1. There is no valid logical inference there.

2. It seems to me that if we want to speak accurately, it would be more realistic to talk about mental events and neurological events, rather than talking about states.

3. Ancient people didn't have the opportunity, to become much better informed, that is available to us now. So what do ancient people have to do with the subject?

1. There is no valid logical inference there. — wonderer1

Mental states are not identical to brain states. If they were, ancient peoples would have been coherently talking about brain states when they talked about mental states, but ancient peoples had almost no idea what the brain did. The Greeks thought it cooled the blood. Yet they could intelligently converse about their mental states.

2. It seems to me that if we want to speak accurately, it would be more realistic to talk about mental events and neurological events, rather than talking about states. — wonderer1

The same problem arises: ancient peoples could converse intelligently about mental events, but the idea of them conversing intelligently about neurological events is absurd.

3. Ancient people didn't have the opportunity, to become much better informed, that is available to us now. So what do ancient people have to do with the subject? — wonderer1

It doesn't have to be ancient people. Picture two children stranded on a desert island with no education talking coherently about how they feel (i.e., their mental states). Are they talking coherently about brain states or neurological events? No.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states. (a=b)
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states. (M)
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states. (¬B)
5. Therefore, mental states are not identical to brain states (a=b ↔ (M↔B), but ¬B so a≠b).

Or,
1. Mental states are identical to brain states. (a=b)
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states. (M)
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states. (¬B)
5. Therefore, ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their mental states. (a=b ↔ (M↔B), but ¬B so ¬M, a=b is not challenged)

P1. (a=b)↔(M↔B)
P2. ¬B
C. ¬M∨¬(a=b)
P1 and P2 do not entail ¬M, neither does it entail ¬(a=b), but that ¬M∨¬(a=b)

Do you understand that humans can become less wrong over a period of time? As a result of, among other things, paying attention to what we can be learned about the world we live in.

5. Therefore, ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their mental states. — Lionino

This is wrong. Ancient peoples talked incessantly (and coherently) about their mental states. Just as people do today.

This is wrong. Ancient peoples talked incessantly (and coherently) about their mental states. — RogueAI

Begging the question.

Just as people do today. — RogueAI

Which is why psychology is so successful? :sweat:

This is wrong. Ancient peoples talked incessantly (and coherently) about their mental states.
— RogueAI

Begging the question. — Lionino

Are you claiming that ancient peoples could not talk coherently about their mental states? Or that there's some doubt they were able to? I think I'm on pretty solid ground asserting that ancient peoples knew full well what a person was talking about when they said "I miss my dead wife" or "There's just been a battle with the Gauls, I'm worried about my son".

You think that is question begging?

I think I'm on pretty solid ground asserting that ancient peoples knew full well what a person was talking about when they said "I miss my dead wife" or "There's just been a battle with the Gauls, I'm worried about my son". — RogueAI

If "full", "know", and "about" mean what I think they do, which are their conventional meanings in English, you would have a solution for the problem of other minds, but you don't, right?



If mental states and brain states are no different, either the ancients were talking coherently about mental states and brain states or they were talking coherently about neither.

Picture two children stranded on a desert island with no education talking coherently about how they feel (i.e., their mental states). Are they talking coherently about brain states or neurological events? No. — RogueAI

For reductive materialism, yes, because saying "I have pain" is the same as saying "I have neurons of type X firing stimulus of type Y". So they would be talking coherently about both.
For eliminative materialism, they would not be talking coherently about brain states because they are not saying "I have neurons of type X firing stimulus of type Y". The eliminative materialism would have to go with that the ancients were not talking coherently about mental states, because there is no such thing as mental states, only brain states — talk of MSs would be a confusion or something of the sorts.

The argument makes it sound like you haven't taken into account ancient people's ignorance.

Sound is waves of compressed air. Ancient people currently talked about sounds without talking about compressed air. Therefore sound isn't waves of compressed air?

No, I don't think this holds.

The argument makes it sound like you haven't taken into account ancient people's ignorance.

Sound is waves of compressed air. Ancient people currently talked about sounds without talking about compressed air. Therefore sound isn't waves of compressed air?

No, I don't think this holds. — flannel jesus

I think there's an equivocation here. Noises are compression waves in the air, sure. But words and conversations and spoken language are not the same thing as vibrations travelling through the air. Words and conversations convey meaning, which transcends their physical properties. Spoken language can possibly be physically reduced to sound waves, but my argument is not about mental states being reduced to physical states. It's attacking the notion that mental states are identical to brain states.

Do you think conversations are identical to sound waves moving through the air? Or is there something more going on?

If "full", "know", and "about" mean what I think they do, which are their conventional meanings in English, you would have a solution for the problem of other minds, but you don't, right? — Lionino

This is absurd. There's nothing about having to solve the problem of other minds asserting that ancient peoples talked meaningfully to each other about how they felt. Of course they did! What could be more obvious? I talk all the time to my wife about how she's feeling and vice-verse. Do you think that necessarily leads to the problem of other minds? I don't think we need to bother with that kind of radical skepticism to evaluate my argument.

but my argument is not about mental states being reduced to physical states. It's attacking the notion that mental states are identical to brain states. — RogueAI

I don't see the distinction

but my argument is not about mental states being reduced to physical states. It's attacking the notion that mental states are identical to brain states.
— RogueAI

I don't see the distinction — flannel jesus

Maybe there's not. But lets explore this a little bit. Do you think a definition of pain is complete if it doesn't talk about the fact that pain hurts? That is feels bad? Suppose aliens send us a completely exhaustive physical account of how pain works in their bodies. Would we be satisfied with that? Wouldn't we also want to know how their alien pain feels?

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states. — RogueAI

Inference is invalid. Talk of Superman is not the same as talk of Clark Kent.

Talk of Superman is not the same as talk of Clark Kent. — fdrake

The two have the same extensional definition, so there's a sense in which talk of one is talk of the other.

3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states.
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states.
5. Therefore, mental states are not identical to brain states. — RogueAI

I think it works in the vein of the conceivability of a distinction. The stakes are just about who has the burden of proof regarding reduction.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states.
4. Ancient peoples did not coherently talk about their brain states. — RogueAI

How about:

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states.
3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states.
4. Therefore, ancient peoples coherently talked about their brain states.

4. Therefore, ancient peoples coherently talked about their brain states. — Leontiskos

They just didn't know they were talking about brain activity.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_neuroscience:

Already in the 4th century BC, Aristotle thought that the heart was the seat of intelligence, while the brain was a cooling mechanism for the blood. He reasoned that humans are more rational than the beasts because, among other reasons, they have a larger brain to cool their hot-bloodedness.

The two have the same extensional definition, so there's a sense in which talk of one is talk of the other. — frank

Yes.

3. Ancient peoples coherently talked about their mental states. — RogueAI

Which 'ancient peoples' in particular, and in which texts? A pretty strong argument can be made that many ancient myths and fables can be understood as allegorical descriptions of mental states, told by peoples who had very limited ability for conscious introspection as we understand it. Consider as an example Julian Jaynes theory of the bicameral mind, proposed in his 1976 book "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind." He suggests that ancient humans operated in a state where cognitive functions were divided between two parts of the brain, which he termed the "bicameral" mind. One part of the brain "spoke" as though a god or superior authority, and the other part listened and obeyed. This mental framework, he argues, allowed early humans to navigate their social and environmental worlds without the kind of introspective consciousness that characterizes modern human thought.

There's a related stream of thought, that connect mythological stories and characters with aspects of the unconscious mind. Jung introduced the concept of the collective unconscious, a shared level of unconsciousness across humans that is populated by archetypes—universal, mythic characters and themes that reside within the psyche of all people. He believed that myths and dreams are expressions of these archetypes and serve as a way for the unconscious to communicate with the conscious mind.

James Hillman, building on Jung's work, developed the concept of archetypal psychology. Hillman suggested that myths and dreams are not just expressions of the inner psyche but also have their own autonomy. He argued that mythological stories and characters reflect deep structures of the psyche that play a crucial role in the shaping of human life and culture. For Hillman, these mythological images are not merely symbolic but are essential constituents of psychological reality, influencing how we see the world, ourselves, and our experiences.

None of which has much to do with 'brain states' but that might be part of the point.

How do you know ancient people talked coherently about their mental states? Did they think in terms of mental states at all? Do you have any textual examples that support the claim that they did think in these kinds of terms?

I searched a little and found this which seems to contradict your thesis.

This is absurd — RogueAI

Is it? How do you know something is feeling the same thing as what you think of as "rage" when they say they feel rage? Because their behaviour matches yours when you feel rage? Surely you see how that is not enough.

There's nothing about having to solve the problem of other minds asserting that ancient peoples talked meaningfully to each other about how they felt. Of course they did! What could be more obvious? — RogueAI

I am replying to your «that ancient peoples knew full well what a person was talking about when they said "I miss my dead wife"». They did not know full well, as the problem I put above shows. Therefore they were not talking coherently about mental states in this case.

For the two basic branches of materialism, both refute your argument by rejecting premise 3 or premise 4.

I think that while all of those things are interesting questions, they have no bearing on the argument you made about ancient people. Ancient people not knowing how brains work shouldn't be any kind of signal that brains don't do the things we suppose they do - ignorance of ancient people isn't an argument for anything.

1. Mental states are identical to brain states.
2. From (1), talk of mental states is the same as talk of brain states. — RogueAI

This is certainly not correct. if we had the capability, I could write down the state of every aspect of my brain over a period of four seconds from a few minutes ago, at whatever level you want. Every single particle, or neuron, or structure, or any combination, or whatever. Among other things, I thought of a joke during those four seconds. Are you going to laugh when you look at all that code? Maybe it wasn't funny. Let's try the four seconds from about a minute later. Are you laughing now? Well, I'm not a professional comedian. Maybe that explains it.

You're assuming the joke was funny.

But in all seriousness, this isn't necessarily a solid rebuttal of the idea that mental states emerge from brain states, and are supervenient in relation to them.

Think of a song that makes you feel strongly. Now, go and look at a file that contains all of the data for the amplitues and frequencies of all the sounds in the song. Is looking at that data going to make you feel the way the song itself is going to make you feel? No. BUT the data does include all the necessary information to replay the entire song, which if you did that, would make you feel those things.

The full information of your brain state would be enough to recreate a brain with your thoughts, but it doesn't mean *looking at the data for those brain states* is going to give you an inherent and intuitive understanding of what those brain states correspond to in terms of mind-states, or what thoughts you would have, in the same way looking at the data of an mp3 file doesn't give you an inherent and intuitive understanding of what it's like to listen to the song.

And fundamentally, our human ignorance of how brain states produce mind states shouldln't be considered proof that brain states do not produce mind states. We're ignorant of a lot of things, not knowing how things work doesn't mean things don't work.

I wasn't disagreeing with the idea that brain states produce mind states. I'm disagreeing with the idea that brain states and minds states are the same thing.

Is "your chair" and "all the atoms that make up your chair, in that exact arrangement" the same thing? Are brain states and mind states different things in the same way that your chair is different from the complete arrangement of all the atoms that make up your chair?

It feels to me like calling them "different" Vs "the same" might be a semantic disagreement.

I suppose there's a small difference in analogy there, in that the mind-state has a sense of multiple-realizability in a way the chair does not.

You might be able to create the exact same mind state using an entirely different arrangement of matter, whereas you might not be able to create the exact same chair using an entirely different arrangement of matter.

↪Patterner Is "your chair" and "all the atoms that make up your chair, in that exact arrangement" the same thing? — flannel jesus

Yes.

Are brain states and mind states different things in the same way that your chair is different from the complete arrangement of all the atoms that make up your chair? — flannel jesus

Not sure if you intended that wording and I'm just reading it wrong. But no, atoms > chair and brain states > mind states are not analogous. For a couple reasons.

1) An analogy would be atoms > chair and atoms > brain state.

2) As you say, different arrangements of atoms can bring about the same mind state. That means something else is involved, not just arrangements of atoms.

2) As you say, different arrangements of atoms can bring about the same mind state. That means something else is involved, not just arrangements of atoms. — Patterner

It means there is a layer of abstraction involved, where multiple physically realizable states correspond to the same layer of abstraction.

2 very different computers are capable of implementing the same algorithm, even if they have very different ways of encoding the instructions for that algorithm and different arrangements of logic gates (think a 32 bit computer vs a 64 bit computer). Is the brain-state situation possibly analogous to this? It seems so to me.