It might be helpful if you substantiate your notion of "obligation". I'm not aware of any normative account where moral imperatives are literally obligatory. If so there would be no moral questions, people would simply act as morality dictates.
Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost. — hypericin
b) (as suggested by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept ofobligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and rewardcategorical imperatives is vacuous, and — Michael
Then perhaps you could explain what obligations "truly" are. — Michael
Perhaps the answer is that moral language is complex and cannot be adequately explained by a single metaethics. — Michael
I would say that in the realm of speculative reason there is the law of non-contradiction, which no one directly denies, but which they do indirectly deny. Are we obliged to obey the law of non-contradiction? Yes, I think so... — Leontiskos
Do you think it is a moral failure for people to have inconsistent beliefs? — wonderer1
I have rewritten the OP to reflect the developing changes in my moral subjectivist view as I have conversed with many people on this forum: the original OP is at the button titled ‘Original OP’ for archive purposes. The purpose of the revamped edition is to provide a full defense of moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross
I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory [...] If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. — Leontiskos
I think that is a fine description of moral obligation. — hypericin
In the sense of obligation you described, how does moral subjectivism fail to provide "true obligations", where moral subjectivism is defined as "moral values and judgements are personal, but are deeply informed by both enculturation (moral training) and moral instincts (empathy and a sense of justice/fairness)." — hypericin
If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then [...] If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then [...] — Leontiskos
Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost.
Also, I'll note that anti-realist theories seldom if ever intend to be normative. — hypericin
You say that a subjective conscience morality is normative, but that anti-realist theories (including subjectivism) seldom if ever intend to be normative. Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative? — Leontiskos
No. I would say not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does. — hypericin
Yes, people often do listen to their conscience. Conscience is just how one's moral sensibility expresses itself to ourselves. "Listening to one's conscience" means acting according to our moral sensibility. — hypericin
But do you see how you are toeing the line between normativity and non-normativity, which I have complained about several times throughout this thread? — Leontiskos
Should we act according to our moral sensibility or not? Should we listen to our conscience or not? — Leontiskos
These are your questions, not mine. I think we probably should, but that is not the focus here. — hypericin
Are there moral facts, and if so are they objective? I believe there are, and that they are subjective. You believe they are objective. The goal is a description of what these purported "moral facts" are, and how they operate. "Moral facts" involve "should", "ought", so in that sense they are the focus. But the idea is to describe, not prescribe. — hypericin
I think we probably should [listen to our conscience]... — hypericin
To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting. It doesn't matter whether we "think," "suggest," "opine," "suppose," "admonish," "argue," "force," et al. In each case the judgment of action is occurring (moral judgment). Tentative judgments are still judgments. Abductive judgments are still judgments (judgments to the best possibility, or judgments from significantly limited information). Judgments which are open to correction or revision are still judgments.
The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude. — Leontiskos
Yes, people often do listen to their conscience. Conscience is just how one's moral sensibility expresses itself to ourselves. "Listening to one's conscience" means acting according to our moral sensibility. — hypericin
Yet one cannot wait until our ethical considerations are all settled and our morality derived from a foundation of certainty before one acts; That you choose not to eat babies - to return to your example - shows that you act ethically, and this despite not having the firm foundation you crave.
Well, if we define morality according to justice, as the realm of interpersonal 'oughts', then A3 is a moral truth. — Leontiskos
Do you think it is a moral failure for people to have inconsistent beliefs?
— wonderer1
"Things which we know (or believe) to be bad or evil are things that we know we oughtn't do." We know it is bad or evil to simultaneously hold contradictory propositions, and therefore we know we ought not do so. Whether one wants to call this a moral failure will depend on their definition of moral. I have given two definitions, one which would apply and one which would not.
What do you think? — Leontiskos
― Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance: An Excerpt from Collected Essays, First SeriesA foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what to-morrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day. — 'Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood.' — Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood.
I think conscience is just self talk. People’s conscience also tells them they should have killed that rapist when they had the chance. They should have kept the money they found, etc. We call self-talk conscience when the talk seems to match conventional behavioural expectations as we might find them in church or a popular sitcom. Many people regret not stealing or lying or beating the shit out of someone, although they might find comfort behind a pretence of having done the ‘right thing.’ — Tom Storm
We commonly suppose that suffering is caused by people whose conscience is flawed or who pursue their aims without regard for the consequences to others. From a relational standpoint, we may entertain the opposite hypothesis: in important respects we suffer from a plenitude of good.
As we social primates do, in the heat of the moment I'm prone to see people as evil and act on the basis of such mental projections. However in this era, where dishing out the law of the jungle is seldom well advised, I think it is generally better to recognize one's mental projection of evil, for the monkey mindedness that it is, and try to achieve a more enlightened perspective. — wonderer1
So to say that something is moral is to say that it is just? That just shifts the question to a new mystery. — Michael
I see the atheist trolls have arrived (↪wonderer1, ↪Joshs). — Leontiskos
Anyway, I gave a serious response to your question. — wonderer1
I find both moral realism and moral subjectivism to be fairly nauseating, but my own touchstones on the subject of morality are so far removed from these ways of thinking that bringing them in would just derail the thread. — Joshs
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