why is it the things that by nature must necessarily be the closest to us, most intimately connected to us, the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see? How is it I could be a mind that cannot know what a mind really is? — Fire Ologist

Excellent question. Isn't it because it is too near to us to grasp? Focus requires some distance, you can't see something pressed right against your eye, although that analogy also fails, because whatever is pressed is still something other to you, a foreign object of some kind.

I'm inclined to the view that the self is both unknown and unknowable. And that what we think of as the self, mainly comprises those things and circumstances to which we are attached and that we identify with. And a lot of what we cling to as self, is precisely to avoid the unknowability of the self, by identifying with something habitual and familiar.

If that sounds Buddhist, it is, not that I write as a Buddhist but as someone who has committed some time to studying the topic. There's a specific book: Early Buddhism, the I of the Beholder, Sue Hamilton-Blyth (and note the similarity with the thread title). This explicates this analysis in great detail (although it's a hard book to get and quite expensive).

But overall, I think you're on the right track, and asking the right questions.

Which leads to a clear formulation of my question: why is it the things that by nature must necessarily be the closest to us, most intimately connected to us, the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see? — Fire Ologist

Because most of the light we see reflected by our bodies is reflected off surfaces like skin, hair, etc. The enormous complexity of what goes on in our brains is pretty well hidden.

How is it I could be a mind that cannot know what a mind really is? — Fire Ologist

Via biological evolution that selects for propagation of genes rather than insight. Which is not to say that there isn't much that can be learned.

How is it I could be a mind that cannot know what a mind really is? — Fire Ologist

It seems to me that just as an eye does not appear within its own visual field, a hand cannot grasp itself, and willing does not will what it wills ... "mind" is necessarily transparent to itself in order to mind – attend to – nonmind (which includes, among all other ideas, also the idea of "mind"); thus, "being a mind" is functionally perspectival.

Maybe I do not have the right tools yet. A possibility, that mind has yet to be measured and weighed. But I wonder, could it be because these things are not there – there is no individuated thing being me, in me, or in mind, that one would distinguish from the brain that is seeking something distinct? I was satisfied when I saw my eyeball seeing that there is body. Why do I still not confirm the shape of the soul such as "I' when it is I seeking this soul? — Fire Ologist

These are all fairly standard questions/observations which occur to many at some point in their lives. My question is a respectful, so what? What are you hoping to find and how does this nebulous introspection differ to smoking weed and postulating infinities?

As humans we can generate endless, different types of questions and be struck by the ineffable. Who are we really? What is mind? No doubt there are endless ways in which such enquiries can be posited and answered. Are you looking for an answer that will change how you see yourself and how you live?

What you are describing is the inevitable result of having an enquiring mind.
Enquiring minds have contemplated this conundrum for millennia and what they came up with are scientific, religious, philosophical and mystical explanations.

Presumably you have already read much of the literature and are enquiring a bit deeper. So what in particular are you looking for an answer to?

….the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see…. — Fire Ologist

We as conscious thinking subjects, do not seem to operate in terms of the very natural law by which we understand the operation of all natural real things. The brain operates according to natural law, but none of the terms of it are present in our direct, first-person, unmediated thinking. We can never understand how the self-conscious thinking subject arises, by the same means by which we understand all other natural events, so perhaps a better question is….why does it seem like there is such a thing at all?

The account for the seemingly self-conscious thinking subject is the jurisdiction of metaphysics, at least this far into human evolution, even if for no other reason that science proper is not yet sufficiently equipped for it, which is the same as saying the scientist presently has no sufficient method for how to proceed.

All that being said, I reject that the things that must be us are the hardest to see. I rather hold the view, that for which the negation, for all practical intents and purposes, is impossible, one had best figure out how to see it, in order to get the best and most out of it. Hence the assemblage of the plethora of abstract ways, means and ends into manufactured speculative explanatory devices, none of which are real in the strictest sense but the denial of which is absurd. Still, it helps, to be “… sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.…”

It still seems impossible, or better put, an absurd possibility, for me to imagine I could prove to myself that myself is not there, but then again, I began this wondering in the first place, and I still have no idea what a “myself” actually is.

It is no wonder I know so little of the world; I can’t even see my face in a mirror, and further, I can’t see my face in a mirror even while it is appearing the mirror itself is me — Fire Ologist

Have you read any Wittgenstein, particularly his later work? He tried to show how the kinds of questions you’re asking result from confusions caused by how our language is grammatically structured around the subject-predicate relation. This linguistic heritage straitjackets the way we think about meaning into boxes, generalities and abstractions like assuming the mind as some kind of container, the existence of a thing as an inert property , and factual knowledge as divorced from the context of interactions in which we use that knowledge and make it relevant and intelligible. In other words, your puzzlement comes less from the way the world is than the presumptions you are tacitly relying on in posing your questions. Start by asking yourself , not what something means in itself, but what you are trying to do with it.

:up: :up:

I realized another way to put these nebulous thoughts. You know when your sunglasses are on your head, and you are running out the door, gathering your keys, found your wallet, and dammit, you can't find your sunglasses. And you are looking everywhere, check the car, back upstairs, until you realize they are right there on your head. Isn't that what we are doing when we ask what a mind is? We just haven't had the epiphany yet.

...what we think of as the self, mainly comprises those things and circumstances to which we are attached and that we identify with. — Wayfarer

This sounds a bit like "consciousness is consciousness of" which is Sartre. I always liked that. I am conscious of a cat, so the cat in a consciousness can also be called me being conscious of a cat, or just summed up as a particular moment of me, of self. Self is consciousness of...whatever. But why not be conscious of my own particular consciousness? Consciousness of the cat is not the same thing as the cat. I actually am conscious of my own particular consciousness, but at the same time, I have no real object in mind when my object is mind. As you said, the self may be unknowable.

It seems to me that just as an eye does not appear within its own visual field, a hand cannot grasp itself, and willing does not will what it wills ... "mind" is necessarily transparent to itself in order to mind – attend to – nonmind (which includes, among all other ideas, also the idea of "mind"); thus, "being a mind" is functionally perspectival. — 180 Proof

Mind can't see itself when it is busy minding something, like an eyeball can't see itself. And a bit like the mind is pre-occupied with it being consciousness of, and not just consciousness. All seems true. But at the same time, eyeballs can be seen. Hands can be grasped (just not by themselves). Unless we are saying that there is no such thing as mind, or there is no such thing as consciousness. We are thinking of a particular state of affairs when we point out "consciousness". Yet, in a sense, I keep finding that I am saying there is no such thing as an objective "mind" when I am minding my own mind. Or minding my own minding. Is there nothing there anymore, or was there nothing there in the first place? All that said, mind as a perspectival function seems important. I have to think about that.

What are you hoping to find and how does this nebulous introspection differ to smoking weed and postulating infinities? — Tom Storm

I might have been smoking a little weed when I wrote this. What do you mean by introspection? If we could really define what introspection is, we would have to include a firm demonstration of the being who is introspecting, and that is what I am hoping to find, or more like, interested in here.

So what in particular are you looking for an answer to? — Punshhh

It's a fair question. Goes right along with Tom's use of the word nebulous. I don't know. Am I body and soul, material mixed with the immaterial, or am I just a body? But I'm really just making the observation that, if in fact I am a soul, I am currently a soul that has no idea whether souls exist, as I use my soul to wonder about it, which is ironic, I think.

We as conscious thinking subjects, do not seem to operate in terms of the very natural law by which we understand the operation of all natural real things. — Mww

That is interesting. Our very presence is like a contradiction in the regular flow of things.

The brain operates according to natural law, but none of the terms of it are present in our direct, first-person, unmediated thinking. We can never understand how the self-conscious thinking subject arises, by the same means by which we understand all other natural events, so perhaps a better question is….why does it seem like there is such a thing at all? — Mww

Why does it seem like there is a self-conscious thinking subject arising? One answer is, this very exchange of ideas makes it seem like subjects in-themselves exist, but honestly, I don't know! Here, I'm wondering how stupid I would feel if not only does it in fact arise, but it arises right there with me when I ask if it is there, but still I don't know!

The account for the seemingly self-conscious thinking subject ... science proper is not yet sufficiently equipped for it, which is the same as saying the scientist presently has no sufficient method for how to proceed. — Mww

I noted that where I said that maybe we don't have the right tools yet to measure and weigh this "self". I just have no patience for the science on this one, because we can't even seem to get started: right now, it looks like the scientist can't identify an object to study, even though the object is that same scientist.

All that being said, I reject that the things that must be us are the hardest to see. I rather hold the view, that for which the negation, for all practical intents and purposes, is impossible, one had best figure out how to see it, in order to get the best and most out of it. — Mww

I'm with you here. That's why I posted this in the first place. Soul = that for which the negation is impossible. Now, on to the next question, what does this soul smell like.

Have you read any Wittgenstein, particularly his later work? He tried to show how the kinds of questions you’re asking result from confusions caused by how our language is grammatically structured around the subject-predicate relation. This linguistic heritage straitjackets the way we think about meaning into boxes, generalities and abstractions like assuming the mind as some kind of container, the existence of a thing as an inert property , and factual knowledge as divorced from the context of interactions in which we use that knowledge and make it relevant and intelligible. In other words, your puzzlement comes less from the way the world is than the presumptions you are tacitly relying on in posing your questions. Start by asking yourself , not what something means in itself, but what you are trying to do with it. — Joshs

I have read Wittgenstein. I think Wittgenstein would agree with me that it is hard to say whether anything I took from him is what he meant. I agree that language and logic are just as much chains as the senses are chains, and the things we seek to understand, are just as foreign to the words we use to express them as things in themselves are to the senses.

What if the self is the linguistic heritage? This question is as confused as any other, but then, we are trying to communicate and only have words, our linguistic heritage, to do so. And that is where my "question" lives - only a mind can make any sense of these words at all. I would agree that maybe I don't know the language to properly ask myself "what are you?" (already this sentence is absurd) but I do not agree that because I don't know the language, I can't even conceive my question. Whether I can express it or not, something is being straight-jacketed; therefore, there is something beyond the words. I disagree that meaning is simply use. Use ties meaning to the words, but it does not tie the words back to anything else, and I don't agree that meaning is merely use.

But I should re-read Wittgenstein, and I appreciate that. I do believe that there are subjects/objects that language and logic can't contain or penetrate, or at least that language is not best suited to. I don't believe that those objects, therefore, do not exist.

This sounds a bit like "consciousness is consciousness of" which is Sartre. I always liked that. I am conscious of a cat, so the cat in a consciousness can also be called me being conscious of a cat, or just summed up as a particular moment of me, of self. — Fire Ologist

There is a logical equivocation in what consciousness is when implicitly stipulating that one’s (consciousness’s) being conscious of the cat is equivalent to the (percept of) the cat being an aspect of one’s consciousness. The first is consciousness in the sense of “that which is conscious of”; the second is consciousness in the sense of “all of which a conscious being, aka consciousness, is conscious of”.

For example, when affirming, “a memory brought into consciousness,” or else, “a conscious memory (rather than an unconscious memory),” one will implicitly stipulate the just mentioned second sense of “consciousness”. But when affirming, “I am conscious of memory X,” one will be implicitly stipulating the first just mentioned sense of “consciousness”. A conscious memory will hence never be a memory which in and of itself as memory holds awareness of other (the first sense of “consciousness”) but will instead always be a memory which one as conscious being is conscious of (the second sense of consciousness).

If interested, I clarify this distinction in the following chapter of my ongoing work: Chapter 12: Volition’s Basic Determinants, Part I—Intentions (specifically, section 12.2). But, so its known, I do make use of several newly coined terms—many of which were introduced in previous chapters—so as to be able to adequately demarcate that which is being addressed.

My main point being, the “I” (or else "self" when thus interpreted) addressed in the thread cannot (or at least should not) then be consciousness in the second sense of “all that a conscious being is conscious of”. It can (or should) only be consciousness in the first sense of “that which is of itself aware”—be this an awareness of its very own self as that which is aware (e.g., I am (aware/conscious of being) content and intrigued as that first-person point of view which is aware/conscious and is thereby aware/conscious of other, such as of a memory) or else be this an awareness of other than itself (e.g., I am aware/conscious of a memory regarding what happened to me a week past—this memory being other relative to me as that which is aware/conscious of the memory).

why is it the things that by nature must necessarily be the closest to us, most intimately connected to us, the things that must be us, are the hardest things to see? — Fire Ologist

we are force-fed the realness of sense perceptions.

What if the self is the linguistic heritage? This question is as confused as any other, but then, we are trying to communicate and only have words, our linguistic heritage, to do so. And that is where my "question" lives - only a mind can make any sense of these words at all. I would agree that maybe I don't know the language to properly ask myself "what are you?" (already this sentence is absurd) but I do not agree that because I don't know the language, I can't even conceive my question. Whether I can express it or not, something is being straight-jacketed; therefore, there is something beyond the words. I disagree that meaning is simply use. Use ties meaning to the words, but it does not tie the words back to anything else, and I don't agree that meaning is merely use.

There is a heritage of mystical traditions which address this and have developed schools of thought for enquiring minds to explore the issues. It goes beyond philosophy in the strict sense in that it relies on religious, or theological traditions, which are adopted as a framework on which to construct one’s enquiry.

It goes beyond philosophy in the strict sense in that it relies on religious, or theological traditions, which are adopted as a framework on which to construct one’s enquiry. — Punshhh

Or is it that they (these mystical schools) have profound philosophical roots, only to have been reconstructed as religious, by the so called religious? What influence did the gods have on Socrates? Christ on Hegel or even Heidegger?

Or, even if the chronology is backward, and what started as religion, evolved into profound philosophy; why should that discourage serious philosophical enquiry?

Either way, it's possible that Western Philosophy "proper" (with some exceptions) only avoids these schools because of prejudice concerning connections with religion. And that, to the former's detriment.

In spite of our desire to the contrary, Philosophy is not some universal, pre-human absolute. Just as Philosophy defines everything else, it defines itself. Why should it necessarily be restricted by the walls it constructs? Or, to get to the pith and substance of your statement, which I am taking the liberty of (mis)interpreting, why shouldn't philosophy explore the mystical? Does it really restrict itself to Truth? Or is Truth necessarily arrived at through reason?

Philosophy is not some universal, pre-human absolute. Just as Philosophy defines everything else, it defines itself. Why should it necessarily be restricted by the walls it constructs? — ENOAH

I agree with the general direction you're taking, but we cannot remove walls without revealing new ones.

Walls are the ground we walk on, and the sentences we write. Philosophy seeks the absolute, constructs it, makes of itself the universal, and, as everything we construct is, it is restricted by the walls it constructs. That's how things move. Motion moves the fixed, and from the fixed, motion begins again. There are always both. Philosophy holds these things for us. There are very few of them to hold.

why shouldn't philosophy explore the mystical? Does it really restrict itself to Truth? Or is Truth necessarily arrived at through reason? — ENOAH

I agree philosophy should explore the mystical. In my experience, there is mystical experience, as much as there are true experiences. We do math, so we have to admit truth. We know the paradox, the impossible that is actual, the sublime, so we know what the mystical is. So the mystical is truth too. The mystical is arrived at through reason just as much as truth. The mystical is as true as reason. Reason is as mystical as Truth, now with a capital "T" to sound a monastic gong that might remind us of its invisible presence.

So what in particular are you looking for an answer to? — Punshhh

I wasn't really looking for an answer. If someone told me what a mind is then I wouldn't be making the observation I made, but the answer to the underlying question of "what is my mind?" is such a difficult nut to crack, instead I was just noticing a peculiarity about wondering what mind is.

I can only use the same mind that is wondering, to wonder what mind is.

So mind is fully there, but still I ask the question and wonder if I can see one distinct feature about "mind" that is there. And we have nothing.

While I am being the thing that is being wondered about, while I am wondering about the thing, I still don't even know if I am looking at anything, or have a clue how to construct any walls around it that might distinguish it as something real, something there, or just say what a mind is.

Do I dare say it is spirit? NO! Too easy, and means literally, nothing, no matter. If I say my mind is spirit, I must immediately ask "what is spirit?" and again I am being the thing that is wondering what is there.

Do I say matter? Sure, but matter is dark and deep, and thick and hides other matter, and more matter, until we isolate functions like consciousness and then maybe mind and "ideas" like "wondering about 'wondering'". I see nothing again that clarifies what matter is mind and what matter is not mind - where does mind begin and end, and where does other matter next to mind begin, specifically, in the matter? What matter carves out the matter that is the complete structure of mind? I might focus on the brain, but to find the instance of "wondering what a mind is" in this "mind" that is this brain... Maybe. But I am still forced to wonder and search.

Either way, spirit or brain function, this function of wondering what my mind is, can only result in the embarrassment of looking for my glasses while wearing them; nowhere in sight can I possibly appear, because in everything I look at, in the looking itself, I am already there, and still I wonder "what is there?"

I think we'll figure it out. But man, kind of embarrassing.

Either way, it's possible that Western Philosophy "proper" (with some exceptions) only avoids these schools because of prejudice concerning connections with religion. And that, to the former's detriment.

I have been struggling with this for years and have tried many times on this forum to make progress. But it always stalls and doesn’t even get started. There are eastern philosophies which work, but the fact that they start from the assumption of God, gods, deity, Western philosophy just doesn’t go there, or reduces it to some peculiarity of the human mind. Essentially dismissing it. Theology does go there, but seems to disappear up its own derrière once the Catholic apologists get to work. It accepts mysticism and that mysticism can be a real pursuit, but doesn’t really get past the enthralled saints like St Francis for example.

I would be happy to lay out the obstacles, some insurmountable in terms of philosophy that I have encountered.

(Not just now, I have to go to work shortly)

So mind is fully there, but still I ask the question and wonder if I can see one distinct feature about "mind" that is there. And we have nothing.

Mysticism does address this and go beyond this insurmountable barrier. But academically the teaching is spread across a broad span of disparate and unrelated sources. The main religions each have mystical schools and traditions. There all pretty much say the same thing, so a study of these is worthwhile and identifying the similarities is a good way of finding one’s own way through without being drawn into one school’s anachronistic practices.

As far as I have found only one school has developed a system of practice which introduces one on to the mystical path. Hinduism, via yoga teachings. Personally I use the Hindu scriptures of Patanjalli as interpreted by Alice Bailey in the book The Light of The Soul**. I have found that each mystic searches for teaching or texts until they find the one that works for them.

There is no one definitive teaching, or truth on this. But in reality it is a process of personal self discovery.

**I can link to the book later. You can access it for free as a PDF file, along with all the Alice Bailey publications.(you would be jumping in at the deep end, I would be happy to help out)

There are eastern philosophies which work, but the fact that they start from the assumption of God, gods, deity, Western philosophy just doesn’t go there, or reduces it to some peculiarity of the human mind. — Punshhh

Let's be fair to Mahayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta. The former, no god. Tge latter, no more religious a god than Hegel, or arguably, Heidegger.

Have a good day at work.

That’s why I said Deity.

Sorry:up:

No worries. How many gods, or deities are there on the head of a pin.

Dumplings!

How many gods, or deities are there on the head of a pin. — Punshhh

My late night answer: This will in large part depend on whether these incorporeal beings are zero dimensional; and to a far lesser extent, on the size of the pin ... of course.

:razz:

The obstacles I found when presenting mysticism to philosophers could be delineated into three categories;

1, It is a mythology, or fairytale, with no logical basis, there is no starting point from which to philosophically test it. Some of the people who level this criticism are idealists. They are stuck in ideas that necessitate a logical foundation.

2, It doesn’t have any basis in the physical world. It’s magical thinking about imaginary beings, in an imaginary world, who never turn up in the physical world. To the people who level this criticism, there is only a physical world.

3, It proposes the transfiguration of the self, this necessarily includes the subjugation of the mind, in favour a soul, or spirit, or something which is not in the physical world. To the people who level this criticism, the mind is everything, we are logical minds and there is nothing else.

An infinite number of omnipresent gods, perhaps.

You might find R. Scott Bakker's "On Alien Philosophy," to be an interesting read. He speculates in how these same issues would likely crop up for all sentient species.

https://www.academia.edu/31152366/On_Alien_Philosophy

He also has one more focused on the causes of these issues. I don't really buy the thesis all the way but it's an interesting paper:

https://www.academia.edu/1502945/The_Last_Magic_Show_A_Blind_Brain_Theory_of_the_Appearance_of_Consciousness



William Harmless' "Mystics" is hands down the best overall coverage of this I've found. After framing the initial question of "what is mysticism?" and point out flaws in James's "peak experience" focused study, he begins on a number of in-depth case studies. IIRC, he does Thomas Merton, Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, Saint Hildegard, Saint Bonaventure, Meister Eckhart, Evargrius Pontus, Rumi, and Dogen. So, weighted towards the West, but also including Sufism and Zen. Where Harmless shines is in his seamless blending of exposition, background, and long, skillful excerpts that let the authors speak in their own words. He also has a really great book on Saint Augustine and one of the Desert Fathers. I do wish Mystics included some Hindu thinkers but I think that's outside Harmless' comfort zone.

For the esoteric tradition, the Cambridge Handbook of Western Mysticism and Esoterica is a real light in the darkness for a field where a lot of the "histories" and "studies" lack rigor and are more interested in grounding their own ideas in "tradition." That's a bit drier though.

I find this area interesting, but it's a hard area to find good sources on because you get perrenialists who want to flatten everything down in accordance with their own agenda, or esotericists who want to use (and abuse) texts for their own purposes. "Light From Light" is another good anthology but it's all Christian and it isn't quite as good as Harmless.

Maybe the "walk through" mysticism from Western Philosophy is being done "backwards."

Maybe the approach could be to reflect on the concepts of import (to a given individual) from the western perspective (since same is unavoidable, like thinking in English is to me), and then, from there, find the parallels in Eastern traditions.

One eg., upon my own reflections, I come across the problem of Mind and conclude, on my own, from within my western narrative, that Mind might not have any corresponding Being, or Reality, "driving", "grounding" or "behind" it, and that it might just be structured by empty signifiers. Comparing that to eastern philosophies, I find the principle of Sunyata (emptiness of Reality). While I believe that the Mahayanists might have gone too far, and that Sunyata applies only to the constructed reality of human experience, yet still, there is a workable parallel.

We are all humans, East and West, drawing upon the same nascent constructions input into all of us, and developed collectively throughout the generations. It wasn't just Schopenhaur who first incorporated the East into Western philosophy. I may not be best suited to demonstrate this, but I feel it is not unreasonable for an historian of philosophy to find what is traditionally thought of as eastern patterns weaved through western thought and vice versa, since the presocratics, and likely much earlier.

Your "obstacles" 1 to 3, (which I know you are exposing and not endorsing) are ways in which we "deliberately" construct barriers out of prejudice. For instance,
1. "test" it? arguably the east has a better test, doing, i.e. yoga and meditation. If mind's conclusions are admittedly questionable (hence, phenomenology), what better test than to silence mind?
(I am not prepared to endorse meditation as any certain test, just saying we could open ourselves to that if we are seriously pursuing Truth and not just fetishizing it and or its pursuit)
2. "physical world?" arguably sitting in meditation for the purposes of silencing the chatter and perceiving the world through the Body for a change, is exactly approaching reality through the physical world. What is more empirical than what your body tells you without interference of concepts?
3. "subjugation of mind to soul?" Firstly, that is the problem I see with western metaphysics in the traditions of Plato, Descartes, Hegel etc. Moreover, Mahayana blatantly denies the "soul." The subjugation part, the so called goal to reach Satori/Kensho or Moksa, is intended to liberate you from the mundane chattering of the Subject Self. Descartes tried to do the same but got stuck in the chattering and gave privileged status to the Subject Self, I (see Heidegger's ontic, everyday vs ontological Being, which I think, he ultimately remains in the ontic everyday, but that's another discussion). And so on...

Thanks for the suggestions, Harmless looks interesting I’ll give it a look.

We each cast our net depending on our place and time and come up with different sources. For me it was a mixture of the more orthodox Theosophy and the far out new age movement in the 90’s.

Maybe the approach could be to reflect on the concepts of import (to a given individual) from the western perspective (since same is unavoidable, like thinking in English is to me), and then, from there, find the parallels in Eastern traditions.

Yes, this is something I’ve tried to do on occasion. There have been attempts to introduce eastern ideas to the West from the pioneering work of HP Blavatsky in the 1890’s followed by numerous Theosophers in the early twentieth century, followed by the hippy movement in 1960’s. Then the New Age movement in the 1980’s and 90’s. With the steady spread of Buddhism throughout the West during the 20th Century. Which now has a world wide reach. This combined with migration of people from east to west and west to east is bringing about the integration of eastern and western philosophies in societies.
It seems to be in academic circles that there is a catch up required.

One eg., upon my own reflections, I come across the problem of Mind and conclude, on my own, from within my western narrative, that Mind might not have any corresponding Being, or Reality, "driving", "grounding" or "behind" it, and that it might just be structured by empty signifiers. Comparing that to eastern philosophies, I find the principle of Sunyata (emptiness of Reality). While I believe that the Mahayanists might have gone too far, and that Sunyata applies only to the constructed reality of human experience, yet still, there is a workable parallel.

Yes an interesting parallel. The Western academic tradition seems to be stuck on a circle, or wheel of logic, like samsara from which it cannot escape and which is abstracted from the real world.

We are all humans, East and West, drawing upon the same nascent constructions input into all of us, and developed collectively throughout the generations. It wasn't just Schopenhaur who first incorporated the East into Western philosophy. I may not be best suited to demonstrate this, but I feel it is not unreasonable for an historian of philosophy to find what is traditionally thought of as eastern patterns weaved through western thought and vice versa, since the presocratics, and likely much earlier.

Yes, I would expect there to be a lineage stretching back over the millennia derived from sources further east. In a sense the Western tradition is a recent, more modern metricated system of thought based on the reductionism of Aristotle. While leaving behind the more reflective philosophies. Perhaps it is time for thinkers to walk backwards and pick up from where they left off.

Your "obstacles" 1 to 3, (which I know you are exposing and not endorsing) are ways in which we "deliberately" construct barriers out of prejudice.

Yes, it is the curse of materialism.

1. "test" it? arguably the east has a better test, doing, i.e. yoga and meditation. If mind's conclusions are admittedly questionable (hence, phenomenology), what better test than to silence mind?

I was thinking more of a test within academic circles. There is no way to anchor the theory of a “spiritual realm” into philosophy. There is the theological tradition as I mentioned, but this seems to have been disregarded. Philosophy is happy to talk about the spiritual, or the divine. But it is increasingly seen as nothing more than a hypothetical, a flight of fancy. (Although I would accept that there is a creeping sense of something else to reality, but which is undefined.)

2. "physical world?" arguably sitting in meditation for the purposes of silencing the chatter and perceiving the world through the Body for a change, is exactly approaching reality through the physical world. What is more empirical than what your body tells you without interference of concepts?

Yes, very much so. A module dedicated to being a being, absent the mind. The acceptance that a being isn’t just a mind, there are other layers, realities, experiences, more immediate, more real than thoughts.

3. "subjugation of mind to soul?"

Forgive my Theosophical terminology. What I am referring to is the notion that a being can become a pure still being absent the mind. When the mind is banished, the being has not been banished, the being is still present. The word “soul” has a lot of baggage, a better word might be something like Atman, the atmic, or something.

Firstly, that is the problem I see with western metaphysics in the traditions of Plato, Descartes, Hegel etc. Moreover, Mahayana blatantly denies the "soul." The subjugation part, the so called goal to reach Satori/Kensho or Moksa, is intended to liberate you from the mundane chattering of the Subject Self. Descartes tried to do the same but got stuck in the chattering and gave privileged status to the Subject Self, I (see Heidegger's ontic, everyday vs ontological Being, which I think, he ultimately remains in the ontic everyday, but that's another discussion).

Yes, they were already stuck on the wheel of mind by that point.