Mind in part consists of thoughts. How are thoughts physical? One can of course state that the thoughts of a corporeal sentient being would not be in the absence of the respective corporeal body. But this does not entail that the given thoughts - say of a unicorn or of Harry Potter - are of themselves physical. — javra

But if not everything that does or can occur is physical, then physicalism so defined can only be false. — javra

Thoughts are widely considered to be neural events or processes. That they do not seem to be such to the thinker is no guarantee that they are not such. There is no guarantee that physicalism is false. Nor is there a guarantee that it is true. The real issue as I see it is what does it matter? Why should we mind whether physicalism is true or false?

“If you’re moved by something, it doesn’t need explaining.
If you’re not, no explanation will move you.”
—Federico Fellini

I'm not interested in being moved by the question as to the truth or falsity of physicalism I'm just interested to know why others are moved by it.

My pleasure. And yea, I myself like the concept of constructive empiricism as just outlined.

There is no guarantee that physicalism is false. Nor is there a guarantee that it is true. The real issue as I see it is what does it matter? Why should we mind whether physicalism is true or false? — Janus

Hmm, because of its implications.

There a bunch of other reasons, but as one significant gripe I have with it (here placing its inconsistencies aside), if physicalism is true, then this will easily lead to - if it does not directly entail - moral nihilism. And it certainly does away with any possibility of an objective good.

... For example: Given phisicalism, everything sentient then necessarily ends in nonbeing wherein all suffering permanently ends upon their own corporeal death (we're atheists so this for us is a good thing to uphold - lest we suffer the encroachment of that diabolical theism crowd with their concepts of an anima mundi and such). Ergo, enduring the suffering of life with as much grace as possible when things get rough is stupid - and there is no ultimate good to aspire toward, well, other than one's personal death when life gets a bit too much. The abused, the tortured, etc? They too obtain this same salvation from all suffering via their own physical death to this world ... so when one places a bullet through a child's head under the cover of war one in essence is blessing the child with eternal peace and an absolute lack of suffering. Is so murdering a child right or wrong? Within systems of physicalism, there is no one right answer - either due to moral nihilism or to moral relativism.

... Kind of thing. And I say this as one who sometimes longs for the days when I used to believe that my corporeal death to this world meant my absolute nonbeing.

There's concrete shitty stuff happening in the world right now that bothers me, at times galore. And so the issues addressed tend to matter to me, in large enough part for this very reason regarding a proper grounding for ethics. ("God does everything" also not being anywhere near any such proper grounding.)

All this written a bit tongue in cheek, but I hope it might still get the general point across.

BTW, if it doesn't matter to you (as you sort of insinuate), then why bother replying to my post to begin with?

Mind in part consists of thoughts. How are thoughts physical? — javra

Physicalism being false does not entail non-solipsistic idealism being true. It just means idealism is logically possible. I already acknowledge it is logically possible.

Regarding your claim, you seem to be reifying an action. Engaging in thought is an activity of the brain- a behavior. It often results in the establishment of a new belief-a disposition. Having a belief makes us apt to behave certain way.

we perceive physical realities, but then - given the entailment of physicalism - how is a bona fide hallucination of itself physical? — javra

Our perception of our physical surroundings establishes a complex belief (a disposition) about those surroundings, which will influence how we behave within those surroundings. An hallucination is a non-veridical belief.

But if not everything that does or can occur is physical, then physicalism so defined can only be false. — javra

Sure, but physicalism can be false and idealism still be false. You've provided no reason to think it's true. I'm somewhat agnostic as to a metaphysical theory. I tentatively embrace physicalism because it explains the most and assumes the least. I could switch my allegiance if there were an alternative that bested it. You haven't given one. You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.

You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world. — Relativist

That's a bit confrontational to me. And, as I previously expressed, I'm not interested in so doing.

As to your other replies, they sidestep the questions asked without providing answers. E.g. are non-veridical beliefs of themselves physical? BTW, to the person hallucinating X, the physical reality of X will be a veridical belief ... this up until the time reasoning might intervene (it doesn't always). The movie "A Beautiful Mind" makes a good point of that, for one example.

But I'll leave it at that.

You would have to defeat my belief in an external, minds-independent world.
— Relativist

That's a bit confrontational to me. And, as I previously expressed, I'm not interested in so doing. — javra

It's not confrontational. The term "defeater" is just standard epistemology. A defeater=a reason to give up a belief. It's shorthand for what I've previously asked for.

I hope you understand why it's relevant. I absolutely believe there is an external world that exists independently of minds. I can't possibly accept idealism unless I drop this belief, and that would require a defeater (not just the mere possibility it is false).

As to your other replies, they sidestep the questions asked without providing answers. E.g. are non-veridical beliefs of themselves physical? — javra

I was defending physicalism, so I didn't see the need to state that it entails the claim that beliefs are physical. Indeed, establishing a belief would entail a physical change in the brain. More specifically, it is a change that will affect behavior.

BTW, to the person hallucinating X, the physical reality of X will be a veridical belief ... this up until the time reasoning might intervene (it doesn't always).

That's not what it means. A verdical belief is one that is actually true, i.e. it corresponds to an aspect of reality. If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true.

If the protagonist in the movie had hallucinations that he believed were false because his psychiatrists convinced him they were false, then the belief in their falsehood was an undercutting defeater of the (seemingly true) hallucination.

Constructive Empiricism seems to me to go to far, by denying that science tells us anything about reality. I'm more aligned with Structural Realism:

...the most powerful argument in favour of scientific realism is the no-miracles argument, according to which the success of science would be miraculous if scientific theories were not at least approximately true descriptions of the world. While the underdetermination argument is often cited as giving grounds for scepticism about theories of unobservable entities, arguably the most powerful arguments against scientific realism are based on the history of radical theory change in science....
...Structural realism was introduced into current philosophy of science by John Worrall in 1989 as a way to break the impasse that results from taking both arguments seriously, and have “the best of both worlds” in the debate about scientific realism.
...

According to Worrall, we should not accept standard scientific realism, which asserts that the nature of the unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly described by our best theories. However, neither should we be antirealists about science. Rather, we should adopt structural realism and epistemically commit ourselves to the mathematical or structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention of structure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force of the pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in the theory’s description of the furniture of the world) and (b) does not make the success of science (especially the novel predictions of mature physical theories) seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that the theory’s structure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world).

I believe I've stayed faithful to this approach in all my replies to you.

I hope you understand why it's relevant. I absolutely believe there is an external world that exists independently of minds. I can't possibly accept idealism unless I drop this belief, and that would require a defeater (not just the mere possibility it is false). — Relativist

Are you then in search for infallible proof. I've none to give ... regarding anything whatsoever.

That's not what it means. A verdical belief is one that is actually true, i.e. it corresponds to an aspect of reality. — Relativist

Yes, I know what it means.

If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true. — Relativist

This is not always the case in real life applications, most especially when it comes to beliefs regarding future facts. If John believes his team will win the game then he might bet accordingly while nevertheless having a great deal of doubt regarding this same belief. Here, a person believes X without necessarily believing X is true. To claim otherwise is to try to force-feed all real life instantiations of belief into a somewhat limited understanding of the term's denotation.

If the protagonist in the movie had hallucinations that he believed were false because his psychiatrists convinced him they were false, then the belief in their falsehood was an undercutting defeater of the (seemingly true) hallucination. — Relativist

The movie was based on real events. And he wasn't convinced by psychiatrists but by inconsistencies in the hallucinatory people he was observing and interacting with (namely, they were not ageing over time as they ought to have).

The point made seems to however not have been grasped: Until inconsistencies appear, no one has reason to believe that what they observe as an aspect of the physical world is in fact a hallucination - say, for example, a cat that one sees running across one's path. Which however does not entail the necessity that the last stray cat one saw was therefore not a hallucination (... hence being a non-veridical experience and belief regarding what is real). The only means we hold for discerning what is and is not veridical is justifications, which tend to not hold when inconsistencies are present.

The question again was "are hallucinations physical?". So if a person hallucinates a stray cat running along their path, is the hallucinated cat physical?

As to perceptions being this and that in the brain, this will include all veridical perceptions just as much as it will include all non-veridical perceptions. So claiming that the hallucinated cat was caused by the brain does not resolve whether or not the hallucinated cat was physical as a hallucination per se.

Constructive Empiricism seems to me to go to far, by denying that science tells us anything about reality. — Relativist

I don't know if it does that. The term 'anti-realist' often gives the impression of someone who denies the reality of science or regards scientific findings as somehow illusory or insubstantial. This isn’t what van Fraassen advocates at all. Instead, he’s deeply committed to the empirical success and practical validity of science but questions whether we should interpret scientific theories as giving us a literal account of an objective, mind-independent reality. At issue is the nature of the fundamental constituents of reality and whether they are physical, as physicalism claims.

Another basic point in this context is the distinction between reality, as the aggregate or sum total of observable phenomena and the objects of scientific analysis, and being, as a description of the existence as experienced by human beings. This is where I think physicalism over-values scientific method, for which physicalism may be an effective heuristic while being descriptively accurate within its scope. But many of the questions of philosophy may not be amendable to scientific analysis. Unless you're a positivist, that doesn't make them meaningless.

we should not accept standard scientific realism, which asserts that the nature of the unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly described by our best theories. — Relativist

which also implies distance from physicalism.

Why would we have these intuitions, if they aren't consistent with reality (i.e. true within the scope of our perceptions). — Relativist

Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles.

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false? — Relativist

There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false.

Special relativity demonstrates that our perceptions of space and time aren't universally true, but it also explains how it is true within the context in which our sensory perceptions apply. — Relativist

Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that. — Relativist

How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth?

Are you then in search for infallible proof. — javra

No.

This is not always the case in real life applications, most especially when it comes to beliefs regarding future facts. If John believes his team will win the game then he might bet accordingly while nevertheless having a great deal of doubt regarding this same belief. — javra

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win. — Relativist

I'm not big on that distinction. For starters, as a falliblist, upon analysis all my beliefs are graded (probabilistic or else comparable) - this even though I will typically address them in the categorical "yes/no" format. Do I believe the sun will rise again tomorrow? My answer is "Yes," this barring the odd improbable occurrence, such as of a large meteorite hitting the Earth before then in a manner that makes the Earth shatter, or some such (this such that I will hold this one graded belief with a probability assignment - say of 99.999% or thereabouts). All this then makes the distinction between categorical beliefs and graded beliefs artificial, to my own ears at least.

All the same, the initial point you made was:

If a person believes X, then he necessarily believes X is true. — Relativist

My point was that this is not always the necessary case. Graded beliefs, when so dichotomized from categorical, being beliefs all the same.

Intuitions are not formed to be consistent with reality. According to evolutionary theory they are shaped by some sort of survival principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "intuitions" in question are relevant to survival. If there is a world external to ourself, it would be necessary to have a functionally accurate view of that world. If there is not such an external world, what would explain this false intuition?

Why think our abstractions about space and time are false?
— Relativist

There is much reason to think that our conceptions of space and time are false, spatial expansion, dark matter, dark energy, quantum weirdness. Anywhere that we run into difficulties understanding what is happening, when applying these abstractions, this is an indication that they are false. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to our primitive (pre-science) abstractions of space and time. As I said, they are valid and true within the context of our direct perceptions.

Well sure, these conceptions are true in the context of our sensory perceptions, that's how we use them, verify them, etc.. But if our sensory perceptions are not providing truth, that's a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's not. Our sensory perceptions aren't oracles that magically know truths beyond what we could possibly perceive. Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time.

I acknowledge that our descriptions (and understandings) are grounded in our perspective, but we have the capacity to correct for that.
— Relativist

How would you propose that we could do that? How do we verify that our sensory perceptions are giving us truth? — Metaphysician Undercover

See my prior comment.

Then he doesn't have a categorical belief that his team will win. Rather, he believes it probable that his team will win.
— Relativist

I'm not big on that distinction. For starters, as a falliblist, upon analysis all my beliefs are graded (probabilistic or else comparable) - this even though I will typically address them in the categorical "yes/no" format. — javra

Sure, but then you have some loose epistemic probability in mind, and a more precise statement of your belief would identify this. So it is not strictly true that the guy believes his team will win. Rather, he believes it more likely than not that they will win, or that it is a near certainty, or some other probabilistic qualification.

If "Joe believes it more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday" then "Joe believes it is true that it is more likely than not that the Columbus Spinsters will win on Saturday". This is the "equivalence theory" in theory of truth.

Further, the error has not prevented science from learning more precise truths- such as a more precise understanding of space and time. — Relativist

I will note here my conviction that time has an inextricably subjective element, which is a specific example of the more general observation in the OP, that perspective is an irreducible element of what we perceive as external reality. There’s an interesting Aeon essay on this point, about Henri Bergson and Albert Einstein’s meeting and debate about the nature of time, n Paris, 1922:

Bergson insisted that duration proper cannot be measured. To measure something – such as volume, length, pressure, weight, speed or temperature – we need to stipulate the unit of measurement in terms of a standard. For example, the standard metre was once stipulated to be the length of a particular 100-centimetre-long platinum bar kept in Paris. It is now defined by an atomic clock measuring the length of a path of light travelling in a vacuum over an extremely short time interval. In both cases, the standard metre is a measurement of length that itself has a length. The standard unit exemplifies the property it measures.

In Time and Free Will, Bergson argued that this procedure would not work for duration. For duration to be measured by a clock, the clock itself must have duration. It must exemplify the property it is supposed to measure. To examine the measurements involved in clock time, Bergson considers an oscillating pendulum, moving back and forth. At each moment, the pendulum occupies a different position in space, like the points on a line or the moving hands on a clockface. In the case of a clock, the current state – the current time – is what we call ‘now’. Each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each moment, each unit, is separate and distinct. But this is not how we experience time. Instead, we hold these separate moments together in our memory. We unify them. A physical clock measures a succession of moments, but only experiencing duration allows us to recognise these seemingly separate moments as a succession. Clocks don’t measure time; we do. This is why Bergson believed that clock time presupposes lived time. — Evan Thompson

Bergson’s critique aligns with Kant in suggesting that time is not merely a succession of isolated moments that can be objectively measured, but a continuous and subjective flow that we actively synthesize through consciousness. This synthesis is what lets us experience time as duration, not just as sequential units. It is our awareness of the duration between points in time that is itself time. There is no time outside that awareness.

By this account, Bergson is challenging Einstein’s emphasis on clock-based measurement, pointing to the irreducibility of subjective experience in understanding time’s nature. Kant’s notion of time as an a priori intuition parallels this because he saw time as essential to organizing our experiences into coherent sequences. It’s not a feature of objects themselves but rather of our way of perceiving them—a precondition that shapes experience.

This highlights how understanding “what exists” inevitably involves interpreting it through something that only a perspective can provide. In both Kant and Bergson’s views, the subjective experience of time is foundational, suggesting that any scientific or philosophical statement about existence must, knowingly or not, rely on this element of lived experience.