Ok. Does it actually say that in the Bible or is this your interpretation? Any reason why we should take these myths more seriously than any other tradition's scriptures?

I wish to talk about suffering in the general world sense such as earthquakes, financial hardships, dictator cruelties and personal sense such as depressions, illnesses, disease etc.

I think this question ties up to the problem of evil and why it exists for if god is indeed perfect (which I’m not sure he is) then why is there imperfection in the world such as evil for example.

Well I’m gonna try to answer this. Firstly a perfect being does not imply that the creatures he creates such as animals and men and plants are as perfect as he is. This kind of logic would apply to the planet itself which is why it’s the best possible planet in the solar system despite the plate tectonics that cause earthquakes and I guess it applies to the human body too i’d rather be a rational human being that dies of cancer at age 50 than a snail

Additionally man COULD actually BE perfect but free will leads him astray from the path of god and thus committing evil.

Any other complaints about god …apart from him not existing ? — simplyG

If you do not believe in God then suffering just comes from the world right? :smile:

Life is very precious, some people can find comfort in God's love because God knows what is best for us.

God, or the event, determined the initial conditions for evolution. But then, at some point, intentionality emerges because, well, here we are. Good and evil don't seem like coherent concepts unless intentionality and subjectivity exist, so they emerge within intentionality.

We can always tie everything back to ultimate causes, and in this way we can say "God authors evil," or "the universe fundementally produces evil." But it's in the immanent unfolding that everything interesting happens and that the very intentionality that defines evil exists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean, now we are just word-parsing but "evil" can mean many things. Some common ideas:

1) Evil is a judgement about certain acts or intentions people do or have that either result in someone else's misery or negative experience. To act with malice intent or disregard for suffering.

2) Evil is any negative experience whether man-made or non-manmade (accidents, natural disasters, and someone's negative actions towards others).

3) Evil is some sort of metaphysical "stain" on one's being (this is very much a Christian/Augustinian/Pauline conception) by simply being born a human whose nature is sinful or some such.

So there are a lot "family resemblances" here. The way your OP set it out, it seemed all 3 of these could be on the table. Either way, since the OP mentions a God, I was assuming that was necessary. I still think you have not fully addressed these ideas I had from previous post:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/838906

By virtue of what are natural disasters bad? The storms of Jupiter, the ongoing nuclear explosions of the Sun, we don't see as disasters. If they were to occur in Earth, they would be disasters.

It seems that in an important way, there is a "semiotic cut," that starts with life. Things can be good or bad for a lifeform, it can experience harm. But it doesn't make sense to say the fusion of hydrogen atoms into helium is good or bad in relevance to the atoms themselves.

"Good and bad," emerge from the process of cosmic evolution with lifeforms. Before intentionality, nothing could experience good or bad and nothing could "do evil." If the universe has a purpose, there is an absolute unity of purpose before life forms. As life develops, that unity dissolves. So, if you assume a divine unity, such a progression always results in a falling away from unity, as intentional beings by definition have their own purposes.

And I don't see how it could be metaphysically possible for it to be otherwise. If there is multiple subjects, there is necessarily the possibility of disunity in judgement. They might be causally constrained from disunity, but such constraint would entail that they aren't free. If there is freedom, it seems disunity is bound to follow. There is only one way for all subjects to agree on the good; there are many ways for them to disagree. In a world where there are "free beings," and "yet it is only ever possible for them to have goals and feelings that harmonize," how are they free?


But I think the framing of God in terms of "omni " superlatives is itself contradictory. An omnipotent being can never act lest it limit itself, but then it is not free to act, etc.

Human beings cannot discern spiritual truth by their own means. It must be given to them. Philosophy has failed in its task to answer the big questions. We must be guided by revelation and awareness.

As life develops, that unity dissolves. So, if you assume a divine unity, such a progression always results in a falling away from unity, as intentional beings by definition have their own purposes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why must it fall away from unity/good? It is possible to evolve towards the good. Not all intention is against the good.

Human beings cannot discern spiritual truth by their own means. It must be given to them. Philosophy has failed in its task to answer the big questions. We must be guided by revelation and awareness. — EnPassant

I consider revelation to be contrived fiction, so we're not going to find any common ground. Thanks.

I'm talking about individual revelation from God or His teachers. There is no other way.

That's your view. I don't believe in gods so my interest in this is in the logic of myth and storytelling

The logic of theology that I'm aware of tends to be dialetheistic, allowing for "true contradictions," and denying proof by contradiction in some cases. I think this is where a lot of philosophy of religion goes off the rails. It tries to apply systems of inquiry that violate core conceptions of the traditions they want to explore.

To be sure, there is a religious tradition, starting more with the Enlightenment, that tries to use a more classical sort of system to analyze God. You see this with folks like Alvin Plantinga, who would be a great person to read on for a classical, bivalent logic based analysis of this sort of thing. But such logic and methodology seems totally alien to the religious thinking of Saint Denis, Saint Bonaventure, Eckhart, Boheme, Merton, etc.

There, you often see paradoxes set atop each other as a mode of description of the divine essence, or even the argument that all description and analysis ultimately causes us to lose sight of God. I don't think the traditions are necessarily commensurate and more religious people seem to read and agree with Merton or Eckhart, or their spiritual descendents, then your Plantingas.

What creates suffering if god created the world ? [/quote]

If we assume God created everything then we must assume this includes suffering. If He hadn't created anything then there wouldn't be any.suffering . I find it an odd question. .

To be sure, there is a religious tradition, starting more with the Enlightenment, that tries to use a more classical sort of system to analyze God. You see this with folks like Alvin Plantinga, who would be a great person to read on for a classical, bivalent logic based analysis of this sort of thing. But such logic and methodology seems totally alien to the religious thinking of Saint Denis, Saint Bonaventure, Eckhart, Boheme, Merton, etc.

There, you often see paradoxes set atop each other as a mode of description of the divine essence, or even the argument that all description and analysis ultimately causes us to lose sight of God. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I liked your post as it raises interesting issues, but do do agree. I'd be interested to know why you believe Eckhart's view requires that we abandon ordinary logic.The dialethists claim this but their arguments don't withstand analysis.

It would be because the Ultimate lies beyond the categories of thought that it cannot be conceived and must be described in partial and contradictory ways, but these would not be true descriptions, just the best we can do. For Eckhart the truth would lie beyond the possibility of contradictions or, as De Cusa puts it, 'beyond the coincidence of contradictories'. Thus beyond all contradictions. This view requires no modification of ordinary logic, just the recognition that bivalent logic cannot describe the unity of the Ultimate. The Buddhist philosopher-monk Nagarjuna explains this in his doctrine of 'Two Truths', and Eckhart endorses the same world-view.

Just defending Eckhart. .

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Suffering might be the result of being able to form expectations that don't align with reality, which is unavoidable for beings who are not omniscient, as well as the result of creatures with nervous systems that live in a world governed by natural laws.

Potentially, yes one could look at suffering that way. Once certain basic needs are met then we as human beings can live in happiness rather than misery.

The issue with having a nervous system is the experience of physical pain but the upside is the experience of pleasure too.

I also think a life without suffering would have no meaning as even pleasurable or happy experiences would become mundane.

Suffering is a necessary precondition to appreciating the good life so I don’t see the problem or issue if there is some of it in the world as they’re challenges to be overcome and make one stronger, better and fitter in the long run as opposed to only having lived an easy life.

If we assume God created everything then we must assume this includes suffering. If He hadn't created anything then there wouldn't be any.suffering — FrancisRay

Well it’s an interesting question to me because god is meant to be all good and perfect which implies no need for suffering or pain yet here we are. I can catch a bad cold that pains me so where did these imperfections that cause pain come from if god is perfect? I would answer to appreciate our good health in good times.

But what if in extremes one was in chronic pain ? How would we answer this question of a god that loves his children ? This one I cannot fully answer but it would be through the innovation of brilliant scientists who would find a cure to such ailments, in short a miracle.

Or we could have the wrong ethics - his are far beyond the ethics we understand. — Manuel

Perhaps his ethics could be neatly be summed up by no pain no gain. I think he knows better than us, imagine a society of above average looking millionaires, the concept of beauty would no longer have any meaning here and who would do the grunt work of say picking up the rubbish? So everything has to be balanced by different classes of citizens some who are not so well off to some who are…perhaps that’s his logic. Strikes me of the master/slave …but can you think of a better way society can be organised? Communism ?

I think you have it exactly right, my phrasing might have been incautious. God is beyond the analysis offered of on terms of "God as omni-x." My point was merely that these traditions embrace paraconsistent descriptions as better, if still flawed ways of conceiving of that which is beyond all description.

It's an anachronism to say they were actually paraconsistent, since multivalued logics, etc. are fairly recent. These are just modern terms that I think better fit the spirit of what they lay out. I do wonder what these guys would have thought of such systems, because they had brilliant minds and a knack for illustrating profound truths with contradictions. Hegel too.

I am not aware of theologians doing much with these, although I haven't looked very hard. Thomism still seems very strong in Catholic philosophy programs.

I would say that the need for a paraconsistent;logic that you speak of is a misperception.

My point was merely that these traditions embrace paraconsistent descriptions as better, if still flawed ways of conceiving of that which is beyond all description. — Count Timothy von Icarus

They're not paraconsistent descriptions, albeit they seem contradictory. They are a rejection of all extreme views and descriptions requiring no modification of ordinary logic. .

There are two crucial issues here. First, those who describe the Ultimate in seemingly contradictory terms do not say this is God. Eckhart and Plotinus, for instance, deny that this is God. To think of The One as God, says Plotinus, is to think of it 'too meanly'.

Second, the contradictory language associated with the nondualism of Eckhart and Plotinus strictly obeys the rules of logic. When Heraclitus states 'We both are and are-not' he is not abandoning logic, but saying that there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not. As a consequence, it would be unrigorous to state 'we are' or 'we are not'. These are extreme positions and all such positions are rejected by nondualism.

The point would be that the propositions 'we are ' and we are not' would not form a legitimate contradictory pair, since it would not be the case that one is true and one is false. Thus to reject both requires no modification to dialectical logic. .

Lao Tzu tells us 'true words seem paradoxical', not that they actually are. I suspect that this point about logic is vital for an understanding of Eckhart and the mystics, since otherwise it will seem that they speak in riddles and have no respect for the laws of dialectical logic.

Second, the contradictory language associated with the nondualism of Eckhart and Plotinus strictly obeys the rules of logic. When Heraclitus states 'We both are and are-not' he is not abandoning logic, but saying that there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not. As a consequence, it would be unrigorous to state 'we are' or 'we are not'. These are extreme positions and all such positions are rejected by nondualism.

If there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not then you can simply clarify those senses in a bivalent way by breaking the statement down into atomic propositions.

Of course, it is not a violation of logic to say that a natural language sentence appears contradictory, but actually isn't.

And I think this is what is meant in some statements that might seem contradictory or heretical at first glance. Like Eckhart's claim that he preexisted God. This is a claim about the potentialities within God, including humans, pre-existing creation, versus the human conception of God as God only existing temporally. No contradiction there.

But Saint Denis's claims about a light that is darkness doesn't yield to the same sort of breakdown.

I'm not sure what you mean by "rules of logic," here. There are many logical systems. Multivalued logic is not any less rigorous or less logic. Second, I don't know what you mean by "nondualism" here. Generally the term refers to ontological dualism, in which case, yes, Plotinus and Plato are absolutely dualists in key respects. But it seems like you might be talking more about rejecting bivalence?

If there is a sense in which we are and a sense in which we are not then you can simply clarify those senses in a bivalent way by breaking the statement down into atomic propositions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can, yes, and then both statements would be untrue.

Of course, it is not a violation of logic to say that a natural language sentence appears contradictory, but actually isn't.

Of course not. But most people would say that the statement 'We are and are-not; is a contradiction and find it difficult to see how it can not be one. .

And I think this is what is meant in some statements that might seem contradictory or heretical at first glance. Like Eckhart's claim that he preexisted God. This is a claim about the potentialities within God, including humans, pre-existing creation, versus the human conception of God as God only existing temporally. No contradiction there.

Eckhart is saying that God is a concept and that consciousness and ultimate reality is prior to concepts. He is saying that God is not fundamental, thus that monotheism is wrong. He is merely agreeing with the pagan philosophers he so admired, who say that God is a misunderstanding. So yes, no contradictions are implied.

But Saint Denis's claims about a light that is darkness doesn't yield to the same sort of breakdown.

I think you;ll find ti does, but I don't know Dennis so don't know the quote or the context. If it is a contradiction in the way that he meant it then he is not thinking clearly, but I expect he;s endorsing the same view I'm defending. .

I'm not sure what you mean by "rules of logic," here. There are many logical systems. Multivalued logic is not any less rigorous or less logic. Second, I don't know what you mean by "nondualism" here. Generally the term refers to ontological dualism, in which case, yes, Plotinus and Plato are absolutely dualists in key respects. But it seems like you might be talking more about rejecting bivalence?

I was speaking of the rules for the dialectic as proscribed by Aristotle. This is necessarily bivalent, and because of this must be transcended for nondualism. Nothing wrong with the rules though. It's just that reality would not be bivalent. It would be 'advaita or 'not-two', undivided, undifferentiated and best described as a unity, or as Plotinus describes it - a one without a second. ,

The idea that Plotinus was a dualist is one I've never encountered previously. To see that he is not would require a study of nondualism. If you don't know what this word means then Plotinus and the entire literature of of mysticism will be incomprehensible.

You clearly know your stuff theologically, but I feel you're missing out on the view that opens up when one lets go of monotheism. The idea of God confuses the issues since it is so emotive and vague. Plotinus and Eckhart ask us to look beyond this idea.

I suspect even Aquinas would have agreed since he endorses the doctrine of Divine Simplicity, and nothing could be simpler that the unity or 'One' that serves as the Ultimate for the Perennial philosophy.. .

Thanks for an interesting discussion. . . .

Any other complaints about god …apart from him not existing ? — simplyG

What do you mean "apart from him not existing"?
If he doesn't exist, how can there be any complaint about him, i.e. about something that doesn't exist? :smile:
Except if the complaint is about his non-existence. That is, that we are alone, without anyone to protect and guide us. :smile:

According to your basis, free will always pushes us to commit sins. Only in a predetermined life would we all be perfect then? — javi2541997

:up:

Gotcha, I get how you mean nondualism now, in the sense that Shankara's advaita is nondualist, right. That makes perfect sense to me.

Although, I would disagree that Plotinus, Porphery, Proclus, etc., the Neoplatonists, advance a similar sort of non-dualism in that sense. For Shankara, Maya is ultimately illusion, the base reality is Brahman. But for the Neoplatonists the Plotinian hypostases seem to be a distinct reality, albeit one that can be overcome. The One actually emanates, where as the play of Brahma in Maya seems to be illusory in Shankara.

At least that's how I've normally seen them read, but I can see how they could be read in non-dualist ways as well because of the references to "illusion." At least in Porphery or early Augustine, the illusion seems to harden more, because of the idea of downward causality where the higher, Psyche, Nous, effects the lower material realm, but not vice versa (I forget if that is as explicit in Plotinius himself.)

And this is generally what is meant by "ontological dualism," the idea there is another level of reality that is distinct from the material world of sensation. E.g., the realm of Platonic forms.

Interestingly, and I'll see if I can find an example, modern scholars do accuse Shankara or falling into the excluded middle and violating bivalence. I'm not familiar enough with Shankara to really weigh these appropriately, but it's interesting in that it's another example where religion seems to clash with analytical techniques that, IMO, might be being misapplied.

He is saying that God is not fundamental, thus that monotheism is wrong. He is merely agreeing with the pagan philosophers he so admired, who say that God is a misunderstanding. So yes, no contradictions are implied.

Maybe, that's sort of the perennialist take on Eckhart. But the man maintained throughout his life that his doctrine was in keeping with Catholic orthodoxy, granted we could imagine this was partly due to social pressure and threats.

Personally, I can't buy it. The man's work is too covered in scriptural references, practical references to living in the type of Christ, love as loving Christ in others, etc. I'm by no means an expert on his vast corpus, and I originally got into Eckhart reading the perennialist interpretations, Eckhart as a pantheist, but Bill Harmless and others make a pretty convincing case for a more orthodox Eckhart based on his correspondence and practical advice.

But we can't know for sure, right? That's what always makes history interesting. Maybe this was just cover for him to explore unorthodox ideas.

I like the orthodox reading in part though because it shows the vast space of conceptual possibilities that exist within orthodoxy, even if they are rarely explored. We tend to think, "if most x state y, then x is what is consistent with y," but I find it neat how Eckhart, Rumi, etc. can show us, "hey look, there is this whole set of other spaces that don't conflict with the boundaries of Christian/Muslim orthodoxy, and yet are conceptually very different."

Theology is cool in that way, a bit freer than philosophy is some ways.

I also enjoy the Patristic interpretation that Evil comes from the absence of God, so all things evil are things which are void of God. Anathasis wrote a great piece on this called "On the Incarnation"

[quote="Count Timothy von Icarus;840524" Modern scholars do accuse Shankara or falling into the excluded middle and violating bivalence. I'm not familiar enough with Shankara to really weigh these appropriately, but it's interesting in that it's another example where religion seems to clash with analytical techniques that, IMO, might be being misapplied.[/quote]

Modern scholars often make this accusation. I would argue that that they are misunderstanding bivalence and abusing Aristotle;s logic. Nondualism requires no changes to the rules but only their stricter than usual application. This can be demonstrated and is not a matter of opinion. Graham Priest accuses Buddhism of being full of contradictions, and I cannot imagine a more profound and unnecessary misunderstanding. It seems utterly perverse. , .

Maybe, that's sort of the perennialist take on Eckhart. But the man maintained throughout his life that his doctrine was in keeping with Catholic orthodoxy, granted we could imagine this was partly due to social pressure and threats.

It seems mostly to be bang in line with the orthodoxy, but clearly he restricted what he said for the reasons you mention. In mysticism Jesus us usually regarded as m authentic teacher who was misunderstood by the later church. For instance, in Taoism Christ is the True Man who resides within each of us.

Personally, I can't buy it. The man's work is too covered in scriptural references, practical references to living in the type of Christ, love as loving Christ in others, etc. I'm by no means an expert on his vast corpus, and I originally got into Eckhart reading the perennialist interpretations, Eckhart as a pantheist, but Bill Harmless and others make a pretty convincing case for a more orthodox Eckhart based on his correspondence and practical advice.

I feel pantheism is a confusing red herring so won't go there. It seems inevitable that people who do not understand nondualism are bound to misread Eckhart, Jesus and all others who teach the same doctrine. I had to study Buddhism in order to make sense of Christianity and I've heard many others say the same. . . . .

But we can't know for sure, right?

I think we can know for sure. He writes with great care and clarity.

Theology is cool in that way, a bit freer than philosophy is some ways.

Hmm. I rather think the limitations of theology are made clear in the name. Philosophy has to start with no assumptions about God. I'd recommend replacing theology with metaphysics and starting with a clean slate. Still, if you're talking about what passes for philosophy in our universities then I'd probably agree. . .

To me the whole issue is summed up in Lao Tzu's comment, 'True words seem paradoxical'. This would only be the case if the advaita doctrine is true, so his brief words reward a lot of study. .

What do you mean "apart from him not existing"?
If he doesn't exist, how can there be any complaint about him, i.e. about something that doesn't exist? :smile:
Except if the complaint is about his non-existence. That is, that we are alone, without anyone to protect and guide — Alkis Piskas

It appears you have taken the quote out of context. If you read my opening post again you will find that the point I’m making is that if god exists who is perfect why is there suffering in the world. This is a common complaint or objection to the existence or non existence of a perfect, benevolent God.

I don't know if I was out of context, but you are certainly out of response time! :smile:

I think the idea is that suffering goes along, necessarily, with differentiation. And creating a world is nothing other than differentiation, so that one bit of space if different from another. Only when there are other things can something impinge on you from outside, like an earthquake or other person.

True, but that’s like saying differentiation between say land and water. Water can give you pleasure if you’re by the beach enjoying a nice swim to cool down, however a tsunami could wreck havoc and be a cause of suffering. So differentiation as cause of suffering depends on context.

Suffering is also relative for example some people have plastic surgery because they’re insecure or unhappy about their looks, but in a world without differentiation in terms of attractiveness this cause of unhappiness would be eliminated.

So I guess it comes down to equality if we’re born equal and remained equal in all aspects the general level of suffering would be fairly low.

I believe Schopenhauer drew inspiration from Boheme. — schopenhauer1

I like the orthodox reading (of Eckhardt et al) in part though because it shows the vast space of conceptual possibilities that exist within orthodoxy, even if they are rarely explored. We tend to think, "if most x state y, then x is what is consistent with y," but I find it neat how Eckhart, Rumi, etc. can show us, "hey look, there is this whole set of other spaces that don't conflict with the boundaries of Christian/Muslim orthodoxy, and yet are conceptually very different." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think what might be missing in this discussion is the ethical or moral dimension of religious philosophy and its ultimately existential nature. One of the Schopenhauer quotes that is relevant:

In order to always have a secure compass in hand so as to find one's way in life, and to see life always in the correct light without going astray, nothing is more suitable than getting used to seeing the world as something like a penal colony. This view finds its...justification not only in my philosophy, but also in the wisdom of all times, namely, in Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras [...] Even in genuine and correctly understood Christianity, our existence is regarded as the result of a liability or a misstep. ... We will thus always keep our position in mind and regard every human, first and foremost, as a being that exists only on account of sinfulness, and who is life is an expiation of the offence committed through birth. Exactly this constitutes what Christianity calls the sinful nature of man. — quoted in Schopenhauer's Compass, Urs App, p1

The Eastern religions designate this state or condition as 'avidya' or ignorance, rather than 'original sin', which has a more cognitive connotation (i.e. corruption of the intellect) than sin (corruption of the will).

In either case, I think the essential implication is that existence as we understand it is inherently prone to suffering. The human condition is characterised in the early Buddhist texts as being one of inherent suffering due to being separated from what one loves, united with what one doesn't love, and subject to old age, illness and death, the implication being that the only real escape from suffering it to escape altogether from re-birth in saṃsāra (although this became modified in Mahāyāna Buddhism with the idea that the Bodhisattva can take voluntary birth 'for the welfare of all sentient beings', which actually dovetails rather well with Christian theology.)

Whereas in today's culture, physical satisfaction, safety, health, enjoyment, and so on, are regarded as the only real goods, so it is unnacceptable to this outlook that God doesn't just facilitate that. He doesn't conform to our ideas of what constitutes 'the good life'. (This is what I describe as the 'hotel manager theodicy' - 'who's responsible for all this!?!' I believe C S Lewis has an essay on that, God in the Dock (although I haven't read it) - but the gist is, in previous times, man was the accused, standing in the dock and being judged by God. However, in the modern era, this has reversed, and God is the one being judged by human standards.)

So the upshot is, according at least to ol' time religion, there is no permanent peace and security to be found 'in this vale of tears', all we can do is improve physical well-being and political security and maximize comfort. Against that background, 'religion' generally makes no sense. As we see.