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Skalidris
132Disclaimer: Don’t read this if you’re sensitive to existential crises.
The previous thread I made, "what could solve the hard problem of consciousness?", aimed to clarify our intuitions about it, and I’ll now reply to the intuitions people pointed out.
1) The hard problem of consciousness is specific to consciousness
On physicalism there is no reason to think that we could consciously grasp the full details of what occurs in our brains. — wonderer1
That just leaves unsolved those other, truly hard problems of philosophy that you allude to. Time and so on. — bongo fury
I think consciousness is a place where the natural limits of self-explanation really becoming prominent... the thing is, there is no reason we should be able to explain everything, especially the self (i.e. experience) — Apustimelogist
First part of the problem: we can never produce knowledge that perfectly matches reality. This problem isn't specific to consciousness.
Even if, as you suggest, some waveform of energy is responsible for consciousness, a natural question arises: why does that energy produce consciousness, while some other energy does not produce consciousness? — NotAristotle
In any knowledge that we create, we can always generate new "why" questions that we aren't able to answer, this isn't specific to consciousness.
It just doesn't seem possible to account for certain aspects of consciousness through natural means Qualia are the most glaring. We can envision how to program things like belief, deduction, and intentionality - but not the actual experience of pain, sadness, pleasure, etc. — Relativist
"What is it like to be a rock?" We understand the atomic make up and composition of the rock. But what it is it like to BE the rock AS the rock? — Philosophim
The second part of the problem, which seems specific to consciousness, is the notion of subjective experience: how a subject experiences the world, which leads to point 2).
2) Intuitively, consciousness is tied to the notion of individual:
But rationally, are they really tied together? Would the experience of consciousness be any different if we weren’t “one soul”, “one individual”?
Imagine that there are balls of energy that are able to travel from one brain to another. They would travel every time consciousness shuts down (for example during deep sleep or coma), and new ones would come back to light up consciousness again when we dream or wake up. When a ball reaches our brain, it accesses all of our previous memories and concepts, and therefore would make “us” feel like we are the same person, that we have been in this body and mind since it was born, but it would be an illusion since the “balls of energy” are constantly changing. The notion of individual itself is like a code written in our brain that the ball of energy reads, just like other notions like love, cat, time, table,…
So theoretically, if this notion of individual, of one soul living a human life and then dying, was an illusion, it wouldn’t change our experience, it wouldn’t change “consciousness”.
Moreover, in altered states of consciousness, someone can have a “conscious” experience without having the concept of “I am”. I once woke up from fainting and the first images and sounds were so incoherent that I was not able to formulate a thought like “I am experiencing this”, only a few moments later when I truly woke up did I realize that I was back to “me”. I truly felt like I had disappeared and came back to life. But yet, during that in between phase, I lived a conscious experience without realizing that I was an individual. The concept of “me” came back afterwards, hence the feeling that I had disappeared.
So even though our intuition tells us that consciousness and the notion of individual come together, I think they are two very different things, and that you could very well have one without the other.
In other words, our conscious experience correlates with the notion of individual, since it is present almost all the time, but I don’t see any proof of causality, since one can happen without the other.
So the problem is split into two: consciousness and the notion of individual.
A) Consciousness
Intuitively and by definition, the unconscious parts of our brain don’t produce some sort of conscious experience.
But rationally, would it be any different for our conscious experience if other parts of our brain experienced something similar as well?
Imagine that any neural network gives rise to this “conscious experience”. The experiences would be very different from each other since the input they read in the brain would be drastically different (for example, the ones with visual inputs would have a visual experience only, and wouldn’t have sounds or concepts like “I am”). It would be like several altered states of consciousness being triggered simultaneously in our brains. But if this were the case, why wouldn’t we be aware of them? There could be one obvious reason: because none of the other conscious states “told us” that they are conscious (and most of them logically wouldn’t have the notion of self and consciousness because it’s not necessary for treating visual signals for example). And it gets even weirder if you think about people with schizophrenia, who literally experience other parts of their brain talking to them as if they were individuals. I’ve known someone with this disorder and the other voice in his head told him things that could simply be “his own” intuitions. The only difference was that he perceived the intuition as another individual giving him advice, while “normal” people perceive intuition as a “gut feeling”. In other words, other “conscious” neural networks could communicate with the neural network we experience in different forms, whether it is a gut feeling or a voice.
B) The notion of individual
I think therefore I am
Every time we think, "we" are, it's impossible to formulate a rational explanation of something without realizing we are "we", the notion of subject is there every time we explain something. Therefore, we can consider that this notion is a building block of our reasoning. And explaining what an individual is, is like explaining what a brick is made out of when all you have to do so are bricks that you can't break.
And I said in my previous thread, consciousness and the notion of subject aren't the only things that face this problem. Time, space, simple logic connectors like “and” can’t be explained with a reasoning that doesn’t use them as building blocks.
What do you think of this reasoning?
P.S.
Even if this thread starts with the hard problem of consciousness, it goes in a completely different direction, I don't see any reasons to merge it :) -
Joshs
5.7k
First part of the problem: we can never produce knowledge that perfectly matches reality. This problem isn't specific to consciousness — Skalidris
As long as you think reality is something that has to be ‘matched to knowledge’ you’re screwed from the get-go. Assuming consciousness as an ‘in-itself’ standing over against a world is the basis of the Hard Problem. You can blame it on our subject-predicate grammar. -
mentos987
160I did not read your entire post because I don't care enough about the subject but --
B) The notion of individual
I think therefore I am — SkalidrisThis is a mistranslation of "cogito, ergo sum". A more proper translation would be "thought, therefore existence" or "thought exist, therefore existence is proven". However, it never says that I/me/we are proven to exist, just that our thoughts must have an origin.
Incorrect -
Lionino
2.7kA more proper translation would be "thought, therefore existence" or "thought exist, therefore existence is proven" — mentos987
That is not accurate, neither is it gramatically correct in English.
Cogitō is the first person singular present indicative of the verb cogitare (to think), ergo means "therefore" or "thus", sum is the person singular present indicative of esse (to be).
The meditations were originally written in Latin and then Descartes translated it to his mother tongue French. In French it says "je pense, donc je suis" which translates to "I think therefore I am". -
Wayfarer
22.5kfair enough, we'll leave it.
First part of the problem: we can never produce knowledge that perfectly matches reality. This problem isn't specific to consciousness. — Skalidris
As Joshs pointed out, there's an inherent issue in framing it this way. But I will add that you're overlooking the cardinal point of modern science, which is the objectification and quantification of measurable abstractions. It concentrates on what can be described in mathematical and quantitative terms, beginning with the motions of objects and the effects of energy, and then generalises this approach to all manner of phenomena. There is no conceptual space for the role of the subject in that method - or at least there wasn't until the measurement problem in quantum physics forced scientists to reckon with it, hence the Tao of Physics in 1974 and the whole quantum-consciousness connection which has happened since.
Would the experience of consciousness be any different if we weren’t “one soul”, “one individual”? — Skalidris
The following section touches on an interesting topic but doesn't do much to advance it. Individuation is indeed a fundamental part of human being, but mystics have long pointed to states of consciousness beyond that of 'me and mine'. It is fundamental to Buddhist philosophy, for instance, where 'all things are devoid of self (anatta).' Jesus Christ said 'he who looses his own self (i.e. consciousness of his separate self) for My sake will be saved (i.e. realises higher consciousness).
What do you think of this reasoning? — Skalidris
That it's very jumbled. It's full of mixed metaphors and partially-grasped ideas.
Since David Chalmers wrote that original paper, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness in 1996, it launched an entire philosophical movement (and won Chalmers tenure and an international reputation as a celebrity philosopher, a rare breed). The whole Consciousness Studies movement came out of that paper, and they have bi-annual conferences associated with the here]University of Arizona in Tucson[/url]. There was the famous mock Sgt Pepper's Album Cover graphic featuring some of the attending luminaries back in the 20th anniversary edition of the Conference:
Conference poster art for 20 year anniversary conference ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness 2014 -
mentos987
160That is not accurate, neither is it gramatically correct in English. — Lionino
Fair, I retract my statement.
Edit. It seems I got it all confused with this:
"One critique of the dictum, first suggested by Pierre Gassendi, is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking"!" -
Philosophim
2.6kFirst, this is a nice discussion topic. Its always fun to think about things like this! Second, if you have any real interest in consciousness, my suggestion is not to look to philosophy, but neuroscience, psychology, and sociology. The days of wondering about consciousness as a concept alone are long gone, and without a good understanding of modern day science's explorations and conclusions about consciousness based on our subjective experience alone are intellectual play, not anything serious.
While there are a few areas of consciousness that are open to a philosophical lens, they must be done with the knowledge of what has already been discovered to have any bearing in reality.
2) Intuitively, consciousness is tied to the notion of individual:
But rationally, are they really tied together? Would the experience of consciousness be any different if we weren’t “one soul”, “one individual”? — Skalidris
I believe you are correct that they are not tied together. One can be conscious but not have any awareness of self as you mentioned. But often times the talk of consciousness has the fallacy of thinking it only applies to humans. If we are to look to animals, we can see other levels of consciousness without an indicator that they see a 'self'.
First there's "The mirror test". This is a test where animals, and even some human children as old as six cannot recognize that the image in the mirror is themselves. Now, I'm not saying that alone means that such subjects do not have a sense of "I". Its just a very visual example of creatures not recognizing 'Themselves". It could be because they have no notion of I, or it could be they simply lack the intellectual capacity to see the mirror as 'themself'.
Of course, there is an argument out there that animals are not truly conscious, only automatons. With the removal of biased hubris and a little thought, we can throw that notion out as ridiculous. You are familiar with the problem that we cannot objectively know what another person's subjective consciousness is like. And its true, we can't. Which means all of our judgements that other people are conscious are based on their behavior, and the fact that they're human. The lesson we can learn is that if something is confirmed to behave consciously, we cannot make an assessment as to whether they have a subjective, or non-subjective experience. Thus they could be conscious, but perhaps not have an "I".
When we get down to the point when a creature recognizes itself as a 'self' we find this much more difficult to determine through behavior. If a creature cannot communicate with us, how do we tell? It might fail the mirror test, but maybe it at some primitive level feels that it is, 'itself'. Considering we cannot know another creature's subjective experience by experiencing it ourselves, it seems extremely difficult for us to posit whether a being that behaves as a conscious entity has a sense of self without its explicit communication, or easily recognizable human behaviors.
Anyway, that's enough musing from me for now, hopefully it sparks some thoughts. -
Apustimelogist
584In any knowledge that we create, we can always generate new "why" questions that we aren't able to answer, this isn't specific to consciousness — Skalidris
First part of the problem: we can never produce knowledge that perfectly matches reality. This problem isn't specific to consciousness — Skalidris
I think neither of these really reflect the problem of explaining phenomenal experiences. There is something very different about the way experience cannot be described or explained. -
180 Proof
15.3k
Too reliant on folk psychology and seemingly not informed enough by contemporary cognitive neuroscience. "Consciousness" is an empirical problem yet to be solved (i.e. testably explained) and not merely, or even principally, a speculative question ... unless by "consciousness" one means a 'supernatural' or non-empirical entity. :chin:What do you think of this reasoning? — Skalidris -
Skalidris
132I understand that my thread is quite long, but I did not expect that level of misunderstanding.
As long as you think reality is something that has to be ‘matched to knowledge’ you’re screwed from the get-go — Joshs
That is not my opinion, all I said is that knowledge doesn't perfectly match reality... How did you go from that to "reality has to be matched to knowledge"? They're two completely different sentences...
There is no conceptual space for the role of the subject in that method — Wayfarer
Saying this is ignoring philosophy of sciences. And even if we put philosophy aside, there is and there was a place for the subject in sciences long before quantum physics. This is why so many papers get criticized and rejected (and this process is part of the scientific method), we're only humans applying a method that we created, we're biased and make mistakes, and science takes that into account.
Individuation is indeed a fundamental part of human being, but mystics have long pointed to states of consciousness beyond that of 'me and mine'. — Wayfarer
I think you misunderstood, my opinion is that the notion of subject isn't tied to the notion of consciousness.
That it's very jumbled. It's full of mixed metaphors and partially-grasped ideas. — Wayfarer
What do you mean partially-grasped ideas? Who's ideas?
I think neither of these really reflect the problem of explaining phenomenal experiences — Apustimelogist
Indeed, they do not, this is why I said they aren't specific to the hard problem of consciousness.
"Consciousness" is an empirical problem yet to be solved (i.e. testably explained) and not merely, or even principally, a speculative question ... unless by "consciousness", Skalidris, you mean a 'supernatural' (i.e. non-empirical) entity. :chin: — 180 Proof
Okay, let me understand what you mean by empirical. Is anything "non-empirical" supernatural? What about love for example, is it empirical or supernatural?
And if by empirical you mean scientific, well this is a philosophy forum, not a scientific one. If science is the only field that is allowed to deal with the topic of consciousness, should it be banned from this forum?
Its just a very visual example of creatures not recognizing 'Themselves". — Philosophim
Yes, I always thought the mirror test was really reductive, we are animals that rely heavily on visuals so this test makes sense to us but it doesn't make sense for a lot of other animals. Dogs can recognize their own smell but not themselves in a mirror. -
180 Proof
15.3k
No.Is anything "non-empirical" supernatural? — Skalidris
'Empirical' is also a philosophical term (e.g. Kant) so it's not synonymous with "scientific".And if by empirical you mean scientific,well this is a philosophy forum, not a scientific one.
No. :roll:If science is the only field that is allowed to deal with the topic of consciousness, should it be banned from this forum? -
Apustimelogist
584Indeed, they do not, this is why I said they aren't specific to the hard problem of consciousness. — Skalidris
I think my point on is that these aren't really part of the nature of the hard problem, fullstop. And my quote was never intended to directly refer to those things. -
L'éléphant
1.6k
Consciousness is not causality.In other words, our conscious experience correlates with the notion of individual, since it is present almost all the time, but I don’t see any proof of causality, since one can happen without the other. — Skalidris
Perception is causality. -
Wayfarer
22.5kThere is no conceptual space for the role of the subject in that method
— Wayfarer
Saying this is ignoring philosophy of sciences. — Skalidris
Not at all, I am perfectly familiar with philosophy of science. See the following.
"Consciousness" is an empirical problem yet to be solved (i.e. testably explained) — 180 Proof
Do you think that could be done from some perspective outside of consciousness?
An explanation comprises explanans and explanandum. The explanandum is what it is that is to be explained, and the explanans that which provides the explanation. So in the case of consciousness, as any act of explanation is a conscious act, how could the one capacity, i.e. consciousness, provide both the explanans and explanandum?
When we try to explain consciousness, it becomes the subject of our inquiry—the explanandum. We're asking, "What is consciousness?" or "How does consciousness arise?" These are questions about the nature, origin, and mechanisms of consciousness. But any act of explanation, including the explanation of consciousness, is a conscious act. This means that consciousness is also a part of the explanans. When we articulate a theory or a model to explain consciousness, we are doing so using our conscious understanding, reasoning, and cognitive faculties. That immediately puts the question of the nature of consciousness in a different category to objective phenomena. We cannot step outside of our conscious experience to examine it in the same way we can step outside of a physical process or event. We are always 'within' our own consciousness, making it challenging to analyze it as an external, independent entity. It is like the hand, which is perfectly capable of grasping an object, trying to grasp itself. That is specific to this enquiry. -
Pantagruel
3.4kEdit. It seems I got it all confused with this:
"One critique of the dictum, first suggested by Pierre Gassendi, is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking"!" — mentos987
Yes, "thought is occurring now" is the valid inference. I agree with this interpretation. -
180 Proof
15.3k
I'm a p-naturalist¹ and thereby speculatively assume that aspects of nature are only explained within – immanently to – nature itself by using other aspects of nature, which includes "consciousness" as an attribute of at least one natural species. Atomic structures, genomic evoluntion and human brains, for instance, are each scientifically studied publicly, or "from outside any one conscious perspective", within the horizon – limits – of culture (e.g. ordinary / narrative & formal languages) that is, again, an attribute of at least one natural species. IMO, Wayfarer, whatever else (individual) "consciousness" may be, it seems to function as a lower-information phenomena always situated within higher-information systems of culture which likewise is always conditioned by the unbounded-information 'strange-looping, fractal-like' structure of nature that I compare analogously to 1-d lines imbedded on surfaces of 2-d planes imbedded in 3-d objects / an N-d manifold, etc.Do you think that could be done from some perspective outside of consciousness? — Wayfarer
¹Whatever else reality might consist in, nature is the only aspect of reality with which we natural beings, who are inseparable from – encompassed by – nature and therefore constrained by our natural capabilities, or attributes, can only finitely observe and thereby asymptotically explain nature itself. (re: Epicurus, Spinoza, Peirce-Dewey, Zapffe-Camus, D. Parfit, P. Foot et al) -
Lionino
2.7kNo. — 180 Proof
What is an example of something non-empirical and natural? And by empirical I mean something that can be observed, not something that has been or is observed now — I believe you share this definition.
So in the case of consciousness, as any act of explanation is a conscious act, how could the one capacity, i.e. consciousness, provide both the explanans and explanandum? — Wayfarer
I agree with this doubt. For me consciousness explaining itself is like a computer simulating itself — not fully doable. And by consciousness I mean subjective experience, which even many physicalist philosophers admit to be an issue for their worldivew, I don't mean a biological or cognitive phenomenon. -
Gnomon
3.8k
Maybe we can get closer to plausible answers to such enigmas. Folk wisdom has equated Mind with Energy for centuries, and that notion is often the basis of Magical thinking. However, there is now some scientific evidence to suggest that Consciousness is not a material substance, but an energetic process*1. Yet Energy itself is not made of Matter, but is a primordial-essential-causal form of existence that can transform into Matter (E=MC^2), and Mind. So, the Hard Problem of Consciousness may be related to the equally mysterious nature of Energy itself*1b.Even if, as you suggest, some waveform of energy is responsible for consciousness, a natural question arises: why does that energy produce consciousness, while some other energy does not produce consciousness? — NotAristotle
In any knowledge that we create, we can always generate new "why" questions that we aren't able to answer, this isn't specific to consciousness. — Skalidris
In my Enformationism thesis, I equate both Energy & Mind with an even more general & fundamental process in the world : EnFormAction, which is merely a novel spelling of "Information"*2. We typically associate information (power to enform) with Knowledge, or computer Data, but it's also the causal agent of human culture that can put a man on the moon --- not by magic, but by collective communal Intention (mind power to imagine and to execute a plan of action). Unfortunately, the procedural steps by which Information produces Energy, which produces Consciousness, remains a "how" question for Science, and a "why" question for Philosophy. :nerd:
*1. Mind Energy :
a> Is the mind made up of energy?
Yes, there would be no conscious experience without the brain, but experience cannot be reduced to the brain's actions. The mind is energy, and it generates energy through thinking, feeling, and choosing. ___Caroline Leaf, Ph.D., Communication Pathologist and Neuroscientist
https://www.mindbodygreen.com/articles/difference-between-mind-and-brain-neuroscientist
b> Consciousness as a Physical Process Caused by the Organization of Energy in the Brain
Recent neuroscientific evidence can be interpreted in a way that suggests consciousness is a product of the organization of energetic activity in the brain. The nature of energy itself, though, remains largely mysterious, and we do not fully understand how it contributes to brain function or consciousness
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02091/full
c> Consciousness as a Form of Energy
An electromagnetic field is a type of material reality, and so is consciousness. Alternatively, consciousness is one form of energy, along with kinetic energy or electrical energy. If this hypothesis is true, then consciousness is material after all—though not in the Cartesian sense.
https://academic.oup.com/book/1758/chapter-abstract/141408450?redirectedFrom=fulltext
*2. What is Information? :
Linguistically and grammatically the word information is a noun but in actuality it is a process and hence is like a verb. . . .
What is the role of information in the propagation of life? What is the relationship of information to energy and entropy? What is the relationship of information to science?
___by Robert K Logan, physicist
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Gnomon
3.8k
That is an astute question : why does a particular physical waveform transform into metaphysical (meaningful) awareness? It's easy to imagine that Consciousness is a process caused by some form of Energy. But what specific form (or waveform) causes Awareness instead of Light or Heat or Motion or Gravity? I don't know the answer to that query, but it seems to be a good direction for scientific investigation. One clue to the puzzle of Personal Experience may be that both Consciousness and Energy are special forms of non-specific Generic Information (the power to change form ; to transform ; energy?). And in human experience, Information is also Meaning, Significance, Relevance to Self.Even if, as you suggest, some waveform of energy is responsible for consciousness, a natural question arises: why does that energy produce consciousness, while some other energy does not produce consciousness? — NotAristotle
So, if we picture a waveform of Light (for instance), it may function like Morse Code (max-min instead of dot-dash). For a computer analogy, consider the maximum & minimum intensity to be equivalent to a digital code : On & Off, or light & dark, or Positive & Negative, or 1 & 0. With that metaphor in mind, we can imagine that a ray of light is transmitting a message of some kind. If so, then our visual sensing (receiving) apparatus can interpret the quantitative signal as the qualitative experience of Redness. This presumes that evolution equipped the brain with a table of numerical codes & their nominal/symbolic meanings. The physical-to-mental Interpreter is often imagined as a homunculus, but it might be simply a probabilistic computing*1 device with genetic memory*2 trained by eons of evolutionary events (experience?).
Having established Color as one kind of meaning to a Mind, we can carry the metaphor on to greater levels of information complexity, which the brain mechanism can compute-interpret as qualities of experience and properties of the material world. Hence, our senses are like the receiving end of a morse code transmission, and the mental images or impressions are the self-relevant interpretations of that abstract code. The translation may be merely a physical Phase Transition, whose meaning is Metaphysical knowledge. I'm just riffing on a philosophical theme here, and will leave the science to those more qualified. :nerd:
*1. Probabilistic Computing :
an emerging discipline integrating probabilistic programming and generative AI into the building blocks of software and hardware, and using computer science concepts to scale up computations involving uncertain knowledge.
https://medium.com/digital-architecture-lab/what-is-probabilistic-computing-and-how-does-it-work-1efea7d780c9
*2. Genetic memory :
In psychology, genetic memory is a theorized phenomenon in which certain kinds of memories could be inherited, being present at birth in the absence of any associated sensory experience, and that such memories could be incorporated into the genome over long spans of time. ___Wikipedia
LIGHT OSCILLATIONS MAX-MIN = ON-OFF = LIGHT-DARK = 100%-0%
LIGHT OSCILLATIONS AS CODE
MIND IS THE TRANSLATOR OF WAVEFORM CODES
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Philosophim
2.6kAppreciate the tag. I read it with interest, just nothing further to add to the matter. :)
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jkop
905The translation may be merely a physical Phase Transition, whose meaning is Metaphysical knowledge. — Gnomon
Direct (naive) realism? Perhaps depending on how we use the words 'code' or 'translation' or 'transition'. In any case it is not the process of seeing that one sees but the objects that emit or reflect visible light. -
Gnomon
3.8k
No, informed realism*1. I was merely comparing the Hard Problem --- of how the experiential quality of Consciousness could "abruptly" emerge from the physical properties of Energy or Matter --- to a well-known, yet still mysterious, transformation in Physics.The translation may be merely a physical Phase Transition, whose meaning is Metaphysical knowledge. — Gnomon
Direct (naive) realism? Perhaps depending on how we use the words 'code' or 'translation' or 'transition'. In any case it is not the process of seeing that one sees but the objects that emit or reflect visible light. — jkop
The experience of seeing is indeed a process of translation of light energy into mental imagery. But scientists still can't explain that transformation in physical terms, because Conception is supervenient (metaphysical*2) upon the physics of sense Perception. Yet we can understand it philosophically by analogy to "mysterious" Phase Transitions*3 in physics. The before & after states are well known, but the intermediate steps remain obscure, despite centuries of attempts to construct an empirical explanation. :smile:
*1. Naïve realism :
In social psychology, naïve realism is the human tendency to believe that we see the world around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must be uninformed, irrational, or biased.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism_(psychology)
*2. Metaphysical :
Derived from the Greek meta ta physika ("after the things of nature"); referring to an idea, doctrine, or posited reality outside of human sense perception.
https://www.pbs.org/ . . ./gengloss/metaph-body.html
Note --- The "posited reality" is what I call mental Ideality, not supernatural Spirituality.
*3. Mysterious Phase Transition :
Phase transitions, such as ice melting or turning graphite into diamond under intense pressure, are common phenomena. They are abrupt, qualitative changes in the properties of a substance and usually occur when a physical system approaches a specific critical temperature. Many physicists believe that phase transitions happened in the first moments after the Big Bang, when all matter in the universe was an extremely hot and dense plasma. . . . . The physics of these primordial phase transitions go beyond the Standard Model of elementary particles.
https://www.advancedsciencenews.com/footprints-of-phase-transitions-in-the-early-universe/ -
jkop
905the intermediate steps remain obscure, despite centuries of attempts to construct an empirical explanation. :smile: — Gnomon
Granted that little is known of the brain's mechanics, but the seeming obscurity regarding experiential quality is perhaps not so empirical.
As soon as we assume that one never sees things directly but only one's own representation of things (interpreted by the brain etc), then we have a relation between representations and things, and it is primarily this mysterious relation and its supposedly unknown mechanics that has remained obscure for centuries.
One might suspect that its true explanation is not empirical but conceptual. Hence my previous reference to direct realism (the philosophy of perception, recall, not social psychology).
According to direct realism, there is no representation in the brain, because we sense things and their qualities directly. The process in the brain is what constitutes the sensing, and what is sensed are the things and their qualities.
When I see a colour, for instance, the process may evoke something that I can identify (reflexively) as the experiential quality of seeing that colour. So, I see the colour, which in turn has a physiological effect that I can identify as a quality in seeing that colour. Not unlike pinching my arm and feeling its effect. Depending on my sensitivity, previous exposure, habit and so on one and the same pinch can be experienced somewhat differently at different occasions.
How the nerve signals transform to my conscious experience might still be a great challenge for empirical sciences, but it seems less mysterious if we ditch the assumption that the experience is a representation, or model, or translation etc. -
Gnomon
3.8k
Sorry, my previous post was based on the definition of "Direct (naive) Realism" in Wikipedia. Apparently, your definition is more like "Indirect (representational) Realism"*1.Granted that little is known of the brain's mechanics, but the seeming obscurity regarding experiential quality is perhaps not so empirical. . . . One might suspect that its true explanation is not empirical but conceptual. Hence my previous reference to direct realism (the philosophy of perception, recall, not social psychology). — jkop
Actually, modern neuroscience has amassed a lot of data about the "brain's mechanics", but the gap between neural Mechanics and mental Experience remains enigmatic. So, perhaps you are correct that the solution to the puzzle is not Empirical, but Philosophical. In the last century, we have learned from Quantum science that the foundations of physical reality are not classically mechanical & certain, but statistical & uncertain : hence, Probabilistic. Since probability is somewhat chaotic, it can confuse logical thinking. Which is why Bayesian Statistics*2a was developed, in order to work around the unpredictablity of non-mechanical systems --- including social systems. Bayes' methods begin with predictive Concepts (beliefs) based on incomplete information, then adjust that subjective credence as more objective data becomes available.
The brain is basically an organic machine for making predictions from current evidence. Like a computer, It works with stored memories, and extrapolates past events into the future. But objective neurons have no Beliefs about those prophesies ; that's the function of the subjective Mind. And Beliefs are basically automatic probability assessments. Unlike a mechanical system, the belief system of the mind can be internally contradictory. Which is why a more deliberate & rational adjustment*2b was deemed necessary to upgrade subjective beliefs into more objective assessments of likelihood. That's also why Quantum theory is not directly objectively Empirical, and requires some statistical manipulations to get Closer to "Truth" --- to the "participatory realism" of rational/emotional humans. :smile:
*1. Indirect Realism :
In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences; out of the metaphysical question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by our conscious experience.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism
*2. Quantum Bayesianism :
a> In QBism, all quantum states are representations of personal probabilities. This interpretation is distinguished by its use of a subjective Bayesian account of probabilities to understand the quantum mechanical Born rule as a normative addition to good decision-making. . . . .
b> For this reason, some philosophers of science have deemed QBism a form of anti-realism. The originators of the interpretation disagree with this characterization, proposing instead that the theory more properly aligns with a kind of realism they call "participatory realism", wherein reality consists of more than can be captured by any putative third-person account of it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_Bayesianism
On Participatory Realism :
Physics is about the impersonal laws of nature; the "I" never makes an appearance in it. Since the advent of quantum theory, however, there has always been a nagging pressure to insert a first-person perspective into the heart of physics. In incarnations of lesser or greater strength, one may consider the "Copenhagen" views of Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli,the observer-participator view of John Wheeler, the informational interpretation of Anton Zeilinger and Caslav Brukner, the relational interpretation of Carlo Rovelli, and, most radically, the QBism of N. David Mermin, Ruediger Schack, and the present author, as acceding to the pressure. These views have lately been termed "participatory realism" to emphasize that rather than relinquishing the idea of reality (as they are often accused of), they are saying that reality is more than any third-person perspective can capture. Thus, far from instances of instrumentalism or antirealism, these views of quantum theory should be regarded as attempts to make a deep statement about the nature of reality. This paper explicates the idea for the case of QBism. As well, it highlights the influence of John Wheeler's "law without law" on QBism's formulation.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.04360 -
NotAristotle
384Thanks for your comments. I've had somewhat of a shift in perspective the last couple days. I now think the question you cited -- why is this energy conscious -- may not be the most productive. It would be like asking, why are coyotes alive, but rocks are not? The fact is, coyotes are alive and rocks are not. So the answer both for consciousness and living organisms, in my opinion, has to do with the biological history to which both belong. On that understanding, we needn't postulate anything extra or in addition to the physical.
Is that a fair reply or is there something about the question (or your answer) that I am missing? -
Gnomon
3.8k
Are you giving-up on philosophy? Are you no longer interested in "why" questions about Purpose? Will biological histories, speculating into cosmic eons past, satisfy your mild curiosity about impractical questions of "Life, the Universe and Everything"? If that is the case, my proposal for a scientific "how" answer, about mechanisms, may produce too much information for you. But, I don't claim to have THE answer, merely a path to a solution for age-old mysteries of living & thinking matter. Do you know of a settled physical answer to those questions?↪Gnomon
Thanks for your comments. I've had somewhat of a shift in perspective the last couple days. I now think the question you cited --why is this energy conscious -- may not be the most productive. It would be like asking, why are coyotes alive, but rocks are not? The fact is, coyotes are alive and rocks are not. So the answer both for consciousness and living organisms, in my opinion, has to do with the biological history to which both belong. On that understanding, we needn't postulate anything extra or in addition to the physical. — NotAristotle
This thread is about Mind questions, but Life questions are similar. Life & Mind are observed facts, still waiting for a How or Why explanation. The science of Biology has lots of hypothetical scenarios about how living creatures evolved from non-living matter, but no consensus answer to "how/why is a coyote alive, but rocks are not". Various Abiogenesis*1 theories about warm pools have been postulated, but life-in-a-vat experiments have never produced any living matter. Some modern biologists admit that spontaneous generation of life was disproven long ago by Pasteur. So, they propose stories about Exo-biology, wherein life on Earth was seeded by organisms on crashing comets. But the look-over-there ploy doesn't answer either of the Origin (genesis) questions. To date, there is no empirical evidence of Life emerging from non-life*2. So, instead of trying to answer such vexing questions, most biologists & psychologists today simply take Life & Mind for granted : "it is what it is". Is that what you are recommending? Do you think evading those questions is scientifically or philosophically productive?
This thread raises questions about the scientific history and philosophical status of Consciousness. Physics is focused primarily on Energy & Causation, not Life or Mind. Do you expect physicists to answer those questions "without postulating anything extra"? My Energy-based proposal above suggested an approach that might be able to show how it could conceivably be possible to derive Life & Mind from Energy --- if you take Energy as a given. The only "extra" is the concept of an integrated wholistic state, that is currently being studied under the heading of Systems & Complexity Theories. It also points toward a Why answer to the Purpose of Life & Mind in a mechanical-material world. But I won't get into that on this thread. :smile:
*1. Abiogenesis :
Charles Darwin once theorized that the origin of life — known as abiogenesis — could have happened as precursor compounds came together in "warm little ponds."
https://www.businessinsider.com/life-origin-abiogenesis-warm-pools-darwin-2017-10
*2. How close is science to achieving artificial abiogenesis in the lab?
Abiogenesis is not a theory. It is a fact that some theory must explain. There was a time when earth had no life, and then a time when there was life. That is a fact disputed by nobody: Something caused life to exist where it had not previously existed. The question that gets so much attention is whether that something must have been supernatural. Typically, “abiogenesis” is the preferred label for any explanation that does not presuppose supernatural causation. There are several under consideration, but none is sufficiently supported to have achieved consensus.
https://www.quora.com/How-close-is-science-to-achieving-artificial-abiogenesis-in-the-lab -
Lionino
2.7k"One critique of the dictum, first suggested by Pierre Gassendi, is that it presupposes that there is an "I" which must be doing the thinking. According to this line of criticism, the most that Descartes was entitled to say was that "thinking is occurring", not that "I am thinking"!" — mentos987
Russel also raises a similar criticism.
And another poster here on TPF raises it here too, which I answer here. -
mentos987
160
Interesting read and I do not disagree, but I do have a nitpick. If I converse with you, I will differentiate between us by thinking in terms of "I" and "you". In your reasoning, I belive you describe an alternative where both "you" and "I" have the same source, same thinker (like a dreaming god with a split mind). If one would assume this, one would also have to move away from the definition of "you" and "I" that I used earlier.
The "I" has lost some meaning. That is why I still think that the "I" does not belong in "I think, therefore I am" even though I agree with your reasoning.
The word "I" has been bent to fit.
Or like this: When everything is I, nothing is. -
Lionino
2.7kIn your reasoning, I belive you describe an alternative where both "you" and "I" have the same source, same thinker (like a dreaming god with a split mind) — mentos987
I don't say it in those terms, but you could put it that way.
I have to go back to the text written in my language and go over it once again, there are some things missing and pieces not connected. Then I will be able to translate it properly to English. I will come back to this thread once that is done.
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