• Arkady
    768
    Al, Bob, and Charles work in a bank. Some money goes missing one day. Al knows that Bob has a history of petty theft, for which he has been convicted multiple times. Bob also has served a light prison sentence for petty theft, and was fired from a previous job for stealing from a cash register. Al further knows that recidivism rates among offenders is rather high: that is, they are likely to commit the same crime over and over.

    On the other hand, Al knows that Charles has an impeccable moral track record, and has never stolen a thing in his life, and has always been upstanding and honest (we will set aside how he could come by such information; let us just assume that he has it on good authority).

    Al forms a belief that Bob stole the money. This belief is arguably justified, given his body of knowledge concerning Bob. Later, an investigation finds the missing money (identified by serial number) at Bob's house, there is surveillance footage from the bank of Bob taking the money, and a tipster reports that Bob was in the local bar, bragging about his theft.

    It has now been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Bob was the thief. So, when he initially formulated his belief about Bob's having taken the money, Al held a justified true belief. Did he know that Bob took the money?
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.9k
    I don't think you need most of paragraph 3 of you're just trying to build a Gettier case. You just need "Bob in fact stole the money."

    Your case seems to turn on whether Al's belief was really justified, whereas Gettier cases usually try to make this airtight. This may be case of epistemic luck, but it feels more like, "I'll bet it was him" than the Gettier type.
  • Janus
    16.2k


    It depends on what you mean by 'know'. Does anybody ever really know anything in the empirical sphere (in the sense that it is absolutely impossible that they could be wrong)?

    If knowledge is defined as JTB, then anything we believe for the right reasons and which really is true (despite the fact that we could never know that it really is true with absolute certainty) is knowledge. If that is so, then we might know many things, but never truly know that we know them.
  • Chany
    352
    No. The entire point behind Gettier cases is to show situations in which someone meets the three conditions for the JTB theory of knowledge, yet it appears that they do not possess knowledge. Gettier was not just talking about skepticism and luck- he was saying that our entire understanding of what knowledge is is incorrect.

    In the above example, Al was not really epistemologically justified in believing Bob committed the crime. He may be justified in believing that Bob was the more likely culprit, but he should have suspended judgement until further information was gathered. Before the police report, Al was unjustified, so his belief was lucky, but in the average JTB sense, not in the Gettier sense.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.9k
    You're close, @Arkady, if readers will tend to have an intuition that this doesn't count as knowledge, but they'll think that because they'll feel the belief isn't really justified.
  • Arkady
    768
    In the above example, Al was not really epistemologically justified in believing Bob committed the crime. He may be justified in believing that Bob was the more likely culprit, but he should have suspended judgement until further information was gathered. Before the police report, Al was unjustified, so his belief was lucky, but in the average JTB sense, not in the Gettier sense.Chany
    I think this is the crux of the matter, and is debatable. (Is there a difference between epistemological justification and justification simpliciter?)

    If JTB suffices for knowledge, does the theory need to stipulate how much justification is required before a true belief can so qualify? I would argue that Al possessed at least some justification in believing that Bob was the thief, even if his justification was weak (perhaps we can strengthen his justification by adding that there is evidence that the theft was an inside job).
  • Arkady
    768
    It depends on what you mean by 'know'. Does anybody ever really know anything in the empirical sphere (in the sense that it is absolutely impossible that they could be wrong)?John
    I think there are some assumptions in your statement which need to be examined. Most theories of knowledge do not require certainty to qualify (if only for the reason that we could hardly be said to "know" anything, when it seems apparent that we know a great deal).

    After all, even the most homely truths (e.g. I have 2 hands, I live on planet Earth, etc) are vulnerable to defeat at least in principle (even if only due to being a BIV, a victim of a Cartesian demon, or various other skeptical scenarios).
  • Arkady
    768
    I don't think you need most of paragraph 3 of you're just trying to build a Gettier case. You just need "Bob in fact stole the money."Srap Tasmaner
    Yea, I agree that that was a bit wordy, but I wanted to forestall any questions as to how one knows that Bob did in fact take the money. But yes, from our "God's eye view," we could just take it as given.

    Your case seems to turn on whether Al's belief was really justified, whereas Gettier cases usually try to make this airtight. This may be case of epistemic luck, but it feels more like, "I'll bet it was him" than the Gettier type.
    I agree: the point of the post was to ask whether this was in fact a Gettier case, not to examine Gettier cases in general. So it does turn on whether Al was justified in believing Bob was the thief. I am inclined to believe that (1) Al did possess at least some justification (even if weak), but (2) Al did not know that Bob was the thief at the time he initially formed the belief. Obviously, (1) and (2) are not mutually consistent given a JTB conception of knowledge, so something has to give.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.9k

    Gettier cases always feel to me like magic tricks or confidence games. You're elaborately given the opportunity to verify things that don't matter, and then forced to draw conclusions you know you shouldn't. Meanwhile there's all sorts of crap going on behind the scenes.
  • Janus
    16.2k


    Yes, although I wasn't referring to that kind of "hinge proposition" knowledge. I was concerned more with so-called empirical knowledge; specifically what is taken to be knowledge about what has happened. If I remember taking the money, then I could rightly be said to know that I took the money (assuming that my memory is not at fault). If I saw Bill take the money then the same applies; in those cases I may be justified in assuming that I have JTB, and I do have JTB if the events I recall actually occurred.

    You could say that even if events did not occur as I remember them, I am still justified in believing that they did, on account of the fact that I have no good reason to doubt my power of memory. If I took the money, but the circumstances were not as I remember them at all, then I have true belief, and I could be said to be either justified or unjustified in that belief, depending on how you define justification.

    If I didn't see Bill take the money, then I am not justified in believing that he took it, under either of the possible definitions I alluded to above, because I have no evidence that he took it.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    4.9k
    I am inclined to believe that (1) Al did possess at least some justification (even if weak)Arkady

    The word "justification" is unfortunate, because in ordinary usage it admits of degrees, the same way you might talk about having a lot or a little evidence. In the JTB theory it's supposed to be binary, I think.
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