I am complete skeptic when it comes to Plato
Do you expect the “real” reasons for these developments to be available outside of all culturally influenced interpretation?
No. I'm actually quite a fan of speculative history.
What I am saying is that the method is easy to do poorly, and in some respects Nietzsche does it very poorly indeed. His Plato is almost a gnostic, and it is indeed hard to see why he would have become so influential — Count Timothy von Icarus
Deleuze destroys Freudian Psychoanalysis, and Deleuze is very well versed in Nietzsche. — Vaskane
Melanie Klein herself writes: "The first time Dick came to me ... he manifested no sort of affect when his nurse handed him over to me. When I showed him the toys I had put ready, he looked at them without the faintest interest. I took a big train and put it beside a smaller one and called them 'Daddy-train' and 'Dick-train.' Thereupon he picked up the train I called 'Dick' and made it roll to the window and said 'Station.' I explained: 'The station is mummy; Dick is going into mummy.' He left the train, ran into the space between the outer and inner doors of the room, shutting himself in, saying 'dark,' and ran out again directly. He went through this performance several times. I explained to him: 'It is dark inside mummy. Dick is inside dark mummy.' Meantime he picked up the train again, but soon ran back into the space between the doors. While I was saying that he was going into dark mummy, he said twice in a questioning way: 'Nurse?' . . . As his analysis progressed . . . Dick had also discovered the wash-basin as symbolizing the mother's body, and he displayed an extraordinary dread of being wetted with water." Say that it's Oedipus, or you'll get a slap in the face. The
psychoanalyst no longer says to the patient: "Tell me a little bit about your desiring-machines, won't you?" Instead he screams: "Answer daddy-and-mommy when I speak to you!" Even Melanie Klein.
Your version of the Ubermensch is beyond strawman, to the point of I know you've never read Nietzsche level of stupid. — Vaskane
Eternal Recurrence for Nietzsche is more of a thought experiment for "The Heaviest Burden." Obviously you wouldn't understand that cause you've not read Nietzsche's Gay Science. — Vaskane
Freudian Psychoanalysis is based off Oedipalizing Family Structures and doesn't know shit about the Apollonian and Dionysian. Deleuze destroys Freudian Psychoanalysis, and Deleuze is very well versed in Nietzsche. — Vaskane
I'm driving, but I'll get your first comment now, the rest later. You never read much of Nietzsche imo, that aside, you've also never read Nietzsche from Nietzsche's perspective so you'll never know Nietzsche. — Vaskane
It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times,
at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said the id.
Eternal Recurrence for Nietzsche is more of a thought experiment — Vaskane
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yes.
I don't confer any Truth (capital letter T) to Freud, I only see that his general ideas are more on the mark than Nietzsche's notions — schopenhauer1
In keeping with Freud’s idea of science, with its goals of objectivity and impartiality, he ‘fights for truth’ through reasoned discourse. Again, for Freud, ‘reason is the only truly unifying influence’, so that reasoned discourse alone makes the achievement of a scientific community possible. But in keeping with Nietzsche’s idea of a ‘gay science’ that scorns ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth’ as myths and that is committed rather to radical perspectivism and the ideal of nobility as solitude, his style of authorship displaces the expectation of agreement, openness, certainty and truth – Freud’s ideals – with a persistent deferral of direct communication. More strongly, Nietzsche deliberately invites misunderstanding: ‘Every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood’
However strange and wicked Freud’s own project may be in the way it unsettles and shocks us – recall his warning to the audience of his lectures on psychoanalysis at Vienna, that he ‘will show … how the whole trend of your previous education and all your habits of thought’ will be challenged – he addresses an audience he seeks to convince through values he believes we all share: the value of the search for truth, the commonality of our
faculty of reason, and the shared space of our reality. Nietzsche, though, questions those very values and hence renounces the pretext that what he has to say can be grounded in a shared set of assumptions.
Obviously you're a dope when it comes to Nietzsche — Vaskane
Of course, that is a bad example because he has no actual beliefs other than narcissism, but you get my point. — schopenhauer1
Just like ↪Lionino thought he was being smart by not using Nietzsche's perspective in his attempt to poke me — Vaskane
↪Joshs I'm curious and forgive the awkward wording - is it hard to get a useful reading of Nietzsche? How often do you think his work is taken into 'bad reading' territory? — Tom Storm
and eating Cheetos to moving to the recliner watching cartoons and eating potato chips. — Fooloso4
That's because a child hasn't formed decisions yet which decide (kill off) all other outcomes. — Vaskane
All values are ephemeral, transitory, changing. All are of equal value so why the "sacred yes' to these and not others when in time the sacred yes must become a sacred no? — Fooloso4
Aye, for the game of creating, my brethren, there is needed a holy Yea unto life: ITS OWN will, willeth now the spirit; HIS OWN world winneth the world’s outcast.
Still all seems like a thought experiment to allow a certain amount of freedom to the person who understands it. — Vaskane
Courage also slays dizziness at the abyss; and where do human beings not stand at the abyss? Is seeing itself not – seeing the abyss?
Courage is the best slayer; courage slays even pity. But pity is the deepest abyss, and as deeply as human beings look into life, so deeply too they look into suffering.
What if a demon crept after you into your loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said to you ...
However strange and wicked Freud’s own project may be in the way it unsettles and shocks us – recall his warning to the audience of his lectures on psychoanalysis at Vienna, that he ‘will show … how the whole trend of your previous education and all your habits of thought’ will be challenged – he addresses an audience he seeks to convince through values he believes we all share: the value of the search for truth, the commonality of our
faculty of reason, and the shared space of our reality. Nietzsche, though, questions those very values and hence renounces the pretext that what he has to say can be grounded in a shared set of assumptions.
Still all seems like a thought experiment to allow a certain amount of freedom to the person who understands it.
341
The Heaviest Burden. What if a demon crept after you into your loneliest loneliness some day or night, and said to you: "This life, as you live it at present, and have lived it, you must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh, and all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to you again, and all in the same series and sequence - and similarly this spider and this moonlight among the trees, and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once more, and you with it, you speck of dust!" - Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth, and curse the demon that so spoke? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment in which you would answer him: "You are a God, and never did I hear anything so divine!" If that thought acquired power over you as you are, it would transform you, and perhaps crush you; the question with regard to all and everything: "Do you want this once more, and also for innumerable times?" would lie as the heaviest burden upon your activity! Or, how would you have to become favourably inclined to yourself and to life, so as to long for nothing more ardently than for this last eternal sanctioning and sealing?
— Nietzsche, Gay Science
If not already the sweetest concept, what must you begin doing at this moment to make reliving your life, infinitely more times, exactly as it is, the sweetest concept to your ears?
As Nietzsche details, this is the heaviest burden at the core of the essence of Eternal Return.
Same with this.. Go tell me what the REAL Nietzschean expert knows about this idea, and then I will probably just see that it is indeed the same as I characterized. There is a difference between KNOWING something and then EVALUATING that something. A lot of posters on this forum think that simply KNOWING what someone said confers that one must ACCEPT THE TRUTH of what is said. That is not the case.
— schopenhauer1
First -- get it straight, I am a real Nietzschean expert. Which is why when you say stuff like this:
Eternal Reoccurrence:
Again, Schopenhauer dealt with these issues in a more nuanced and informative way. This can easily be co-opted by fitness instructors and company gurus.. Rand types actually, who want to make sure that everyone is living the best moment they can over and over, embracing the "suck". Nope, the suck just sucks, and you are not a pussy for acknowledging this. It is just life. It's juvenile to think that at every moment one is calculating the best way to live that. Why? Because if you lived to the extreme at all moments, you end up burning out, becoming homeless, dying, suffering more. But then if you claim that it requires structure as well, it just starts looking like a Randian industrialist, artist, inventor, and the like. You become exactly sublimating in the way that is conducive to society. Besides which Freud got to these ideas better with his ideas of the Id, Ego, and Superego. You can't just live as an Id.
— schopenhauer1
Just makes me laugh about the fact you're not even talking about Nietzschean philosophy and psychology, but just some fantasy of it, your own personal fantasy. Just like how the Father and Mother Oedipalize the child with their own personal fantasies about their child via psychoanalysis. — Vaskane
I don't see how that diverges much from my interpretation. Again, he is pretty abstract here and up for interpretation. I take him as meaning that we should live a life where we would say "yes!" to life over and over.. Sometimes you have to wait at the post office (aka Satan's asshole) for hours, or visit someone you dearly love in a hospital, or deal with terrible tragedies, and these are not things one would want over and over again — schopenhauer1
For Nietzsche the self is a community, divided within itself, made of competing drives. We dont decide to will what we will . We find ourselves willing. Will is equal parts determinism and freedom. The implication of this is that Nietzsche wasn’t advocating self-actualization, as if we can choose a path or value system and stay the course. We fall into these paths, and then fall out of them into other values. What we can do is choose not to deny or repress the fact that whatever we want and prefer will end up morphing in directions we can’t predict or control, and we just make things worse by embracing moral or empirical notions of truth that pretend that there are firm grounds ( objective scientific and ethical verities) to attach ourselves to. There is much more suffering attached to this way of thinking than there is to rejecting the idea of a self-determining ego and an objective worldly order in favor of
being receptive to the creative possibilities wrapped up within what we first encounter as the unpredictable, the painful and negative. — Joshs
What Nietzsche calls the ‘aesthetic phenomenon’ is disclosed in the concentrated dealings with itself of a decentered subjectivity set free from everyday conventions of perceiving and acting. Only when the subject loses itself, when it sheers off from pragmatic experience in space and time, and when the illusions of habitual normality have collapsed- only then does the world of the unforeseen and the astonishing become open”. — Number2018
Only when the subject loses itself, when it sheers off from pragmatic experience in space and time, and when the illusions of habitual normality have collapsed- only then does the world of the unforeseen and the astonishing become open”. (Habermas, ‘The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,’ p 93). How can we abandon firm and stable grounds of self-nurturing while avoiding the pitfalls of self-oblivion? — Number2018
For Nietzsche the self is a community, divided within itself, made of competing drives. We dont decide to will what we will . We find ourselves willing...
The implication of this is that Nietzsche wasn’t advocating self-actualization, as if we can choose a path or value system and stay the course. We fall into these paths, and then fall out of them into other values. What we can do is choose not to deny or repress the fact that whatever we want and prefer will end up morphing in directions we can’t predict or control, and we just make things worse by embracing moral or empirical notions of truth that pretend that there are firm grounds ( objective scientific and ethical verities) to attach ourselves to. There is much more suffering attached to this way of thinking than there is to rejecting the idea of a self-determining ego and an objective worldly order in favor of being receptive to the creative possibilities wrapped up within what we first encounter as the unpredictable, the painful and negative.
...I do not think that one can read Nietzsche at any phase of his career without being swamped with the impression that, as my students would put it, "he tells us how to really live!" Of course, my students are also stymied by the question, "What is Nietzsche telling us about how to live?" as are we more seasoned commentators. But the seeming lack of specificity in Nietzsche's proposals... does not mean that his is not first and foremost an existential, one might even say moralistic, philosophy.
One powerful argument in favor of Nietzsche's strong sense of responsibility, quite apart from any thesis regarding free will, is his heavy use of what I call the blaming perspective, according to which people are held accountable as the authors or agents of their actions. Of course, their actions can also be praised and they can be forgiven, but I think "blame" best captures the essence of this perspective, both as Nietzsche pursues it and, admittedly, as he sometimes exemplifies it as well. The blaming perspective presupposes a robust sense of agency. It thus tends to emphasize responsibility and be suspicious of excuses. To be sure, in On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche urges us both to get "beyond good and evil" (Essay I) and to get over our felt need to judge, to blame, and to punish (Book II). But it would be difficult to read virtually any of Nietzsche's writing without noticing the harsh denunciations that permeate his style...
Nietzsche professes disgust with the blaming perspective, but he nevertheless exemplifies it more than any other philosopher. He holds people responsible for what they do, but as exemplary of their "natures" and their virtues and not only because of their choices and decisions.
...Nietzsche's fatalism is clearly not a metaphysical thesis. It rather harks back to his beloved pre-Socratic Greek tragedians. It is an aesthetic thesis, one that has more to do with literary narrative than with scientific truth. In this sense, fatalism has little to do with determinism. There need be no specifiable causal chain. There is only the notion of a necessary outcome and the narrative in which that necessity becomes evident. Thus Oedipus was "fated" to do what he did, whatever causal chain he pursued...
...his "fatalism" consists almost entirely of his intimate and enthusiastic engagement with what Leiter calls "classical fatalism," where this must be understood as not only the fatalism of the ancients (Sophocles, Aeschylus, Heraclitus) but as a rich way of viewing our lives in which we are neither victims of chance and contingency nor Sartrian "captains of our fate." One might even say, alluding to one of Nietzsche's better-known bits of euphoria, that we are more like the oarsmen of our fate, capable of heroic self-movement but also swept along in an often cruel but glorious sea.
Nietzsche may be unclear about the extent to which character is agency and how character and specific actions are related, but he is very clear about the fact that we, whatever we are "given" in our natures, are responsible for cultivating our character. Not that this is easy. Nietzsche tells us, "Giving style to one's character—a great art. But whether rare or commonplace, whether limited to a few "higher men" or something that we all do, cultivating one's character goes hand in hand with Nietzsche's conception of fatalism.
...One becomes what one is. And if one believes—as I think anyone not blinded by ideology or an empty "humanism" must believe—that we are all talented and limited in different ways (including what we might call our meta-talents, such as self-discipline, which have to do with our ability to foster our talents), then it more or less follows that we are free to development our talents (free, that is, insofar as we have the talent). But we are not free regarding what talents we have and, therefore, what talents we might choose to develop. I say "more or less" here because of a number of pretty obvious qualifications: most people have more than one talent and are therefore free to choose among them, and the development of any talent can be thwarted by any number of external and internal factors, such as lack of opportunity, the absence of adequate role models or exemplars, a paucity of praise and encouragement or (worse) an excess of discouragement and even ridicule, or a debilitating mishap or accident.
Robert Solomon - Nietzsche on Fatalism and "Free Will"
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/24092#REF23
If we don't decide what we will, and if we can't choose our paths, and "fall into" our values, in what way can we choose to embrace or not embrace moral or empirical notions of truth? It seems like we have some capacity for truth and self-determination or we don't, and if we don't, then books about self-overcoming are useless. And why the focus on being controlled by bad ideas? — Count Timothy von Icarus
“In its critical moment, social constructionism is a means of bracketing or suspending any pronouncement of the real, the reasonable, or the right.” “ Constructionist thought militates against the claims to ethical foundations implicit in much identity politics - that higher ground from which others can so confidently be condemned as inhumane, self-serving, prejudiced, and unjust. Constructionist thought painfully reminds us that we have no transcendent rationale upon which to rest such accusations, and that our sense of moral indignation is itself a product of historically and culturally situated traditions. And the constructionist intones, is it not possible that those we excoriate are but living also within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical primacy.”
‘In Buddhism, we have a case study showing that when groundlessness is embraced and followed through to its ultimate conclusions, the outcome is an unconditional sense of intrinsic goodness that manifests itself in the world as spontaneous compassion.”
When I dissect the process expressed in the proposition ‘I think,' I get a whole set of bold claims that are difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish, – for instance, that I am the one who is thinking, that there must be something that is thinking in the first place, that thinking is an activity and the effect of a being who is considered the cause, that there is an ‘I,' and finally, that it has already been determined what is meant by thinking, – that I know what thinking is.
I will not stop emphasizing a tiny little fact that these superstitious men are loath to admit: that a thought comes when “it” wants, and not when “I” want. It is, therefore, a falsification of the facts to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think.” It thinks: but to say the “it” is just that famous old “I” – well that is just an assumption or opinion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate certainty.” In fact, there is already too much packed into the “it thinks”: even the “it” contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. People are following grammatical habits here in drawing conclusions, reasoning that “thinking is an activity, behind every activity something is active, therefore –.” Following the same basic scheme, the older atomism looked behind every “force” that produces effects for that little lump of matter in which the force resides, and out of which the effects are produced, which is to say: the atom. More rigorous minds finally learned how to make do without that bit of “residual earth,” and perhaps one day even logicians will get used to making do without this little “it” (into which the honest old I has disappeared).
One powerful argument in favor of Nietzsche's strong sense of responsibility, quite apart from any thesis regarding free will, is his heavy use of what I call the blaming perspective, according to which people are held accountable as the authors or agents of their actions
(BGE, 12)Boscovich has taught us to abjure the belief in the last thing that "stood fast" of the earth--the belief in "substance," in "matter," in the earth-residuum, and particle- atom: it is the greatest triumph over the senses that has hitherto been gained on earth. One must, however, go still further, and also declare war, relentless war to the knife, against the "atomistic requirements" which still lead a dangerous after-life in places where no one suspects them, like the more celebrated "metaphysical requirements": one must also above all give the finishing stroke to that other and more portentous atomism which Christianity has taught best and longest, the SOUL- ATOMISM. Let it be permitted to designate by this expression the belief which regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from science!
(BGE 12)Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary to get rid of "the soul" thereby, and thus renounce one of the oldest and most venerated hypotheses--as happens frequently to the clumsiness of naturalists, who can hardly touch on the soul without immediately losing it. But the way is open for new acceptations and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as "mortal soul," and "soul of subjective multiplicity," and "soul as social structure of the instincts and passions," want henceforth to have legitimate rights in science. In that the NEW psychologist is about to put an end to the superstitions which have hitherto flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, he is really, as it were, thrusting himself into a new desert and a new distrust--it is possible that the older psychologists had a merrier and more comfortable time of it; eventually, however, he finds that precisely thereby he is also condemned to INVENT--and, who knows? perhaps to DISCOVER the new.
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