The Conjunction of Nihilism and Humanism

Showmee

On the Duality and Revolt of a Stranger

The Distortion and Alteration of the Irrational Reality:

Human consciousness is dictated by rationality and value judgement, whence derived the essence of a human being—a rational being. A rational being does not merely desire an outcome, but rather judges this or that outcome ought to be desired, and therein lies the very distinction between a being qua rationality and being qua animality[1]. The latter simply accepts and obeys to its desires and instincts, and follows them faithfully wherever it is led to; whereas the former, a rational being, seeks additionally to justify and explain and search for reasons in everything it experiences and perceives, for it is bonded by its own creation, its own set of values that insists that whatsoever found in this world ought to be justifiable. For example, a beast would willingly sacrifice itself in exchange for the safety of its offspring simply because it adheres to the raw instinct of motherhood, but a human being—a rational mother—additionally develops an ethical system that would deem such an instinct as a necessity and would punish anyone who disobeys it.

However, no matter how firmly a conscious being asserts what the world ought to be, it remains a stranger snared in the chaotic cage of the cosmos, for the reality of the universe is inherently irrational and meaningless; even if there exists a meaning or something sublime and superior such that a definition or a providence is indeed bestowed to the universe, it is, nonetheless, most certainly hidden away from the domain of pure reason. Thus, the universe, for humanity at least, is fundamentally irrational, since the faculty of reasoning is confined by its own rules and delimitations, eternally doomed to remain ignorant pertaining to the quiddity of the cosmos, which most probably is no-existent. Human beings, as beings qua rationality, therefore immerse themselves within the illusion that all substances are encompassed within the illumination of reason, than the fact that it is rationality per se that is confined within the irrationality of the world. However, it is imperative to note that the predicate 'irrational' does not necessarily indicate a sense of inferiority, as it is often associated with. Humans regard themselves as superior because they are beings qua rationality. However, the distinction of what is superior or inferior is, again, nothing but another unfruitful human construct unfamiliar to the universe. Anything that is not rational is labelled as irrational, and this categorisation is entirely unrelated to value judgments but only to factual properties.

Consciousness, akin to a parasite, gradually undermines the true structures of reality in its quest for survival, weaving a world of fantasy apt solely for its own purpose, a world abundant with colourful illusions, in a literal manner (perceived colours are merely a creation of brain's interpretation of the various wavelengths of electromagnetic waves). But humans cannot escape consciousness just as they cannot eliminate the irrational aspects remained within them. For without consciousness, they would cease to be the stranger of the universe, and would return to the purposeless embrace of Nature, becoming, at last, a portion of the unity they had always been longing to, albeit meaningless. Indeed, this feeling of nostalgia, the rawest inclination to seek self-transcendence[2]as a means to escape the inevitable end—the total annihilation of consciousness—is embedded within the veins of humanity, whence gods were born to bear the burdens of humans' crave for eternity and reconciliation. Hence, the state of absurdity befalls upon every individual who become aware of the inherent contradiction whithin the nature of their existence—a contradiction characterised by the rational inclination to seek answers within the confines of an irrational space-time, where the very question itself remains fictitious. Akin to a monkey strives to catch its own reflection from the surface of water, humans in a similar manner rely on reality, praying to find answers to questions engendered by their own imagination—an eternal battle between rationality and irrationality, meaning and meaninglessness, order and chaos, elusion and reality.

Henceforth, there remains only one question to be answered, and that is: does the meaningless disposition of reality necessarily lead to the negation of the worth of living? Should individuals universally reject the pursuit of purpose in a world devoid of values and instead prefer death? [3]

The question answers itself.

The Quiddital Duality of Men:

All meaningful principles, standards, or moral beliefs live and die by humanity, as they are the products of human creation, not inherent features of the external world. In our absence, the concept of right or wrong and evil or just shall likewise fade into nothingness. Thus, the very notion that a universe devoid of rationality and meaning should be deemed unworthy of living represents yet another artificial construct. It is paramount to become not the slaves of our own creation, just as a deity serves not its worshippers. We have confused the means with the end. Our existence is not to be governed by the rules we have begotten, but rather guided by these rules, allowing us to direct our attention toward the essence of life, more specifically, that which belongs to humanity.

To embrace reality is to accept its intrinsic condition: the universe, all living organisms, and humanity as well, in their essence, simply exist without inherent purpose. An asteroid aimlessly drifting in the outer space shares the same meaninglessness with a human being intentionally seeking a beloved one, for standing from the perspective of objectivity, both occurrences simply exist and unfold. It is imperative to recognise and accept this reality of the world, rather than elude into a well-fabricated illusion. We, likewise, can either refuse to face the inherent absurdity of our existence, or embrace it as it is.

However, whilst it is true that the universe is irrational, it is also undeniable that rationality is the most substantial property that characterizes humanity. Henceforth, we are doomed to revolt against the fate of meaninglessness, just as Greek tragic heroes challenged their own prophecies. Life is about recognising the futility of our actions and existence, yet, nonetheless, ever holding on to the hope of rationality, for this is who we are. On the one hand, no one possesses the power to demand providence and meaning from this world, and we are to lose not ourselves amidst the very creations we have brought into existence; on the other hand, we also cannot abandon the very identity that constitutes us, and rather converge ourselves into mere cynics as a means to flee away from our fear towards the absurd contradiction and mingle with the irrationality of the world. Therefore, when fully consumed by the fire of Love, we might discern the seemingly futile nature of emotions, recognizing them as mere chemical reactions within our brains, evolved to secure our survival. Yet, in this realization, we are also encouraged to wholeheartedly embrace and savour both experiences and feelings, for it is through accepting this invitation that we truly fulfil our dichotomic identity, lest ourselves being deprived of our rightful title as humans. This sense of revolt against irrationality, introducing beauty and significance to substances intrinsically devoid of meaning, is, perhaps, the ultimate manifestation of hubris, characterizing precisely the human perseverance. Notwithstanding being the stranger to this unfamiliar universe, surrounded by the unconscious darkness of reality, humanity does not require the compassion of a Prometheus, for they are capable of kindling their own flames of hope, provided this hope devours not wholly its creator and the reality.

The Absurd Question:

In a parallel to the dyophysitism[4]of Christ, our essence is likewise twofold. Despite the lofty heights of our intellectual capacities, our consciousness remains tethered to the primal aspects of natural impulses and bodily experiences. Therefore, we reside within the intersection of two realms, with one foot planted in the irrational world of objective reality, and the other in the rational path of subjective interpretation of reality and meaning creation. Hence, the semantic structure of the question: “does the meaningless disposition of reality necessarily lead to the negation of the worth of living?” is itself absurd, for it confuses the two metaphysical realms as aforementioned. If one seeks meaning, one does so in the realm qua subjectivity, and if one searches the disposition of reality, one does so in the realm qua objectivity. Any cross-sectional integration would inevitably result to a fallacious product, such as religion. We are the ones who introduced the very notion of “meaning”, and thus we—not an imaginative meta-metaphysical being—are the only ones who are capable to ascribe a “meaning” to ourselves.

Life can be meaningful, but reality cannot.

[1]Originating from Aristotelian metaphysics, “qua” in Latin means “in the capacity or role of.” So “being qua animal” refers to the nature of living beings as animals, whereas “being qua rationality” refers to that of rational beings, namely humans.
[2]The concept of transcending oneself resonates across the essences of numerous philosophical schools and religions. For instance, Plato underscores the significance of moving beyond our corporeal existence and instead embracing the realm of forms, which he deems as the perfect world. Likewise, Stoicism advocates for the transcendence of individuality, encouraging individuals to unite with the broader unity of Nature, becoming integral parts of something greater. Finally, Christianity also holds contempt to terrestrial joy, looking up instead to the universal of God.
[3]The first sentence of “The Myth of Sisyphus”: “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that
is suicide.”
[4]The Christological position asserts that the hypostasis of Christ encompasses both the divine nature of God and the human nature of man; thus, He is recognized as both the Son of God and the Son of Man. This doctrinal stance was officially adopted by the Church at the Council of Ephesus in 431.

tim wood

for the reality of the universe is inherently irrational and meaningless; even if there exists a meaning or something sublime and superior such that a definition or a providence is indeed bestowed to the universe, it is, nonetheless, most certainly hidden away from the domain of pure reason. — Showmee

Thus God is irrational?

Thus, the universe, for humanity at least, is fundamentally irrational, — Showmee

What do you mean? Don't we have, in various forms, "nothing is without reason." Does not the world and the universe appear soon enough to yield to reason where reason chooses to look?

eternally doomed to remain ignorant pertaining to the quiddity of the cosmos, which most probably is no-existent. — Showmee

English words: but what do they mean? What are you trying to say?

Anything that is not rational is labelled as irrational, and this categorisation is entirely unrelated to value judgments but only to factual properties. — Showmee

Facts and values entirely unrelated? That seems extravagant. And so forth. I suggest, fwiw, you ask yourself what you are trying to say, and try to say it in four or six or seven well-crafted sentences, if even it takes that many. Else people like me (and the others of TPF) will be asking you for clarity, definitions, and meaning, and if you're lucky, explicitly.

The Christological position asserts that the hypostasis of Christ encompasses both the divine nature of God and the human nature of man; thus, He is recognized as both the Son of God and the Son of Man. This doctrinal stance was officially adopted by the Church at the Council of Ephesus in 431. — Showmee

And this all encompassed and included in the opening words of the Creed, "We believe." And once you're clear on that, you can believe what you like, and what follows much like a game, of course with rules. Is it a game you wish to play?

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Showmee

Very well written piece. I think your conclusion probably works, provided you accept a lot of the assumptions it rests on. However, I find the premises shakey, so I'll go through the objections there:

Human consciousness is dictated by rationality and value judgement, whence derived the essence of a human being—a rational being. A rational being does not merely desire an outcome, but rather judges this or that outcome ought to be desired, and therein lies the very distinction between a being qua rationality and being qua animality[1]. The latter simply accepts and obeys to its desires and instincts, and follows them faithfully wherever it is led to; whereas the former, a rational being, seeks additionally to justify and explain and search for reasons in everything it experiences and perceives, for it is bonded by its own creation, its own set of values that insists that whatsoever found in this world ought to be justifiable. For example, a beast would willingly sacrifice itself in exchange for the safety of its offspring simply because it adheres to the raw instinct of motherhood, but a human being—a rational mother—additionally develops an ethical system that would deem such an instinct as a necessity and would punish anyone who disobeys it.

You might be interested in Frankfurt's distinction re second-order desires and second order volitions — the ability to "want to desire x," if you aren't already familiar with it. I've always thought it was a very clear way to define what you are getting at.

However, no matter how firmly a conscious being asserts what the world ought to be, it remains a stranger snared in the chaotic cage of the cosmos, for the reality of the universe is inherently irrational and meaningless; even if there exists a meaning or something sublime and superior such that a definition or a providence is indeed bestowed to the universe, it is, nonetheless, most certainly hidden away from the domain of pure reason.

I mean, that's certainly a popular dogma, but I don't think it's by any means something that has been well demonstrated. Plenty of thinkers have thought they have discovered something quite the opposite, reason and purpose at work throughout the world. The "rock solid" foundations for the claim that the universe is essentially "meaningless and purposeless," seem to be to be grounded by the same epistemic methods that tend to ground religious beliefs.

Existentialism does seem to be a religion of sorts in key ways, so it sort of makes sense, but as with most religions, adherents tend to over estimate how convincing the evidence for their dogma is to non-adherents. Which isn't to say such evidence can't be convincing or rational, but it will tend to have less global validity. Religion tends to work more on the epistemic methods employed by historians and literary critics, or by people when they decide which other people to "have faith in," which makes interpretation highly variable. I don't think those sorts of claims can be demonstrated in the way mathematical proofs or even scientific claims can be.

I personally see evidence for the demonstrable "purposelessness," of reality as quite shakey.

Thus, the universe, for humanity at least, is fundamentally irrational, since the faculty of reasoning is confined by its own rules and delimitations, eternally doomed to remain ignorant pertaining to the quiddity of the cosmos, which most probably is no-existent.

Fundementally irrational how? The world seems to operate in law-like ways that can be described rationally quite well. Indeed, this is often a key empirical fact cited as evidence for universal rationality or even purpose (e.g. the concept of Logos Spermatikos).

I also don't know how this would make the universe somehow lack quiddity. It still is what it is. Is this a claim about our epistemic ability to understand the essence of the universe, or a claim about a lack of essence simpliciter?

In any event, if we understand some essences re created things, e.g. the oak tree, the triangle, or the fox, and these are part of the universe, then it seems to me that the essence of the universe is at least partially understandable.

Indeed, this feeling of nostalgia, the rawest inclination to seek self-transcendence[2]as a means to escape the inevitable end—the total annihilation of consciousness—is embedded within the veins of humanity, whence gods were born to bear the burdens of humans' crave for eternity and reconciliation.

I've always found this old Marixst trope on religion ring quite hallow. Plenty of religions lack an afterlife, and in many there is no immortality of the soul. Others have it that avoiding continued existence in our current form (e.g., reincarnation) should be our chief goal — sort of the opposite of the sentiment you describe re annihilation. Plenty more have afterlives that are completely horrible, such that ceasing to exist would be almost certainly preferable for most people. At best, this sort of explanation from psychoanalysis would only explain a subset of religions/religious beliefs.

But I see no reason to accept it when there are far more compelling naturalistic explanations of the ubiquity of religion. Consider that essentially all documented early human societies are animists and that children are also animists until a certain age, even when raised in modern society.

Why is the sky dark and stormy? It's angry. Why does the rock fall down? Because it wants to. Even as adults, steeped in materialism from childhood, we still use this language when describing how chemical reactions or cars work all the time. Explanation from evolutionary psychology, while also on pretty shaky ground, also seem more compelling here, as do less conventional explanations.

But the idea that religion is some sort of "cope," a flight from the terror of the "meaninglessness and purposelessness," of the universe seems to be somewhat an existentialist dogma. Why would this be the case for people who simply don't believe the existentialist claim the the meaninglessness of existence? If they have never believed that claim, then they will have had no motivation to generate such illusions in the first place. It seems to assume something like: "deep down, everyone knows our claim is true." However, I don't think this is the case at all, and empirically it seems hard to support in light of phenomena like suicide bombers.

It also seems like a narrative that sticks around in part because it is flattering to believe (opponents are child-like, etc.). Any disagreement can be taken merely as evidence of self-serving delusion (the problem with most arguments from psychoanalysis).

In a parallel to the dyophysitism[4]of Christ, our essence is likewise twofold. Despite the lofty heights of our intellectual capacities, our consciousness remains tethered to the primal aspects of natural impulses and bodily experiences. Therefore, we reside within the intersection of two realms, with one foot planted in the irrational world of objective reality, and the other in the rational path of subjective interpretation of reality and meaning creation.

I would ask, how does natural selection produce this sui generis rationality in animals? How does a sense of the rational emerge from the totally irrational, and then why is human rationality so good at predicting and understanding what will happen in an irrational world?

Second, isn't science as good of a candidate of an objective description of the world as we have. But if scientific explanations are rational, often framed in mathematical terms, then why would we say objective reality is "irrational?" It seems to submit to rational explanations quite readily.

Objectivity only makes sense in the context of subjectivity in any case. It's the view of things with relevant biases removed. The claim then would be that removing all biases would also remove all rationality? But why should we accept that?

As for the conclusion, I'm not sure how good the case is for the sort of hard dualism it seems to assume TBH, and the case see to hinge on that.

4]The Christological position asserts that the hypostasis of Christ encompasses both the divine nature of God and the human nature of man; thus, He is recognized as both the Son of God and the Son of Man. This doctrinal stance was officially adopted by the Church at the Council of Ephesus in 431.

I don't know if this is a good analogy. You seem to be
setting up a dualism based on two opposed and incompatible modes of "being in the world." But in orthodox christology, Christ if fully man and fully God in nature. The two aren't like oil and water, where they remain separate despite being mixed (this is an analogy they indeed had major fights over). It's more a mixing of water and wine.

Plus, the conception of subjectivity as in a way illusory would seem more in line with Docetist christology. You might also consider that, if our rationality is truly sui generis, distinct to humanity and a distinct subjective mode of being, people might rightly decide that it is in fact the material world that should be rightly thought of as illusory. That gets you into more of a classically Gnostic response I suppose. After all, how do different minds come to understand the same rationality, given it is absent from the material world? This questions play off Platonist intuitions that night lead you back to the sublime and transcendent.

Showmee

↪tim wood

Thus God is irrational? — tim wood

Only when God actually exists. And even then, yes, I would regard Him irrational in the sense that His essence is beyond the realm of human understanding, and thus "irrational" here does not bear any diminishing implications, but signifies only the incapability of rationality to grasp God.

What do you mean? Don't we have, in various forms, "nothing is without reason." Does not the world and the universe appear soon enough to yield to reason where reason chooses to look? — tim wood

It depends on the exact definition of "reason". If by "reason" you refer to causality, then sure, but that is irrelevant to my propositions. However, if "reason" signifies providence and intention, e.g. God created humans to love Him, then no, I don't think anything has a "reason".

English words: but what do they mean? What are you trying to say? — tim wood

Human intellect is unable to grasp the meaning the world, because either the world has no meaning to start with, or the cosmos is described by something intangible through rationality.

Facts and values entirely unrelated? That seems extravagant. And so forth. I suggest, fwiw, you ask yourself what you are trying to say, and try to say it in four or six or seven well-crafted sentences, if even it takes that many. Else people like me (and the others of TPF) will be asking you for clarity, definitions, and meaning, and if you're lucky, explicitly. — tim wood

Facts are members of the objective world, and values are our subjective interpretation of facts we perceive. I would say that the relation between these two concepts is not bidirectional. Namely, values judgements depend on facts, but not the other way around. And since in this part of the essay the focus is on the factual aspect of the world, "[...]this categorisation is entirely unrelated to value judgments but only to factual properties."

+ You mean I write overly complex sentences which are ambiguous?

And this all encompassed and included in the opening words of the Creed, "We believe." And once you're clear on that, you can believe what you like, and what follows much like a game, of course with rules. Is it a game you wish to play? — tim wood

Could you please elaborate on your question, I don't quite get it, sorry...

Showmee

↪Vaskane

Could you explain to me which part is antithetical please, thank you.

tim wood

I would regard Him irrational in the sense that His essence is beyond the realm of human understanding, — Showmee

Then why or how do you presume to understand it/him/her/them? Or if you are merely expressing your regard, does not that fall under the, "We believe"?

I hold belief to be a kind of safe house wherein the believer is "safe" from critique except sometimes - not always - on the basis of inner consistency. So you can believe what you like. If you wish to expound on them and their inner consistency, have at it, but that is not always easy to do successfully.

But to represent your beliefs as themselves factual or valuable, or in short anything more than just mere beliefs, that is a whole other exercise. And if any part of your argument is grounded anywhere on mere belief, then the argument as a whole cannot escape the confines of being mere belief. Or again in short, if you buy god, then you can claim anything.

The game is that you have or propose a set of rules and then you and others test the consequences, at times making up new rules as needed. But as religion; i.e., taking on the unanswered and in some cases likely unanswerable questions about the world, this game is already thousands of years old.

Tom Storm

Henceforth, there remains only one question to be answered, and that is: does the meaningless disposition of reality necessarily lead to the negation of the worth of living? Should individuals universally reject the pursuit of purpose in a world devoid of values and instead prefer death? — Showmee

I don't see how no transcendent meaning matters very much. Humans will always generate meaning and values and reasons for participating in life. The question 'is life worth living' is not an abstraction - the answer is found in what you do with your day. A nihilist may have a very rich and rewarding life and, ironically, a happier life than the theist, who may live in quaking fear of divine judgement and understands misery to be god's will.

Life can be meaningful, but reality cannot. — Showmee

All we have is life, this is our reality. I don't think humans ever arrive at or know some external to self 'reality'. As you say, humans inhabit a world of their own making, a function of our experience, our cognitive apparatus and shared subjectivity. Do we need more than this?

JuanZu

It seems to me that in the OP lies the dilemma between practical reason (morality, the meaning of life, ethics) and objective reason in Kant's philosophy. In practical reason, God can be related to a necessary idea but not demonstrable, as a physical law can be demonstrated. God is just an idea that seems to function as a foundation but without objective reality.

From this it can be followed, by a desire of objective reason, that in the objective world the prescriptive nature cannot be proven, nor does the ought-be, otherwise as physical law can. From this point it is easy to fall in nihilism, thanks to the objectivist reason that hoped to determine God in the same way that ancient theology determined him. Consequently, the meaning of life as a teleological expression of the law only finds its foundation in something unproven and undemonstrable. It can only be determinated as a necessary assumption at most.

Nietzsche would say that the idea of God belongs to the field of necessary fictions that guide our actions. But at the end of the day fictions. With which all objective foundation of the moral law disappears (like the order of how to act and what to pursue in our lives). Thus, what we understand by "meaning of life" would not have an objective foundation as pre-Kantian philosophy believed (theology, atomism, etc.)

From here it is easily understandable why the OP goes so far as to say that the world is irrational. Not because it is irrational in the descriptive sense (physics and objective sciences are rational because describes legaliform-properties of the world) but in the prescriptive sense.

Tom Storm

God is just an idea that seems to function as a foundation but without objective reality. — JuanZu

Agree. The problem with theism however is that it doesn't provide an objective moral system or set of values. As is evidenced even within the one religion (let's say Christianity) wherein believers all following the word of god, commonly profess very different moral positions on everything from abortion to euthanasia, the role of women to gay rights, capital punishment to drug law reform.

We have a chaotic Christianity all over the place in these and other issues, all convinced they are following some objective view of a god whose identity and qualities they can't even agree on. I think it's a bit of a furphy when anyone claims that god provides us with a foundational guarantee of anything - instead it seems to be down to subjective interpretation in the name of an ever shifting, ever changing, incoherent deity.

Wayfarer

God is just an idea that seems to function as a foundation but without objective reality. — JuanZu

God does not exist

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Wayfarer

Nice article. Seems pretty much to be the common argument for panentheism you see in Plato, the Patristics, etc. However, they generally say things like "God exists," it is just that "existence" is meant differently for God than for material bodies.

Terms like "exists," "is good," "is necessary," etc., when applied to God, are necessarily all forms of analogical predication, as opposed to the standard uniquivocal predication at work when we point to a real tree and say "this tree exists," or "this tree is green." We know of God's "goodness," or "necessity," through finite creatures' participation in an analogically similar, but lower instantiation of the property. That, and/or positive statements about God are, in reality, (largely) reducible to statements about "what God is not," since God is primarily known through what God cannot be while remaining God (Maimonides, e.g. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/864330).

More abstractly, I think Hegel's idea of the true/good infinite makes the same sort of claim.

It's a fairly widespread conception of God, which makes it stranger that the mentioned authors: Dawkins, Hitchens, (and we could add Harris) do seem to largely ignore it. But it sort of makes sense because the God of fundementalism (a ready made, real-life strawman), some forms of Reformed theology, and, strangely enough, the "classical theism," of a good majority of philosophy of religion articles (a faith hardly any human seems to actually embrace) fit this "finite God," mold. But against this, we could consider that by far and away the two largest denominations of Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, are officially against this classical theistic view, basing their ideas off Aquinas and Pseudo Dionysius respectively. I know less about the relative popularity of different theologies in Islam, but Avicenna would fall into this bucket too.

It seems to me that the fixation of New Atheism on fundementalism has to do with it being an easy target, and it's an easy target because it makes explicit claims about the types of facts that scientific inquiry is well adapted to explore. This has, however, led to a mistake in New Atheism where there is this idea that all religious/metaphysical claims can/should be explored via the techniques of the sciences. Or, more problematic, the claim that the methods of the sciences are the only ways people can develop rational beliefs (Dennette calls science "the only game in town," when it comes to facts).

However, as noted in the post above, we can have a rational belief in historical facts (historians are not scientists), a rational faith in people or institutions, etc. that isn't grounded in scientific epistemic methods. This being the case, the whole New Atheism project seems to very easily slip into scientism, where we also look to "the popular opinions of scientists," to answer all sorts of questions science cannot answer for us, and to which scientists are not particularly well trained to answer.

Eternalism, which the article alludes to, is another example. "Popular opinion," among physicists is taken as the gold standard for a question that has largely been answered using (IMO bad) philosophical arguments originally developed by philosophers and merely popular with popular science writers. The "illusory" nature of time flow is then used to make all sorts of pronouncements about freedom, "meaning," and even religion — quintessential scientism.

wonderer1

It seems to me that the fixation of New Atheism on fundementalism has to do with it being an easy target, and it's an easy target because it makes explicit claims about the types of facts that scientific inquiry is well adapted to explore. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'd think it is much more about recognition of the toxicity of fundamentalism. Remember the role 9/11 played.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Tom Storm

I don't see how no transcendent meaning matters very much. Humans will always generate meaning and values and reasons for participating in life. The question 'is life worth living' is not an abstraction - the answer is found in what you do with your day. A nihilist may have a very rich and rewarding life and, ironically, a happier life than the theist, who may live in quaking fear of divine judgement and understands misery to be god's will.

Right. And if humans generate meaning and value, and humans are part of the universe, then in an important way the universe generates meaning and value. It is clearly not completely hostile to the existence of such things.

Moreover, if conciousness is an example of strong emergence, then it would seem in some way to be "fundemental," not fully decomposable. Further, some primitive form of meaning and value seem essential to the existence of any first person subjective experience. If that's the case, then meaning and value are fundemental elements of nature.

We might also consider the popularity of panpsychism as a solution to the Hard Problem of Conciousness. If panpsychism is true, then the claim that the universe is in any way valueless seems to simply be false. We're in a sea of experience and value.

The claim that the universe is meaningless also seems like it would be refuted if you accept most pansemiotic views of reality. The universe is a sea of signs and meaning given you accept those theories.

Plus, if the Fine Tuning Problem and related issues give us reason to think the conciousness is not only in some way fundemental (irreducible) but also not contingent, then the "valuelessness," claim seems to run into further problems. This is true even following atheistic views of natural teleology (e.g. Nagel) or views where conciousness might be both fundemental and quite central to the functioning of the universe (e.g. panpsychism, Wheeler's Participatory Universe/It From Bit, or the Von Neumann - Wigner interpretation of quantum mechanics). It might even be in jeopardy for views like Tegmark's ontic structural realism, because there conciousness is a necessary, rather than contingent fact of the universe (and this is generally true anywhere eternalism is embraced). Which leads to the question: "if the universe necessarily produces all this meaning and value, in what way is it meaningless and valueless?"

The claim seems to rest on demanding that meaning and value come in some sort of eternal Platonic form, and a conception of the Platonic form that I don't even think is commensurate with how most Platonists have often understood Platonism. I'm not even sure if "goodness and purpose," existing "in itself" as some sort of measuring stick to point to, free from all subjectivity, is a coherent idea. Hell, arguably, trading off concepts in information theory, the idea of things we think of as quite "objective," like length and speed are also incoherent if we insist on some sort of supernatural "in itself," view of them.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪wonderer1

This certainly seems to be the case in Harris. It doesn't fix the problems re epistemology and scientism though.

Plus, it seemed historically short sighted to me. The Nazi regime was not particularly religious, nor was imperial Japan. The Soviet Union and Mao's China were openly hostile to religion. I never got the argument for atheistic regimes necessarily being any better on the repression and violence front. To be sure, religion has motivated plenty of atrocities, the Thirty Years War, the Crusader sack of Jerusalem, but then you have equally vile acts, Belgian activities in the Congo, the Mongol sack of Baghdad, motivated by simple greed and lack of concern for foreign peoples.

wonderer1

Which leads to the question: "if the universe necessarily produces all this meaning and value, in what way is it meaningless and valueless?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Meaning and value are things naturally evolved minds project on things in the environment, since survival and reproduction is fostered by seeing things in the environment as meaningful and valuable. Obviously there is no requirement that people recognize their projection of value for what it actually is, (and most don't, and no one does all the time) in order for such subconscious projection to be adaptive.

How would you distinguish between something having value, and your mind subconsciously projecting value on that thing? Does not what you find meaningful and valuable change over time, and how would that be possible if you were somehow perceiving objective value?

Showmee

↪Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean, that's certainly a popular dogma, but I don't think it's by any means something that has been well demonstrated. Plenty of thinkers have thought they have discovered something quite the opposite, reason and purpose at work throughout the world. The "rock solid" foundations for the claim that the universe is essentially "meaningless and purposeless," seem to be to be grounded by the same epistemic methods that tend to ground religious beliefs — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is a very valid point worth reflecting. However, religions and other beliefs, in terms of logic, are deductive conclusions (e.g. the Ontological Argument presumes the existence of God) without any valid empirical evidence to support their propositions (many times these systems even lack logical validity). On the other hand, nihilism is an inductive conclusion, derived from the observation that so far no belief or religion can adequately prove the existence of an objective meaning independent of the mind. Nihilism is not a simple affirmation, it is a negation of other affirmations. This is the very reason I included also a weaker version of nihilism, claiming that "even if there exists a meaning or something sublime and superior such that a definition or a providence is indeed bestowed to the universe, it is, nonetheless, most certainly hidden away from the domain of pure reason."

Thus, demanding a religious person to prove the existence of God is not the same with demanding, say, an atheist to prove that God does not exist. It's like demanding a physicist to prove that a fifth fundamental force does not exist. In fact, if we observe the history of physics, we find that scientists always faithfully followed the so called Occam's razor:" entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity." Whilst I understand that physicists are able to utilize empirical measures to obtain their results, both physics and nihilism share the same notion that if X is not a logical necessity and cannot be proved empirically, then X can be eliminated from the system of knowledge. Therefore, if an objective meaning or purpose is not a hard necessity for the existence of us and of the world, and such meaning cannot be proved empirically, it follows that this world does not require any intrinsic meaning.

Fundementally irrational how? The world seems to operate in law-like ways that can be described rationally quite well. Indeed, this is often a key empirical fact cited as evidence for universal rationality or even purpose (e.g. the concept of Logos Spermatikos). — Count Timothy von Icarus

The fact that this world functions in a seemingly law-like manner does not necessitate a creator or an intrinsic meaning, since the universe may exist in other unimaginable forms had it started slightly different. It's all merely probabilities. Furthermore, the predicate "law-like" we apply onto the function of the universe is a concept begotten by rationality; it's a conclusion yielded only by beings capable of recognizing patterns, which are merely different arrangements and configurations of information. For me, all things, objectively speaking, merely exist. Any other description one might add is just a subjective interpretation of the world. One might argue that even without our existence, this universe would function in the exact same law-like manner; but in reality, it would merely continue to function, and not in a "law-like", "chaotic", "beautiful" or any other way.

I also don't know how this would make the universe somehow lack quiddity. It still is what it is. Is this a claim about our epistemic ability to understand the essence of the universe, or a claim about a lack of essence simpliciter? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Quiddity is merely a nominalistic existence, a product of cognitive abilities. The essence of a rock for humans may be its hardness, but if we were stronger, say being able to smash rocks easily, its essence would consequently change too.

But the idea that religion is some sort of "cope," a flight from the terror of the "meaninglessness and purposelessness," of the universe seems to be somewhat an existentialist dogma. Why would this be the case for people who simply don't believe the existentialist claim the the meaninglessness of existence? If they have never believed that claim, then they will have had no motivation to generate such illusions in the first place. It seems to assume something like: "deep down, everyone knows our claim is true." However, I don't think this is the case at all, and empirically it seems hard to support in light of phenomena like suicide bombers. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Whilst I agree that the origin of religion is better explained by other more scientific theories, it is an undeniable fact that one of the main reason a substantial proportion of the contemporary population still finds refuge in religion is to cope against the fear of death, either consciously or unconsciously. As for the suicide bombers, or even self-immolators, they are those who had already conquered the fear of death through having faith in the continuity of their spirit posterior to death. And it's an excellent example of how people are often misguided by their own creations—religion in this case, as I had pointed out in my essay.

Second, isn't science as good of a candidate of an objective description of the world as we have. But if scientific explanations are rational, often framed in mathematical terms, then why would we say objective reality is "irrational?" It seems to submit to rational explanations quite readily.

Objectivity only makes sense in the context of subjectivity in any case. It's the view of things with relevant biases removed. The claim then would be that removing all biases would also remove all rationality? But why should we accept that? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The universe is irrational in the sense that there exists no meaning. I don't see how the rational discoveries/descriptions of science has any connection with an intrinsic meaning.

Showmee

↪Count Timothy von Icarus

Terms like "exists," "is good," "is necessary," etc., when applied to God, are necessarily all forms of analogical predication, as opposed to the standard uniquivocal predication at work when we point to a real tree and say "this tree exists," or "this tree is green." We know of God's "goodness," or "necessity," through finite creatures' participation in an analogically similar, but lower instantiation of the property. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the analogical view here does not necessarily stand. Sure, when we say "the sun is bright" and "this colour is bright", the predicate "bright" is not univocal; but terms you provided such as "exist/being", "good", and "necessary" transcend the boundaries of the ontological categories (say that of Aristotle), applying across all of them. As Duns Scotus insisted, a concept is univocal when:

"it possesses sufficient unity in itself so that to affirm and deny it of one and the same thing would be a contradiction. It also has sufficient unity to serve as the middle term of a syllogism, so that whenever two extremes are united by a middle term that is one in this way, we may conclude to the union of the two extremes among themselves. (Ord. 3. 18)"

For example, "being good" could be defined as a subject manifesting highly its quiddity or telos. Thus, a "good" man is a fully rational man; a "good" knife is a very sharp knife; and a "good" God is a God that is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent (assuming these are God's essence). The predicate "being" is univocal in a more apparent way. When X is, X exists in reality. How can "being" thus be analogical, unless you say that the existence of God in reality is different from the existence of anything else by being either more or less real (what does "more" real even mean)? It's both unclear and unnecessary.

Showmee

↪Tom Storm

All we have is life, this is our reality. I don't think humans ever arrive at or know some external to self 'reality'. As you say, humans inhabit a world of their own making, a function of our experience, our cognitive apparatus and shared subjectivity. Do we need more than this? — Tom Storm

I guess you could say that it is precisely the humanity's inability to comprehend reality which makes it devoid of meaning (though I think reality is just the way the world is as it is, without any meaningful properties). However, I would regard seeking an objective meaning as a natural impulse. We as rational animals constantly ask ourselves, "who are we", "where did we come from" and "where are we going". And it is genuinely difficult for a person to fully renounce a sense of metaphysical egocentrism.

JuanZu

↪Wayfarer

I would say that the article is a bit irrelevant to what I have said and about the topic. Among all the mental juggling attempted in the article there is no mention of deontology, ethics, morality, or something related to is-ought problem (things which is what determines how nihilism and humanism can be raised and developed as relevant issues). I mean, first cause is not equivalent to a benevolent God, nor equivalent to God as the foundation of the meaning of life. We could talk about Aristotle's unmoved mover and there wouldn't be much difference. We could not deduce an ethical and moral theory from that. I think you should read my response to the OP again.

Tom Storm

However, I would regard seeking an objective meaning as a natural impulse — Showmee

Sure, but everything humans do is natural by definition. From mass murder to painting pictures of Krishna. Given the hold transcendental narratives (religions) still have on people all over the world, is it any wonder many are still caught up quests for objective meaning? I suspect we may leave behind this impulse at some point.

Tom Storm

Right. And if humans generate meaning and value, and humans are part of the universe, then in an important way the universe generates meaning and value. It is clearly not completely hostile to the existence of such things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Humans are clever animals who use language to manage their environment - sense making (inventing narratives) is what we do. We still love our metanarratives. I would simply say all meaning is contingent and tentative - an ongoing, ever changing conversation. I make no claims about the universe (whatever that is).

Plus, if the Fine Tuning Problem and related issues give us reason to think the consciousness is not only in some way fundamental (irreducible) but also not contingent, then the "valuelessness," claim seems to run into further problems. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I leave speculations about consciousness (and QM) to others (preferably those with expertise). Whether any of those speculations are warranted or not, I can't say. I know it is contested space (from Thomas Metzinger to Bernadro Kastrup) and we seem to be waiting for a breakthrough.

Which leads to the question: "if the universe necessarily produces all this meaning and value, in what way is it meaningless and valueless?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not say the universe is meaningless, that would be a claim I can't justify. As I said:

I don't think humans ever arrive at or know some external to self 'reality'. As you say, humans inhabit a world of their own making, a function of our experience, our cognitive apparatus and shared subjectivity. Do we need more than this? — Tom Storm

Showmee

↪Tom Storm

So in short, your view is that we are to be content with dwelling within the subjective interpretation we as a species formulated, whilst simultaneously recognizing that the true/objective nature of the world is incomprehensible by not claiming neither the world has a meaning nor it’s devoid of meaning?

Sure, but everything humans do is natural by definition. From mass murder to painting pictures of Krishna. — Tom Storm

This actually is a quite ambiguous theme that I need further insights on. We often automatically draw a line between our own existence and Nature. However, it is also true that our consciousness, that is what enables us to produce our subjective reality, is begotten by nature through evolution. Maybe the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity arises only from the first person perspective we stand upon? Because if we imagine ourselves as beings external from this World, humans would seem to us as an integral part of this universe, encompassed within Nature. Thus, the entire cosmos would be analogical to our body, where the role of humans would be similar to that of the brain, carefully perceiving and examining the rest of the body, which are unconscious on their own. In other words, the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity converge into a unity, and thus the world does possess an intrinsic meaning in that we as meaning-making beings are a part of that world. On the other hand, does there exist a possibility such that consciousness has its own existence outside of nature, albeit the former has its root in the latter? Think about ChatGPT: it is an AI technology invented by humans. But if I command it to write a poem (which is similar to the mass murder example you gave), to what extend am I eligible to claim that this poem is mine.

Note that these concepts are not consolidated within my system of knowledge, thus further critiques are required. Thank you.

Tom Storm

So in short, your view is that we are to be content with dwelling within the subjective interpretation we as a species formulated, whilst simultaneously recognizing that the true/objective nature of the world is incomprehensible by not claiming neither the world has a meaning nor it’s devoid of meaning? — Showmee

Yes, I think that's essentially my position. But philosophy is not about 'being content' and I recognise that intellectual restlessness will always have people prodding at the 'unanswerable' questions.

My view is that language, values and beliefs are contingent - they are culturally and historically constructed. The search for foundations through one metanarrative or another is likely to be pointless and is probably a remnant of Greek philosophy. All our truths and our moral positions are products of human conversations and conventions and are not grounded in some objective reality. I also think we can continue to have conversations which can test and modify beliefs to improve them subject to our everyday goals.

On the other hand, does there exist a possibility such that consciousness has its own existence outside of nature, albeit the former has its root in the latter? — Showmee

Is nature a product of consciousness, or is consciousness a product of nature? For many philosophers, this is one of the big unresolved questions.

I'm not confident that we can point to anything existing as outside of nature.

Have you explored idealism? (It comes in many flavours, some more convincing than others.) A currently prolific thinker in this space, Bernardo Kastrup, spends significant time debunking physicalism and asserting that what we seem to take as the material world is essentially consciousness when seen from a particular perspective.

Showmee

↪Tom Storm

I think for me, the problem with idealism is its extremely anthropocentric nature. It seems that this position supports the claim that the material world would cease to exist had human consciousness ended. If so, don't you think that we might have endowed to ourselves too much significance? Moreover, along with idealism follows the universal scepticism, which leads only to solipsism. Also, how do we define consciousness if we are to claim that the world is a mind-dependent entity. Does it depend on individual consciousness (without me, the world may cease to be) or on the collective consciousness of humanity (without humans, the world may cease to be).

Tom Storm

It seems that this position supports the claim that the material world would cease to exist had human consciousness ended. — Showmee

That's not quite right for most versions I am aware of. The problem with idealism is it requires some serious reading up on and can't be readily parsed in a few dot points by me. Also, I think it is possible to break down the notion of physicalism to where it seems incoherent and this appears to leave us with just consciousness to make sense of. I am no expert in this area. The fact that perhaps we don't know how it all works is a separate intellectual problem. Incidentally, I am a big fan of 'I don't know'. I see no reason why I need to arrive at a fully coherent system for making sense of my world.

Does it depend on individual consciousness (without me, the world may cease to be) or on the collective consciousness of humanity (without humans, the world may cease to be). — Showmee

As I understand it, a common account is that there is cosmic consciousness (or mind at large) of which we are all dissociated alters. No risk of solipsism, since we are all a fragment of a larger field of consciousness which is all there is and 'holds' the reality we experience. I do not subscribe to this account, but I am trying to understand it better.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Tom Storm

:up:

Sorry, I wasn't very clear there. Those questions were more rhetorical questions that came to mind given the topic covered in the OP vis-á-vis what you had said, not direct questions.

↪Showmee

However, religions and other beliefs, in terms of logic, are deductive conclusions (e.g. the Ontological Argument presumes the existence of God) without any valid empirical evidence to support their propositions (many times these systems even lack logical validity). On the other hand, nihilism is an inductive conclusion, derived from the observation that so far no belief or religion can adequately prove the existence of an objective meaning independent of the mind.

Well there are inductive arguments for the existence of God, e.g. Saint Aquinas' argument from design, arguments from the Fine Tuning Problem, Leibniz argument from the law-like behavior of the universe, etc. Arguments like Anselm and Gödel's are proofs that aren't supposed to rely on any empirical evidence. That would actually be a perk, depending on who you ask, since we can often be more sure of the results of such arguments, e.g. that two odds added together always make an even number, etc. These would be "relations of ideas," or "analytic truths," if you think the distinction holds any water still post-Quine. These don't "assume God exists," but rather try to show that "God exists," is implied by relatively innocuous premises.

IMO, it is on the one hand surprising that Anselm and Gödel's proofs have held up so long, and on the other, sort of irrelevant since, for all the difficulty in convincingly disproving them, they don't seem to have ever convinced anyone one way or the other on the issue.

But I would question the very premise that the world is somehow "meaningless" if there is not "objective meaning independent of a mind." What after all does this mean? How can there be meaning without a mind in the first place? This seems to set up and then knock down an impossible standard. Am I invisible because I cannot be seen without eyes? Is a rock concert silent "in itself," because it cannot be heard without ears?

The idea of "meaning in itself," makes no sense with popular theories of meaning and communication (e.g. information theory is relational, semiotics as well, Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics and Wheeler's Participatory Universe/It From Bit would make relations, not objects ontologically basic, etc.)

Personally, I feel like philosophy writ large has a bad hangover from the heyday of positivism, when it was assumed that "objectivity approaches truth at the limit." This leads to the weird conception that a thing is "as it is conceived of without a mind." What could that mean?

To my mind, it's led to a problem where "objective" is conflated with "noumenal" or "in-itself." But I don't think this works. In a world without minds, without the possibility of subjectivity, the term "objective" would apply equally to everything. Applying to everything, it would describe absolutely nothing, having no content at all, the same problem Hegel diagnoses re "good' being contentless without the possibility of "bad."

Objectivity, the view of things with biases removed, is only coherent in the context of biases being possible. This is also true of how truth, knowledge, and perception only make sense in the context of minds. So an "objective meaning," would be one everyone could agree on given appropriate information, reasoning, cognitive abilities, etc. That people can disagree about meaning and morality does not, of itself, preclude their being objective. After all, you can find plenty of people online denying that the Earth is round, or the germ theory of disease, etc. However, it is nonetheless an objective fact that the Earth is round.

To my mind, some form of objective meaning seems quite possible. When a store has a sign that says "closed" on its door, that objectively means the store is closed and not taking customers. To be sure, non-English speakers, birds, etc. might not understand the meaning, but in the view with all biases removed, it is still the case that the sign is there precisely to denote that the store is closed.

Maybe this doesn't solve the whole nihilism issue, but it's an avenue worth turning down because if objective knowledge can exist without knowledge of some inaccessible "noumena," that seems pretty important. Likewise, an objective morality grounded in biology, institutions, etc. doesn't appear to be necessarily precluded.

Certainly there do seem to be some objective facts vis-á-vis morality. E.g., "Bob thinks stealing pens from work is wrong," or "Americans are less supportive of stay-at-home dad's than stay-at-home moms." The question is whether these sorts of facts can ever be globalized for all peoples in a rational way.

Nihilism is not a simple affirmation, it is a negation of other affirmations. This is the very reason I included also a weaker version of nihilism, claiming that "even if there exists a meaning or something sublime and superior such that a definition or a providence is indeed bestowed to the universe, it is, nonetheless, most certainly hidden away from the domain of pure reason."

Isn't the fact that something is completely inaccessible a positive affirmation? At least to the extent that it is saying that such things are impossible it seems to be. Quite a few thinkers did think universal meaning, an "intelligible world," could be grasped by pure reason.

Indeed, plenty thought sense perception was fairly useless, except that it directed our attention to the higher hypostasis of the intelligible world. This would be some readings of Plato, as well as Plotinus, Porphery, Proclus, Saint Augustine, Eriugena, Saint Bonaventure (to a lesser extent), etc. For another, more "empirical," road to meaning through reason, there is Hegel's project in both Logics, where we start at attempting to fathom sheer, indeterminate being and see what progresses out of that. We might say all these attempts have fatal flaws, but that wouldn't preclude finding such a road to meaning in the future.

Thus, demanding a religious person to prove the existence of God is not the same with demanding, say, an atheist to prove that God does not exist. It's like demanding a physicist to prove that a fifth fundamental force does not exist.

They wouldn't need to prove that a fifth fundemental force does not exist, but they would need to prove that the scientist claiming to have discovered a fifth fundemental force didn't have good evidence for their claims.

I am not overly impressed by the arguments that non-agnostic atheism requires a significantly different standard of justification. Saying "I have no belief regarding x," doesn't give one any grounds to challenge other beliefs regarding x. What atheists generally charge is that theists' beliefs lack good evidence, are contradictory, etc.

For example, atheists understandably want policy changes in line with their beliefs, e.g. that religious teachings not be taught in schools. For this demand to make sense, it isn't enough to say "I don't believe that x is the case." After all, we couldn't very well demand that chemistry not be taught in schools simply because we never took chemistry and thus have no beliefs about the field. For this demand to be justified we need to show that "there aren't good reasons to believe (and thus teach) x."

A claim that "x does not exist," is not the same as having no beliefs about x. That said, I do think it is true that, in general it is easier to prove not-p than p, simply because there are many more ways to describe the world inaccurately than accurately. So atheists probably do enjoy an easier path to justification, just not a different type of justification. After all, we wouldn't say that the claim that "the Earth isn't round," requires less justification simply because it is a negative claim.

In fact, if we observe the history of physics, we find that scientists always faithfully followed the so called Occam's razor:" entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity." Whilst I understand that physicists are able to utilize empirical measures to obtain their results, both physics and nihilism share the same notion that if X is not a logical necessity and cannot be proved empirically, then X can be eliminated from the system of knowledge. Therefore, if an objective meaning or purpose is not a hard necessity for the existence of us and of the world, and such meaning cannot be proved empirically, it follows that this world does not require any intrinsic meaning.

I'm not sure if I would agree with this characterization of the sciences. I think that Kuhn gets at something quite important with the idea of paradigms. Newton's laws were falsified by astronomical observations almost immediately. The scientific community didn't drop them, instead they posited unobserved planets to explain the planetary orbits that failed to conform to what the laws predicted. It turned out that these planets did indeed exist.

Science seems far more abductive to me, less methodologically strict. Right now we have like 9 major, mutually exclusive theories for how quantum mechanics "really," works for example.

Quiddity is merely a nominalistic existence, a product of cognitive abilities. The essence of a rock for humans may be its hardness, but if we were stronger, say being able to smash rocks easily, its essence would consequently change too.

Makes sense, if we accept nominalism. But we have other views, from within the sciences, e.g. Tegmark's ontic structural realism/Platonism.

I think one problem for a strict nominalism is explaining how it is that we can generally agree on which tropes/universals are being instantiated by some object.

Why is it that our minds all work similarly? If we appeal to natural selection, then we seem to be saying that order, law-like behavior — rationality — is "out in the world" posterior to our existence as thinking beings. But if this is true, it would seem to undermine the most strict forms of nominalism, because names would be based on something "out there."

The universe is irrational in the sense that there exists no meaning. I don't see how the rational discoveries/descriptions of science has any connection with an intrinsic meaning.

Well, for thinkers like Hegel, the Stoics, the Patristics, Leibniz, etc. the rational behavior of the world was strong empirical evidence for a Logos, universal reason, at work in the world. After all, why else would we have order and not chaos?

But as I noted above, I don't get how we can say "the universe lacks meaning." We see meaning everywhere. We are part of the universe. If we are monists and take it that man isn't in some way magical/unique, but rather "emerges from nature," then it would seem the universe absolutely produces meaning. You could also consider C.S. Pierce's semiotic view of "a universe of signs," or pansemiotic theories, like Lyon's "Signs in the Dust."

Personally, I'm more inclined towards these views because they don't have the problem of explaining how man uniquely creates meaning, or how we can all be said to live in and experience "the same world."

In any event, that's simply what I meant by "it works with the premises, but there appears to be plenty of other options."

FrankGSterleJr

I awoke from another very bad dream, a reincarnation nightmare / where having died I’m yet again being forced to be reborn back into human form / despite my pleas I be allowed to rest in permanent peace. //

My bed wet from sweat, I futilely try to convince my own autistic brain / I want to live, the same traumatized dysthymic brain displacing me from the functional world. //

Within my nightmare a mob encircles me and insists that life’s a blessing, including mine. //

I ask them for the blessed purpose of my continuance. I insist upon a practical purpose. //

Give me a real purpose, I cry out, and it’s not enough simply to live / nor that it’s a beautiful sunny day with colorful fragrant flowers! //

I’m tormented hourly by my desire for emotional, material and creative gain / that ultimately matters naught, I explain. My own mind brutalizes me like it has / a sadistic mind of its own. I must have a progressive reason for this harsh endurance! //

Bewildered they warn that one day on my death bed I’ll regret my ingratitude / and that I’m about to lose my life. //

I counter that I cannot mourn the loss of something I never really had / so I’m unlikely to dread parting from it. //

Frustrated they say that moments from death I’ll clamor and claw for life / like a bridge-jumper instinctively flailing his limbs as though to grasp at something / anything that may delay his imminent thrust into the eternal abyss. //

How can I in good conscience morosely hate my life / while many who love theirs lose it so soon? they ask. //

Angry I reply that people bewail the ‘unfair’ untimely deaths of the young who’ve received early reprieve / from their life sentence, people who must remain behind corporeally confined / yet do their utmost to complete their entire life sentence—even more, if they could! //

The vexed mob then curse me with envy for rejecting what they’d kill for—continued life through unending rebirth. //

“Then why don’t you just kill yourself?” they yell, to which I retort “I would if I could. //

My life sentence is made all the more oppressive by my inability to take my own life.” //

“Then we’ll do it for you.” As their circle closes on me, I wake up. //

Could there be people who immensely suffer yet convince themselves they sincerely want to live when in / fact they don’t want to die, so greatly they fear Death’s unknown? //

No one should ever have to repeat and suffer again a single second that passes. //

Nay, leave me be to engage the dying of my blight!

wonderer1

↪FrankGSterleJr

:flower:

boagie

Nihilism is the awareness I think, that in the absence of a conscious subject the physical world is meaningless. The world we perceive is a manifestation of the alterations the energies of the physical world bestowed upon our bodies, which is experience and meaning. The relation of subject and object is then the source of an emergent reality, energy processed through our biology. Humanism and Nihilism should go hand in hand, rationally, for as reactive creatures we create our own apparent reality. Nihilism is then a light in our consciousness which enables us to realize we, life, and humanity are the ones that create the world we know.

The Conjunction of Nihilism and Humanism

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