In the mythological explanation provided by Diotima in Plato's Symposium,.... — Paine

If I had written like this during my academic non-philosophy essay days, I would get a markdown -- in fact, anyone would have gotten a markdown. Those teachers did not know how the writer's mind works.

Those teachers did not know how the writer's mind works. — L'éléphant

This is interesting when looking at how Plato is working with Diotima's account.

In the dialogue of Symposium, Socrates is supposed to give his explanation for what eros is but recounts a dialogue instead. This dialogue presents a friendly conversation between the philosopher and the poet in stark contrast to others Plato has written, such as the Republic, as noted by Fooloso4:

All of this is, in my opinion, Plato's philosophical poetry, intended to replace the teachings of the traditional poets. In the Republic it is not simply that poetry is banned along with the traditional poets, they are replaced by Plato's own images of the just, beautiful, and good. — Fooloso4

Within the Symposium, I see a likeness between Diotima's:

First, he is ever poor, and far from tender or beautiful as most suppose him: [203d] rather is he hard and parched, shoeless and homeless; on the bare ground always he lies with no bedding, and takes his rest on doorsteps and waysides in the open air; true to his mother's nature, he ever dwells with want.

and the sober exit of Socrates from the gathering:

When Socrates had seen them comfortable, he rose and went away,—followed in the usual manner by my friend; on arriving at the Lyceum, he washed himself, and then spent the rest of the day in his ordinary fashion; and so, when the day was done, he went home for the evening and reposed. — 223d

The tension between being homeless and also a keeper of a house reminds me of Odysseus. The wiliness Diotima observes in the Lover is exemplified by the hero on his journey home. But Socrates is travelling in a different way.

This dialogue presents a friendly conversation between the philosopher and the poet — Paine

In this symposium speeches on love take the place of drinking since several participants have hangovers. Two highly regarded poets speak, the tragic poet Agathon, in whose house this party takes place, and the comic poet Aristophanes, who in his play The Clouds satirizes Socrates and philosophy. Just as Socrates could out drink them all, he demonstrates that he could give a better speech on love then them all. With regard to both wine and love, he suffers the least adverse effects.

Just as [correction: Plato] never speaks in his own name in the dialogues, Socrates does not speak in his own name but rather recounts in his own words those of an unknown, possibly fictitious, woman Diotima on matters of love and wisdom.

This is interesting when looking at how Plato is working with Diotima's account. — Paine

I meant what I quoted. Your writing.

Hm. So Eros is innate to the soul, but Eros for the good is not innate to the soul because Eros is blind. Thank you, that helps!
I suppose that Plato was just lucky that his desire was for the good, and then he wanted to school everybody on what he saw was the right path for the betterment of the soul?

There are varying interpretations on Plato, but my take would be that desire of the good is in everyone. However, this desire is often corrupted or overrun in various ways.

There are two problems Plato diagnoses. First, we can be internally disordered, at war with ourselves, our actions driven by desire, instinct, and circumstances. When we do not understand why we are acting, we are effects of other causes, and thus not fully self-determining, and not fully "real" as ourselves. Even if we love the good, we do not pursue it in this disordered state. Second, we can fail to know what is truly Good, and be led into evil by ignorance.

Plato describes the soul has having multiple parts in the Republic. Only the intellect is capable of unifying the soul, ordering the desires, and allowing us to be more self-determining and thus freer. Why is this? Because the intellect is always going beyond itself. In wanting to learn the truth, we go beyond our current beliefs, transcending our current selves and reaching outwards. In this mode, we are not defined by externalities, but rather incorporate them into ourselves.

In the Republic, Plato says that, in general, people want "what is really good" not just "what appears to be good at the moment." If we want X and find out that we were mistaken about X, that in light of the truth, Y is better, we will want Y.

Arguably, Plato is begging the question here. Obviously if we think something is "better" we prefer it. But I don't think this is the case, because by "better" he means "more morally good," or "more true," not just "preferred." Yet Plato does not think we always choose the good. Disordered desire and instinct can make us act in favor of the less good. His point was only that the intellect always has a desire to "know what is truly good and really true" and that this transcendent element of the intellect is what makes it fit to have authority over the other parts of the soul.

The wicked normally don't think "I am evil." E.g., Hitler did not see himself as a monster. Thus, evil is often born of an ignorance of what is truly good. People can have a love for "the Good" and still fail to know what the good truly is, resulting in evil actions. The other way people end up acting evilly is that they are disordered. They do what they think is bad because desire rules over them; intellect is not unifying the person, but rather they are divided against themselves.

Love is important here because love is also transcendent. For Plato, what we love in others is the Good in them. Love is based in our desire to be unified with the Good. In this, it is also transcendent. The ideal state is one of seeking knowledge, in love, because only in this state are we continually going beyond our current beliefs and desires, transcending them as we reach out for the Good. When one hates something, one is defined by that relation. But love is a broadening of identity.

Wallace's Philosophical Mysticism in Plato, Hegel, and the Present is a summary of this I really like. It is sort of poorly named, because it isn't so much about what we generally call "mysticism", as it is about Plato (and to a lesser extent Hegel)'s conception of morality and freedom (although I think Wallace might be reading a bit of the later Platonist theologians back into Plato.)

I was reluctant to address your observation about my writing; The idea that it might be better than it appears is encouraging. Is the deficiency a penchant for merely making connections between texts rather than explicating a thesis?

I wonder if the 'madness' that Socrates refers to might be likened to ecstasy (ex-stasis, outside the normal state)? — Wayfarer

One could read Socrates hanging back from the party to commune with his thoughts at the beginning of the Symposium as a bout of "divine madness." He is literally 'standing outside' on a porch such as Diotima describes the homeless might be found to sleep upon.

That image also compares one kind of 'absorption' with the wine that overwhelms the others.

I was reluctant to address your observation about my writing; The idea that it might be better than it appears is encouraging. Is the deficiency a penchant for merely making connections between texts rather than explicating a thesis? — Paine

I wasn't talking about a deficiency. But yes, it is better than it appears to you.
Here's the full paragraph:

In the mythological explanation provided by Diotima in Plato's Symposium, Eros is the child of very different parents: — Paine

Truly, this, to me, is written by a writer, not by someone trying to submit an essay for a mark after having studied the recommended tone and population limit of undefined terminology and nouns squeezed within a paragraph, let alone a single sentence.

Keep writing.

Sorry to go off-topic.