Does this follow from an argument? Or is it an assumption? — frank

Show me something that doesn't originate from matter and energy. What third type of substance would it be?

Show me something that doesn't originate from matter and energy. What third type of substance would it be? — Philosophim

Energy isn't a substance, though:

Gravity for one. If we didn't have gravity, we would not have neuroscience, compute science, philosophy, etc.

Electromagnetism too, if we didn't have that, we wouldn't have a universe, or at least, nothing with life or of any interest would be around.

Oxygen is another important one, which would also render everything we adore obsolete, nitrogen too. Iron.

Mutations: no mutations, no speciation. Plate tectonics.

And on and on and on.

Philosophy is the main field we are talking about.

I am using energy as understood by E=mc^2.

"On the most basic level, the equation says that energy and mass (matter) are interchangeable; they are different forms of the same thing."

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/einstein/lrk-hand-emc2expl.html#:~:text=%22Energy%20equals%20mass%20times%20the,forms%20of%20the%20same%20thing.

I would start with physicalism re philosophy of mind.

In the body doesn't in some way "produce" the mind, then why does ingesting certain chemicals so radically affect our cognition? Aren't traumatic brain injuries and dementia powerful demonstrations of this fact?

Against the view that an immaterial soul somehow "pilots" the body and that the body being broken simply break this connection somehow, we can consider our own experiences if we've ever been concussed, drunk, etc. and how these physical causes radically affect all aspects of mental life.

Metaphysical physicalism is harder to advocate for. The most convincing argument might be that "physicalism is what science says is the case. Science has given us atom bombs, GPS, the internet, antibiotics, etc. The proof is in the pudding. What other system is so useful at predicting the future or increasing our causal powers? If the world isn't made of atoms, why do nuclear power pants successfully light out homes? If we aren't composed of chemicals, why does biochemistry help heal us from illnesses? Physicalism, in its reductive variety is intuitive, and seems to work extremely well."

I will allow that this is a bad argument, subject to many objections, but on the face of it, not having heard those objections, it seemed convincing to me.

The proposition that information is as fundemental as matter and energy is not uncommon in physics. There is also the proposition that information is more fundemental than matter and energy, and that the latter emerges from the former ("it from bit.") Being substrate independent, it seems difficult to reduce information to matter and energy, although some people do think it's possible. Sort of an issue of open debate.

But this isn't really a challenge to physicalism, since plenty of people who would claim that information is ontologically basic would also go with Landauer's principle, "information is physical." It might point to Hemple's Dilemma though, the idea that if "physical" = anything we have reason to believe exists, the term become vacuous.

Being substrate independent, it seems difficult to reduce information to matter and energy, although some people do think it's possible. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Technically, its not substrate independent, we just minimize the differences to create a more manageable identity in our head. I'll use music as an example. You can play the same tune on a piano and a harp. While the 'notes' are the same, the expression is different because of the different medium. Meaning that the song on a harp and a piano are actually different, we just find a way of packaging certain information of actions that can be attempted on multiple mediums.

It might point to Hemple's Dilemma though, the idea that if "physical" = anything we have reason to believe exists, the term become vacuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I'm keen on avoiding that as well. Perhaps there is something that exists that cannot be boiled down to energy and matter at its foundation. But, this would need proof of existence before it became anything more than speculation.

Oxygen is another important one, which would also render everything we adore obsolete, nitrogen too. Iron. — Manuel

Is there a Hard Problem of Oxygen? Is the nature of Oxygen deeply mysterious? Is there a lack of consensus about what Oxygen is, or whether it's an illusion or doesn't exist at all?

Well, there is historically a hard problem of motion, that was made worse when Newton discovered gravity, which to his dismay made no sense to him.

I think an appropriate way to look at these things is to see that they are all at bottom mysterious. As Schopenhauer said:

"The tendency to gravity in the stone is precisely as inexplicable as is thinking in the human brain, and so on this score, we could also infer a spirit in the stone. Therefore to these disputants [between 'spiritualists' and 'materialists'] I would say: you think you know a dead matter, that is, one that is completely passive and devoid of properties, because you imagine you really understand everything that you are able to reduce to mechanical effect. But… you are unable to reduce them… If matter can fall to earth without you knowing why, so can it also think without you knowing why… If your dead and purely passive matter can as heaviness gravitate, or as electricity attract, repel, and emit spark, so too as brain pulp can it think."

I think that is accurate perspective. Or take Locke:

Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought... it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first-thinking Being...Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker. For, since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon?

(Bold added).

I could add more from Hume, Priestley even Leibniz, and others.

So yeah, I think there is a deep mystery as regards to oxygen, gravity, mutations, liquidity, and virtually everything, on equal footing with consciousness.

Currently, there are two: The very successful use of scientific method in the West, and reductionist arguments as possible explanations of seemingly non-physical phenomena. — J

Odd then, that physics can't even explain how traffic lights work.

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. — SEP

What about logical necessity? How is that 'necessitated by the physical'?

What about Hempel's dilemma? If we define "physical" as what is currently understood by physics, the dilemma arises because our current understanding of physics is likely incomplete and may change in the future. As a result, the claim that the mind (for example) is 'physical' might be false simply because our current physics does not fully capture all physical aspects of the universe. And If we define "physical" as whatever a future, complete physics will include, the dilemma arises because this definition is too vague and open-ended. We cannot currently know what the future physics will encompass, making it difficult to make meaningful claims about the mind being physical based on this definition.

So yeah, I think there is a deep mystery as regards to oxygen, gravity, mutations, liquidity, and virtually everything, on equal footing with consciousness. — Manuel

I disagree. The rise of Ai isn't going to compel people to think about "oxygen, gravity, mutations, liquidity". It's going to compel them to ask the very basic question: are these a.i.'s conscious? As the a.i.'s continue to improve, and achieve human level AGI, people are going to look to the sciences to provide answers to basic questions: are these AGI's conscious? What rights do they have? How should we treat them? These questions will then become the most outstanding problems in science.

Where do you disagree with that?

What is the alternative to physicalism? The only alternative I can think of is idealism. What are the differences between them? The former says that there are mind-independent existents, and the latter says there are not. Which seems the more plausible? To me physicalism seems more plausible because it can explain how it is that we and the animals (judging from their behavior) all perceive the same world, without positing a god or universal mind.

So, for me, I tend towards physicalism as being the inference to the best explanation for the world as we experience it. At the same time, I don't deny that there is a semantic or semiotic aspect that is inherent in physicality, so a kind of pan-semiosis, which becomes all the more evident as biological life has apparently evolved into ever more complex forms.

As the a.i.'s continue to improve, and achieve human level AGI, people are going to look to the sciences to provide answers to basic questions: are these AGI's conscious? What rights do they have? How should we treat them? These questions will then become the most outstanding problems in science.

Where do you disagree with that? — RogueAI

To me it doesn't matter how much AGI may look like human intelligence—I'll consider them conscious when it becomes obvious that they actually care about anything.

Odd then, that physics can't even explain how traffic lights work. — Banno

What do you think is missing in the physical explanation of the workings of traffic lights?

Because that is one of the goals of the developments of AI, so of course questions about consciousness are going to rise.

I didn't say that AI is going to cause us to marvel about gravity or mutations. What I am saying is that without these two, we wouldn't be alive to try to make sense of experience, nor would we be around to create such machines.

On that basis alone, these things merit much more wonder that they often do. But we are much more ignorant about them then we are about consciousness.

My main disagreement is the emphasis in which consciousness is held to a problem, over and above anything else, it's a very recent and narrow focus in philosophy. There's a lot more to say, but it's late here so I won't go into detail now, tomorrow (or whenever) sure.

Certainly, Locke and Schopenhauer cared about consciousness (Locke's "ideas of sensation" and "ideas of reflection", and Schopenhauer's "representations"), hence hey wrote entire books dealing with how it is we come to acquire knowledge. But they did not see consciousness as more problematic than other properties of the world.

Well arguably these are not analogous scenarios in the respective worlds.

I would state that everything that we've discovered so far is physical in origin. — Philosophim

On what basis?

What do you think is missing in the physical explanation of the workings of traffic lights? — Janus

Well, first set out for us "the physical explanation of the workings of traffic lights".

Then we'll be able to tell you what's missing.

I would state that everything that we've discovered so far is physical in origin. — Philosophim

SO explain, using only physics, why folk stop at the red light.

Where is this heading - convention and behavior?

SO explain, using only physics, why folk stop at the red light. — Banno

So, you're not asking about the physical workings of traffic lights but about human behavior. Of course, people don't always stop at red lights, so the question is inapt.

In any case physicalism does not necessarily entail that everything must be explainable in terms of physics, although of course that may be one interpretation of the meaning of the term.

what do you think the best arguments for it are? — frank

Sorry, Frank - I've flipped the thread to "what is the best argument against physicalism"...

Oops.

Where is this heading - convention and behavior? — Tom Storm

I'm just giving a concrete example of Hemple's dilemma. But further, physicalism is itself not a physicalist doctrine, and hence denies itself.

Of course, people don't always stop at red lights, so the question is inapt. — Janus

Then give us a physical explanation of why folk sometimes do not stop at the red light. And what often happens next.

Sorry, Frank - I've flipped the thread to "what is the best argument against physicalism"... — Banno

That's probably the best way to see what physicalism has to say for itself. Thanks!

I'm just giving a concrete example of Hemple's dilemma. But further, physicalism is itself not a physicalist doctrine, and hence denies itself. — Banno

I get the performative self-refutation part. What's the Hempel's dilemma aspect of the traffic light e.g.? I understand that all non-black things are non-ravens.

Indeed. The physicalist dream is that one day we'll have robust reductive explanations, and that these will make sense of any and all phenomena, including people's social behavior. I think this is wildly unlikely, but I count reductionism as an important argument (or perhaps "prop" is a better word) for physicalism because it appeals to one of the most basic human intuitions -- that to understand big things, you need to know what they're made of.

Then give us a physical explanation of why folk sometimes do not stop at the red light. And what often happens next. — Banno

In case you failed to notice this:

In any case physicalism does not necessarily entail that everything must be explainable in terms of physics, although of course that may be one interpretation of the meaning of the term. — Janus

That said, human behavior may be explainable in neuronal, that is physical, terms, but it does not follow that neurology is reducible, in the explanatory, if not the ontological, sense, to physics.

Yep. pointed out physicalism is at best a methodological imperative.

What's the Hempel's dilemma aspect of the traffic light... — Tom Storm

if physicalism is defined via reference to contemporary physics, then it is false — after all, who thinks that contemporary physics is complete? — but if physicalism is defined via reference to a future or ideal physics, then it is trivial — after all, who can predict what a future physics contains? — SEP

contemporary physics cannot provide an adequate description of the function of a traffic light. So it falls back on the claim that some future version fo physics will be able to provide that explanation (see ). It amounts to an act of faith.

That's probably the best way to see what physicalism has to say for itself. Thanks! — frank

:wink: I think it will add a few pages to your thread.

If physicalism is bereft or trivially true, what account of the world do you give when talking to an average person with some philosophical interest?

I understand that all non-black things are non-ravens. — Tom Storm

Albino ravens are apparently a thing.

In the body doesn't in some way "produce" the mind, then why does ingesting certain chemicals so radically affect our cognition? Aren't traumatic brain injuries and dementia powerful demonstrations of this fact? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The brain-as-receiver or brain+consciousness=mind models would solve this as the changes are occurring in hardware/wetware receiving “mind” data from elsewhere; the experiential changes are in many senses not related to the consciousness per se but the representative exprience of it which can be devolved to an ersatz experience because of damaged or aberrant hardware/wetware