Discussion on interpreting Aquinas' Third Way

NotAristotle

The issue may be stated in this manner: Aquinas' 3rd Way, as written, may require interpretation. That is to say, Aquinas' Third Way may not appear to be a satisfying argument without interpreting it.

Here is part of the argument for reference:

"The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now, if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary."

(Fradd, Delfino "Does God Exist" Chapter 6).

An objection to Aquinas' argument, in my opinion, is that, while there could have been a time when nothing was in existence, there also could have been "possible beings" in existence at all times. In that case, the absurdity that Aquinas is suggesting need not occur. In other words, there is nothing absurd about all beings being "merely possible" beings. And in other words there need not be a necessary being.

Here is an interpretation of Aquinas that I came up with (I think it resolves the objection stated above) --

From our perspective, there are things existing. From the perspective of us "now" those things must exist; there existence is necessary. Therefore, it is false that it is possible for the things that exist "now" to not exist (as they would if everything ceased to exist at the time of "now" or earlier). Since the things existing in nature now are merely possible beings, the necessity of their existence must derive from another, that is, from a necessary being.

What do you think? How do you interpret Aquinas' argument? I am interested to hear from both critics as well as supporters of Aquinas' Third Way argument.

Tom Storm

What do you think? How do you interpret Aquinas' argument? I am interested to hear from both critics as well as supporters of Aquinas' Third Way argument. — NotAristotle

Is it not just the argument from contingency? There are threads on this argument here. Something from nothing.

I have never found it convincing (along with his other four ways). But it is one of the prominent classical arguments for theism and David Bentley Hart - a progressive Christian thinker and philosopher, writes to this very well.

We have no way of knowing if there was ever nothing. We are not even able to provide an example (for obvious reasons) of nothing even being the case. Might there not alwasy have been something - even before our particular singularity? How do we know that the universe isn't eternal? (If you look it up, some interpretations of quantum cosmology, particularly those based on theories like loop quantum gravity or certain interpretations of quantum mechanics, propose that the universe has no distinct beginning or end. Instead, time might be cyclical or have no boundary, allowing for an eternal existence.)

Our own localized experince points to contingency, but we do not have all the information. We have no way of investigating this matter except through speculative theory of a highly specialized nature. So no real role for the average person here.

But even if we accept that there was once nothing and now something - this does not get us to a necessary being or god. Certainly not a particular god of a particular contrived human religion. We get causation but to move from this to a being which made a choice to create a universe sounds to me like an anthropomorphism of reality.

The people who accept this argument on Aquinas' terms tend to already believe in god and those who reject it tend to already think of god as fictive and of no explanatory power. For me this points to the general impotence of classical arguments for or against god.

Johnnie

Bonevac provides a nice interpretation here
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x3xQwFIUJ80
And Koons formalized it here: https://robkoons.net/the-rigorous-thomist/the-third-way-a-new-interpretation
Basically they claim it's a mistranslation to attribute to Aquinas an obviously fallacious: "if all things could not exist sometimes, sometimes they all don't exist". It's a matter of Latin adverbs that "sometimes" also means "in some case", or "it's possible that". So a better translation would sound like "If for all things it's possible they don't exist, it's possible they all don't exist which is an obvious tautology in most predicate modal logics. So the argument is modal in nature and it's a classic contingency argument. Idk about its metaphysical background and my Professor for example thinks it's not even thomistic, it's Avicennian, Thomas just uses it as an example of philosophical ways to God like most of the five ways. It's not a proof he himself would pur forward since he views existnce as an act of essence, not an accident of essence. In my Prof's view the argument requires a reification of possible essences which Aquinas wouldn't endorse.

Imo it's pretty straightforward and establishes the existence of a necessary being, but like in all modal logics, the meaning of possible and necessary is very vague. It's harder to prove the unicity, goodness, personhood of a necessary being. Assumptions behind contingency arguments are generally poorly understood. What do they quantify over? Do they take temporal structure into account? Do we need bimodal temporal logic to distinguish the sences of possibility? How do I distinguish possible and necessary objects?

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪NotAristotle

Is the idea here that necessity needs to be imparted by something else that is necessary?

But consider the case of being dead (as opposed to simply not living). If something is dead, it was necessarily alive at some point, regardless of if that thing's existence was contingent. Or consider Greg, whose death was contingent, an accident. It is necessarily the case that Greg, being dead, is not alive.

Likewise, my being in a room alone might be contingent, but if I am in the room alone I am necessarily the tallest person in the room.

Wayfarer

An objection to Aquinas' argument, in my opinion, is that, while there could have been a time when nothing was in existence, there also could have been "possible beings" in existence at all times. — NotAristotle

But not by the logic of the argument. In other words, you're simply asserting that Aquinas' reasoning is wrong. In order to show why it is wrong, you would have to establish that there can be an infinite sequence of contingent causes, without an initial uncaused cause to ground them. Simply asserting that 'there could have been' doesn't amount to an argument against it.

NotAristotle

↪Tom Storm

Thanks for the reference to David Hart re: the contingency argument. I will look it up.

Am I understanding you to say that a contingency argument proves causation, but that it may only prove, at most, an infinity of contingent causes? If so, what would you say to one who objects to infinite contingents on the grounds that none of the members of that infinite would possess the existence necessary to pass along existence causally? Unless I have misunderstood you..

NotAristotle

↪Johnnie

Yeah, I am somewhat confused about the distinction between necessary and possible. From my perspective, everything in the past and present are necessary. But at some point in the past they would have been merely possible as they did not yet exist, and projecting into the future may at some point cease to exist. Does that make everything a fusion of necessity and possibility? It's difficult to make sense of.

NotAristotle

↪Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the question. The point is notsomuch that necessity must be derivative, but that where it cannot be self-imputed (as in this case a possible being by definition cannot of itself be necessary), then necessity must be imputed by another, a necessary being. If one possesses tallness and is the only person in the room, then I would say the necessity of their being tallest is something they can "self-impute." The individual has the necessity by virtue of what they are in that case.

NotAristotle

↪Wayfarer

My point here is that, at face value without interpretation, Aquinas' argument doesn't actually say anything. Sure there could have been nothing now, but if there could have been something now, even if everything was contingent, then what work is Aquinas' argument doing?

Wayfarer

↪NotAristotle

So why bring it up?

NotAristotle

↪Wayfarer

1. Because I might be wrong. 2. I want to hear others' interpretations.

Wayfarer

↪NotAristotle

I removed it. But I was vexed by the fact that after you introduce the topic you then declare that it doesn't say anything, i.e. that it's meaningless. It gives me the impression that you don't understand the point of the argument, so I'm asking, if you think it's a pointless argument, then why go to the trouble of starting a thread about it?

NotAristotle

Because 1. I've been giving it a lot of thought the past few days 2. I wanted to have a philosophical discussion 3. I wanted to hear what others thought about it 4. I want to learn and develop my views and understanding. I don't have all the answers believe it or not Wayfarer. And I don't think the argument is pointless but, like I said, I do think it requires some sort of interpretation. But thanks for calling me out on my posts because it gave me the opportunity to reflect on them.

Wayfarer

↪NotAristotle

That's OK, and sorry for my outburst. But Aquinas' arguments are exceedingly difficult, in their own way - and I'm not saying that as any kind of expert, either. I've only read parts of the Summae and various articles about Aquinas, but this metaphysical argument rings true to me (for reasons I can't really put my finger on.)

Let's go back a few steps. Your paragraph beginning 'An objection to Aquinas' argument....' is not, as I said, an objection. Aquinas argues that if every being were contingent (i.e., could either exist or not exist), there must have been a time when nothing existed, because contingent beings are not the necessary cause of their existence. If nothing existed at some point in time, nothing would exist now, since something cannot come from nothing without a cause. Therefore, the existence of contingent beings today implies the existence of a necessary being that initiated the chain of existence. (Note that this is very similar to, and probably built around, Aristotle's argument for the First Cause in Metaphysics.)

Simply asserting "there could have been 'possible beings' in existence at all times" does not effectively counter Aquinas's argument, because you have not provided a logical alternative to the necessity of a first, uncaused cause. To effectively challenge Aquinas's Third Way, you would need to demonstrate logically - rather than simply assert - how an infinite regression of contingent causes could exist without a prime mover or uncaused cause, or to provide an alternative explanation.

NotAristotle

↪Wayfarer

No need to apologize Wayfarer. Thanks for your comment. The argument you just stated is a good one, convincing to me. My concern is that Aquinas does not say "there must have been a time when nothing existed." He says "there Could have been a time when nothing existed." That, in a nutshell is the issue I take with the argument as well as the reason I suggest it needs interpretation. At the same time, I think Aquinas is a really smart dude, so I'm like "what am I missing about his argument?"

Wayfarer

At the same time, I think Aquinas is a really smart dude, so I'm like "what am I missing about his argument?" — NotAristotle

Does he say 'there could have been a time when nothing existed?' or are you imputing that to him. The argument, as you've provided, and which is a fair paraphrase, doesn't claim that.

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.

He's simply observing that all things 'found in nature' are temporally de-limited, i.e. they have a beginning and an end in time. They don't exist 'by necessity' but only as a matter of contingency. He goes on:

Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now, if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.

I concede, the 'at one time there could have been....' might be speculative. But something to consider is that, if the Universe had existed eternally, and everything in it has a finite lifespan, then again, nothing would exist now, as everything that could have existed, would have already perished, as the amount of time involved is infinite, and no addition of finite durations can add up to an infinite sequence of time. (This is not stated explicitly in the argument, but it is part of the background to the family of arguments).

(You might also peruse this essay, which provides some more background on Aquinas' interpretation of creation.)

//ps// - there's a remark at the end of the Third Way, "Now it is impossible to go on to
infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes" - I belive that reference to 'has already been proved' is to another of the arguments. //

Tom Storm

Does he say 'there could have been a time when nothing existed?' or are you imputing that to him. The argument, as you've provided, and which is a fair paraphrase, doesn't claim that.

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.

He's simply observing that all things 'found in nature' are temporally de-limited, i.e. they have a beginning and an end in time. They don't exist 'by necessity' but only as a matter of contingency. He goes on:

Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now, if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. — Wayfarer

That's interesting. It would be good to get this right since my limited understanding has always been the contingency argument and Third Way presupposes nothing existed until the unmoved mover engaged in creation. If god is the creator and sustainer of our reality then it must be that case that before creation, before existance and causality, there was nothing but god.

Wayfarer

f god is the creator and sustainer of our reality then it must be that case that before creation, before existance and causality, there was nothing but god. — Tom Storm

(I'm bracketing this response as I don't want to derail the conversation about the OP. The popular image of God as a kind of cosmic director or literal sky-father is deeply entrenched in culture and is typically the target of athiest polemics. But it's telling that David Bentley Hart, whom you mentioned, is generally dismissive of theistic populism and personalism and its representations in such movements as intelligent design and creationism. The crucial and difficult thing to understand, is the sense in which God is not any thing. The 'nothing' that is at the ground of 'creation from nothing', is not 'before the big bang' in a temporal sense, but a fecund field which appears to us as nothing because of not being situated or existent in time or space. But it is nevertheless that (not that there is a 'that') from which everything emanates and to which everything returns. 'When (Augustine) cries out in the midst of his vision of the divine nature, “Is truth nothing just because it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite?” he is acknowledging that it is the discovery of intelligible truth that first frees him to comprehend incorporeal reality.' (The Divine Nature: Being and Goodness, Scott McDonald, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine.) It is not a 'that' or a 'this' of any kind, certainly not a 'divine engineer' or the deistic 'first cause' who kick-starts a process but then lets it run on its own accord (which is where so many atheist polemics, and theistic apologetics, are far off base). My intuition about Aquinas is that at the end of his career, when he fell into an ecstatic state and declared 'compared with that I have seen, all I have written seems as straw', it was because of direct realisation of that reality. In Aquinas this is naturally interpreted through the prism of Christian faith, but there are comparable realisations of the 'divine no-thing' in the philosophy of Plotinus and even the śūnyatā of Buddhism - which is not to say they're "all the same" as the subject matter is beyond comparison.)

Kizzy

(I'm bracketing this response as I don't want to derail the conversation about the OP. — Wayfarer

avoiding derailing again??? NOW i see.

↪Wayfarer

Sorry...I see that it is actually my bad when I replied to you abruptly here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/887904. I apologize for my comment to you earlier, in "on the matter of epistemology and ontology" thread...i didnt realize you are just being courteous. I will slow my roll now. I'm sorry for the blind sided comments, I am learning!

Enough for now. Thanks, kizzy

NotAristotle

But something to consider is that, if the Universe had existed eternally, and everything in it has a finite lifespan, then again, nothing would exist now, as everything that could have existed, would have already perished, as the amount of time involved is infinite, and no addition of finite durations can add up to an infinite sequence of time. (This is not stated explicitly in the argument, but it is part of the background to the family of arguments). — Wayfarer

I see, yeah, the argument does make more sense with that background in mind. Still, the argument would be easier to follow had he said, "by necessity, everything must not exist at some time if everything were contingent" or something like that.

Count Timothy von Icarus

↪Wayfarer

:up:

↪Tom Storm

If god is the creator and sustainer of our reality then it must be that case that before creation, before existance and causality, there was nothing but god.

In a way, it seems like there is always sort of nothing but God. I think. Aquinas is tricky on this point. God is present to all things and gives them their being, and this is not a sort of making or production, but more a participation.

Creation is not the sort of making that is properly speaking a change, but is rather a certain receiving of being. Hence it need have no essential relation except to the giver of being, and in this way it is not ‘out of’ non-being, except insofar as it is after non-being, as night is ‘out of’ day.”

Tom Storm

(I'm bracketing this response as I don't want to derail the conversation about the OP. The popular image of God as a kind of cosmic director or literal sky-father is deeply entrenched in culture and is typically the target of athiest polemics. — Wayfarer

Thanks for this and nicely put. I am aware of this more sophisticated account of god and probably first encountered this through Tillich.

My point when I said -

-

If god is the creator and sustainer of our reality then it must be that case that before creation, before existence and causality, there was nothing but god. — Tom Storm

- was simply trying to enter the sprit of the argument as generally presented, as understood by Aquinas and others who use the argument from contingency. But perhaps Aquinas changed his view as he became older? The sky father version, which transcends atheist polemics, does remain popular and I would imagine is in the minds of the vast majority of believers. But I get your broader point.

My intuition about Aquinas is that at the end of his career, when he fell into an ecstatic state and declared 'compared with that I have seen, all I have written seems as straw', it was because of direct realisation of that reality. — Wayfarer

I wonder if this Aquinas would have found his Five Ways lacking.

Wayfarer

↪Tom Storm

The meaning of Aquinas ceasing from writing is conjecture but it has parallels in other religious traditions.

Tom Storm

↪Wayfarer

?

Wayfarer

↪Tom Storm

Sorry about that, got caught by an editing glitch. I was only going to add that the image of 'our father in heaven' is ubiquitous in ancient religions, as I think I've said before, the name 'Jupiter' is an adaption of the proto Indo-European 'dyaus-pitar', which means 'sky-father'. (A 'pagan' deity but nevertheless what many have in mind.) But then for a great part of its history, Biblical religion was addressed to illiterate agrarian and farming communities, and had to be presented through myth and allegories that this audience would understand. It's anachronistic in our post-industrial technocratic culture. The mystical stream within Christianity is somewhat detached from that, which is why the mystics often skirt with, or even are accussed of, heresy.

Metaphysician Undercover

From our perspective, there are things existing. From the perspective of us "now" those things must exist; there existence is necessary. Therefore, it is false that it is possible for the things that exist "now" to not exist (as they would if everything ceased to exist at the time of "now" or earlier). Since the things existing in nature now are merely possible beings, the necessity of their existence must derive from another, that is, from a necessary being. — NotAristotle

What we observe through empirical evidence, sensation, is activity, actual being. This proves that not all being is "possible being". So there is something absurd about the notion that all beings are possible beings. Understanding this requires understanding Aristotle's categories of potential and actual.

Tom Storm

But then for a great part of its history, Biblical religion was addressed to illiterate agrarian and farming communities, and had to be presented through myth and allegories that this audience would understand. It's anachronistic in our post-industrial technocratic culture. The mystical stream within Christianity is somewhat detached from that, which is why the mystics often skirt with, or even are accussed of, heresy. — Wayfarer

I wonder if there should be (if there isn't already) a thread on (dare I say it) alternative accounts of god which are not personal or anthropomorphic? Is your sense that most of these are likely to amount to versions of idealism - cosmic consciousness/eternal mind? Or even Leibniz's ultimate Monad idea of god?

Leontiskos

The issue may be stated in this manner: Aquinas' 3rd Way, as written, may require interpretation. — NotAristotle

There is a great deal of secondary literature looking at this argument. To start I would suggest Ed Feser's blog entries (first, second), and Jeff Speaks' close analysis of the argument (link).

Wayfarer

I wonder if there should be (if there isn't already) a thread on (dare I say it) alternative accounts of god which are not personal or anthropomorphic? — Tom Storm

Good idea, although on a secular forum, it's rather like tossing bits of bloodied meat into the Piranha River. ;-)

↪NotAristotle

In addition to Leontiskos' suggestions above, I found a rather good text-book excerpt on the topic, see here (.pdf).

Tom Storm

Good idea, although on a secular forum, it's rather like tossing bits of bloodied meat into the Piranha River. ;-) — Wayfarer

Yes, I was wondering about consequences too. But it might be good if in the OP we specify that this is not for secular polemics or atheist grenade throwing. As an atheist, I would appreciate a more nuanced awareness of the various notions of god in more accessible language. I found Paul Tillich very interesting back in the 1980's but I have forgotten most of what I read.

I've also often thought that some atheists and theists could form an 'alliance' around a more sophisticated understanding of god and take an assertive but respectful anti-fundamentalist position together. Bishop Shelby Spong did a good job of this a few decades ago. We really need Christians and Muslims to come out against this stuff, rather than just atheists. But that's another matter.

NotAristotle

↪Leontiskos

↪Wayfarer

↪Metaphysician Undercover

Leontiskos and Wayfarer, thanks for the links.

I read the link to Feser and found what he had to say helpful and interesting; it appears very similar to the background information Wayfarer articulated earlier.

Metaphysician Undercover, I have in mind by "possible being" something more like a "contingent being" rather than a being that is merely possible but not actual. Based on what I read, the reading of "possible" as meaning "contingent" that is "as what could have or could not have occurred/ existed" is consistent with Aquinas' use of the term "possible."

To summarize and condense, the argument I am suggesting as an interpretation of Aquinas' Third Way is as follows:

1. If everything is contingent, then it is possible for there to be nothing now.
2. But it is not possible for there to be nothing now.
3. Therefore it must be false that everything is contingent.
4. Therefore, there must be a necessary being.

To say a bit more, I think that Aquinas is not only rejecting that "there is nothing now." rather, he is in addition rejecting even the possibility that there is nothing now.

Thoughts?

Discussion on interpreting Aquinas' Third Way

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