disagree then you will have to provide an argument. — Leontiskos
There are two questions here: first, whether the mediation of the knowledge of appearances and the mediation of the knowledge of first-person acts are different kinds of mediation; and second, whether the knowledge of first-person acts are mediated. — Leontiskos
It is an attempt to explain what has already occurred. — Leontiskos
Hrm! I don't know that I'd accept "we know our own actions in a more immediate way than we know others' actions" as a true sentence, but it'd be for boring reasons: I simply wouldn't use the predicate "...immediate" with respect to knowledge in general. — Moliere
Anything that is an appearance is known mediately,
Action is known only non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance.
This makes it clear that the question is whether action is known only non-mediately, and that would seem to be false, which makes the argument as reformulated valid, but unsound.
— Janus
Using this approach, you can get true premises in the following way:
Anything that is an appearance is known only mediately
Action is known non-mediately
Therefore, action cannot be an appearance
(The point is not that action is known only non-mediately, but rather that action is known non-mediately (and mediately), whereas appearance is only known mediately.) — Leontiskos
We know our actions in a direct way -- no input from the outside world. If I walked over to the kitchen, I knew it without waiting for an object to hit my eyes. My action is within me. My being is within me. A ball is outside of me, I can perceive it. I can perceive its qualities. If I lay down and imagine aliens, only I could know I am imagining. The act of imagining is not something that I perceive like I am perceiving a tree. In fact, compared to the perception of a tree, my imagination can take many forms; whereas a tree is a tree is a tree. Seven billion people could confirm that a pine tree is a pine tree. — L'éléphant
That was never a contention... — Mww
So, yes, we know our own actions in a more immediate way that we know others’ actions... — Mww
Give that system any name you wish... — Mww
Ever tied to explain what hasn’t occurred? — Mww
Some questions: Do you act? When you act do you know you are acting, or are you not sure whether you are acting? Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen? Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by? — Leontiskos
I think the reason no one has challenged the minor is because we all believe that we possess a knowledge of our acts which is not mediated. This is different from our knowledge of the acts of others.
— Leontiskos
If all knowledge of action is mediated by neural processes, then we may well all be mistaken in thinking that we possess non-mediated knowledge of our own actions. We "feel" our own actions "from the inside" it seems, and we see, or hear the actions of others, but if feeling as well as seeing and hearing is mediated by prior neuronal activity, the immediacy may be merely phenomenological, which then just be to say that knowledge of our actions seems immediate, which is of course true. — Janus
Some questions:…. — Leontiskos
Do you act? — Leontiskos
When you act do you know you are acting…. — Leontiskos
…..or are you not sure whether you are acting? — Leontiskos
Do you disagree with L'éléphant about his knowledge of walking over to the kitchen? — Leontiskos
Finally, if you think this knowledge is mediate, then what is it mediated by? — Leontiskos
Do you think people without "systems" are also capable of knowledge? — Leontiskos
So, if one is doubting whether they're acting, then the doubting itself is an act that they're not sure of. This has a funny consequence -- I'm not sure I'm walking, but I'm also not sure that I'm not sure I'm walking, and I really can't be sure at all of anything, which means there is one thing I know non-mediately: that I don't know anything. So, there IS ONE THING I know for sure!!When you act do you know you are acting, or are you not sure whether you are acting? — Leontiskos
So, if one is doubting whether they're acting, then the doubting itself is an act that they're not sure of. This has a funny consequence -- I'm not sure I'm walking, but I'm also not sure that I'm not sure I'm walking, and I really can't be sure at all of anything, which means there is one thing I know non-mediately: that I don't know anything. So, there IS ONE THING I know for sure!!
:sweat: — L'éléphant
Sure, when we are aware we feel our body acting, moving and we feel the ease or the effort. — Janus
Yes, I’m sure I’m acting, iff I’m in the act of doing something and aware of it. — Mww
Why, the knowledge that I have walked to the kitchen, is mediated by my understanding of what a kitchen is. — Mww
And yes, you actually do need a kitchen-type object to hit your eyes, or, possibly but not as definitively, some particular kitchen-like perception, in order to KNOW you’ve arrived in the kitchen. — Mww
When we are riding an ass we feel the ass acting, moving, and we feel the ease or the effort. But to act is not to be carried around by an ass. ...Not even St. Francis' "brother ass"! — Leontiskos
Quite right — Leontiskos
Of course to have knowledge of a proposition involves having knowledge of the terms of the proposition, but the knowledge of the proposition is not mediated by the terms. — Leontiskos
…..the knowledge that you are walking into a kitchen presupposes knowledge of the kitchen. I think it would be quite odd to call this mediation, particularly in the sense of the "appearances" of the OP. — Leontiskos
…..consciously thinking (….) consciously walking…. — Leontiskos
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