At least I recognize that there is a problem, and I'm acting toward resolution. That's a lot better than you, doing nothing, thinking that everything's fine. Eventually I'll find the way out, through my trial and error, while you'd be still sitting there thinking everything's fine, until your dying day.

This definition is based in human experience. You define "exist" as what is not imaginary. So you base the definition in imagination, and say whatever is not imagination, exists. But that's self-refuting, because your definition is itself imaginary, you are imagining something which is not imaginary, i.e. exists, but by that very definition, it cannot exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

It means that we must go beyond experience if we desire to understand the nature of reality. Since many people believe that truth is limited to what can be known from experience (empiricism), but others do not believe this, then it is very important, and not pointless to note this distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

You contradict yourself. You say definitions are based in human experience and then go on to say we must go beyond experience, while saying that something beyond human experience cannot exist. This is hopelessly confused.

By what faculty other than experience could we know anything (apart from what is logically necessary) ?

Eventually I'll find the way out, through my trial and error, while you'd be still sitting there thinking everything's fine, until your dying day. — Metaphysician Undercover

Find your way out of what? Do you mean life? If so, you'll find your way out of that on your dying day. Far better to worry about how to live in the meantime.

You contradict yourself. — Janus

Clearly then, you misunderstand me.

By what faculty other than experience could we know anything (apart from what is logically necessary) ? — Janus

Experience is not a faculty. And, we are born with knowledge, it's known as intuition. This is why you can't understand me, and you think that I contradict myself, you have presuppositions which make no sense. Those nonsense presumptions make it impossible for you to understand some things, rendering some statements in the appearance of contradiction.

Let's recall what this thread is about. Scientific instruments vastly expand the sensory capabilities of humans, but the data they generate are still essentially empirical in nature. The OP is a more about insight into the way the brain or mind interprets experience. It's about the meaning of empirical experience, not its veridicality.

My claim in the OP is that cognitive science validates at least some important aspects of idealist philosophy - that what we perceive as the external world is, in an important sense, mind-dependent, because what we know of it is constantly being assimilated and interpreted by the mind.

And that therefore empiricist philosophy errs when it seeks a so-called 'mind-independent object', as sense objects are, by their very nature, only detectable by the senses (or instruments) and cannot be mind-independent in that way.

Being aware of the way ‘mind constructs world’ is more a matter of self-knowledge and self-awareness - something with which phenomenology and Eastern philosophy (and indeed Greek philosophy) is much more familiar with than science or much of modern philosophy.

Experience is not a faculty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Each of the five senses are perceptual faculties, as well as interoception and proprioception. All together they constitute the faculty of experience, not of particular experiences, but of being able to experience.

So-called intellectual intuition does not give us reliable knowledge, it consists mostly of imagination applied to ideas derived from experience.

You are still just blowing hard, and getting nowhere.

Noodling around on the Internet, I happened upon a book by one Robert Ornstein, who's earlier book on the evolutionary roots of consciousness I bought in the 1990's. (He died in 2018). On Amazon, I find his last book (published posthumously) is called God 4.0:

The book explores how our "everyday" mind works as a device for selecting just a few parts of the outside reality that are important for our survival. We don't experience the world as it is, but as a virtual reality – a small, limited system that evolved to keep us safe and ensure our survival. This system, though essential for getting us safely across a busy street, is insufficient for understanding and solving the challenges of the modern world. But we are also endowed with a quiescent "second network" of cognition that, when activated, can dissolve or break through the barriers of ordinary consciousness. We all experience this activation to some degree, when we suddenly see a solution to a problem or have an intuitive or creative insight – when we connect to a larger whole beyond the self. By combining ancient teachings with modern science, we have a new psychology of spiritual experience – the knowledge to explore how this second network can be developed and stabilized. ...they emphasize the need to reflect on and explicate, both individually and collectively, the functional value of virtues such as generosity, humility and gratitude, and of service. These attitudes and activities shift brain function away from the self and toward an expanded consciousness – an experience of the world's greater interconnectedness and unity and an understanding of one's place in it. — God 4.0 - in the Nature of Higher Consciousness and the Experience called God, Robert Ornstein, Sally M. Ornstein

Which seems thoroughly compatible with the ideas expressed by the O.P.

If all you're saying is that what we experience is mediated by our senses, our bodies and brains, then you are saying nothing controversial.

We can say that because things have their own existences independent of our perceptions, their own existences will not be the just the same as our perceptions and judgements. But you are wont to say that they don't even have their own existences, which makes your position look extremely confused.

If all you're saying is that what we experience is mediated by our senses, our bodies and brains, then you are saying nothing controversial. — Janus

You alternate between saying that it's obvious, and that it's absurd. Wrong on both counts, but then I've noticed your inveterate tendency to regard your own educational limits as binding on the rest of the community here.

This seems a typical obfuscation from you. The evasive slur, when you actually know nothing about my "educational limits" makes you look like a very "poor faith": interlocutor.

Exactly what have I said is both obvious and absurd? Try engaging with others' responses for a change―you might come to understand what they are actually saying.

I engage with plenty of people here thank you. I've been discussing this post and the related The Blind Spot of Science for two years, most of your comments are that you don't see the point of either of them. I will deal with constructive critcism but not uninformed hostility, which is mostly what I get from you. Over and out!

And that therefore empiricist philosophy errs when it seeks a so-called 'mind-independent object', as sense objects are, by their very nature, only detectable by the senses (or instruments) and cannot be mind-independent in that way. — Wayfarer

Thats like taking a picture of something and calling it a "camera-dependent object". I don't know why you keep phrasing it as if the object is dependent on your mind when you should be talking about what you see or perceive. It just makes it much clearer for everyone else to talk about it in that way.

I would say that sure all our perceptions are in the context of the structure of a brain which, in the context of the whole universe of intelligent things, can be very diverse with different levels of capabilities. At the same time, I would say that they are all picking out or extracting information about structure that exists out in the world independently of us. Different brains, different perceptual apparatus give us different purviews, different informational bottlenecks, and affect our ability to extract this information effectively.

Obviously a lot of the time we are wrong about a lot of things; but, I think my point is that there is no kind of mysterious intrinsic barrier between perception and some way the world really is. All of the information we could want, that there is to know about the world, is available to any information processing system that can interact with the rest of the universe in the right way. Unfortunately, we are just naturally extremely limited, even wuth technology. I don't think the notion of some kind of serene, "objective", platonic, God's eye picture is required to have real information about the world. Information is effective; Can I predict what happens next? There is nothing more than that. And if I can't do that, its not due to some mysterious noumeno-phenomenal barrier, but because I don't have all the information I need or there is stuff I haven't seen.

Again you are wrong. I offer reasoned counterpoints and critiques which you apparently cannot deal with so you resort to insult or you just ignore what I've said. I feel no hostility towards you because I have nothing to defend. The hostility seems to be all from your side. I'm not the one delivering personal attacks, I attack only the ideas, not the person.

I simply express what I think, make the criticisms that I think need to be made. You could try actually engaging the counterpoints and critiques for a change. You might actually learn something. Or if you can successfully refute my objections I will concede as much.

I don't see you engaging with anyone on these forums who disagrees with you.

I see you are offering much the same kind of critique as I have. Let's see how @Wayfarer responds.

I don't know why you keep phrasing it as if the object is dependent on your mind when you should be talking about what you see or perceive. — Apustimelogist

You're still missing the point of the critique, which isn’t about denying that there is some kind of reality independent of our particular perceptions (no one here is advocating solipsism), but about the structure of knowledge itself—specifically, that so-called “sense objects” are only ever known as appearances within a framework of consciousness.

The analogy you offered—of calling the photographed object “camera-dependent”—actually illustrates my point rather well, if unintentionally. A photograph is an image produced by the optical and mechanical structure of a camera. No one confuses the photo with the object, but neither is the photo the object “as it is in itself.” It’s the object's appearance as mediated by the particular structure of the apparatus. Likewise, our perception is not of the thing in itself, but of its appearance as structured by our perceptual and cognitive apparatus. A dog won't recognise a photo of itself because it can't smell it.

What you describe as “information about the world” presumes precisely what is at issue: that the world is available to us as it is, rather than as it appears under our particular modes of access. This is the very presupposition that transcendental arguments (like Kant’s, and many idealist successors) call into question. The point is not to deny that there is something that gives rise to experience, but to insist that what we experience is never “raw” reality but always reality as structured by mind.

Your appeal to prediction and effective interaction—“if it works, it's real”—simply substitutes pragmatism for ontology. That's fine if your goal is engineering, which is where I think your actual interests lie. But it's not a rebuttal to the philosophical question: what is the nature of the reality we claim to know? You’ve asserted that “there’s no mysterious barrier between perception and the world”—but that’s not an argument; it's a declaration of faith in the transparency of perception, which is precisely what’s being contested!

Each of the five senses are perceptual faculties, as well as interoception and proprioception. All together they constitute the faculty of experience, not of particular experiences, but of being able to experience. — Janus

As I said, you have presuppositions which make no sense. How do you propose that the senses are united into a single faculty called "experience", or "being able to experience"? Your proposal, that we have a single faculty known as "being able to experience" is nonsense.

But it's not a rebuttal to the philosophical question: what is the nature of the reality we claim to know? — Wayfarer

Your position entails that we cannot know anything at all about reality "in itself" and I agree with that as far as it goes.. So, we are left with what we know of reality as it appears. We don't know with certainty what appearances tell us outside the context of appearances and I've never claimed otherwise. We simply deal with what seems most plausible.

We certainly do have the faculty of being able to experience.

specifically, that so-called “sense objects” are only ever known as appearances — Wayfarer

Pictures taken by the camera.

It’s the object's appearance as mediated by the particular structure of the apparatus. Likewise, our perception is not of the thing in itself, but of its appearance as structured by our perceptual and cognitive apparatus. — Wayfarer

Yes, but so what. If I want to know more about the object, I take more pictures, I use other tools to investigate.

What you describe as “information about the world” presumes precisely what is at issue: that the world is available to us as it is, rather than as it appears under our particular modes of access — Wayfarer

Well you have to explain why the world would not appear to us "as is". When I see a tree, is there not something about the shape of that tree which veridically represents how it is? What would you mean about how the shape of the tree appears to us that is different than how it really is which isn't trivial? Sure, I can't see everything about the tree, I don't know everything. But in what way is the stuff I do see not capturing some enduring structure in reality that is consistent? If different modes of access just means that some perspective can access information that others do not, and vice versa, then to me that is just different organisms capturing actual structures in the world that happen to be distinct. A snake might be able to sense heat or infra-red light, or whatever it is, in a way that I cannot. I might be able to hear in a way that a snake cannot. Nonetheless, we are both picking out information regarding events in the world.

“if it works, it's real” — Wayfarer

Its not necessarily just that as if it were purely pragmatics, but the fact that there is nothing more to knowing about stuff than the observable interactions that they have with us, or in principle could have with us. The idea that there is something out therr that in principle cannot interact with anything or make its presence known is nonsensical, grounds for reasonable disbelief and perhaps not even intelligible. Reality as it really is must be effective, must have consequences. All understanding really does reduce to 'what happens next?' in some sense because thats how brains work, thats how state-of-the-art artificial intelligence works.

it's a declaration of faith in the transparency of perception, which is precisely what’s being contested! — Wayfarer

In what way should I be skeptical?

You are going to be accused of not getting the point, while a coherent explanation of the point will never be forthcoming.

Noodling around on the Internet, I happened upon a book by one Robert Ornstein, who's earlier book on the evolutionary roots of consciousness I bought in the 1990's. (He died in 2018). On Amazon, I find his last book (published posthumously) is called God 4.0:

This passage chimes with me, I have found that there are thresholds or veils in the mind, which blind us to what, what possibilities, are beyond. That it requires a creative means of circumventing, or dissolving these barriers to progress to a broader perspective and recognition of other architecture and possibilities.
I can illustrate this by a description of formal philosophy. It has a rigorous and refined structure which has been developed over a long period. Into which the aspirant is introduced, trained, tested. Taught how to use the architecture, to develop their own architecture, do a PHD. This leaves the aspirant who masters this knowledge a master of critical and analytical thought. But it also results in them finding that in ordinary life these ideas go over the head of their friends and family and in a way they are isolated and have to find other masters of the same art to converse with about these matters.

Now there is another formal architecture of mind out there running parallel to this using a different system. But with different bases, presuppositions, techniques. Which is based more around lifestyle, self realisation, and deconstruction of conditioning. Followed by a rebuilding of mind and being assembled around a spiritual, mystical, or religious architecture. Rigorously developed over millennia, which similarly leaves the student a master of this approach to life and similarly isolated amongst their friends and family.

I would suggest that this is the root of all this sparring and it is incumbent on us to bridge this divide in some way. To circumvent this veil so that we can converse in a more meaningful way.

coherent

Reminds me of that word, “proof”.

You are going to be accused of not getting the point, — Janus

I gave up at:

you have to explain why the world would not appear to us "as is". — Apustimelogist

We certainly do have the faculty of being able to experience. — Janus

Here's the problem. You describe the unity of the five senses as the faculty of experience, defined as "being able to experience". And, you attribute knowledge to this faculty. But the ability for something does not necessitate its actual existence. Therefore your descriptive terms "the faculty of experience" cannot account for, or describe, the actual existence of experience, nor can it account for the actual existence of knowledge.

So you propose an "ability to experience", which supports the ability to sense, but all this amounts to is a meaningless, nonsensical, interaction problem. By your terms, human beings have the capacity to experience. That in no way accounts for the reality of actual experience. I, as a human being have 'the capacity' to do a whole lot of different things, but having 'the capacity' does not account for why I do some and not others. Therefore your proposition makes no sense as a proposal to account for the existence of knowledge. Knowledge is active in the world. It blows very hard, regardless of whether it gets anywhere or not.

So-called intellectual intuition does not give us reliable knowledge, it consists mostly of imagination applied to ideas derived from experience. — Janus

The question was " By what faculty other than experience could we know anything (apart from what is logically necessary) ?". "Intuition" answers that question. It's "reliability" is relative, and context dependent, so your dismissal is just an attempt to avoid the reality that it answers your question, regardless of whether answering your question gets us anywhere or not.

You are simply leading our discussion in a meaningless, nonsensical direction, so that my replies to your questions can be met with "just blowing hard, and getting nowhere".

If you want to get somewhere, then let's go!

Quit limiting the discussion to the ability to do something, and address actually doing something, if you want to get somewhere. Obviously though, you don't want to get anywhere, because that would require breaking free from your nonsensical presuppositions, which produce an interaction problem.

I'm sorry I have been unable to pester you for the last few days. But I have been thinking about our discussion a lot. I hope you are willing to take it up again.

_____________________

Of course! That's what the whole thread is about. (Maybe I should have called it 'Mind-Constructed World'). It's about how cognitive science validates philosophical idealism. The realisation that what we think is the external world, is constructed, ("synthesised" to use Kant's terminology) by the magnificent hominid forebrain. .... It arises as a result of the interaction between mind and world. — Wayfarer

I would have put some of the detail slightly differently, but broadly I agree with that. It seems to me incontestable.

No one confuses the photo with the object, but neither is the photo the object “as it is in itself.” — Wayfarer

It's not an hallucination or an illusion, but it does not possess the inherent reality that we accord to it. — Wayfarer

But could you explain to me what you mean, exactly, by the bolded phrases?

When I see a tree, is there not something about the shape of that tree which veridically represents how it is? — Apustimelogist

I realize that's standard way of putting it and I would love to agree with you. But the problem is that a representation implies an original. So to know that a given representation represents the original, we have to examine the original and compare it to the representation. Which we cannot do.

Well you have to explain why the world would not appear to us "as is". — Apustimelogist

Do you really want me to trot out the bent stick, mirages and Macbeth's dagger, or perhaps quantum mechanics and relativity?

All understanding really does reduce to 'what happens next?' in some sense — Apustimelogist

I agree that "what happens next?" is important. Whether that's the whole story is another question. Could you explain what you mean by "reduce to" and "in some sense"?

Followed by a rebuilding of mind and being assembled around a spiritual, mystical, or religious architecture. Rigorously developed over millennia, which similarly leaves the student a master of this approach to life and similarly isolated amongst their friends and family. — Punshhh

I had never put things together in that way. Fascinating. You could be right that there must be common ground. At least they agree in rejecting common sense. But it isn't obvious to me that the two approaches are compatible. Have you found that it is?

No one confuses the photo with the object, but neither is the photo the object “as it is in itself.”
— Wayfarer

It's not an hallucination or an illusion, but it does not possess the inherent reality that we accord to it.
— Wayfarer

But could you explain to me what you mean, exactly, by the bolded phrases? — Ludwig V

Certainly—I'll try to explain.

The idea is that a photograph presents the appearance of an object as mediated by the camera’s optical and technical structure. It’s not the object itself, but an image of the object—structured by the mechanics and limitations of the device. In this conversation, the photograph was being used as a metaphor for perception itself. Just as a photograph is a camera-dependent image, so our perception of the world is mind-dependent, shaped by the structure of our perceptual and cognitive apparatus.

This is one of the central themes in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. He distinguishes between the appearance of things—how they present themselves to us—and the thing in itself (das Ding an sich), which is how things are independently of how they appear. Now, this idea has been the subject of extensive debate, and there are many interpretations. But one sympathetic reading is to see the “thing in itself” as a philosophical placeholder: it marks the limit of our possible knowledge. It also preserves a sense of mystery that no amount of empirical or conceptual inquiry can dissolve—the mystery of what reality is in itself, outside of its appearance to us. In this way, Kant's philosophy continues the classical distinction between appearance (what seems) and reality (what is).

If you look again at the original post, this ties in with the quote from Charles Pinter’s Mind and the Cosmic Order, where he describes how the gestalts or objects we perceive are not merely “given” but are assembled through the interplay between sense data and cognitive interpretation. The kind of world we experience depends on the kinds of senses we have—and, in our case, also on the concepts and structures we use to interpret them. This doesn’t mean the world is illusory. But it also doesn’t mean it exists independently of the properties and meanings our minds contribute to it. That’s what I meant by saying it lacks the "inherent reality we accord to it." The reality we perceive is not free-standing in the way objectivist realism assumes; it is co-constituted by the perceiving mind.

Here’s another way to put it: try to imagine the Universe as it would be if there were no living beings anywhere in it. You can’t—not really. Whatever you imagine is still ordered by a perspective. What you’re visualizing is a Universe as if there were no observers—but the very act of visualizing already imposes a kind of structure, a standpoint. That unknowable, perspective-less universe is what I refer to as the “in itself.” And as mind evolves within that background, the Universe begins to ‘take form’—not merely physically, but in terms of meaning, appearance, and coherence. There's a sense in which we are the universe coming to know itself (an idea which is by no means original to me.)

I realize that's standard way of putting it and I would love to agree with you. But the problem is that a representation implies an original. So to know that a given representation represents the original, we have to examine the original and compare it to the representation. Which we cannot do. — Ludwig V

Well, we don't necessarily need representation in that kind of way. All that we do is predict what happens next. All that we have to be able to do is know how to navigate. If something unexpected happens, the structure of my navigational "map" was wrong. Clearly, the shape of trees represents part of our navigational maps that is quite consistent and enduring. I don't understand in what sense this could not be veridical. It becomes very apparent usually when that fails. I don't need to know everything about trees or everything at exact precision. But I have a pretty good understanding of tree shape, leaf shape that seens consistent.

Do you really want me to trot out the bent stick, mirages and Macbeth's dagger, or perhaps quantum mechanics and relativity? — Ludwig V

I've already said we can be wrong, but when we are wrong, its usually intelligible why we are wrong in terms of not having the right information. In principle one can understand ehy information processing in the brain produces illusions regarding things in the world we understand well physically. My view of quantum mechanics is realistic. I don't think relativity really has the same problems as the alleged difficulties in quantum theory.

I agree that "what happens next?" is important. Whether that's the whole story is another question. Could you explain what you mean by "reduce to" and "in some sense"? — Ludwig V

I believe it is because thats all that neurons do, thats all that state-of-the-art A.I does. Obviously what I am saying must be some kind of simplification but I think it fundamentally characterizes intelligence, to make distinctions and recognize things.

This is all cogent and helpful, very clearly written. Just one thing:

The kind of world we experience depends on the kinds of senses we have—and, in our case, also on the concepts and structures we use to interpret them. This doesn’t mean the world is illusory. But it also doesn’t mean it exists independently of the properties and meanings our minds contribute to it — Wayfarer

To me, this muddles the idea of "world" a bit. As you say, a world without perceivers, a world of noumena, is a kind of "placeholder world," granted as necessary but by definition unknowable in itself. The world we experience -- let's call it our world -- is not illusory, but nor is it the world of noumena. But when you say, "[the world] doesn't exist independently of the properties and meanings our minds contribute to it," you're talking about our world. The noumenal world does exist independently. So, if I may:

"This doesn’t mean that our world is illusory. But it doesn’t exist independently of the properties and meanings our minds contribute to it; that sort of world, the noumenal world, does have such an independent existence."

I only bother with this because otherwise is tempting to read the position as saying that there is no independent reality, which I don't think is what you mean. "What reality is in itself" may be a mystery, as you say, but it is not an empty phrase. We can't jump from the inevitable fact that our world is co-constituted, to the conclusion that our world is all there is. But you know this.

The noumenal world does exist independently — J

But 'exist' is precisely the wrong word! 'To exist' is to be apart, to be separated, to be this as distinct from that. Which is why I say in the original post that the in-itself neither exists nor does not exist (if existence is the wrong description, then non-existence is the negation of something which doesn't apply.) So to think of 'the noumenal' or the 'in-itself' is already to designate it as an intentional object, a 'this here' or 'that there'. Hence the 'way of negation', neti neti or wu wei.

OK, I'd forgotten the context of the OP.

It's against my religion to dispute about how to use the term "exist". :wink: I'll just point out that if the world neither exists nor does not exist, then to say "our perception of the world is mind-dependent" is a bit of a puzzler. How can I perceive something that transcends the category of existence? It's hard enough to perceive things that don't exist! Unless -- as I was trying to suggest -- "the world" and "the in-itself" are not the same. This was the distinction I was drawing between "our world" and "the world of noumena."

How can I perceive something that transcends the category of existence? It's hard enough to perceive things that don't exist! Unless -- as I was trying to suggest -- "the world" and "the in-itself" are not the same. This was the distinction I was drawing between "our world" and "the world of noumena." — J

If there are things in themselves (noumena) which appear to us as phenomena, then we do perceive things in themselves, but we do not perceive them as things in themselves (and this is so by mere definition). It there are noumena then by any ordinary definition of 'existence' they can be said to exist.

@Wayfarer wants to insist that his own idiosyncratic definition of 'existence' is the correct one, which is absurd given that the meanings of terms are determined by (predominant) use.

It's against my religion to dispute about how to use the term "exist" — J

If possession is nine-tenths of the law, then defining existence is nine-tenths of philosophy.

You’re right that if the world “neither exists nor does not exist” in the ordinary sense, it can’t be perceived as an object in the way phenomena are. That’s the point: the “in-itself” isn’t something to be retreived from beyond appearances. As an old Buddhist adage puts it, the “end of the cosmos” isn’t reached by travelling somewhere, but is found “within this fathom-long body, with its perception and intellect,” where the arising and ceasing of the cosmos can be known. World and perceiver arise together in the same field of lived experience — which is exactly what “co-arising” means in phenomenology and enactivism.

But I also believe this is broadly compatible with the phenomenal-noumenal distinction. The problems arise when we try to 'peek behind the curtain' to see what the in-itself really is. That is what the 'way of negation' that is found in various forms of apophatic practice is intended to ameliorate.

All that we do is predict what happens next. All that we have to be able to do is know how to navigate. — Apustimelogist

This is not really the case. In most instances the goal is to create what happens next, i.e. we want to shape the future, not predict it. The ability to predict is just a means to that further end.

The noumenal world does exist independently. — J

This is exactly the wrong attitude. By giving the name "world" to the noumenal, you imply that what exists independently is in some way similar to our conception of "the world".

There is no need to assume that what exists independently is in anyway at all, similar to how we represent it. For example, the word "world" is in no way similar to the concept we have of the world, yet in some way, that word signifies that concept. Likewise, our conception of the world might be in no way similar to the independent reality, yet it could still in some way signify it. There is no reason to believe that the signifier is in any way similar to the thing represented by it. This means that if the concept "world" represents an independent reality, there is no reason to believe that the independent reality is similar to that concept which signifies it.

Wayfarer wants to insist that his own idiosyncratic definition of 'existence' is the correct one, which is absurd given that the meanings of terms are determined by (predominant) use. — Janus

Hmm, seems like the same accusation was leveled against me. That indicates that the person making the accusation is really the one with the idiosyncratic definition.