I'm not sure I follow why science must look outside its own domain. Science is self-contained for the inquiry about which it is concerned. There are other disciplines outside science where knowledge can potentially be gained (e.g., history), but this doesn't mean science needs to be instructed by these disciplines to be coherent. If science meets with an absurdity, it either aims to resolve the absurdity with science or leaves the problem scientifically unanswered and outside its domain.

This is most clearly false. Some matters are logical or philosophical absurdities, and hence should not be employed by science as preferable models. Instead, a criteria for choosing scientific theories and models for given empirical data should also be logical and philosophical consistency. As such, for example, Big Bang is nonsense.

Is the Big Bang nonsense or is the interpretation of the Big Bang you've imported to the scientific understanding of the Big Bang nonsense? As far as I know, scientists are very comfortable with saying our knowledge of the cosmological genesis of the universe is limited to fractions of a second after some massive event. The inference of a Big Bang is useful for explanatory purposes, but ultimately outside the domain of science, for now.

Is the Big Bang nonsense or is the interpretation of the Big Bang you've imported to the scientific understanding of the Big Bang nonsense? As far as I know, scientists are very comfortable with saying our knowledge of the cosmological genesis of the universe is limited to fractions of a second after some massive event. The inference of a Big Bang is useful for explanatory purposes, but ultimately outside the domain of science, for now. — Soylent

No, but I'm saying the Big Bang should a priori be excluded as a model. It is absurd to say that existence itself has a beginning.

I don't follow, if there is empirical evidence of an event that resembles what we call the Big Bang, leaving aside the "existence itself has a beginning" part you've tagged onto it, why should we a priori reject that model?

I don't follow, if there is empirical evidence of an event that resembles what we call the Big Bang, leaving aside the "existence itself has a beginning" part you've tagged onto it, why should we a priori reject that model? — Soylent

No you should only reject models which imply that existence itself has a beginning. As far as I am aware, the Big Bang model as traditionally understood does imply a beginning to the Universe, which is traditionally thought to be the equivalent of all that exists.

which is traditionally thought to be the equivalent of all that exists. — Agustino

A better way to phrase it would be, which is scientifically thought to be the equivalent of all that exists. Which is only to say, the Universe is the limit to our scientific observation. We cannot comment about existence outside our Universe with science because it is currently not accessible to observation or empirical measurement so is outside the domain of science. Other traditions might have their own interpretations of the Big Bang and what we can say beyond our Universe, but we should be concerned with and only with the scientific view here.

A better way to phrase it would be, which is scientifically thought to be the equivalent of all that exists. Which is only to say, the Universe is the limit to our scientific observation. We cannot comment about existence outside our Universe with science because it is currently not accessible to observation or empirical measurement so is outside the domain of science. Other traditions might have their own interpretations of the Big Bang and what we can say beyond our Universe, but we should be concerned with and only with the scientific view here. — Soylent

Good - then it follows that the scientist should not believe that the limits of scientific observation is equivalent with the limits of the world. In other words, a priori and metaphysical investigation can reveal something more from the structure of the world.

Good - then it follows that the scientist should not believe that the limits of scientific observation is equivalent with the limits of the world. — Agustino

This doesn't follow at all. It introduces a term not mentioned previously, in particular I'm not sure where the normative declaration "should" is coming from.

I agree with you that philosophical questions are in an important sense prior to scientific ones, insofar as they're concerned with a different sense of 'why'. Science, generally, is concerned with what in traditional philosophy would be categorised as material or efficient causes, whereas philosophy also considers the broader sense of 'why' implicit in the consideration of formal or final causes.

It is true that the question of whether the universe has a beginning is philosophically problematic, indeed still a subject of debate:

The big bang may not have been the beginning of everything – but new calculations suggest we still need a cosmic starter gun YOU could call them the worst birthday presents ever. At themeeting of minds convened last week to honour Stephen Hawking's 70th birthday- loftily titled "State of the Universe" - two bold proposals posed serious threats to our existing understanding of the cosmos. One shows that a problematic object called a naked singularity is a lot more likely to exist than previously assumed (see " Naked black-hole hearts live in the fifth dimension"). The other suggests thatthe universe is not eternal, resurrecting the thorny question of how to kick-start the cosmos without thehand of a supernatural creator. While many of us may be OK with the idea of the big bang simply starting everything, physicists,including Hawking, tend to shy away from cosmic genesis. "A point of creation would be a place wherescience broke down. One would have to appeal to religion and the hand of God."

New Scientist Why Physics Can't Avoid a Creation Event.
11 January 2012, Lisa Grossman

So it's interesting that Hawkings will shy away from theories which imply a beginning, in much the same way that science generally shys away from suggestions of cosmological 'fine-tuning': uncomfortably close to natural theology. SO the question is, will scientists even give such ideas a fair hearing? Or will they refuse to contemplate them as a matter of principle? And, would such refusal be scientific?

SO the question is, will scientists even give such ideas a fair hearing? Or will they refuse to contemplate them as a matter of principle? And, would such refusal be scientific? — Wayfarer

I think the problem is that they are giving such ideas a more than fair hearing. In my opinion, the Big Bang should be a priori ruled out. A beginning of existence makes absolutely no sense, and is just as irrational as the existence of square circles.

1. I'm always open to the possibility that there's a lot about this stuff that I don't get.

2. The story of how the Big Bang theory was published and gained acceptance is worth reading in it's own right. It was the work of a Belgian Catholic priest and physicist, Georges Lemaître, who published his theory in an obscure journal, in which he referred to the concept as 'the primeval atom' or 'cosmic egg'. And, as it happens, the notion of a 'cosmic egg' or 'bindu' (point) is also a creation mythology that is found in the Vedic religions (indeed the point between the brows of pious hindus is called a bindu.)

I have always found the big bang idea quite a mystical notion. The idea that the vast Universe could sping into existence from a single point in a single instant, seems awfully close in meaning to creation ex nihilo. So much so, that the idea was vigorously resisted by many scientists on a priori grounds for decades after it was published. And indeed the Catholic Church declared the Big Bang theory quite compatible with its own doctrines:

By 1951, Pope Pius XII declared that Lemaître's theory provided a scientific validation for Catholicism. However, Lemaître resented the Pope's proclamation, stating that the theory was neutral and there was neither a connection nor a contradiction between his religion and his theory. When Lemaître and Daniel O'Connell, the Pope's science advisor, tried to persuade the Pope not to mention Creationism publicly anymore, the Pope agreed. He persuaded the Pope to stop making proclamations about cosmology. While a devout Roman Catholic, he was against mixing science with religion, though he also was of the opinion that these two fields of human experience were not in conflict

Admirable stance, in my view.

3. I notice there are suggestions that the Big Bang was really a Big Bang - that it might actually have been one of a sequence of such 'events'. I must say, from the viewpoint of 'natural philosophy', that would appeal to me, not least because like everything else in nature, it is cyclical. Again, the myth that this most resembles is that of the 'eternal return', as explicated by Mircea Eliade in his book of that name.

But as I say, I'm always open to the possibility that there's a lot about this stuff that I don't get. The ideas involved are mind-boggling and need to be handled with some diffidence, I would suggest.

It seems obvious to me that science should be informed by ethics; that is, it should be practiced ethically. Beyond that, science and philosophy are quite separate disciplines. I find the idea that the Big Bang Theory should be rejected on a priori grounds to be ridiculous in the extreme.

"A point of creation would be a place where science broke down. One would have to appeal to religion and the hand of God."

This is pure nonsense. The limits of science can be freely admitted without having to appeal to superstition to fill a supposed void.

'One reason for the initial resistance to the Big Bang theory was that, unlike the rival Steady State theory, it proposed that the Universe had a beginning - a proposition that had unwelcome religious implications'. The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, p 9

The notion of science as distinct from philosophy hails from around the 1830's - according to Walter Isaacson's recent history of technology, The Innovators, the term 'scientist' was coined to describe the learned company that gathered in the salon of Charles Babbage, the forefather of the computer, to discuss the latest ideas. Prior to this time - in the writings of Newton for example - what we now call 'science' was routinely described as 'philosophy'. I think the perceived division between the two, was very much a consequence of movements such as positivism, and also the 'essential conflict between science and religion thesis' of scientists such as Tyndall.

I find the idea that the Big Bang Theory should be rejected on a priori grounds to be ridiculous in the extreme. — John

Please explain to me how the idea of a beginning to existence is any bit less absurd than the idea of square circles. Because by the "Big Bang", I am referring to whatever theory claims a beginning to existence. If existence had a beginning, it follows that it must have a reason why it began when it began and not sooner or later. But such a reason is incoherent. Therefore existence could not have a beginning. Neither could chronological time go infinitely back, because if it did, we would never get to the present. Therefore existence must be eternal, and cyclical.

But isn't the idea of 'a beginning' analogous to the question 'what came before the BB? To which the answer was, there was no 'before'. The notion of 'before' implies a temporal sequence, and so there was no 'before' because time itself originated here. Same with 'beginning' - the very idea of 'beginning' implies a time prior to the commencement of the event in question. But time itself began from this point - there was no 'before', no 'prior to', no time in which anything could have happened, or space to locate it. It is literally inconceivable.

I do understand from my sketchy amateur physics, that physicists can 'see' back until this minute fraction of a second after the 'singularity'. (All the facts about this kind of research are mind-boggling, mind you, for instance the divisions of time they're discussing are in the trillonths of seconds.) There is a vast amount of observational evidence for this event, but even so, there is an absolute barrier which prevents any kind of analysis of 'moment zero'. It is literally beyond science, possibly forever. (Any physicist here please correct me if I'm mistaken.)

I don't believe that we can prescribe what must be so based on our intuitive notions of time. Certainly it makes sense to say that every experience must have a beginning, and as Kant pointed out the idea of an actual beginningless series of events is no less antinomous than the idea of an absolute beginning to all events.

But isn't the idea of 'a beginning' analogous to the question 'what came before the BB? To which the answer was, there was no 'before'. The notion of 'before' implies a temporal sequence, and so there was no 'before' because time itself originated here. Same with 'beginning' - the very idea of 'beginning' implies a time prior to the commencement of the event in question. But time itself began from this point - there was no 'before', no 'prior to', no time in which anything could have happened, or space to locate it. It is literally inconceivable. — Wayfarer

Hence the difference between chronological time (which philosophers talk about) and physical time (which physicists claim began to exist at the Big Bang)

"Chronological time" is nothing more than an idea.

rather, a condition for the establishment of any idea (pace Kant.)

No, that would be phenomenological or lived time.

Agustino, I'm going to copy-paste what I wrote the other night on a different philosophy forum over on Reddit regarding the relationship between science and philosophy:

This might be an unpopular opinion, and if you disagree I would love to hear your arguments. But honestly, many philosophers need to stop being so obsequious to scientists. I don't think scientists need philosophers to get by. I love philosophy as much as anyone else here, but I can't help but cringe when philosophers feel the need to justify their field or force it into a field. (Ornithologist-bird analogy). Scientists aren't worried about those questions.
People who say philosophy is worthless are philistines. Philosophy is great in coming up with interesting questions, but bad at answering them, which isn't a stab at philosophy, it's just the nature of the questions (as far as we know). They are outside the realm of empirical observation. But it needs to keep up to date with contemporary science, in case science happens to burst into the bubble of philosophy unexpectedly. But contemporary science doesn't necessary have to keep up with philosophy because science will keep plugging and chugging regardless.
The scientific method is a well-established method of obtaining data even if the operator is incompetent in analyzing it. But philosophy requires someone to have the cognitive capabilities to be able to analyze data like that and make interesting conclusions about it. And possibly this is a counterargument to my argument, that fields like theoretical physics rely on data to make theories, just like...philosophy?
But sometimes I often wonder if one day much of philosophy will become irrelevant, or a product of the past, kicked in the dust by the verifiable and reliable scientific method, which seems to be what is happening here.

(EDIT:)

I think philosophy has the potential to be applied, but I'm not sure if it has the potential to find "truth" (which is a metaphilosophical question itself). Can any system of inquiry find "truth", other than the Heideggerian way of knowing "how" to do something, like a blacksmith knows how to melt steel? But anyway, back to the point, political and ethical philosophy are definitely some examples of how philosophy has been applied. Just look at the Cold War, an ideological conflict. But in these cases, these people don't know that they are right, they just are very self-assured that they are right and feel concerns around them motivating them to act upon this assurance.
This is the problem with consulting someone who is an expert in philosophy, other than being able to explain the subject: there is no consensus on things.
Now, both a scientific and a philosophical theory have a potential to be disproven, the former by evidence and the latter by rational argument (or evidence as well I suppose). The issue is that in science, the data is collected, evidence presented, theories stacked against each other until we come to a consensus. This may take decades. But it happens. Often. With great success. You can go to Biologist A for an explanation of Darwinian Evolution and you will get the same explanation if you go to Biologist B.
But in philosophy, like I described above, there is no "philosophical method" that everybody follows and will get the same results. Theories abound and nobody ever seems to come together to a consensus. So how on earth can someone go to a philosopher for advice? Going to Philosopher A for an explanation for the problem of universals in metaphysics will give you one of many realist explanations, while going to Philosopher B will give you one of many nominalist explanations.
I can't understand how philosophers say they are needed in the process of science when science requires consensus on matters that philosophers cannot decide upon. This isn't a jab at philosophers or philosophy itself, but merely shows the limitations of the field.
I honestly think philosophers should not go into research wondering how it can be applied to the real world; to do this is the limit the scope of the field and make it philistine. I think philosophy should be something that is pursued for the sake of our own curiosity, not because it can yield results. But sometimes I find this answer to be lacking. :\

(EDIT 2):

I think I might have committed a self-defeating argument here, because theoretically if everyone agrees with me in my argument above, then technically philosophy has progressed. whoops. Maybe it's just very, very rare for it to progress.

, credit goes to you for the inspiration for the term "philistine".

3,000 cheers.

:)

↪Bitter Crank, credit goes to you for the inspiration for the term "philistine". — darthbarracuda

I have a super computer working on whether that was a compliment or an insult. No results yet.

Most definitely a compliment. You used it in a previous thread. Perfect word to describe the scientism of today.

Db, I think it must be admitted that there will always be aspects of human behavior which cannot be understood in scientistically reductive terms. This is because human decisions, desires, actions and so on are only intelligible to us in culturally and linguistically mediated terms that cannot be translated into physical terms. As I said in the other thread this is just another example of how, in general, 'higher level' subjects like geology, biology, animal behavior and so on cannot be reduced to 'lower level' descriptions without loss of information. There is no mystery in this; it does not point us to anything supernatural. The supernatural is itself unintelligible on every level, and so is philosophically useless.

(Not saying that you are promoting the supernatural, of course, this is merely to defuse what I see as a common polemic against the naturalism of science, and against, of course, supposedly science-instigated philosophical naturalism. For me, the dichotomy 'human/natural', and the attendant dichotomy 'higher/ lower' are aberrant (and abhorrent) philosophical malformations).

(don't mention the [culture] war'....)

I can see this is an apposite time for one of my favourite quotes, namely, the passage by Thomas Nagel, in his essay Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, where he says:

IN SPEAKING OF THE FEAR OF RELIGION, I don't mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper—namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn't just that I don't believe in God and, naturally, hope that I'm right in my belief. It's that I hope there is no God! I don't want there to be a God; I don't want the universe to be like that.

My guess is that this cosmic authority problem is not a rare condition and that it is responsible for much of the scientism and reductionism of our time. One of the tendencies it supports is the ludicrous overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life, including everything about the human mind. Darwin enabled modern secular culture to heave a great collective sigh of relief, by apparently providing a way to eliminate purpose, meaning, and design as fundamental features of the world.

No, that would be phenomenological or lived time. — John

Which is exactly what I am referring to by chronological time.

But isn't the idea of 'a beginning' analogous to the question 'what came before the BB? To which the answer was, there was no 'before'. The notion of 'before' implies a temporal sequence, and so there was no 'before' because time itself originated here. Same with 'beginning' - the very idea of 'beginning' implies a time prior to the commencement of the event in question. But time itself began from this point - there was no 'before', no 'prior to', no time in which anything could have happened, or space to locate it. It is literally inconceivable. — Wayfarer

This only applies to physical time. Don't forget that for physicists time is that which you can measure by a clock; in this case an atomic clock. If you can't measure it, there's no time for them.