sorry baccarat, or some board game or another. So I read. Anyway, the only valuable thing about Hume was prodding Kant to show that he was wrong, which he did.

Anyway, the only valuable thing about Hume was prodding Kant to show that he was wrong, which he did. — Wayfarer

And what about Hamann? Hamann became a theist because of Hume.

The poll here asked which philosopher was most important, not which one the taker most identified with.

The poll here asked which philosopher was most important, not which one the taker most identified with. — The Great Whatever

We don't have an exact poll, but: — Agustino

Thanks Captain Obvious :P

It was backgammon.

thanks! Bit muddle-headed of me.

And what about Hamann? — Agustino

Only discovered him via your posts. Probably not within scope of my syllabus, but I can't help but like his notion of 'Prosopopoeia'.

Hamann used the notion of ‘Prosopopoeia’, or personification, as an image of what can happen in philosophical reflection. In a medieval morality or mystery play, the experience of being chaste or being lustful is transformed from a way of acting or feeling into a dramatic character who then speaks and acts as a personification of that quality.

How much of today's 'identity politics', which pervades the entire sphere of culture and commentary, is derived from that, eh? ;-)

That's true. He thought that reason leads inevitably to skepticism, and that Kant's project of rational faith via practical reason was misconceived.

I remember something said by Bertrand Russell (I think it was Russell) which went roughly like this:

"Hume may have awoken Kant from his dogmatic slumbers, but it didn't take him long to go back to sleep".
Although Russell would not have agreed at all with Hamann's assessment regarding faith, this seems quite apposite to Hamann's standpoint.

I think Hamann saw skepticism and dogmatism as being the only two real alternatives for reason, anything else would be, for him, an illusory dream of reason and would turn out to be nothing more than another dogmatism in disguise.

"Hume may have awoken Kant from his dogmatic slumbers, but it didn't take him long to go back to sleep". — John

I very much doubt Russell would have said anything like that.

Yes, but those are just Hume's metaphysical positions. There's more to Hume than that. Two other factors I can think of:

• Ethics — Agustino

Hume used the same boring trick in ethics too.

"There's no necessary connection between an 'is' and an 'ought'" -- > skepticism about morality

Hume was a one-trick pony.

As I said. I am not sure it was Russell, but I am quite sure it was one of the analytic or positivist philosophers. Russell was no great admirer of Kant, if my memory of the chapter on Kant in his history of philosophy is any indication (although it is probably more than twenty years since I read that. In any case what makes you say you don't think he would have said that?

Anyone who characterises Kant as being 'asleep' or in 'dogmatic slumber' has no grasp of Kant. He was a workaholic and his ideas were constantly changing.

I don't think being a workaholic contradicts being in a dogmatic slumber. As to his ideas constantly changing; that may have been so during his pre-critical phase; but there doesn't seem to be much evidence that they changed significantly after that. Also the philosopher already referred to: Hamann (whom Goethe referred to as "the brightest mind of his day) thought that Kant's philosophy constituted dogma, so it can hardly be blithely said that that judgement is self-evidently wrong.

"There's no necessary connection between an 'is' and an 'ought'" -- > skepticism about morality — lambda

>:O Fine, but that's not Hume's only contribution to ethics. Three main ones that come to mind:

• "Reason is only a slave to the passions".
• Virtue is a coverup for utility (virtue is what brings social utility - not that I agree with the idea, but it's Hume's contribution, esp. with regards to justice).
• Morals arising from sentiments, not reason.

(whom Goethe referred to as "the brightest mind of his day) — John

And whom Hegel referred to as a "penetrating genius" and Kierkegaard called, along with Socrates, "perhaps [the] most brilliant minds of all time". Hamann's greatness consist principally in:

• Understanding reason as emerging from tradition, and thus never being wholly independent of it.
• Foreshadowing the dependence of reason upon language - something that only fully comes into focus with Ludwig Wittgenstein.
• Comprehending that skepticism with regards to reason and metaphysics is as equally theistic as it is atheistic.
•Anticipating the fideism of S. Kierkegaard and breaking out of the rationalism of the Enlightenment:

Kant made reason the rule of his life and the source of his philosophy; Hamann found the source of both in his heart. While Kant dreaded enthusiasm in religion, and suspected in it superstition and fanaticism, Hamann reveled in enthusiasm; and he believed in revelation, miracles, and worship, differing also in these points from the philosopher. In some respects they complemented each other; but the repelling elements were too strong to make them fully sympathetic. The difference in their stand-points, however, makes Hamman’s views of Kant all the more interesting

More here on page 202-206.
• Located freedom in creativity and artistic expression.

I think Hamann saw skepticism and dogmatism as being the only two real alternatives for reason, anything else would be, for him, an illusory dream of reason and would turn out to be nothing more than another dogmatism in disguise. — John

The problem with reason, for Hamann, was that reason set the standards, and then installed itself as some kind of tribunal that had the authority to judge and decide on how things stand. But reason itself was the contingent product of language and tradition - reason was historical (an idea further explored by Hegel, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein). So Hamann recognised that we cannot think outside of reason - BUT the bounds of reason are determined historically, and therefore our thinking ability itself is limited - man is finite. In certain epochs certain truths are obscured - there is no perfect rationality, when something is revealed, something else becomes hidden (Heidegger) - so the march of reason (The Enlightenment) is alike the horse chasing the carrot. According to Hamann, Kant too was fooled by reason, and didn't go far enough. Hamann offered a better and stronger critique of pure reason than Kant.

Hamann's genius was in realising that even if skepticism holds, that doesn't mean we're cursed to be atheists (contra Hume). On the contrary, we are free to listen to our hearts. If the uncertainty of reason enables one to believe that there is no God, then certainly it is this same uncertainty that enables one to believe that there is a God. As Pascal had said, there is enough light for those who want to believe, and enough darkness for those who don't.

Hamann, perhaps more than any other, understood Hume's distinction between true religion, and false religion. False religion is a matter of argument and reason. True religion is a matter of the heart.

he problem with reason, for Hamann, was that reason set the standards, and then installed itself as some kind of tribunal that had the authority to judge and decide on how things stand. But reason itself was the contingent product of language and tradition - reason was historical — Agustino

That is called 'historicism'. Reason is sovereign, because it is the standard that truth claims are obliged to meet, not because it is imbued with some authority on external grounds.

Reason is sovereign, because it is the standard that truth claims are obliged to meet, not because it is imbued with some authority on external grounds. — Wayfarer

Who decides that it's the standard that truth claims are obliged to meet? Reason? That's like playing at the Casino - the House always wins (because it sets the rules).

Crap analogy. When you roll the dice, they don't fly out of your hand and float through space. There's a reason why that is. They have six sides, with numbers on them, and there's a chance that one of them will come up. There's a reason for that, also. All of this can be discovered by reason. Why you go and waste money on craps cannot. But that says nothing whatever about reason as such.

In order to even start to tackle a topic as big as 'the nature of reason', is going to take far more time than you or me or anyone else here is likely to have. But go back to the origins of the rationalist tradition, with Pythagoras and the other Greek philosophers. Their entire effort was to discover the reason, ratio, why things occur as they do, what is the order of things, what are the causal regularities that enable us to make predictions which the hoi polloi could never grasp. They could 'see reason', they could understand why things are they way they are. That was the origin of the rationalist tradition.

The problem, in my view, is that reason has become debased by scientific materialism, which claims that only those things which can be measured by scientific instruments and quantified according to known science, will be considered. Kant was well aware of that, he was trying to ground morality in something more compelling than 'following the heart', which after all anyone can say in respect of anything they do. I personally don't care much for Kant's deontological ethics, but I think he did understand the problem posed by the appropriation of reason by science.

Hume is famous for his problem of induction. If Hume wouldn't have come up with that problem my guess is that he wouldn't be nearly as popular.

How did Hume explain the observed fact that when you drop an apple it always falls down? That it's a coincidence?

You mean the observed fact that it always has fallen down?

How did Hume explain the observed fact that when you drop an apple it always falls down? That it's a coincidence? — litewave

More a regular conjunction of events than a coincidence. He simply observed that, whereas logical propositions or deductive truths, are true by virtue of definition, inductive truths are only true by virtue of the fact that effect always appears to follow from cause. But there's no logical reason why that is so, it is purely observational. So an inductive claim that 'all crows are black', is sound - right up until a white crow is observed.

More a regular conjunction of events than a coincidence. — Wayfarer

But why would a conjunction of events be regular? Did he think there are regularities like the law of gravitation?

That's the question being asked! Don't forget, Hume was inquiring into the 'nature of human understanding'. He is asking very deep questions about what we think we know, and what are the grounds for thinking we know it. Hume was in the tradition of scepticism - not the typical lounge-chair games of 'is this my hand?', but deeply considering the nature of understanding.

When we say that 'a causes b' - how do we know this? Usually all we have to go on is that every time it's observed, then a causes b. But is there a logical warrant for the supposition that a must always cause b, or is it simply custom? And what possible answer to that could there be to that question? How can you show that a must always cause b, as a matter of logical necessity. You can't prove that a must cause b, in the sense of providing a logic or mathematical proof. What is the warrant for induction, other than the customary association of effects with causes (and so on)? Those were the questions he was considering.

• Understanding reason as emerging from tradition, and thus never being wholly independent of it.
• Foreshadowing the dependence of reason upon language - something that only fully comes into focus with Ludwig Wittgenstein.
• Comprehending that skepticism with regards to reason and metaphysics is as equally theistic as it is atheistic. — Agustino

Thanks for linking the book: I downloaded it and will be able to have a read later.

I agree with all the points above. According to Frederick Beiser in The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte ( https://www.amazon.com/Fate-Reason-German-Philosophy-Fichte/dp/067429503X) Kant's main concern was with exposing the assumptions and limitations of rationalism from Plato to Leibniz and Wolfe. Beiser cites Kant as believing that all rationalist philosophy must, if followed to its logical conclusion, result in Spinozism; which in turn must result in atheism.

Kant rejected the central claim of rationalist philosophy: that reality must be as reason tells us. However his mistake, according to Hamann and others, consisted in claiming that experience and reason itself must be as reason tells us. If rationalism accepted, leads to dogma, and rationalism rejected to skepticism, then Kant's dogmatic assertion that reason and experience must be as reason tells us they are, gives rise, ironically, to the possibility of yet another layer of skepticism.

Fichte, Maimon, Hegel, Schelling and others all recognized this fatal flaw in Kant's system, and tried in their various ways to 'heal the rift' and reinstate an accord between reality and reason, expressed best in Hegel's "the Rational is the Real". Interestingly Hegel acknowledged that Kant had failed to recognize the historicity and the dialectical nature of reason and his solution to the puzzle consisted in making the Real, or Spirit, itself into an historical, dialectical becoming.

Hume's skepticism, if taken to its logical conclusion, would result in skepticism of memory; so we could have no warrant for claiming that the apple has always been observed to fall down, either.

I've never thought of Hume as a skeptic.

Really? I must say I find that surprising. I would think he is not a skeptic in the radical Pyrrhonic sense, or at least doesn't see himself as such; but I think if you take his assumptions to logical conclusion you will end up with radical skepticism.

What is the warrant for induction, other than the customary association of effects with causes (and so on)? Those were the questions he was considering. — Wayfarer

But it seems he at least acknowledged there are stable regularities in nature. To me this seems the same as acknowledging there are laws in nature, even though it is unknown whether they will continue to hold in the future.

But it seems he at least acknowledged there are stable regularities in nature. — litewave

I suppose so, although I don't know if he thought in those terms. In any case, Russell comments, in his entry on Hume in the HWP, that Hume's scepticism tended to undermine the authority of science.

I've never thought of Hume as a skeptic. — Srap Tasmaner

Hume is very much part of the tradition of scepticism, although nowadays scepticism is usually associated with 'scientific scepticism' which is very different from traditional philosophical scepticism.

Beiser cites Kant as believing that all rationalist philosophy must, if followed to its logical conclusion, result in Spinozism; which in turn must result in atheism. — John

Atheism as a proposition/conclusion, or atheism as a subjective emotional/rational/spiritual experience?

You could probably produce a zillion papers, conferences, books, etc. with irrefutable arguments and evidence about the benefits of coffee, but all that would do is tell me that the available arguments and evidence dictate that coffee has benefits. It would not change my experience of coffee--the fact that other than one time around the age of 10, I have never drank it. Even if I did start drinking it, I doubt that arguments and evidence about its benefits are going to have much of an effect on what I experience.

On the other hand, if mind over matter is real then I suppose arguments and evidence could rearrange one's neurological material and make him/her an atheist. And arguments and evidence could rearrange my neurological material and make me crave and enjoy coffee.

If the latter two are possible, then doesn't reason disappear? Don't we then only have a physicalist/materialist world of interactions leading to mental and emotional states like "atheist" and "enjoying coffee"? Wouldn't saying that the latter and the former are arrived at through some external thing called reason be like saying that vapor condenses into rain through some external thing called reason?

Meanwhile, if atheism is a proposition/conclusion like 2 + 2 = 4, doesn't that make atheism a triviality?